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Reordering diplomatic theory for the twenty-first century: a tripartite approach.

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**Reordering diplomatic theory for the twenty-first century:
a tripartite approach**

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Submitted in total fulfillment of the requirements
of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

March 2006

To the best of my knowledge and belief the thesis entitled: **Reordering diplomatic theory for the twenty-first century: A tripartite approach**, represents my own work and contains no material which has been previously submitted for a degree or diploma at this University or any other institution, except where due acknowledgement is made.

Signature:

Date:

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Abstract

The central aim of this thesis is to deconstruct and reconstruct the dominant theoretical perceptions of diplomacy, by reworking radically existing theories of diplomacy. This thesis achieves reconceptualisation of diplomatic theory by critiquing the thoughts and ideas of theorists postulating on modern diplomacy. Consequently, this thesis is concerned (largely) with the theoretical terrain of diplomacy studies.

The purpose of this intended deconstruction and reconstruction is to introduce and construct three lucid types of diplomatic theory. These three types or categories introduced in this thesis are Traditional, Nascent and Innovative Diplomatic Theory. By categorising these three distinct types of theories, it is hoped that the diplomatic scholar will have a choice of lenses through which to interpret the complexities of the modern diplomatic environment. Ultimately, this thesis aims to strengthen Traditional Diplomatic Theory (TDT) and introduce/construct two alternate forms of diplomatic theory, Nascent Diplomatic Theory (NDT) and Innovative Diplomatic Theory (IDT).

To date, diplomatic theory as a specific topic has not been simply and rigorously explored. This thesis takes on this responsibility. No simple attempt has been made to establish what diplomatic theory actually *is* and if existing works on diplomatic theory remain relevant to the modern diplomacy. The notion of updating diplomatic theory, so that it remains applicable to the complex, modern diplomatic environment, is one central motivation of this thesis.

Two central arguments are prevalent throughout the thesis. Firstly, that diplomatic theory can be viewed as tripartite. This thesis argues that within the diplomatic studies literature three distinct forms of diplomatic theory can be evidenced. At first, these three

divergent theories appear to share an adversarial relationship, with each championing a vastly different impression of what constitutes the modern diplomatic environment. However, this thesis aims to consolidate, strengthen and reconcile each type of theory, with the purpose of confirming their complementary relationship. If a method of incorporating all three types of theories under the banner of diplomacy studies can be proposed then the diplomatic studies field will have a truly modern approach to diplomatic theory. This tripartite approach tells the whole modern diplomatic story, from both the state and non-state perspective. In addition, this approach accounts for the complexities of modern diplomacy, completes a frank stock-take of the diplomatic studies field and is aimed at ultimately strengthening diplomatic theory.

The second argument suggests that an innovative approach to theorising on diplomacy can yield substantial theoretical rewards. Tripartite diplomatic theory is one example of innovation. A second example is this thesis' assertion that there is a more compelling relationship to be realised between International Relations (IR) and diplomatic studies. This thesis demonstrates how an interdisciplinary approach can result in robust and enriched theories of diplomacy. The similarities between TDT and Realism, NDT and Idealism and IDT and Constructivism demonstrate the value of an interdisciplinary confluence. By broadening the field of enquiry to IR theory, this thesis argues for the coexistence of three alternate but complementary theories on diplomacy. Just as IR theory has room for several different types of theory so too does the discipline of diplomatic studies.

Preface

This thesis aims to deconstruct, strengthen and modernise diplomatic theory. To do so, means broadening the field of inquiry for diplomatic theory to incorporate non-state as well as state actors. Ultimately, this approach is aimed at enhancing understanding of the complex multi-actor nature of the modern diplomatic environment. Essentially, this approach suggests that ‘the concept of diplomacy can and must be reconstructed’.¹ Validating this approach means challenging dominant and enduring assumptions of existing diplomatic theory.

In order to distance itself from the dominant assumption of diplomatic theory – that diplomacy is a practice, primarily an exclusive activity between state actors – requires this thesis to introduce an innovative approach to theorising on diplomacy. In doing so this thesis does not intend to abandon ‘what we know’, instead it seeks to introduce a method that consolidates existing knowledge on diplomatic theory while incorporating alternate but equally valuable theories on diplomacy. This thesis argues that three different types of diplomatic theory can be evidenced within and constructed from the existing diplomatic studies literature. In all, three distinct categories of diplomatic theorists and theory are presented in chapters two, three and four: Traditional Diplomatic Theory; Nascent Diplomatic Theory; and Innovative Diplomatic Theory.

One reservation with categorising or branding various types of theorists is the danger of constraining scholars to a rigid classification. Hocking, for example, was wary of confining theorists to a ‘conceptual ghetto’.² However, imprisoning theorists is not the intention of this thesis. Categorising different opinions on diplomacy is intended to

¹ John Hoffman. (2003). Reconstructing Diplomacy. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 5 (4), p. 541.

² Correspondence with Brian Hocking. July 15th, 2005.

organise and distinguish various theories on diplomacy, which in turn allows an appraisal of strengths and weaknesses of these theories.

There are a number of benefits to placing, not confining, diplomatic theorists and theories into ‘rigid disciplinary pigeon holes’.³ For example, by constructing the three categories, different types of diplomatic theory can be better understood. Organising different types of theories is important in terms of clarity of academic focus within the diplomatic studies field. Of diplomatic theorists, ‘anyone of us who has attempted to give an honest answer to the question, “So what exactly is it that you do?”’ is unable to give a concise answer.⁴ Categorisation provides a concise and informative answer to this question by developing a better understanding of the respective produce of diplomatic theorists. In other words, this approach introduces order to the diplomatic studies field. With the diplomacy studies field enjoying a recent renaissance, the need to clarify respective theoretical focuses is greater than before.

Once respective diplomatic theories are categorised, each group can be appraised and their contribution to understanding the modern diplomatic environment recognised. Categorisation allows recognition of the merits, as well as the limitations, of each type of diplomatic theory. This approach can illustrate weaknesses in the diplomacy studies field, potential areas in need of further research – for example the much-needed analysis of non-state diplomatic actors - and research opportunities within the field.

³ John L. Gaddis. (1987). Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists and the Enrichment of Security Studies. *International Security*, 12 (1), p. 5.

⁴ Paul Sharp. (1999). For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations. *International Studies Review*, 1 (1), p. 35.

Thus, categorisation permits us to ascertain where the field currently lies on the ‘diplomatic continuum’.⁵ Essentially, this approach constitutes a stock take of the diplomatic studies field, an appraisal of what we know or think we know in relation to diplomatic theory. This appraisal of diplomatic theory is long overdue when compared to other disciplines. For example, IR theorists ‘have often shown an interest in evaluating the state of their discipline; its practitioners have produced a steady stream of research appraisals’.⁶ Since the end of the Cold War and the close of the millennium, this exercise has been apparent in the broader IR domain but has not been conducted with diplomacy studies in mind.⁷ In relation to diplomacy studies and diplomatic theory, this thesis shoulders that responsibility.

The stock take is timely too. For example, today IR theorists are re-examining ‘their basic assumptions about world politics and re-evaluating the usefulness of the mental maps they have relied on to make sense of its complexity’.⁸ To reduce further marginalisation of the diplomatic studies field, there is a need for diplomatic theorists to follow suit. Central to this revaluation of the diplomatic theorists ‘mental maps’ is questioning the relevance and adequacy of existing diplomatic theories to account for the complexity of the modern diplomatic environment.

⁵ *ibid*, p. 44.

⁶ Colin Elman and Miriam Elman. (2003). *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*. Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 3. For examples of IR theorists appraising their discipline, see R. N. Lebow and T. Risse-Kappen. (1995). *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*. New York: Columbia University Press; M. W. Doyle and G. J. Ikenberry. (1997). *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*. Boulder: Westview Press; D. B. Bobrow. (1999). *Prospects for International Relations: Conjectures About the Next Millennium*. Malden: Blackwell.

⁷ The 2000 International Studies Association annual convention illustrated such a trend. Entitled ‘Reflection, Integration, Cumulation: International Studies Past and Future’ it invited ‘self-critical, state-of-the-art reflection within epistemologies, perspectives and sub fields’ and suggested that without such reflection, ‘the promise of International Studies cannot be fulfilled’. The Diplomatic Studies field was not subjected to such an examination. See, www.isanet.org/archives/

⁸ Glenn P. Hastedt and Kay M. Knickrehm. (2003). *International Politics in a Changing World*. Boston: Pearson Education, p. 29.

Finally, the categorisation of different types of theorists within the diplomatic studies field has not been attempted so far. This thesis demonstrates the value of innovation and originality of approach to fixed methods of theorising on diplomacy; even if this thesis' approach promotes criticism, at least debate is encouraged, and argument is injected into a discipline dominated by restrictive state-centric approaches to diplomatic theory.⁹ This thesis argues that Debate, innovation and a frank appraisal of the diplomatic studies field are preferable to further marginalisation.

Innovation in diplomatic theory is particularly important. In order to understand the complex twenty-first century diplomatic environment it may be beneficial to distance, but not abandon, theory from the traditional, statist perspective on diplomacy. Today, state and non-state actors can be said to engage in diplomacy but we have little knowledge on the latter while theory abounds on the former. By the end of the next three chapters, the reader will be able to elucidate the central tenets of not only the most recognisable form of diplomatic theory (Traditional) but also two alternate and equally valuable forms of diplomatic theory (Nascent and Innovative).

Before categorisation can occur, it is important to contextualise this thesis. Chapter one identifies the explicit area of theoretical terrain this thesis will attempt to navigate. Precedence is first established, by relying on insights of diplomatic theorists who have noticed the paucity of diplomatic theory but have not directly addressed the problem. Following this discussion is a frank appraisal of existing diplomatic theories, which largely consist of traditional, statist approaches to postulating on diplomacy. These statist theories are somewhat limited in their application to the modern diplomatic

⁹ For a lively, if somewhat parochial, discussion on the notion of disciplinary insecurity/neurosis see, Kurth, James. (1998). Inside the Cave: The Banality of IR Studies. *National Interest*, 53, 29 – 40.

environment. The final section in this chapter highlights six themes, factors and forces prevalent in the modern diplomatic environment and the diplomatic studies literature. When these six themes, factors and forces are introduced, it becomes apparent that existing diplomatic theories are unable to account for the increasing complexity of modern diplomacy. The chapter finishes by arguing that in order to understand this complexity the diplomatic studies field needs more than one traditional, statist body of theory.

Chapter two introduces the most recognisable type of diplomatic theorist: the Traditionalist. Traditionalists are engaged in a similar enterprise: endorsing the centrality of the state and the diplomatic institution to their theory of diplomacy. This chapter builds a comprehensive profile of this type of diplomatic theorist from the canon of diplomacy studies. In doing so, the chapter extracts the historical origins of Traditional Diplomatic Theory (TDT), the type of diplomacy Traditionalists theorise upon, their central theoretical tenets, common assumptions and definitions of diplomacy.

Traditional diplomatic theory on six modern themes within the diplomatic studies literature is also presented in chapter two, allowing a comparison to be drawn between their theory and alternate emerging theories on diplomacy. In all of the three of the different categorical chapters (2, 3 & 4), these six themes are employed to highlight divergence of opinion among the three categories of theorists presented in this thesis. Moreover, by providing specific examples of each group's theories on diplomacy one may further distinguish the three respective categories of diplomatic theory. These six themes are prominent and consistent in modern diplomatic literature. They concern the

impact of changes and challenges upon the traditional diplomatic institution.¹⁰ The six themes are: 1) the withering state, and its traditional diplomatic institution; 2) the role of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) in the modern diplomatic environment; 3) the impact of summit diplomacy; 4) the proliferation of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs); 5) the relationship between commerce and diplomacy; and 6) the affect of the information revolution on diplomacy. Each group of theorists has a different opinion on these six themes, allowing this thesis to distinguish between different groups of theorists.

Chapter three introduces, constructs and profiles a second body of distinct theory: Nascent Diplomatic Theory (NDT). Nascent theorists postulate on diplomacy by dismissing the importance of the state and the traditional diplomatic institution in the modern diplomatic environment. Instead, they focus on emerging non-state diplomatic actors, hence the moniker *nascent* diplomatic theorists. This chapter builds the profile of Nascent theorists by constructing an alternate body of diplomatic literature (to the canon of diplomacy studies). The purpose of chapter three is to extract the historical origins of Nascent theorists, the type of diplomacy they theorise upon, their central theoretical tenets, common assumption and definitions of diplomacy. Following this, Nascent theorist's opinion on six modern themes within the diplomatic studies literature is presented, which further illustrates the differences between this group of theorists and the dominant Traditionalists.

¹⁰ For similar usage of the term institution, and the reasons behind the employment of this term in place of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see Christer Jonsson and Martin Hall. (2006). *Essence of Diplomacy*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 39 – 42.

Certain theorists can fit into both TDT and NDT categories. Sharp, for example, in the article *Who needs diplomats?*¹¹ builds an argument that incorporates the traditional, statist theory of diplomacy alongside the value of theory on nascent diplomatic actors. How do we then classify Sharp, or Hocking (1999, 2000 and 2004) or Cooper (1997, 2000)? The answer is to introduce a third categorisation of theorists, which is the focus and purpose of the fourth chapter.

Chapter four introduces the distinct category of Innovative Diplomatic Theory (IDT). These theorists, the Innovators, theorise on both state and non-state actors, incorporating and evidencing a symbiosis between the two as central to their particular type of diplomatic theory. This approach – privileging both the state and the non-state – is novel, hence the ‘Innovative’ label. Innovators can be distinguished by their historical origins, the type of diplomacy they theorise upon, their central theoretical tenets, common assumptions and definitions of diplomacy. These characteristics are described at length in this chapter, alongside IDT on the six themes prevalent in modern diplomatic studies literature. Innovators offer an alternative interpretation of modern diplomacy from TDT and NDT.

Chapter five is concerned with tackling a consequence of categorisation; the need to reconcile these three divergent theories on diplomacy. If the notion of three different types of theories within diplomacy studies is accepted then the existence of three different and often-conflicting opinions on modern diplomacy must also be accepted. Chapter five continues by offering a tentative solution. This chapter argues that to produce a comprehensive body of theory on modern diplomacy, the reconciliation of the

¹¹ See, Paul Sharp. (1997). Who needs diplomats? The problem of diplomatic representation. *International Journal*, 52 (4), 609 – 634.

three diplomatic theories is paramount. This chapter suggests that the key to reconciling tripartite diplomatic theory lies with learning from another discipline that has encountered and overcome similar problems. The discipline employed is IR, where divergent theories are inherent to the field.

Chapter five is also concerned with exploring the relationship between TDT and Realism, NDT and Liberalism and IDT and Constructivism. The simple premise is that just as these three theories are central to IR, so to must TDT, NDT and IDT become central to diplomacy studies. In chapter five, the similarities between each diplomatic theory and IR theory are explored and found to be quite remarkable. IR theory is employed to not only reconcile the three divergent diplomatic theories but also to further strengthen each of the different types of diplomatic theory. Through reconciliation, this thesis is able to banish disagreement between the three types of diplomatic theory by arguing *all* three types of theory have validity. This thesis proposes that just as IR theory needs Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism to understand the modern IR system, then diplomatic theory needs TDT, NDT and IDT in order to understand the modern diplomatic environment. The presence, consolidation and reconciliation of all three different theories ultimately strengthens diplomacy studies and diplomatic theory in the modern era.

The final chapter of the thesis, chapter six, demonstrates how this tripartite approach – using TDT, NDT & IDT in eclectic fashion - to theorising on diplomacy can enrich analysis of the modern diplomatic environment. In other words, this chapter tests the applicability of tripartite diplomatic theorising against empirical evidence. After all,

‘theory tested against data is more powerful than theory alone’.¹² The central assumptions of each of the three diplomatic theories are juxtaposed with empirical evidence relating to the six realities of the modern diplomatic environment. The aim of chapter six is twofold: firstly to demonstrate the value of tripartite diplomatic theorising; and, secondly, to introduce a subsequent set of theoretical observations that better helps understanding the modern diplomatic environment.

¹² Bates in Rudra Sil. (2000) The Foundations of Eclecticism: The Epistemological Status of Agency, Culture, and Structure in Social Theory. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 12 (3), p. 375.

Chapter One: Establishing Precedence

1.0 The poverty of diplomatic theory

In 1966, Martin Wight's essay 'Why is there no International Theory?' was concerned with addressing and alleviating the 'theoretical impoverishment' of international theory.¹ Central to his observations was the claim that 'international theory does not, at first sight, exist' as it has a 'recalcitrance to being theorised about'.² For Wight international theory was an 'impression' or an assumption that international relations scholars had taken for granted; consistently they failed to question the origins, rigor or depth of the 'notion of international theory'.³ According to Wight, works written on international theory were 'marked, not only by paucity but also by intellectual poverty'.⁴

Wight's observations continue to resonate with diplomacy studies and diplomatic theory in particular. In the field of diplomacy studies we too have the 'impression' that diplomatic theory is a robust and vibrant topic which has been deeply explored.⁵ The fact that many 'theorists' ranging from De Callieres (1716) to Berridge (2002) have written on diplomacy reinforces this assumption. However, herein lies the central concern relating to diplomatic theory: we *assume* diplomatic theory exists.

The 'paucity' and 'poverty' of diplomatic theory has gone largely unnoticed in the diplomatic studies field.⁶ One reason is that until the end of the Cold War the diplomatic

¹ M. Wight. 'Why is there no International Theory?', in M. Wight, and H. Butterfield (eds.). 1966. *Diplomatic Investigations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 20.

² *ibid.*, pp. 17 – 33.

³ *ibid.*, p. 19.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 20.

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 17.

⁶ *ibid.*, p. 19.

environment was largely predictable and dominated by one actor: the state.⁷ However, there now exist several unconventional, non-state diplomatic actors such as NGOs or multinational corporations (MNCs) alongside the traditional state actor. In the complex, multi-actor and modern diplomatic environment the ‘impression’ of a solid body of diplomatic theory is no longer adequate. Weaknesses in diplomatic theory have become more apparent as the diplomatic environment becomes more complex. As the environment becomes more complex there is need for diplomatic theory to react and change accordingly. This thesis takes on the responsibility of deconstructing, modernising and strengthening diplomatic theory.

Attempts to address the frailty of diplomatic theory are not novel. They are, however, rare. For example, the weakness of diplomatic theory prompted James Der Derian to firmly ‘assert the need for a theory of diplomacy’.⁸ Adopting a similar line of aggressive enquiry as Wight, Der Derian argued that:

diplomacy has been particularly resistant to theory⁹...theories of diplomacy, when they do exist, usually consist of underdeveloped and implicit propositions...neither is there to be found

⁷ For a discussion on the origins of the term ‘actor’, when describing an international entity, see Arnold Wolfers. (1959). The Actors in International Politics, in William Fox (ed.). (1959). *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 83 – 106. For the development and employment of an alternate term - states as people - see Patrick Jackson. (2004). Hegel’s House, or People are states too. *Review of International Studies*, 30 (2), pp. 281 – 288; Alexander Wendt. (2004). The state as person in and actor in international theory. *Review of International Studies*, 30 (2), pp. 289 – 317.

⁸ J. Der Derian. (1987). Mediating estrangement: a theory for diplomacy. *Review of International Studies*, 13 (2), p. 92.

⁹ Der Derian’s ‘notion of the resistance to theory’ was ‘borrowed from Wight’s celebrated essay’ (Costas M. Constantinou. (1993). Late Modern Diplomacies. *Millennium*, 22 (1), p. 90). Der Derian’s work begins where ‘Wight left off, to interrogate present knowledge of international relations through past practice, to search out the margins of political theory, to listen for the critical voices drowned out by official discourses, and to conduct an enquiry into the encounter of the given text.’ (Der Derian, *On Diplomacy*, pp. 6 –7).

a substantial theoretical work on the subject in the contemporary literature of international relations...diplomacy has suffered from theoretical neglect.¹⁰

For Der Derian, existing theories of diplomacy tend to be underdeveloped and lacking in theoretical rigor. In addition, Der Derian felt that explicit and substantial works on diplomatic theory are conspicuous by their absence in the diplomatic studies field. Der Derian decided it was time to embrace diplomatic theory *sui generis*. In essence, Der Derian sought to ‘fill a gap in the field: the gap of diplomatic theory’.¹¹ His approach would endorse ‘a different method of conceptualising diplomacy’.¹²

Der Derian certainly introduced a different method to theorising on diplomacy. In the 1987 publication, *Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*, Der Derian combines theory on diplomacy with the philosophical theory of alienation,¹³ covers over 3,000 years of diplomatic evolution and produces six distinguishable theoretical classifications of diplomacy ranging from Mytho-diplomacy to Techno-Diplomacy.¹⁴ In terms of the focus of this thesis, it is important to ask if Der Derian achieved his intended purpose: to ‘fill the gap of diplomatic theory’?¹⁵

¹⁰ Costas M. Constantinou. (1993). Late Modern Diplomacies. *Millennium*, 22 (1), p. 91.

¹¹ J. Der Derian. (1987). *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 5.

¹² *ibid*.

¹³ For a full explanation of Der Derian’s adaptation of alienation theories to diplomacy see Der Derian, *On Diplomacy*, pp. 8 – 30.

¹⁴ In total, Der Derian forwards ‘six interpenetrating paradigms to analyse the origins and transformations of diplomacy’ (p. 5). Mytho-diplomacy (chapter 4) locates the origins of symbolic reciprocity between ‘foreign’ entities in mythology and religion. Proto-diplomacy (chapter 5) identifies prototypes of diplomacy that developed during the middle ages. Diplomacy (chapter 6) presents an account of state forms of diplomacy to emerge after the peace of Westphalia. Anti-Diplomacy (chapter 7) refers to the idealist rejections of state boundaries and *raison d’etat*, as in Christian universalism and various sixteenth and seventeenth century utopian writings. Neo-diplomacy (chapter 8) occurs when anti-diplomacy is politicised, as in socialist internationalism. And techno-diplomacy (chapter 9) describes situations in which diplomatic interactions can no longer contain new kinds of interactions made possible by new technologies.

¹⁵ Der Derian, *On Diplomacy*, p. 5.

If anything, Der Derian overwhelms the gap. His work is so extensive and so exhaustive that claims of ‘intellectual overkill’ were leveled at *Diplomacy*; the work was subject to both sycophantic adulation and hostile criticism.¹⁶ Der Derian certainly expanded diplomatic theory however his observations are ‘largely repellent and intractable in form’ not to mention ‘mostly inaccessible to the layman’.¹⁷ Furthermore, by leaning heavily on the theory of alienation as ‘endorsed by Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx, Sartre, and others’ meant the core of his new diplomatic theory was a mixture of philosophy and diplomacy, rather than pure diplomacy.¹⁸ In other words, Der Derian’s attempt to radically (re)conceptualise diplomatic theory was too ambitious.

However, Der Derian’s book has relevance to this thesis for two reasons. Firstly, he demonstrated that embracing diplomatic theory as an independent topic was a viable and productive field of enquiry. Secondly, Der Derian highlighted that approaching diplomatic theory in an innovative and original fashion resulted in new insight. By tackling diplomatic theory in this fashion, Der Derian ‘breathed fresh life’ into diplomatic theory.¹⁹

This thesis adopts a similar approach to diplomatic theory as Wight and Der Derian. This thesis tackles diplomatic theory as an independent topic, in an original fashion and proposes an innovative solution to strengthening diplomatic theory. This

¹⁶ For example of some book reviews of Der Derian’s hallmark work, see *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* by James Der Derian. 1989. Reviewed by Mark Warren, *Journal of Politics*, 51 (1), 208 – 211; *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* by James Der Derian. 1987. Reviewed by Christopher Hill, *International Affairs*, 64 (1), 104; Constantinou, Costas M. (1993). Late Modern Diplomacies. *Millennium*, 22 (1), pp. 89 – 96. One critic described *On Diplomacy* as ‘an ambitious consideration of diplomacy’ (Warren, Book Review, p. 208) and another, more cuttingly, as ‘largely tedious to read, larded as it is with pretentious language and displays of cultural one-upmanship’ (Hill, Book Review, p. 104).

¹⁷ Wight, *Why is there no International Theory?*, p. 20.

¹⁸ Der Derian, *On Diplomacy*, p. 9.

¹⁹ Constantinou, *Late Modern Diplomacies*, p. 90.

thesis is not suggesting that ‘there is no diplomatic theory’, nor does it suggest that ‘diplomacy is resistant to theory’.²⁰ Works on diplomatic theory do exist within the canon of diplomacy studies, but are ‘scattered, unsystematic’ and hardly prominent.²¹ In addition, this thesis argues that far from being resistant to theory the subject of diplomacy is a promising, important and largely unexplored area of enquiry.

1.3 De Callieres will tell us all we need to know: the essence of diplomatic theory.

In order to establish the essence of diplomatic theory (what diplomatic theory *is*?) several well-known books on diplomatic theory are examined here.²² These explicit theoretical works are only a recent occurrence in the diplomatic studies field. In addition, they are hardly numerous, which could suggest, as does Hocking, that existing theoretical works on diplomacy ‘tell us all we need to know’ in relation to modern diplomacy.²³ The aim in this section is to test this claim and elucidate the central tenets of diplomatic theory from these works.

The title of Lauren’s *Diplomacy: New Approaches History, Theory, and Policy* (1979) suggests that at least a third of the book is devoted to diplomatic theory.²⁴ The inclusion of a thorough explanation of diplomatic theory would also be expected. However, this is not the case. Only the introductory chapter, written by the editor himself, explicitly mentions diplomacy and theory. Within this chapter it is clear that Lauren is

²⁰ Der Derian, *Mediating estrangement*, p. 91

²¹ Wight, *Why is there no International Theory?*, p. 20.

²² These works are ‘briefly’ examined here to highlight the difficulty in extracting the central tenets of diplomatic theory. In the following chapter these works are incorporated in an extensive literature review, where, conversely, they are employed to demonstrate the strength of a particular type of diplomatic theory: Traditional Diplomatic Theory.

²³ Brian Hocking. (1997). The end(s) of diplomacy. *International Journal*, 53 (1), p. 170.

²⁴ P. G. Lauren (ed.). (1979). *Diplomacy: New Approaches History, Theory, and Policy*. New York: Free Press.

discussing the relationship between diplomatic history, IR theory²⁵ and foreign policy, and the need for an interdisciplinary confluence between all three. At no point does Lauren clearly explain what he considers diplomatic theory to be. Lucid and simple postulations on diplomatic theory are absent in this work. The reader is left pondering what Lauren's 'new approach' to diplomacy and theory is. Relying on Lauren's work, we are no closer to understanding the essence of diplomatic theory.

A similar avoidance of the basic tenets of diplomatic theory is apparent within Berridge's *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*.²⁶ Berridge relies upon the 'classic texts'²⁷ to illustrate 'the evolution of diplomatic theory' from the 15th century till the 20th.²⁸ For Berridge, modern diplomatic theory relates to 'the business of a multiplicity of states' and the practical activity of diplomacy, which is heavily influenced by a slow historical development.²⁹ Berridge does elucidate several concise theoretical observations on diplomacy, which include: diplomacy has 'no true end or purpose'; 'negotiation should wait for the right season'; diplomats 'need not keep their promises to foreign governments if this does not serve the interests of their own states'; diplomacy is about 'permanent rather than sporadic negotiation conducted with wartime enemies as well as peacetime friends'; and finally, that 'lobbying, gleaning information and

²⁵ According to Lauren IR theory comes in three forms: firstly, *empirical theory*, which 'tries to explain processes, develop propositions, and discover correlations in the world of interaction among nations'; secondly, *normative theory*, which 'possesses an inescapably philosophical dimension, and addresses the "ought" rather than the "is" of international affairs'; finally, policy science theory, which 'attempts to provide explicit guidance for the specific task of policy makers' (Lauren, *Diplomacy*, p. 8). These three theories are, naturally, relevant to IR but in terms of diplomatic theory have questionable application. In the modern era diplomatic theory can and must be considered *sui generis*.

²⁶ G.R. Berridge. (2001). *Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissinger*. London: Palgrave.

²⁷ In this work the authors consider the classic texts as those written by Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Grotius, Richelieu, Wicquefort, Callieres, Satow, Nicolson and Kissenger.

²⁸ *ibid.*, p. 2.

²⁹ *ibid.*, p. 3.

negotiation are staple functions' of diplomacy.³⁰ While all of these theoretical observations are correct, Berridge is actually telling us what diplomacy *does*, rather than what diplomacy *is*. At no point does Berridge explicitly explain what he considers diplomatic theory to be, what diplomacy *is*.

That both Berridge and Lauren fail to elucidate the central tenets of diplomatic theory exemplifies a common occurrence in the diplomatic studies field. Where the explicit diplomatic theory literature is concerned a concise bullet-point description is difficult to extract. Such deficiency in diplomatic theory is apparent when compared to the rigour of IR theory, for example. Each of the established IR theories is able to elucidate its central tenets and assumptions in simple and lucid fashion.³¹ Where diplomatic theory is concerned, no concise presentation of its central tenets exists. This failure to engage with the foundations of diplomatic theory confirms the impression of diplomatic theory as robust, concise and rigorous.³²

The impression of diplomatic theory as robust is understandable. Within most diplomatic works implicit references to the foundations of diplomatic theory do exist.³³ Commonly, there are four central tenets of diplomatic theory that can be extracted with some difficulty. Firstly, that diplomatic theory is applicable to the state system and the traditional diplomacy that 'greases' it. This form of diplomacy is, secondly, conventional,

³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 4.

³¹ For example, see John Bayliss and Steve Smith. (2005). *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp, 161 – 297. Bayliss and Smith present extensive and concise information on Realism, Liberalism, Neo-Realism, Neo-Liberalism, Marxism, and Constructivism. Similarly, see Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf. (2004). *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 9th Edition. Thomson Wadsworth, pp. 29 – 59. These authors also present the central tenets of Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism in a clear and simple fashion.

³² Der Derian, *On Diplomacy*, p. 6.

³³ For example, see G. R. Berridge. (2002). *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. London: Palgrave; Francois De Callieres. (1983). *The Art of Diplomacy*. Edited by H. M. A. Keens-Soper and K. W. Schweizer. Leicester: Leicester University Press; Johan Kaufmann. (1998). *The Diplomacy of International Relations*. Netherlands: Kluwer Law International; Henry Kissinger. (1994). *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

official and professional and executed primarily through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or an equivalent diplomatic institution. Thirdly, this form of diplomacy is influenced by a long period of historical development, where evolution has been incremental rather than radical. Familiarity and continuity of diplomatic method are thus, fourthly, central to theorising on state-to-state diplomacy.

Within diplomatic studies, the state, and its traditional diplomatic institution, is thus endorsed as the ‘only diplomatic actor of significance’ in the modern diplomatic environment.³⁴ This approach to theorising on diplomacy has several synonyms: ‘statist’ or ‘state-centric’ being the most popular.³⁵ Reliance on this statist approach suggests that diplomatic theory is largely concerned with the practical interaction between traditional, state actors. Elman and Elman refer to this state focus as ‘theory on the practice’ of diplomacy rather than ‘theory on the theory’.³⁶ There is a major difference between these focuses, which several diplomatic theorists highlight. Der Derian, for example, claims that we *assume* that some of the more famous guides³⁷ on the practice of diplomacy are in essence diplomatic theory. For Der Derian, this assumption is incorrect, which prompted him to observe of pure diplomatic theory ‘that such knowledge is not readily available. The major subject of concern in the field of diplomacy has been its practice.’³⁸

This practical focus in diplomatic textbooks is significant, after all diplomacy is a profession and it is important to postulate on its professional nature. However, by

³⁴ K. J. Holsti. (2004). *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 19.

³⁵ For the origins and usage of the both terms see, Hannes Lacher. (2003). Putting the state in its place: the critique of state-centrism and its limits. *Review of International Studies*, 29 (4), pp. 521 – 542.

³⁶ Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman. (2003). *Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field*. Cambridge: MIT Press, p. 7.

³⁷ Der Derian’s famous guides are: ‘Abraham de Wicquefort’s *L’Ambassadeur et ses fonctions* (1681), Francois de Callieres’ *De la maniere de negocier avec les souverains* (1716), Ernest Satow’s *Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (1917) and Harold Nicolson’s *Diplomacy* (1939)’ (Der Derian, *On Diplomacy*, p. 2).

³⁸ Der Derian, *On Diplomacy*, p. 2.

focusing on the practical nature of diplomacy, diplomatic theory is largely ignored. In the former case, we theorise on a profession and an institutionalised activity, in the latter on the ‘thoughts and ideas’ of academics involved in the diplomacy studies field.³⁹ The focus on the practical aspect of diplomacy, rather than the theory of diplomacy, is perhaps the most obvious occurrence within the field.

Textbooks claiming to be diplomatic theory are in fact geared towards the many practical aspects of diplomacy. Such ‘conventional accounts’ of diplomacy usually include:

a narration of the progressive story of diplomatic history; the organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the formulation of foreign policy; the functions of the embassy; the qualities of the diplomat; and different accounts dealing with issues ranging from negotiation to immunities, and from international trade or law to etiquette and protocol.⁴⁰

This formulaic approach (with an emphasis on the practical) is a broad generalisation of the type of diplomatic theory that De Callieres, Satow, Nicolson and Berridge espouse, for example. Not all works published on diplomacy and diplomatic theory adopt this approach. However, the majority relate primarily to the state, the traditional diplomatic institution and the practice of diplomacy. As a result, there are several problems with a continued reliance on this type of statist and practical diplomatic ‘theory’.

³⁹ Robert Jackson. (2002) Martin Wight’s Thought on Diplomacy. *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 13 (4), p. 20.

⁴⁰ Constantinou, *Late Modern Diplomacies*, p. 89.

Firstly, and most obviously, a concise answer to the question ‘what is diplomatic theory?’ remains elusive. If focus on the practical aspects of diplomacy endures then works devoted to pure diplomatic theory will remain on the fringe of the discipline. Lucid observations on diplomatic theory, when rarely encountered, are usually described in fleeting and perfunctory fashion. Observations on diplomatic theory therefore tend to be vague, what Nicolson referred to as ‘precise, although wide’.⁴¹ In other words, lucid postulations on the basic tenets of diplomatic theory will continue to escape the diplomatic studies field.

A second problem relates to the field’s general treatment or attitude towards diplomatic theory as an independent topic. In the explicit diplomatic theory texts no attempt is made by the authors to stop and ask ‘what *is* diplomatic theory?’ Perhaps they have no answer; perhaps we cannot speak of a distinct, recognisable and extractable form of diplomatic theory or perhaps we simply assume that diplomatic theory is statist, historical and traditional. If Lauren and Berridge, two adroit observers on diplomacy, are unwilling or unable to convey the essence of diplomatic theory then the assumption that diplomatic theory does not merit deeper exploration may be correct.

For these types of theorists, there is nothing ‘inherently interesting in examining what modern diplomats do because there is nothing of significance in what is new. In fact, there is nothing new. De Callieres will tell you all you need to know’.⁴² Such a flippant attitude results in practical, one-dimensional and state-centric theories of diplomacy. This reliance would be appropriate if the modern diplomatic environment was composed only of traditional, state actors.

⁴¹ Harold Nicolson. (1950). *Diplomacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 5.

⁴² Hocking, *The end(s) of diplomacy*, p. 170.

However, in the modern era the diplomatic environment is composed of not only traditional state actors but also non-state actors such as NGOs and MNCs. In addition, ‘unconventional’ arenas for state and non-state diplomatic exchange, such as multi-lateral IGOs, are now a permanent feature of the modern diplomatic environment. Therefore, it can be argued that the majority of statist works on diplomatic theory fail to account for the complexity and multi-actor nature of modern diplomacy. In other words, statist diplomatic theory only tells us part of the modern diplomatic story.

Subsequently, the area of diplomatic theory has become a target for claims of ‘theoretical impoverishment’ by several diplomatic and International Relations (IR) theorists.⁴³ For example, the ‘unrealistic narrative’ of contemporary diplomacy led Craig to complain that diplomacy, as a field of theoretical study, has ‘failed to engage the attention of the International Relations profession’.⁴⁴ Puchala also wrote of his ‘frustration with the intellectual sterility of many present-day renderings’⁴⁵ concerning diplomacy and Sharp complained that ‘the study of diplomacy remains marginal to and almost disconnected from the rest of the IR field’.⁴⁶

The source of these authors’ frustration is that the few existing works on diplomatic theory are statist in constitution and, subsequently, focus on the practice of diplomacy. For Craig, Puchala and Sharp, the continuing dominance of statist diplomatic theory is unreflective of modern diplomacy, where state and non-state actors can co-exist

⁴³ Ben D. Mor. (2003) Strategic Self-Presentation in Public Diplomacy. Paper presented at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 3 – 6, p. 2.

⁴⁴ Gordon A. Craig. (1983). The Historian and the Study of International Relations. *American Historical Review*, 88 (1), p. 2.

⁴⁵ Donald J. Puchala. (1995). The Pragmatics of International History. *Mershon International Studies Review*, 39 (1), p. 2.

⁴⁶ Sharp, *For Diplomacy*, p. 34. These complaints are not entirely novel. Similar laments have been levelled at diplomacy studies for some time now. For one example, see Smith Simpson. (1986). *Perspectives on the Study of Diplomacy*. Occasional Paper, Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.

in symbiotic diplomatic partnerships. The marginalised or ‘troubled state of diplomatic studies’ is a direct result of the state-centric domination of diplomatic theory, and the aligned theorist’s desire to regard diplomacy and diplomatic theory in singular, partial and narrow terms.⁴⁷ Susan Strange accuses those state-centric theorists of practicing a form of ‘intellectual apartheid’, and warns that ‘the study must move with the times, or be marginalized as narrow specialism’.⁴⁸

For diplomatic studies to ‘move with the times’ there is a need to modernise diplomatic theory. Central to updating/modernising diplomatic theory is to first acknowledge the complex, multi-actor environment it seeks to address.

1.4 The shape of the modern diplomatic environment

In the modern era, a thorough exploration of diplomatic theory is overdue; we no longer have the luxury of *assuming* diplomatic theory exists. In addition, where it exists diplomatic theory tends to be statist in constitution and is therefore relative to only one actor in the modern diplomatic environment. This environment is becoming increasingly complex and there is a need for diplomatic theory to mirror the multi-actor nature of the IR system. Today, ‘we find the diplomatic milieu inhabited by a growing diversity of actors, which certainly poses a far more complex image of international interaction than does the traditional intergovernmental perspective’.⁴⁹

Hocking, therefore, suggests that the modern diplomatic environment is no longer one where traditional diplomacy between states is the sole conduit for diplomacy. A

⁴⁷ Paul Sharp. (2001). Making Sense of Citizen Diplomats. *DSP Discussion Papers*, Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, p. 1.

⁴⁸ Susan Strange. (1992). States, firms and diplomacy. *International Affairs*, 68 (1), p. 11.

⁴⁹ Brian Hocking. (2004). Privatizing Diplomacy? *International Studies Perspectives*, 5, p. 147.

snapshot of the modern diplomatic environment reveals a plethora of state and non-state actors practicing wide and varied forms of official and unofficial diplomacy. There are six actors, environments and phenomena that this thesis, and the diplomatic studies field in general, considers as central to the modern diplomatic environment.

The first actor in this environment is a familiar one: the state. A state can be defined as a legal territorial entity composed of a stable population and a government; it possesses a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, and its sovereignty is recognised by other states in the international system.⁵⁰ Currently, there are 191 states operating in the modern diplomatic environment.⁵¹ In this environment, a state typically pursues a foreign policy: the goals that officials representing states seek abroad, the values that underlie these goals and the means or instruments used to pursue them.⁵²

Chief among a state's foreign policy instruments is the activity of diplomacy, housed physically in the traditional diplomatic institution. This form of diplomacy refers to the 'official channels of communication employed by the members of a system of states'.⁵³ In this context, diplomacy's chief purpose is to 'enable states to secure the objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda, or law'.⁵⁴

The number of traditional diplomatic institutions is hard to estimate as each state has several abroad, depending on the size and budget of the state at any given time. The British Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), for example, finances and manages 233

⁵⁰ John Bayliss and Steve Smith (eds). (2005). *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 30.

⁵¹ This figure was obtained from the United Nations, retrieved 4th February 2006, <<http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html>>

⁵² Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf. (2004). *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 9th Edition. California: Thomson Wadsworth, p. 63.

⁵³ Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissinger*, p. 1.

⁵⁴ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 1.

embassies, High Commissions, Consulates and Missions to International Organisations.⁵⁵ These are linked to the Foreign Office in London in a single, global network that employs almost 6,000 UK-based staff and 10,000 local staff.⁵⁶ This network operates with a total annual budget of 1.5 billion pounds.⁵⁷ The large numbers of diplomatic institutions and states means that these traditional entities remain central actors in the modern diplomatic environment.

The second type of actor operating in the modern diplomatic environment is an NGO. An NGO is any group of people 'relating to each other regularly, in some formal manner and engaging in collective action, provided that the activities are non-commercial and non-violent, and not on behalf of a government.'⁵⁸ The purpose of NGOs is wide and varied. Some NGOs have a political purpose, some a humanitarian function, and others an economic or technical intention. All seek, however, to influence government policy and to fill gaps left by the government in policy execution.

The number of NGOs in the modern diplomatic environment has increased significantly, growing from 997 in 1954 to 20,928 in 2005/6.⁵⁹ What makes NGOs increasingly prominent in the modern diplomatic environment is that their activities are now shaping responses to issues that were once determined exclusively by traditional state actors. For example, Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and other global issues-

⁵⁵ The FCO Annual Report. (2004). UK: Public Records Office, p. 4. Of the FCO's 233 Posts, 153 are Embassies or High Commissions in foreign capitals and ten are UK Representatives or Delegations to international organisations or conferences. The others are Consulates, Deputy High Commissions and British Offices. In addition, 38 Posts are staffed entirely by local staff. The FCO also has resident Governors in 9 of the 14 Overseas Territories such as Australia or Canada.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p. 6.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, p. 12.

⁵⁸ Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p. 134.

⁵⁹ From Part A: Statistical Data Graphics, Figure 1.1.1. (a): Overview of number of international organisations by type [types A-G,] of the Yearbook of International Organisations, Edition 42, 2005/2006, edited by the Union of International Associations, Lausanne, Switzerland.

advocacy groups use their technical expertise, organisational flexibility, and grassroots connections to affect most stages of the development of international regimes, from problem recognition through to policy implementation. NGOs also involve complex networks of people, who ‘coalesce in myriad combinations at different times, for various purposes’.⁶⁰ Their presence and influence demonstrates that modern diplomacy is not merely the interaction of sovereign, territorial states. The increasing numbers of NGOs and their widespread popularity suggests that they are now an integral part of the modern diplomatic environment.

The third type of actor in this environment is also a non-state entity: Multinational Corporations (MNCs). MNCs are business enterprises organised in one state with activities or affiliates in a foreign country.⁶¹ These affiliates may be branches of the parent company, separately incorporated subsidiaries or associates, with large minority share holdings.⁶² The number of MNCs and their international scope has grown dramatically since the end of the World War II. At the beginning of the 21st century there are more than 53,000 MNCs, which have over 450,000 foreign affiliates.⁶³ These ever-growing numbers suggest that MNCs exercise significant clout in the modern diplomatic system, with global assets in excess of \$13 trillion (USD) and global sales of more than \$9.5 trillion (USD).⁶⁴

These figures suggest that MNC’s financial clout rivals or exceeds the Gross National Product of many countries, which means these immense corporations affect the ability of sovereign state actors to ‘control their own economies and therefore their own

⁶⁰ *ibid.*

⁶¹ *ibid.*, p. 173.

⁶² Bayliss and Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 430.

⁶³ Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p. 173.

⁶⁴ *ibid.*

fate'.⁶⁵ Large MNCs thus 'develop their own task-defined diplomatic structures to serve their particular needs and develop local expertise that national diplomatic services find hard to rival'.⁶⁶ Because of their financial strength, global reach and emerging political/diplomatic structures, MNCs exert great influence in the modern diplomatic environment. The interests of these large corporations doing business globally do not necessarily correspond with any one state's interest. Some MNCs may even act against their home government and many control greater resources, and operate internationally with greater efficiency than many small states. As MNCs increase in size and influence, they 'begin to act like states in certain respects'.⁶⁷

A fourth actor prominent in the modern diplomatic environment is the International Government Organisation (IGO). IGOs are purposely created by states to solve shared issues, which gives them whatever authority they possess for the purposes that their members states assign them.⁶⁸ The growth of IGOs in the last hundred years has been significant. In 1909, there were 37 IGOs, by 1962 this number had risen to 163 and by the years 2005/6 the modern diplomatic environment had 1,963 IGOs.⁶⁹ This expansion of IGOs has created a complex network of overlapping international organisations which cooperate with one another to deal with a wide range of global issues.⁷⁰

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, p. 141.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*

⁶⁷ Hocking, *Privatizing Diplomacy?*, p. 149.

⁶⁸ Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p. 137.

⁶⁹ From Part A: Statistical Data Graphics, Figure 1.1.1. (a): Overview of number of international organisations by type [types A-G,] of the Yearbook of International Organisations, Edition 42, 2005/2006, edited by the Union of International Associations, Lausanne, Switzerland.

⁷⁰ These issues are diverse and varied. Some examples are trade, defence, disarmament, economic development, agriculture, health, culture, human rights, the arts, illegal drugs, tourism, labour, women's rights, education, debt, the environment, international crime, humanitarian aid, civilian crisis relief, telecommunications, science, globalisation, immigration and refugees.

IGOs can also be characterised by their permanence and institutional organisation; IGOs meet at relatively regular intervals and have specified procedures for making decisions and a permanent secretariat or headquarters staff. A final characteristic of IGOs is the diplomacy they practice, which is of a multi-lateral nature. Multilateral diplomacy is now a valuable form of diplomacy because in certain circumstances (where member states have a common interest) it provides the best chance for a successful and speedy negotiation. In certain cases multi-lateral diplomacy is cheaper, faster and more effective than traditional bi-lateral diplomacy. Subsequently, IGOs, and their multilateral diplomacy, are now a common feature of the modern diplomatic environment.

A fifth feature of the modern diplomatic environment is not another actor but an alternate environment for diplomacy: diplomacy by summit. Summitry is a term that applies only 'to meetings between incumbent heads of government and/or heads of state, or political leaders'.⁷¹ The summit embodies Lloyd George's emphasis on face-to-face meetings of the upper echelons of power. He stated firmly that 'if you want to settle a thing, you see your opponent and talk it over with him. The last thing to do is write him a letter.'⁷²

The growth of summitry in the twentieth century has been impressive. In the modern era, foreign leaders are familiar with both the demands and necessity of summitry, and are 'increasingly performing diplomatic roles on the international stage'.⁷³ Beside the 'enormous symbolic and propaganda potential', the participation of the head

⁷¹ Jan Melissen. (2003). *Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age. Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', p. 4.

⁷² *ibid.*, p. 2.

⁷³ *ibid.*, p. 1.

of state (the diplomat-in-chief) can act as a catalyst to negotiation at a lower level.⁷⁴ Summits, and the presence of statesmen, can give negotiations ‘an extra push’, ‘sustain diplomatic momentum’ or ‘serve to break remaining deadlocks by virtue of authority’.⁷⁵ Alongside ‘providing some impetus’⁷⁶ to sluggish negotiations, the presence of statesmen and their ultimate authority can set firm deadlines for the ‘completion of an existing negotiation’.⁷⁷ Summits therefore can kick-start stalled negotiations or end negotiations that are unlikely to produce a worthwhile result for those states involved. Their value and frequency makes diplomacy by summit an important and visible feature of the modern diplomatic environment.

Influencing all five features of the modern diplomatic environment is a sixth and final phenomenon: the revolution in Information and Communications Technology (ICT). This phenomenon is often referred to as the ‘information revolution’ in the diplomatic studies literature.⁷⁸ Advances in ICT provide new communications tools, demand new organisational processes, and alter existing hierarchies and power relationships among global diplomatic actors.⁷⁹ The ‘revolution’ has made information itself a crucial source of national power and influence. The information revolution has had a substantial impact on diplomacy, affecting both the content and the conduct of the diplomatic enterprise necessary for success in the transformed international arena. The modern diplomatic

⁷⁴ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 173.

⁷⁵ *ibid.*, p. 176.

⁷⁶ Johan Kaufmann. (1998). *The Diplomacy of International Relations*. Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, p. 60.

⁷⁷ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 174.

⁷⁸ For discussion on the information revolution and diplomacy, see Richard Burt and Olin Robison. (1998) *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age: A Report of the CSIS Advisory Panel on Diplomacy in the Information Age*. Washington: The Centre for Strategic and International Studies; G. Kramarenko and A. Krutskikh. (2003). Diplomacy and the Information Revolution. *International Affairs*, 49 (5), 115 – 123; Jovan Kurbaliga. (1999). *Knowledge and Diplomacy*. Valetta: Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies.

⁷⁹ Jeffery R. Cooper, ‘Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries’, 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, <www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html>

environment – dominated by rapid improvements in ICT - ‘intensifies the exchange of information, view, ideas, services, goods and helps create various virtual communities united by common interests’.⁸⁰

All six of these themes are prevalent in the modern diplomatic environment. The visibility and impact of these six themes confirms that singular, statist and practical works on diplomatic theory only account for one actor (the state) in an increasingly complex environment. In other words, statist works on diplomatic theory are restrictive; ‘De Callieres’ does *not* ‘tell us all we need to know’ in relation to modern diplomacy.⁸¹

State-centric diplomatic theories and theorists tend to avoid the multi-actor nature of modern diplomacy, preferring to endorse the questionable omnipotence of their beloved traditional diplomatic institution. Thus, state-centric theorists appear to be adroit at ‘perfecting and embellishing familiar bricks in a long-established wall whose foundations are crumbling’.⁸² State-centric diplomatic theorists continue to emphasise the one-dimensionality of diplomacy, endorsing a sentimental vision of the past when diplomacy had ‘the monopoly on foreign policy’.⁸³

Statist or ‘traditional textbooks’ fail to recognise that ‘diplomacy amounts to more than what is traditionally attributed to it, they are both too narrow and too exclusive’.⁸⁴ Existing diplomatic theory accounts only for official, conventional and traditional diplomacy. However, TDT remains a profitable area of enterprise within the diplomatic

⁸⁰ G. Kramarenko and A. Krutskikh. (2003) Diplomacy and the Information Revolution. *International Affairs*, 49 (5), p. 116.

⁸¹ Hocking, The end(s) of diplomacy, p. 170.

⁸² Sharp, For Diplomacy, p. 50.

⁸³ Richard Langhorne. (1998). Diplomacy Beyond the Primacy of the State. *Diplomatic Studies Program*, Leicester University, No. 43, p. 1.

⁸⁴ Costas M. Constantinou. (1996). *On the Way to Diplomacy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 89 - 90.

studies field. The statist focus remains valuable as the traditional diplomatic institution endures at the heart of modern diplomacy. It is important to continue theorising on this age-old diplomatic actor. In addition, by categorising this type of diplomatic theory, TDT can be used as a solid benchmark or foundation upon which to compare different types of diplomatic theory.

Chapter Two – Traditional Diplomatic Theory

The aim of this chapter is to evidence Traditional Diplomatic Theory (TDT) within the canon of diplomacy studies.¹ This chapter will survey the general characteristics of a Traditional Diplomatic Theorist. From this survey a comprehensive profile of this type of diplomatic theorist is constructed. Each of the following sections will add layers to the profile of TDT. The construction of the TDT categorisation allows this thesis to appraise its strengths, weaknesses and relevancy to the modern diplomatic environment.

2.0 The origins of traditional diplomacy

The type of diplomacy on which Traditionalists² theorise is state-qua-state diplomacy, a practice that is influenced by historical tradition. Familiarity and continuity for the state and its official diplomatic institution are important; ‘in the often

¹ Within the canon the following works are prominent: Michael Graham Fry, Erik Goldstein and Richard Langhorne. (2002). *Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy*. London: Continuum; Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne. (1995). *The Practice of Diplomacy*. London: Routledge; G. Ball. (1976). *Diplomacy for a Crowded World*. London: Bodley Head; P. G. Lauren. (1976). *Diplomats and Bureaucrats*. California: Stanford; G. R. Berridge. (2002) *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. London: Palgrave; Francois De Callieres. (1983). *The Art of Diplomacy*, edited by M. A. Keens- Soper. Leicester: Leicester University Press; H. Nicolson. (1950). *Diplomacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Henry Kissinger. (1994). *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster; Adam Watson. (1982) *Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States*. London: Eyre Methuen; Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield. (1966). *Diplomatic Investigations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; H. Nicolson. (1998) *The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method: Being the Chichele Lectures delivered at the University of Oxford in November 1953*. Leicester: Diplomatic Studies Programme; Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George. (1995). *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Sir Ernest Satow. (1922). *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*. London: Longman; A. de Wicquefort. (1997) *The Ambassador and His Functions*. (translated by J. Digby in 1716 and reproduced by the Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, University of Leicester, 1997). In the canon, more general (Traditionalist) texts on diplomacy are: R. P. Barston. (1997). *Modern Diplomacy*. London: Longman; A. Eban. (1998). *Diplomacy for the Next Century*. New Haven: Yale University Press; C. W. Freeman. (1997) *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press; A. George. (1991) *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press; P. G. Lauren. (1979) *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy*. New York: Free Press; Kenneth W. Thompson. (1992). *Traditions and Values in Politics and Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press.

² For the remainder of this thesis traditional diplomatic theorists will be referred to as ‘Traditionalists’ (with a capital T) as this thesis evidences and builds a distinct group within the diplomatic studies field.

cacophonous political life tradition is certainly a factor to be reckoned with; none more so than in diplomacy'.³ The emphasis on tradition in diplomacy relates to a long historical period of development.

Preceding the traditional form of diplomacy was a long period of evolution, commonly described as Roman to Greek, Greek to Byzantine, Byzantine to Venetian, Venetian to French, French to European.⁴ However, in tracing the origins of traditional diplomacy, the French period of evolution in the 17th century is especially significant.⁵

Traditional diplomacy emerged in Europe following the ultimate cessation of the Thirty Years War in 1648.⁶ This was the year that the one hundred and ninety-four belligerents signed the Treaty of Westphalia. 1648 was the year of 'the emergence of the modern states system in International Politics'.⁷ This period marked the medieval to modern shift, the transition of European society from feudalism to a system of sovereign territorial states. The acceptance of 1648 as the inception of the state system is not

³ T. J. Otte. (1998) Harold Nicolson and Diplomatic Theory: Between Old Diplomacy and New. *DSP Discussion Papers*, No. 44 (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy), p. 125.

⁴ Within the diplomatic studies field there exists agreement on the evolution of diplomacy. For an informative account of the evolution of diplomacy see Raymond Cohen. (1999). *Reflections on the New Global Diplomacy: Statecraft 2500 BC to 2000 AD*, in Melissen, Jan (ed.). (1999). *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*. New York: Macmillan, pp. 1 – 18; Richard Langhorne in Jovan Kurbaliga (ed.). (1999). *Modern Diplomacy*. Valetta: Mediterranean Academy Diplomacy Studies; H. Nicolson. (1957). *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method*. London: Cassell Publishers; Charles Roetter. (1963). *Diplomatic Art: An informal history of world diplomacy*. Philadelphia: Macrae Smith, pp. 21 – 33.

⁵ For a through exploration of the evolution of diplomacy from the fifteenth century to the early 20th century see, M. S. Anderson. (1993). *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450 – 1919*. London: Longman; Josh Goldstein. (1988). *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 281 – 374; Garret Mattingly. (1955). *Renaissance Diplomacy*. Mineola: Dover Publications.

⁶ For a discussion on the causes, outbreak and resolution of the Thirty Years War see, Maurice Ashley. (1963). *Golden Century: Europe 1598 – 1715*. Troy: Phoenix Press, pp. 84 - 101; Geoffrey Mortimer. (2002). Individual Experience and Perception of the Thirty Years War in Eyewitness Personal Accounts. *German History*, 20 (2), pp. 141 – 160; Charles W. Kegley jr. and Gregory A. Raymond. (2002). *Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, pp. 12 – 83.

⁷ Richard Langhorne. (2000). Full Circle: New principles and old consequences in the modern diplomatic System. *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 1 (1), p. 33.

without controversy,⁸ however during the seventeenth century significant changes to international relations can be evidenced.⁹ In short, the Treaty of Westphalia ‘established principles that have endured and remained at the heart of contemporary international politics’.¹⁰ One of these principles was diplomacy.

The emerging state system needed a method to mitigate the conflict that had dominated Europe for a large part of the seventeenth century. This method was traditional diplomacy.¹¹ Both diplomacy and the state system emerged and evolved in mutual reciprocity. So much that the origins and development of diplomacy, along with international law and a balance of power, were fundamental to the early evolution of the European state system.

From the outset, European diplomacy espoused formal, ceremonial and pragmatic interaction based upon diplomatic norms.¹² In addition, European diplomacy was elitist, secret and confirmed the ‘remoteness of the ordinary citizen from foreign policy’.¹³ European diplomacy was pessimistic, realist, distinctly undemocratic and ‘was predicated

⁸ This thesis avoids entering the debate over the relevancy of the Treaty of Westphalia (1646 – 1648) as the inception of the modern state system. Instead this thesis employs the Treaty of Westphalia as a convenient date to classify a paradigm shift – from medievalism to modernism - in International Relations. There exists a wealth of literature on this particular debate however, notably see Stephen D. Krasner. (1995/96) Compromising Westphalia. *International Security*, 20 (3), pp. 115 – 151; Andreas Osiander. (2001). Sovereignty, International Relations and the Westphalian Myth. *International Organisation*, 55 (2), pp. 251 –287; Daniel Philpott. (1999). Westphalia, Authority and International Society. *Political Studies*, pp. 566 – 589.

⁹ This thesis employs the Treaty of Westphalia, as Caporaso suggests, as a ‘valuable point of departure’ in chronologically classifying a significant development or shift in the formation of a distinct opinion on contemporary diplomacy. For more on the central features of the Westphalian state see, Charles W. Kegley jr. and Gregory A. Raymond. (2002). *Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall; James Caporaso. (2000) Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority and Sovereignty. *International Studies Association*, pp. 1 – 28; James Caporaso. (1996) The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modern. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 34 (1), pp. 29 – 52.

¹⁰ Anon., (1999, December 30th). *States and Sovereignty*. The Times, London, UK, p.16.

¹¹ In this section traditional and European diplomacy are presented as one and the same.

¹² F. Gilbert. (1951). The “New Diplomacy” of the Eighteenth Century. *World Politics*, 4, pp. 6 – 7.

¹³ Kenneth Younger. (1964). Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy. *International Affairs*, 1, p. 22.

not on the peace-loving nature of states but on their propensity for war, which needed to be discouraged or balanced.’¹⁴

The system that discouraged war and managed relations between states was the balance of power.¹⁵ This system was greased by traditional diplomacy and was backed up by the intimidating military power of the five dominant European states: Britain, France, Germany (Prussia), Austria and Russia.¹⁶

The characteristics of this historical/traditional type of diplomacy - constitutional monarchies, mass colonialism or the distance of the public from international affairs, for example – cease to exist today, but the fundamental tenets of sovereignty, national interest, state representation and national security lie at the heart of traditional diplomacy. In addition to these tenets, there are also two necessary qualifications of traditional diplomacy.

The first qualification for diplomacy is that there must be more than one state. These states must be sovereign political units, able to exercise supreme authority within,

¹⁴ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 222.

¹⁵ In essence the ‘rule’ of the European balance of power system was that each of the five great powers (Britain, France, Germany (Prussia), Austria and Russia) should cooperate as necessary to preserve the balance, for this system was the principle means for discouraging any one state from seeking hegemony. Amongst the great powers, it was understood that considerable flexibility in making alliances and shifting alliance partners was necessary to this end. Permanent, rigid alliances were to be avoided, a rule violated with terrible consequences in the variant of the system before the Great War. For discussion on the efficacy of the Balance of Power system see Craig, Gordon A. and George, Alexander L. (1995). *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 25 – 43; Kissinger, Henry. (1994). *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 168 – 201.

¹⁶ For more information of the shape of the Balance of Power system, see M. Wight and H. Butterfield. (1966). *Diplomatic Investigations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Butterfield describes the system as a loose association of powerful states, distrustful of one another (‘secret agents, political adventurers and the adroit manipulators flourished’ under the Balance of Power system according to Butterfield in *Diplomatic Investigations*, p. 186) but keen to ensure affiliation of some sort. He notes that ‘the states within the system (however bitter their rivalries) belonged to a recognisable cultural group, and were members of the same ‘club’ – ready to compete for position within the ‘club’, but anxious not to destroy the club’ (Butterfield, *Diplomatic Investigations*, p. 189).

and independence outside, the unit.¹⁷ A second qualification is the existence of shared values and interests, which allow states to develop some regular pattern of interaction if these qualifications are to constitute a diplomatic system.¹⁸ The regular pattern of interaction, determined by national interest and facilitated by diplomacy, is a continuous rather than a sporadic activity.¹⁹

Guiding the pattern of state interaction is a coherent set of diplomatic rules that each state adheres to. These rules are designed to mitigate the complexity of the IR system through commonality. Different states have different languages, cultures, religions, histories and social values, for example, and diplomacy is the common currency running throughout the state system. Often, these differing state values can lead to conflict. In order to reduce this friction between states, traditional diplomacy is

¹⁷ Hedley Bull. (1977). *The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, p. 8.

¹⁸ Der Derian, *Mediating Estrangement*, p. 109.

¹⁹ For expansion of this theme, see M. S. Anderson. (1993). *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450 – 1919*. London: Longman, pp. 1 – 20; Garrett Mattingly. (1955). *Renaissance Diplomacy*. Mineola: Dover Publications, pp. 181 – 192. The need for continuity in foreign relations led to the creation of the resident ambassador, a development accredited to the period after the Thirty Years War. Although the Italian city state system had earlier generated the resident earlier and produced a clear statement of what it meant (‘the first duty of an ambassador is exactly the same as any other servant of a government, that is, to do, say, advise and think whatever may best serve the preservation and aggrandizement of his own state’) it was not until after the Thirty Years War that the resident Ambassador housed in the diplomatic embassy became a permanent feature of international relations (Barbaro, c1490 in Richard Langhorne. (2000). *Full Circle. Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 1 (1), p. 35). The need for diplomacy to be a continuous activity and not an occasional necessity, led to the permanent institutionalisation of the resident ambassador, and diplomacy as the primary means of state-qua-state interaction. The permanent institutionalisation of diplomacy and the notion of continuity is largely associated with France under the guidance of Richelieu and his successor, Mazarin. Both men were keen to develop a continuous flow of information, both inward and outward, from Paris. However, the realisation of such vision required a ‘unified system of management, under consistent and identifiable control, derived from a single source’, a notion unheard of and untried before in Europe (Langhorne, *Full Circle*, p. 37). Furthermore, France was keen to centralise foreign policy and distance herself from the practice that foreign policy was managed from the edge of the realm and open to interpretation by the whim of the autonomous resident. With France rapidly gaining major-power status, the significance of external relations was becoming increasingly important. This led to the creation of a centralised foreign ministry, a single, separate, office for the keeping of records and the control of French foreign affairs (Hamilton and Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy*, p. 72).

governed by a 'constitutive framework of principles, rules and organised behaviour in interstate relations'.²⁰

Commonality, familiarity (of rules) and standardisation are central to traditional diplomacy. This type of diplomacy:

is something they [states] have in common that enables them to communicate in a predictable and organised manner. Diplomats are the primary guardians and promoters of national interests of the states they represent but are at the same time members of a transnational group of professionals with a shared corporate culture, professional language, behavioral codes, entry procedures, socialisation patterns, norms and standards.²¹

The official practitioners of diplomacy are guided by these standardised norms of state interaction, designed to promote and protect national interest as well as lessening the anarchical nature of the IR system through the established diplomatic tools of negotiation, bargaining and communication.

These diplomatic rules took many years before they were codified. Today, the framework governing relations between states is the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR), which came into existence in 1961.²² The VCDR has several basic functions developed over time: to represent and protect national interests; negotiation;

²⁰ Jozef Batora. (2003). Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy? *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 'Clingendael'. No. 87, p. 1.

²¹ *ibid.*

²² For discussion on the pre-history and significance of the VCDR, see Richard Langhorne. (1992). The regulation of diplomatic practice: the beginnings to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961. *Review of International Studies*, 18, 3-17.

reporting and gathering of information; and the promotion of friendly relations, including economic, cultural, scientific and commercial interests.²³

All of the notions described above are insitutionalised in a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (or equivalent institution), which is characterised by: a hierarchically ordered standardised system of diplomatic ranks, a culture and practice of secrecy, one-way communication with the public and specialised processes of recruitment, socialisation and re-socialisation (the system of rotation between assignments at home and abroad).²⁴ These characteristics, like the diplomatic rules, slowly developed in the centuries following the Treaty of Westphalia. This long period of evolution confirms the importance of tradition and continuity to this form of diplomacy.

In the modern era, state-qua-state diplomacy remains wedded to tradition, and is heavily influenced by the historical development described above. In the modern sense, traditional diplomacy remains the ‘expression of a shared logic of appropriateness informing actions of and identities of states, distributing shared structures to all states’.²⁵ The notions of a shared logic, framework and structure endure at the heart of diplomacy allowing us a conceptualisation of tradition in diplomacy.

In light of this history, a definition of traditional diplomacy can be introduced. Traditional diplomacy can be described as an activity where ‘the foreign ministry and the national diplomatic systems over which it presides acts as a gatekeeper, monitoring and controlling the interactions between domestic and international policy environments and

²³ The VCDR is available from the United Nations, retrieved, 4th February 2006, <<http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/diplomat.htm>>

²⁴ Batora, Does The European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy?, p. 7.

²⁵ *ibid.*, p. 3.

funnelling information between them'.²⁶ In this thesis traditional diplomacy is defined as a nationally endorsed system of diplomatic representation made up of overseas missions overseen by a central government department, typically designated as the Foreign Ministry.²⁷

2.1 The central tenets of traditional diplomatic theory

Tradition is equally important to diplomatic theory. Traditionalists, as their moniker suggests, also stress tradition in diplomatic theory. Inherent to their theory is a belief in the centrality and omnipotence of the state and the diplomatic institution to diplomatic theory. Hence, a Traditionalist theorist endorses, advocates and relates the historical and modern omnipotence of the state to diplomatic theory.

Traditionalists contend that the state, and consequently the diplomatic institution, remain the most important political units in the modern diplomatic environment. A strong relation to the Westphalian state principles of territoriality,²⁸ authority, sovereignty,²⁹

²⁶ Hocking, *Privatizing Diplomacy?*, p. 150.

²⁷ *ibid.*

²⁸ For a discussion on the historical origins and contemporary relevance of territoriality, see K. J. Holsti. (2004). Territoriality, in K. J. Holsti. (2004). *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 73 – 112.

²⁹ See, Jean Bodin. (1992). *On Sovereignty Four Chapters from the Six Books of the Commonwealth*. Franklin Julian, ed. & translator, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 4. In the 16th century Jean Bodin provided the first systematic approach on national sovereignty. In his work, *Six Books of the Commonwealth*, in 1576, he defined sovereignty as 'the absolute and perpetual power of a Commonwealth...' and stated that 'he is absolutely sovereign who recognises nothing, after God, that is greater than himself.' According to Bodin the central notion of absolute sovereignty – of being the judge in your own cause – meant 'the most high, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a commonwealth'. For a discussion on the modern relevancy of the concept of sovereignty, see Andrew Coleman and Jackson Maogoto. (2003). After the Party, is there a Cure for the Hangover? The Challenges of the Global Economy to Westphalian Sovereignty. *Legal Issue of Economic Integration*, 30 (1), pp. 35 – 38. The modern IR system, according to Coleman and Maogoto, is based on the notion of absolute sovereignty. Of Sovereignty, they write that 'what nation states mean and what they desire to protect most of all, when they refer to sovereignty, is primarily that within the context of their borders their government has the competence to organise the nation-states domestic management at its own discretion' (p. 36). In other words, state sovereignty determines freedom from external influence, which is a form of political independence from external forces. For further discussion, see also, Charles W. Kegley jr. and Gregory A.

power and legitimacy underlies much of the Traditionalist's theory, and consolidates their argument that states are the primary actors in the modern diplomatic environment.

There are several historical examples of TDT. Each example has subtle variations but all export a similar message: the state, and its historical development, is central to diplomacy. For example, Butterfield describes traditional diplomacy as 'historical' diplomacy, reaching its zenith in the 'golden age' of eighteenth century Europe.³⁰ Historical diplomacy was characterised by 'the virtue of power, complicated techniques and detailed practices and governed by rules or maxims possessing a permanent validity so long as policy is being operated within a system of states'.³¹ Wight prefers the term 'classical diplomacy', as a 'civilised and civilising' activity relating to 'the nature of the international states-system' and lubricated by the traditional diplomatic institution, 'the master institution of international society'.³² Nicolson employs the term 'old diplomacy', which he describes as distinctly Euro centric and based on state principles to emerge following the treaty of Westphalia.³³ The common assumption in these observations on traditional diplomacy is that diplomacy is an activity associated with states.

More recent works on diplomacy convey a similar statist message. For example in his 2003 book *Diplomacy*, Riordan refers consistently to 'traditional diplomatic structures', which he associates with the Westphalian system dominated by a highly rigid,

Raymond. (2002). *Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, pp. 131 – 132; K. J. Holsti. (2004). *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 112 – 143; Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk. (1992). *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmented Globe*. Aldershot: Ashgate, Edward Elgar, pp. 1 – 13.

³⁰ Butterfield and Wight, *Diplomatic Investigations*, p. 183.

³¹ *ibid.*

³² *ibid.*, pp. 10 – 12.

³³ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, p. 28.

hierarchical policy formulation and decision making process.³⁴ And Kissinger writes that three centuries after Westphalia ‘there is little evidence to suggest that this age old model of diplomacy has changed, or is likely to change in the decades ahead’.³⁵ Kissinger’s views suggest that diplomatic theory embodies continuity and evolution, rather than revolution. Revolution ‘is hardly the dominant metaphor in the field, there has been relatively little genuine innovation’ in terms of diplomatic theory.³⁶ Therefore, it could be argued that traditional diplomatic theory focuses on ‘explaining not change, but rather enduring regularities’ in diplomacy.³⁷ In other words, diplomatic theory is concerned with maintaining continuity and tradition in scholarship.

Attempts to convey the essence of diplomatic theory have the state at their core, which further reinforces the notions of continuity and tradition.³⁸ In *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* (2001), Berridge, for example, correlates the inception of diplomatic theory to the emergence of the Westphalian State system. He writes ‘when it became clear that the rulers of Europe had a common interest in regulating their frequently bellicose ‘foreign’ relations, diplomatic theory acquired an explicit political flavour’.³⁹ Consequently, diplomatic theory explains ‘diplomacy by reference to the business of a multiplicity of states, and [the theorists] who are persuaded of its

³⁴ Shaun Riordan. (2003). *The New Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 13. Riordan highlights that the key points of the Westphalian diplomatic system – that came to prominence in the 19th century - were that nations had complete jurisdiction over their domestic affairs; there was no superior jurisdiction to the nation state; international law existed only in so far as it permitted the minimal rules of coexistence between states; and war was permitted to resolve disputes between states, ‘might is right’ being a key principle of international relations. (Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*, p. 12)

³⁵ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 19.

³⁶ Miles Kahler. (1997). ‘Inventing International Relations: International Relations Theory after 1945’ in M. Doyle and G. J. Ikenberry. (eds), *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, p. 42.

³⁷ *ibid.*

³⁸ For example, see G. R. Berridge. (2002). *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. London: Palgrave; P. G. Lauren. (ed.). (1979). *Diplomacy: New Approaches History, Theory, and Policy*. New York: Free Press.

³⁹ Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, p. 2.

indispensable usefulness – amounting to necessity – to the European states-system’.⁴⁰ Although Berridge argues that over time the work of diplomatic theorists⁴¹ suggests an ‘evolution of diplomatic theory’, he later notes that many of the observations of the earlier theorists ‘have remained points of departure for diplomatic theory to the present time’.⁴² Therefore, evolution of diplomatic theory is slight, rather than dramatic.

The majority of diplomatic theorists, ranging from De Callieres (1716) to Berridge (2002), endorse the central tenets of diplomatic theory described above. These tenets are broad rather than specific and are evident in most works that this thesis labels as Traditional.

2.2 The typical assumptions of a Traditional Diplomatic Theorist

There are certain assumptions that qualify diplomatic theorists as Traditionalists. These are broad assumptions, but not every Traditionalist will demonstrate all of these characteristics. However, consolidating these characteristics is fundamental to developing the category of TDT.

The first assumption is that Traditionalists describe diplomacy as an exclusive state function. They infer ‘that diplomacy is the privileged domain of professional diplomats, conducted almost exclusively by Foreign Service personnel and officials from Foreign Ministries’.⁴³ In other words, Traditionalists champion an exclusive, statist focus on a type of diplomacy practiced by official government representatives. In the modern

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴¹ See G. R. Berridge. (2001). *Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissinger*. London: Palgrave. The diplomatic theorists under consideration are Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Grotious, Richelieu, Wicquefort, Callieres, Satow, Nicolson and Kissinger.

⁴² Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, p. 2.

⁴³ Donna Lee and David Hudson. (2004). The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy. *Review of International Studies*, 30, p. 345.

era, this traditional practice is one where professional, officially accredited state representatives are portrayed as the gatekeepers of a sacrosanct historical tradition.

Secondly, Traditionalists interpret diplomacy as the study of the international realm of sovereign states, with the central purpose of diplomacy being to overcome the anarchical nature of that system and facilitate peaceful relationships amongst sovereign states. Traditionalists promote the notion of the state operating in an anarchical environment and attempting to mitigate the uncertainty and turbulence of the system through familiar, historical channels of diplomacy.⁴⁴ In this light, TDT:

establishes the idea that diplomacy is constituted by, and also constitutes, state sovereignty. State sovereignty, in turn, constitutes the anarchic systemic structures characterised by a separation of the domestic from the international, the economic from the political, and the private from the public.⁴⁵

This separation of the high political agenda from the low political agenda allows Traditionalists, thirdly, to focus on diplomacy's role in relation to classic political-military agenda. This traditional high agenda can be described as a:

conception of international relations, where states are motivated by considerations of measurable power. Thus, foreign affairs among states is fundamentally concerned with war and peace, and the employment of state power vis-à-vis other states. These traditional political-

⁴⁴ For diplomacy's role in mitigating the anarchical setting of IR, see Hedley Bull. (1977). *The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics*. New York: Columbia University Press; M. Wight and H. Butterfield. (1966). *Diplomatic Investigations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; and Adam Watson. (1982). *Diplomacy*. New York: Eyre Methuen.

⁴⁵ Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 354.

military concerns, which include issues such as force balances, demarcation of territories, arms control negotiations and alliance cohesion, have not been replaced.⁴⁶

Traditionalists therefore focus largely, but not exclusively, on diplomacy's role in relation to the high political agenda. Low political issues – socio-economics or humanitarian aid, for example – are considered 'peripheral, rather than central to diplomatic practice' and, subsequently, traditional theoretical understanding.⁴⁷

Fourthly, Traditionalists consider diplomatic history central to their theory.⁴⁸ The study of diplomacy, they argue, demands an embracing of the distant as well as the recent

⁴⁶ Jeffery R. Cooper, 'Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries', 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, <www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html>

⁴⁷ Lee and Hudson, *The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy*, p. 347.

⁴⁸ Alongside the three diplomatic theories this thesis introduces there is a case for, similarly, introducing diplomatic historians as an independent category within diplomatic studies. However this thesis has avoided their inclusion because they are historians and not theorists. Their scholarship has 'tended to be descriptive rather than analytical' (Gordon A. Craig. (1983). *The Historian and the Study of International Relations. American Historical Review*, 88 (1), p. 7.). Like the Traditionalists, Diplomatic historians endorse the dominance of the state in historical considerations of diplomacy. They offer a reinterpretation of historical events or narrative, and enforce a perception of diplomacy as a statist, traditional activity. If analysis is forthcoming in diplomatic history it is a re-examination of the historical narrative. Scholarship in Diplomatic History began in the 19th century with the release of a great series of international treaties and diplomatic documents. Diplomatic History is the study of a 'sort of official handwriting, the archives, constitutes the greater part of the method of the diplomatic historian' (Sharp, *For Diplomacy*, p. 37). Diplomatic historians concern themselves with the study of statecraft and the conduct of foreign policy at the highest level of the state, the purpose being to record a 'formal narrative of what actually happened, and at the same time reveal the pattern of secret strategies of monarchs and statesmen' (Juliet Gardiner. (1988). *What is History Today?* London: Macmillan, p. 131). Understanding of past events and behaviour, through the study of original documents, remains the backbone of the discipline. As such the produce of diplomatic historians can offer a rigorous narrative insight into the complex interaction of states, diplomats and statesmen. With regard to research activities, diplomatic historian's source material is traditional diplomatic documents, correspondence between governments and instructions to embassies. The nature of this material however is restrictive, due to the secretive necessity of protecting state interest and the slow release of official documents by governments, for example the British Government has a thirty-year rule before releasing documents to the Public Records Office (PRO). For discussion on the past, present and future of Diplomatic History, see, Colin Elman and Miriam Elman. (1997). *Diplomatic History and International Relations: Respecting Differences and Crossing Boundaries. International Security*, 22 (1), pp. 5 – 21; P. Schroeder. (1977) *Quantitative Studies in the Balance of Power: An Historian's Reaction. Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 21 (1), pp 3 –22; J. L. Gaddis. (1987) *Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Enrichment of Security Studies. International Security*, 12 (1), pp 3-21; Stephen Haber. (1997). *Brothers Under the Skin: Diplomatic History and International Relations. International Security*, 22 (1), pp 34-43. For a classic example of a work devoted entirely to diplomatic history, see, Rene Albrecht-Carrie. (1967). *A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna*. London: Methuen and Company.

past. TDT is heavily influenced by history; rigorous theoretical testing grounds are to be found in the distant past as well as the recent. For Traditionalists, considering the rich tapestry that diplomacy has woven since its inception at the ‘dawn of history’, there is an intrinsic link between history and modern diplomatic theory.⁴⁹ This ‘propensity to treat the future as an extension of the past’ is a central feature of TDT, and suggests that the Traditionalist’s attitude is ‘psychologically more comforting than living with an uncertain future’.⁵⁰ Therefore, Traditionalists endorse historical continuity in diplomatic theory, which suggests a reluctance to incorporate innovation and originality to concepts of diplomatic theory.

Fifthly, Traditionalists write prescriptive guides to diplomacy where they theorise on the practice of diplomacy. Satow’s *Guide to Diplomacy* (1957), Berridge’s *Diplomacy, Theory and Practice* (2002) and Rana’s *The 21st Century Ambassador* (2004) can be classified as such. These types of books are ‘manuals of diplomatic procedure, in the tradition of the guides that made their appearance early in the European system, and continue to dominate the field’.⁵¹ They convey a view of diplomacy as a specialised skill of negotiation, the vocation of the select few and are beneficial for the novice entering the profession.⁵² These works are guides on the practice of traditional diplomacy, *how to conduct diplomacy*, and naturally reinforce statist interpretations of diplomacy. In terms of informing the academic and practitioner as to the rules, procedures and processes of traditional diplomacy, their contribution is valuable.

⁴⁹ Harold Nicolson. (1957). *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method*. London: Cassell Publishers, p. 2.

⁵⁰ Luc Reyehler. (1996). Beyond Traditional Diplomacy. *DSP Discussion Papers*, (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy), p. 4.

⁵¹ Adam Watson. (1982) *Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States*. London: Eyre Methuen, p. 11.

⁵² Der Derian, *On Diplomacy*, p. 2.

Sixthly and finally, Traditionalists have a sentimental view of diplomacy. They describe diplomacy as an art, the vocation of the privileged and select few and portray the traditional diplomatic institution in a nepotistic fashion. Traditionalists endorse a classical view of diplomacy, heavily influenced by the historical refinement of diplomacy since the 17th century. Traditionalists are unconcerned with the impact of alternate actors or environments on traditional diplomacy, preferring to endorse fierce loyalty to their beloved traditional diplomatic institution. These six common characteristics are evident in the majority of TDT.

2.3 The range within Traditional diplomatic theory: exclusive to inclusive

So far, this chapter has highlighted commonality amongst Traditionalists. However, there are different types or ranges of TDT. These can range from an exclusive state focus (with no consideration of alternate diplomatic actors) to a more inclusive state focus (concentrating centrally on the role of the state, but acknowledging emerging non-state diplomatic actors).

Differentiation in TDT becomes apparent when the eras in which respective Traditionalist's work are identified. When De Callieres' work was first published (1716) he focused exclusively on the fledgling diplomatic institution. When Satow (1917) and Nicolson (1939, 1954) were writing, the traditional diplomatic institution was also central, however both authors incorporated observations on emerging international organisations. In the modern era, Berridge (2002) too has the state in mind, but devotes attention to the proliferation of NGOs, summitry and multilateral diplomacy.

Despite this exclusive to inclusive range, state-centrality is natural for all Traditionalists. This continuity allows each generation to build on the foundations laid by their theoretical forefathers. Each of the Traditionalists relies on, develops and expresses an admiration for the work of their predecessors. A few examples illustrate this trend.

One of the earliest Traditionalists is Francois De Callieres, who published *On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes* in 1716. It is De Callieres who:

most tellingly explains diplomacy by reference to the business of a multiplicity of states, and who is persuaded of its indispensable usefulness – amounting to necessity – to the European states-system.⁵³

Alongside De Callieres' affinity to the state system, his testament to diplomacy demonstrates several hallmarks of TDT. Firstly, the book is largely prescriptive and is written with the practitioner in mind. In the 18th century, this work became 'one of the standard references on diplomatic practice' and was 'considered essential reading for prospective diplomats'.⁵⁴ Secondly, De Callieres demonstrates a belief in the intrinsic link between history and diplomatic theory. He advises any young diplomatist to:

⁵³ Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, p. 3.

⁵⁴ Maurice Keens-Soper, 'Francois De Callieres and Diplomatic Theory', in Berridge, G.R., (2001). *Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissinger*. London: Palgrave, p. 107. The Chapter 'Callieres' (written by Maurice Keens-Soper, in Berridge, G. R. (2001). *Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissinger*. London: Palgrave) is a revised version of an earlier paper: Keens-Soper, Maurice. (1973) Francois De Callieres and Diplomatic Theory. *The Historical Journal*, 16 (3), 485 – 508.

inform himself of all the treaties that have been made since that time [the fifteenth century] but more especially of those which have been concluded between the chief potentates of Europe, beginning with the treaties of Westphalia, down to the present time.⁵⁵

According to Keens-Soper, ‘De Callieres is not interested in past events solely for themselves. Their usefulness is to point a lesson, he calls on two centuries of foreign affairs to drive home and illustrate the abiding predicament of states’.⁵⁶ That abiding predicament is the ‘haphazard coexistence of several states’.⁵⁷ In other words, for De Callieres, states exist under anarchical conditions, which is a third characteristic of the Traditionalists. The three premises – prescription, history and mitigating anarchy - of De Callieres clearly identify him as an early Traditionalist. His work was to provide a strong foundation for, and to have great influence on, later generations of Traditionalists.

Satow (when writing two centuries later), for example, considered the work of De Callieres as a ‘mine of political wisdom’.⁵⁸ Satow’s *Guide to Diplomatic Practice* (1917) is certainly a Traditionalist work, which is to be expected considering the era when it was first published. The dominance of traditional diplomacy as the foremost conduit for international intercourse between states was irrefutable. Non-state diplomatic actors and environments were not of the size or scope they are today, and attracted only fleeting attention from Satow. His ubiquitous definition of diplomacy as ‘the official relations between the governments of independent states’ and the subsequent ‘conduct of business

⁵⁵ Francois De Callieres. (1983). *The Art of Diplomacy*. Edited by M. A. Keens-Soper and K. W. Schweizer. Leicester: Leicester University Press, p. 57.

⁵⁶ Maurice Keens-Soper, ‘Francois De Callieres and Diplomatic Theory’, in Berridge, G.R., (2001). *Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissinger*. London: Palgrave, p. 110.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*

⁵⁸ Satow in T.G. Otte, ‘A Guide to Diplomacy: The Writings of Sir Ernest Satow’, in Berridge, G.R., (2001). *Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissinger*. London: Palgrave, p. 129.

between states' demonstrates his emphasis on diplomacy as a traditional state activity.⁵⁹ *The Guide* is largely a testament to traditional diplomacy's preoccupation with strict rules of protocol and appropriate diplomatic conduct. Alongside this emphasis on the appropriate rules of diplomacy, runs a thorough historical evolution of diplomacy in respect to the state, and the professional diplomat within the state system.

The *Guide* primarily relates to traditional diplomacy's insistence on diplomatic appropriateness. For example, Satow includes chapters on the historical, traditional privileges and immunities of the head of a foreign state,⁶⁰ the Minister of Foreign Affairs,⁶¹ the strict rules of diplomatic precedence among states and the language and forms of diplomatic intercourse,⁶² which includes the appropriate fashion in which a diplomat should communicate through letters, memorandum and notes all governed by strict 'rules and conventions'.⁶³

Satow, like De Callieres, writes with the novice diplomat in mind and aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the sacrosanct intricacies of traditional diplomacy. Satow's work is a sound example of a prescriptive guide to diplomacy, with a strong emphasis on the practical and regulatory aspects of how best to manage inter-state dialogue through diplomacy. Lord Butler encapsulates the intended audience of *The Guide*, describing it as 'invaluable to any young man entering the service'.⁶⁴ Otte agrees, writing of Satow's *Guide* that the audience was intentional, that he 'placed special emphasis on the practical aspects of diplomacy' with the desire to 'impart practical

⁵⁹ Sir Ernst Satow. (1957). *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, 4th edition. London: Longmans, Green & Co., p. 3.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 9 – 11.

⁶¹ *ibid.*, pp. 12 – 19.

⁶² *ibid.*, pp. 21 – 26.

⁶³ *ibid.*, pp. 38 – 54.

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, Introduction.

advice to budding diplomats'.⁶⁵ *The Guide* is one of the classic texts on diplomacy, not only for its usefulness to the practitioner but also for the continuation of TDT.

Harold Nicolson extends this trend. In *The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method*, (1957) he too expresses admiration for the work of his traditional forefathers, regarding De Callieres' work as 'the best manual on diplomatic method ever written'.⁶⁶ Nicolson naturally demonstrates several theoretical similarities to both De Callieres and Satow – the centrality of the state, the value of history and the anarchical nature of the system to diplomatic theory. His admiration of previous Traditionalists illustrates the long line of continuity in their writings. Rather than regurgitate similar observations of De Callieres and Satow, Nicolson's comments on a nascent diplomatic environment – conference diplomacy - illustrate the centrality of the state to his writings, despite a radical environmental change.⁶⁷ In his final summation, however, Nicolson was unconvinced of the efficacy of conference diplomacy over traditional diplomacy, writing it was 'perhaps the most unfortunate diplomatic methods ever conceived'.⁶⁸ Nicolson accepted that 'there was no turning back to the good old days of old diplomacy' but his sentimentality did not lessen his tirade against conference diplomacy.⁶⁹ One of Nicolson's most eloquent

⁶⁵ Otte in Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, p. 128.

⁶⁶ Nicolson, *The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method*, p. 62.

⁶⁷ Nicolson, like De Callieres and Satow, writes with the state in mind. An excerpt from Nicolson, H. (1970). *The Congress of Vienna*, illustrates in a broad sense his observations of diplomacy, he writes: 'Foreign policy is based upon a general conception of national requirements; and this conception derives from the need of self-preservation, the constantly changing shapes of economic and strategic advantage and the condition of public opinion as affected at the time...diplomacy.. is not an end but a means; not a purpose but a method. It seeks, by the use of reason, conciliation and the exchange of interests, to prevent major conflicts arising between sovereign States. It is the agency through which foreign policy seeks to attain its purposes by agreement rather than by war' (p. 164).

⁶⁸ T. G. Otte, Nicolson, in Berridge, G. R. et al. (2001). *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, London: Palgrave, pp. 151 – 181.

⁶⁹ *ibid.*, p. 152.

testimonies (according to Otte he ‘never wrote a boring line in his life’) to conference diplomacy can be found in *The Evolution*, he writes:⁷⁰

These conferences...do much to diminish the utility, guile and wisdom of statesmen as they entail much publicity, many rumours and wide speculation - in that they tempt those involved to achieve quick, spectacular and often fictitious results – they tend to promote rather than allay suspicion, and to create those very states of uncertainty which it is the purpose of sound diplomatic interaction to prevent.⁷¹

Nicolson’s disdain for conference diplomacy is obvious, as is his admiration for the historically refined techniques of traditional diplomacy. The above quote also demonstrates the Traditionalist disdain for revolution in diplomatic theory and practice. The subtle inference above speaks of continuity and evolution, familiarity and commonality, which are central qualities of a Traditionalist. Always writing with the state in mind, Nicolson was said to view the world ‘only through the embassy window’.⁷²

Continuing the long line of Traditionalists, Berridge provides a sound modern example. He too describes diplomacy from a prescriptive, practical and state focus. In the introduction to his hallmark work, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* (2002), this statist focus is unmistakable:

Diplomacy is an essentially political activity and, well resourced and skilful, a major ingredient of power. Its chief purpose is to enable states to secure the objectives of their foreign

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, p. 151.

⁷¹ Nicolson, *The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method*, p. 89.

⁷² Wilson in Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, p. 151.

policies.....it follows that diplomacy consists of communications between officials designed to promote foreign policy.⁷³

While a statist tone is clear, Berridge also demonstrates his modernity and inclusivity, specifically the need to acknowledge less traditional diplomatic actors and environments. He even writes that:

Diplomacy is not merely what professional diplomats do. It is carried out by other officials and by private persons under the direction of officials...it is also carried out through many different channels besides the traditional resident mission.⁷⁴

However, Berridge is quick to realign state focus, informing the reader that ‘together with the balance of power, which it both reinforces and reflects, diplomacy is the most important institution of our society of states’.⁷⁵ From the outset, the reader is left in no doubt that the focus of the book is on traditional diplomacy. Within *Diplomacy*, Berridge adroitly discusses the art of negotiation, prenegotiation, around the table negotiations, diplomatic momentum and packaging agreements before presenting in the second part of the book the modes of diplomacy, from bilateral to multilateral, summitry and mediation. The state and traditional diplomacy are central throughout. For Berridge, the ongoing state reliance on traditional diplomacy is understandable and comforting, inasmuch as the traditional diplomatic institution ensures continuity, familiarity and predictability.

⁷³ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 1.

⁷⁴ *ibid.*

⁷⁵ *ibid.*

In his concluding remarks, Berridge typifies the moderate inclusivity of a modern TDT, noting that ‘while there remains a state system – international diplomacy, bilateral or multilateral, direct or indirect, at the summit or below, remains essential’.⁷⁶ Even in the conclusion, however, Berridge is keen to remind the reader of the importance of the state and traditional diplomacy to diplomatic theory.

All of the above Traditionalist contributions illustrate a preference for continuity and gradual evolution of diplomatic theory over change and revolution. The different types of traditional diplomatic theorists are not really so different. Instead, the evolution of diplomatic theory from De Callieres to Berridge demonstrates a reaction to changes in the diplomatic environment. Despite the broadening of the diplomatic environment to include non-state actors and environments all of modern Traditionalists advocate the state as central to their theory, just as their predecessors did. Their abhorrence towards radicalism and the centrality of the traditional diplomatic institution are the foundations of TDT.

⁷⁶ *ibid.*, p. 209.

2.4 Evidencing TDT within the canon of diplomacy studies

The purpose of the following sections is to evidence the central tenets and common assumptions of TDT within the canon of diplomatic studies. The aim is to locate and evidence Traditionalism within the canon of diplomacy studies. The characteristics of the Traditionalists are then consolidated and some broad examples of their work introduced, which adds validity to the argument that we can speak of a distinct faction of Traditionalists within the diplomacy studies field.

2.4.1 Diplomacy defined from a Traditionalist perspective

A literature review of the traditional canon of diplomacy studies illustrates the centrality of TDT to diplomacy studies. The longevity and modern prominence of Traditionalism remains important for diplomacy studies, for ‘at the heart any worthwhile theory of international relations must lie a theory of traditional diplomacy’.⁷⁷ The statist focus is important in attempting to understand the modern diplomatic environment, for the state and the traditional diplomatic institution will remain important diplomatic actors, and merit continued attention.

Each of the following definitions of diplomacy distinguishes itself by subtle nuances, however each fundamentally impresses upon the reader the now familiar message: that the state is central to any theoretical understanding of diplomacy. That message describes diplomacy as a method of dealing with international problems through traditional diplomatic channels. Diplomacy is portrayed as a conservative, change resistant activity, concerned primarily with negotiation and communication. These

⁷⁷ Paul Sharp. (2003). Herbert Butterfield, the English School and the civilizing virtues of diplomacy. *International Affairs*, 79 (4), p. 856.

definitions are widely employed, popular and immediately recognisable as the core of TDT.

Hedley Bull defines diplomacy as ‘the conduct of relations between sovereign states with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means’.⁷⁸ Bull’s definition endorses a state-centric view of diplomacy, which has the advantage of being a concise, simple and manageable interpretation. Similarly, for Wight, diplomacy is best understood in statist terms. Wight considers diplomacy as ‘inextricably connected to the existence and operation of a state system’.⁷⁹ For example, Wight notes of diplomacy that:

the various activities and institutions of diplomacy, such as the exchange of resident ambassadors, the activity of communication between states, the practice of diplomatic immunity, the holding of congresses and conferences, the negotiation of treaties and agreements of various kinds, are not only distinguishing features of diplomacy but also a foundational element of any society of independent states.⁸⁰

In this statement, Wight once more demonstrates the central features of a traditional approach to diplomacy; that diplomacy is an activity between states based on historical principles and governed by regulated practice.

G.R. Berridge also packages diplomacy simply and in statist terms. He writes that ‘diplomacy is the term given to the official channels of communication employed by the members of a system of states’.⁸¹ He adds that ‘the chief purpose of diplomacy is to enable states to secure the objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force,

⁷⁸ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 156.

⁷⁹ Wight in Jackson, Martin Wight’s Thought on Diplomacy, p. 3.

⁸⁰ Wight and Butterfield, *Diplomatic Investigations*, p. 22.

⁸¹ Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, p. 1.

propaganda, or law’.⁸² Berridge recognises that ‘diplomacy is the most important institution of our society of states’, like Wight, his definition enforces a view of diplomacy as a traditional, statist activity.⁸³

Nicolson’s definition of diplomacy differs slightly from Bull, Wight and Berridge in that he emphasises the importance of the role of ambassadors and envoys when defining diplomacy. According to Nicolson, ‘diplomacy is the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist’.⁸⁴ Portraying diplomacy in this fashion is perhaps too simple a depiction. By describing diplomacy through its traditional function – negotiation – Nicolson is confining diplomacy to a singular activity. However, diplomacy is not only about negotiation. Many diplomats perform other key tasks such as information gathering and dissemination and many seasoned international negotiators are not professional diplomats. Diplomacy portrayed as simply negotiation seems therefore ‘to capture only part of the riches of diplomatic life’.⁸⁵

Besides restricting diplomacy to negotiation, Nicolson also writes from a traditional, statist viewpoint, which is indicative of the period during which he wrote.⁸⁶ Moreover, Nicolson describes diplomacy as the ‘management’ of IR, suggesting that it is

⁸² Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 1

⁸³ *ibid.*

⁸⁴ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, p. 15.

⁸⁵ Jan Melissen (ed.). (1999). *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*. New York: Macmillan, p. xvii.

⁸⁶ Nicolson’s reputation as a writer on diplomacy has come to rest on two books. *Diplomacy* and *The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method*, were published in 1939 and 1954 respectively. For a brief biography of Nicolson and his contribution to diplomatic theory see, T. G. Otte. (1998) Harold Nicolson and Diplomatic Theory: Between Old Diplomacy and New. *DSP Discussion Papers*, No. 44 (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy). A more in-depth account of Nicolson is provided by Derek Drinkwater. (2005). *Sir Harold Nicolson and International Relations: The Practitioner as Theorist*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

within diplomacy's obligation to the state system to monitor, control and guide individual states through peaceful management of the system.

Satow develops this peaceful management aspect of diplomacy further. He defines diplomacy as 'the application of intelligence or tact to the conduct of relations between the governments of independent states; or more briefly still, the conduct of business between states by *peaceful* means'.⁸⁷ Satow adds that 'persuasive argument, if applied skilfully and sensitively at the right time, may achieve a better result than persuasion too obviously backed by the threat of force'.⁸⁸ He claims that diplomacy is 'the best means devised by civilisation for preventing international relations from being governed by force alone'.⁸⁹ In other words, diplomacy is concerned with mitigating the anarchical nature of the IR system, which can occasionally erupt in conflict. For Satow, diplomacy and conflict are mutually exclusive, with diplomacy conceptualised as a far more pacific and preferable alternative to conflict. Therefore, diplomacy and war can be misinterpreted as exclusive forces, rather than 'activities which can take place simultaneously or may follow from one another'.⁹⁰

⁸⁷ Satow, *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice*, p. 1.

⁸⁸ *ibid.*

⁸⁹ *ibid.*

⁹⁰ Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p. xvi. The history of the state system suggests that war and diplomacy are not fundamentally opposed. For example, Sofer quotes the younger Moltke after losing the battle of the Marne in 1914 to validate the widely held view that diplomacy, certainly in the past, was employed to induce conflict. Moltke declared that 'the highest art of diplomacy in my opinion does not consist in preserving the peace under all circumstances but in shaping the political situation of the state continually in such a manner that it is in a position to enter the war under favorable circumstance' (in Sasson Sofer. (2005). Guardians of the Practitioners' Virtue: Diplomats at the Warriors Den. *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 16, p. 2). See also Fry, Goldstein and Langhorne (2002), who in their introduction note that 'war in the nineteenth century was a normal, legitimate instrument of policy, an extension and logical conclusion of diplomacy' (p. ix). Morgenthau also notes of the role of diplomacy in the past that 'when war was the normal activity of kings, the task of diplomacy was not to prevent it, but to bring it about at the most propitious moment' (Politics Among Nations, New York: Knopf, p. 592). For a modern discussion on the non-exclusivity of war and diplomacy see, Sharad Joshi. *Coercive Diplomacy and Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Paper prepared for presentation at the International Studies Association annual conference, Montreal, Canada, March 17 – 20, 2004; Anders Stephanson. (2001). War and Diplomatic History. *Diplomatic History*, 25 (3), pp. 393 – 403; David Stevenson. (1997). *Militarisation and Diplomacy in*

These definitions are useful as they confirm a trend amongst Traditionalists: they appear reluctant to engage in revolutionary study. Modern Traditionalists prefer to slightly tweak these simple observations of their theoretical forefathers. The widely employed and lasting definitions cited above demonstrate subtle nuances but are fundamentally conveying a straightforward message: that diplomacy is a traditional, conservative activity between states. In this respect there is nothing inherently interesting in the modern diplomatic environment because there is nothing of significance in what is new.

Europe before 1914. International Security, 22 (1), 125 -161. And for empirical evidence (mostly from Eastern Europe during the Balkan Crisis) of the inclusivity of force and diplomacy see, Carl Bildt. (2000). Force and Diplomacy. *Survival*, 42 (1), 141 – 148. For an opposing argument, that diplomacy and war are mutually exclusive see, Barry Steiner. (1998). Preventive Diplomacy in Historical Perspective. *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 9 (1), pp, 1 – 23.

2.5 Specific examples of TDT

To illustrate the different types of diplomatic theory presented in this thesis the opinions of Traditionalists on six themes is presented. These six themes are evident in the majority of modern diplomatic literature. They concern the impact of changes and challenges detrimentally affecting the traditional diplomatic institution. These themes are employed to highlight divergence of opinion among the various categories of theorists constructed in this thesis. The provision of specific examples of TDT further informs this category of theorists.

2.5.1 TDT counter to the declining state argument

Traditionalists are not concerned with declining state arguments.⁹¹ They argue that the increasing complexity of the IR system demands more familiarity, stability and continuity through traditional diplomacy, not less. Indeed, as ‘the number of states increases, the complexity of the problems confronting them multiplies and the urgency attending them grows’ the diplomatic institution continues to demonstrate its versatility

⁹¹ The argument that the state was under threat from the emergence of non-state actors prompted a wealth of literature, which portrayed (mostly) a bleak future for the state. For example, Ohmae wrote of the ‘the end of the state’ (1995), Dunn of the ‘contemporary crisis of the state’ (1995) and Wolf asked if the ‘state would survive?’ (2001). Such rhetoric came to dominate the IR discipline during the uncertain decade following the end of the Cold War. Related works suggested a withering, hollowing out and decline in the legitimacy of the state. For example, see Robert Wesson. (1990). *International Relations in Transition*. Inglewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall; Susan Strange. (1995). The Defective State. *Daedalus*, 124 (2), 55 – 7; Susan Strange. (1997). The Erosion of the State. *Current History*, November, 365 – 369; Rik Coolsaet. (1998). The Transformation of Diplomacy at the Threshold of the New Millennium. *Diplomatic Studies Program*, Leicester University, No. 48, 1 – 25; Richard Langhorne. (2000). Full Circle: New principles and old consequences in the modern diplomatic System. *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 1(1), 33-46; Shampa Biswas. (2002). W(h)ither the Nation-state? National and State Identity in the Face of Fragmentation and Globalisation. *Global Society*, 16 (2), 175 – 198; Glenn P. Hastedt and Kay M. Knickrehm. (2003). *International Politics in a Changing World*. New York: Longman; Kanishka Jayasuriya. (2004). Breaking the ‘Westphalian’ Frame: Regulatory State, Fragmentation and Diplomacy. *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*. Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’. No 90, 1 – 21; Charles W. Kegley jr. and Gregory A. Raymond. (2005). *The Global Future*. Belmont: Thompson.

and relevance.⁹² The diplomatic institution is optimally placed to grease the complex IR system by promoting shared norms and ideas that ‘help promote confidence, stability, predictability, and the trust that are the foundations’ of a stable IR environment.⁹³

Traditionalists advocate several responses to the ‘withering’ state arguments.⁹⁴ Their main criticism of these arguments is that they are paradoxical. The state’s demise is predicted yet there is little evidence to support these claims. Traditionalists claim that ‘we still do not have ways of comprehending the diminished role of states without at the same time privileging them as superior to all actors in the global arena’.⁹⁵ In other words, arguments of the declining state are forwarded by non-statist authors while the state system endures and expands. This contradiction does not occupy much print space in the traditional canon. Quite simply, Traditionalists argue that if the state system, and the diplomacy that lubricates it, are irrelevant or obsolete then why do they continue to exist and endure?

For Traditionalists, the portrayal of the state as obsolete or irrelevant rests upon broad and ill-founded stereotypes. The portrayal of states as archaic or Westphalian, obsessed with the politics of a bygone era, sowing the seeds for inevitable conflict fuelled by clashes of national interest, territorial discrepancy and ideological differences, is a simplistic misperception. According to Traditionalists, the state’s reliance upon archaic, traditional and outdated practices is misunderstood. They argue that if a practice is archaic or traditional it does not necessarily mean that the practice is obsolete or ineffective. Rather the reason that the state system, greased by traditional diplomacy,

⁹² Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 111.

⁹³ Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*, p. 195.

⁹⁴ These arguments are introduced and critiqued in the following chapter: Nascent Diplomatic Theory.

⁹⁵ Sheryl J. Brown, ‘Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries’, 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, <www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html>

endures is that no alternative system has promised to be as effective (at mitigating the anarchical nature of the IR system).

Furthermore, Traditionalists also counter that the state's reluctance to change or evolve is misinterpreted as a resistance to change. Traditionalists highlight that not only is this misrepresentation problematic it also encourages dangerous thinking; rhetoric that advocates a shift from the stability, order and continuity of the state system to the uncertainty, confusion and chaos of a stateless IR system. According to Traditionalists, states are evolutionary, and just slower at changing than the rapidity that seems to dominate the 21st century.

Modern challenges to the traditional diplomatic institution, such as the information revolution, do not 'affect the core of the organisation of political power; the central role of territorially defined states'.⁹⁶ Traditionalists broadly agree that there is little currency in the notion that the international political system is in the midst of transition towards a fundamentally different political order where the state will be replaced by an alternative form of political management.⁹⁷ States control the bulk of the power – they continue to possess an important stock of resources including control of territory, military and infrastructure - and therefore remain the dominant actor in international relations.

Traditionalists inform us that the state is able to determine its own future; a feature of the state's historical development has been its autonomy and its tendency to go its own way and resist pressures upon it. In times of crisis or uncertainty it is the familiar methods of state interaction through traditional diplomacy that the international political

⁹⁶ Rik Coolsaet. (1998). The Transformation of Diplomacy at the Threshold of the New Millennium, *DSP Diplomatic Studies Program*, No. 48 (Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy), p. 2.

⁹⁷ *ibid.*, p. 3.

system comes to rely upon. The notion that we are witnessing a ‘systemic transformation of the state and the state system’ is unlikely.⁹⁸ The major decisions that affect international stability are ‘taken by those who possess power and are prepared to exercise it’; at the moment, those power-broking actors are states.⁹⁹

The fundamental premise of diplomacy is that it is an activity between states, and the governments of states. After all, ‘he who has power conducts diplomacy’ and any development in diplomacy must be analysed from an ‘evaluation of the power factor in international relations’.¹⁰⁰ According to Traditionalists, states endure as ‘the focal points which makes diplomacy possible’.¹⁰¹

Traditional diplomacy does not seem to ‘suffer from real decline’ despite the appearance on the international scene of new actors and new working methods.¹⁰² Traditionalists argue that the role of non-traditional actors in IR is ‘of secondary importance to that of national governments’ and therefore their presence is peripheral and inconsequential to traditional diplomacy.¹⁰³ For Traditionalists, the state and the traditional diplomatic institution will survive any challenge that the 21st century will offer.

⁹⁸ Coolsaet, *The Transformation of Diplomacy at the Threshold of the New Millennium*, p. 4.

⁹⁹ Nicolson, *The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method*, p. 48.

¹⁰⁰ Coolsaet, *The Transformation of Diplomacy at the threshold of the new Millennium*, p. 1.

¹⁰¹ John Hoffman. (2003). *Reconstructing Diplomacy. British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 5 (4), p. 525.

¹⁰² Coolsaet, *The Transformation of Diplomacy at the threshold of the new Millennium*, p. 1.

¹⁰³ A. F. Cooper and B. Hocking (2000). *Governments, Non-governmental Organisations and the Re-calibration of Diplomacy. Global Society*, 14 (3), p. 361.

2.5.2 The impact of Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs) on traditional diplomacy

According to Traditionalists, IGOs are constructed by states, for states. Within IGOs ‘key decisions are made by governments representing states’.¹⁰⁴ In other words, IGOs are ‘little more than state ciphers’.¹⁰⁵ Traditionalists believe that IGOs are only as great as the sum of their state parts.

Traditionalists are dismissive of the notion of IGOs as distinctive diplomatic actors; they warn that ‘it is misleading to think of international institutions as outside forces or exogenous actors, they are the self-conscious creation of states’.¹⁰⁶ Consequently, ‘states rarely allow international institutions to become significant autonomous actors’.¹⁰⁷ For example, the effectiveness of the United Nations:

does not rest on any intrinsic power within that organisation, but on the readiness of member states....its will is in fact none other than the joint wills of the states which make up its voting majorities....International organisations, in other words, reflect state initiatives, rather than determine them.¹⁰⁸

In this context, Traditionalists suggest certain advantages of IGOs and the multi-lateral diplomacy that greases them. For example, Koremenos, Lipson and Snidely write that IGOs are valuable in that they facilitate the dissemination of information, the

¹⁰⁴ Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe & Roger A. Coate. (2004). *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*. Boulder: Westview, p. 1.

¹⁰⁵ Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal. (2001). The Rational Design of International Institutions. *International Organization*, 55 (4), p. 762.

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ F. S. Northedge. (1976). *The International Political System*. London: Faber and Faber, pp. 138 – 139.

reduction of bargaining and transaction costs and the ability to enhance collective enforcement of a common course of political action.¹⁰⁹ And Berridge notes that IGOs provide several ‘obvious advantages’ for state members.¹¹⁰

For Traditionalists, one specific IGO advantage is the opportunity and impetus that multilateralism provides for traditional bilateral diplomacy.¹¹¹ IGOs provide a meeting place for state representatives, a forum to voice concern or rally support for a particular position or predicament. IGOs can kick-start negotiations, end negotiations or provide a diplomatic avenue bypassing ‘normal diplomatic channels’.¹¹² In other words, multilateral IGOs can speed up the traditional diplomatic process. Multi-lateral diplomacy through IGOs can be faster, cheaper and more efficient than bi-lateral diplomatic exchange, if a common interest exists between state members.

Traditionalists, however, do not provide an exhaustive list of benefits relating to IGOs and multilateral diplomacy. Any benefits appear to be an indication of IGOs in an ideal sense, rather than a practical one. From a practical angle, Traditionalist criticism of IGOs abounds. Broadly, they argue that the universal makeup of an IGO’s state membership means they are often ineffective and reduced to little more than glorified

¹⁰⁹ Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, *The Rational Design of International Institutions*, p. 771.

¹¹⁰ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 152. Berridge lists several benefits which are unrelated to traditional diplomacy. Firstly, he notes that participation and membership of an IGO confers great power status on states. The advent of IGOs was encouraged by states, and for states ‘because a conference of the great powers was a magnificent device for both identifying and advertising membership of the great power club’ (p. 148). Berridge interprets the value of international organisation in exclusive state terms, noting that to host or secure a home venue for a meeting of great powers was of ‘enormous value to a state’s prestige’ (p. 149). Secondly, Berridge cites as a benefit of IGOs that the opportunity international conferences or organisations provide is for states to keep rival powers in check: IGOs are a ‘subtle device whereby a great power could express respect for, and a bond of solidarity with, its most dangerous rivals’ (p. 149). Thirdly, Berridge notes that IGOs offer ‘vastly improved opportunities for propaganda’, where a government can publicly demonstrate its commitment to or disdain for an agenda (p. 149). IGOs are an important propaganda tool, particularly in the modern age of mass communications. Fourthly, the multilateral IGO is a valuable arena because it has the capacity to advance ‘negotiations between numerous parties simultaneously’, assuming the parties are all in agreement (p. 150).

¹¹¹ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 150; Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 159.

¹¹² Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 149.

‘state coffee mornings’.¹¹³ More specific Traditional criticism of IGOs is rife within the canon.

Berridge, for example, notes that the cumbersome size and swelling state ranks of IGOs has prompted a contemporary ‘crisis in multilateralism’ where the ‘fashion for creating intergovernmental organizations has passed and existing numbers dropped’.¹¹⁴ One reason behind the crisis is the sheer complexity of multilateral negotiation. The universality of IGO membership leads to large numbers of state participants, who can ‘complicate cooperation’ and stall complex negotiations through ‘uncertainty’.¹¹⁵ The swelling numbers of states and the ‘technicality of the issues’ makes IGOs ‘extremely complex’, which vitiates ‘the advantages of conducting diplomacy by this method’.¹¹⁶ In short, complexity (one state, one vote) leads to complication, which can frustrate multilateral negotiation.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Les Luck, interview May 9th 2004. At the time of writing Les Luck is the Australian Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism.

¹¹⁴ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 164.

¹¹⁵ Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, *The Rational Design of International Institutions*, p. 765.

¹¹⁶ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 161.

¹¹⁷ One of the most ineffective multilateral conferences of late was the World Trade Organisation (WTO) summit in Cancun, Mexico, 2003, which ended amid much recrimination, finger pointing and calls for the end of multilateralism. The confrontational stance between the rich nations and the developing world has come to be known as the ‘Mexican stand off’ (Bank, 2003: 16). Rich nations blamed the developing world for their inability to compromise on agricultural issues in particular, and conversely the developing world blamed the developed world for market (over)protectionism, neo-colonialism and obstinacy. The real loser at Cancun was the multilateralism of the WTO, held to be the leading villain in the melodrama. For example, the European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy levelled a tirade directly at the WTO, stating ‘the WTO remains a medieval organisation. The procedures and rules of this organisation have not supported the weight of the task. There is no way to structure and steer discussions amongst 146 members in a manner conducive to consensus.’ (Lamy in European Report, 2003: 501). The US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick was equally scathing, accusing some governments of sabotaging the meeting by engaging in rhetoric and tactical games. Zoellick argued that ‘no progress could be made unless all WTO members were committed to negotiating seriously. We [the US delegation] warned that too many countries were spending too much time pontificating and too little time negotiating. Whether developed or developing, there were ‘can do’ and ‘won’t do’ countries here. The rhetoric of ‘won’t do’ overwhelmed the concerted efforts of the ‘can do’. There was too much time spent on inflammatory rhetoric, and as a result, all walked away empty handed. The WTO needs to take a long, hard look at the multilateral negotiating process.’ (Zoellick in European Report, 2003: 502). The message of the traditional diplomats and state representative was clear, multilateralism can be an extremely complicated and worthless endeavour. See, EU/WTO: Cancun Trade Talks End in Chaos, *European Report*, September 17th, 2003; William Giever. (2003). The

A second Traditionalist criticism of IGO's universal membership is that states can meddle needlessly in the affairs of other states, whereas in the past they would rarely have come into contact with one another. By 'throwing the doors of a conference wide open permits, and may even encourage, each participant to have a say in the affairs of all the others, whether they have a direct interest or not'.¹¹⁸ Therefore, the universal nature of IGO membership is 'anti-diplomatic, gratuitously worsening relations between states that in an earlier era would either have had little contact at all or would have had contact only on issues where both had a direct interest'.¹¹⁹

Thirdly, the very public nature of the IGO forum and the subsequent obligation for transparency is uncomfortable for Traditionalists as these notions run contrary to their affinity for closed or secret conventional diplomacy. The IGO does offer possibilities for positive propaganda, however this publicity of diplomacy negates confidentiality and concession, which underscore successful bi-lateral negotiations. After all:

when debate takes place between a large number of delegations in a public setting without any serious attempt to achieve a prior agreement in private, the political necessity of playing to the audience outside is inescapable and the give and take of genuine negotiation goes out the window. The result is that propaganda is substituted for diplomacy.¹²⁰

Consequently and fourthly, multi-lateral diplomacy facilitated by IGOs creates fictitious state cooperation. This cooperation plays a 'modest role' in the anarchical IR

Real Cancun: WTO Heads Nowhere. *The Nation*, v277, p. 126; Helene Bank. Who was to Blame for Cancun 'Collapse'?. *African Business*, November 2003, i292, p. 33.

¹¹⁸ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 159

¹¹⁹ *ibid.*, p. 159.

¹²⁰ *ibid.*, p. 160

system, according to Traditionalists, who remind us that cooperation is ‘very brittle in the real world’.¹²¹ In multilateral environments, states become ‘reluctant to disclose vital information that could make them more vulnerable’.¹²² Alongside this unwillingness to harm national security, states are unwilling to encourage centralisation of decision-making that could ultimately affect their sovereignty. IGOs are thus viewed as ‘politically and conceptually controversial’, because their presence touches on sacrosanct national sovereignty.¹²³ Through traditional diplomacy, states are able to guard their domestic authority and their exclusive control over foreign policy, therefore ‘they are suspicious of encroachments and strongly resist any shift of sovereign responsibilities to superordinate bodies’.¹²⁴ Subsequently, IGOs lack broad authority, and the ‘day when sovereign countries accept broad international edicts is still far off’.¹²⁵ In other words, states are unlikely to encourage any organisation or diplomatic practice that may engineer their downfall.

According to the Traditionalists, IGOs are interpreted as another layer added to the traditional diplomatic process. This supplementary notion suggests that IGOs are essentially state designed frameworks, rather than independent political actors. Viewed through the Traditionalist lens the presence and questionable efficacy of IGOs is peripheral rather than central to their brand of diplomatic theory.

¹²¹ Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, *The Rational Design of International Institutions*, p. 771.

¹²² *ibid.*

¹²³ *ibid.*, p. 771.

¹²⁴ *ibid.*

¹²⁵ David D. Newsom. (1989) The new diplomatic agenda: are governments ready? *International Affairs*, 89 (1), p. 41.

2.5.3 **The questionable efficacy of summit diplomacy**

Where summitry is concerned the impact on traditional diplomacy is similar to IGOs. Summitry is seen as peripheral or inconsequential to diplomacy by Traditionalists.¹²⁶ Summitry is not to be confused with IGO. Summitry is a term that applies only ‘to meetings between incumbent heads of government and/or heads of state, or political leaders’.¹²⁷ The growth of summitry in the twentieth century has, however, been impressive. In the modern era, foreign leaders are familiar with the demands and necessity of summitry, and are ‘increasingly performing diplomatic roles on the international stage’.¹²⁸ The practice of summitry has ‘become an addictive drug for many politicians’.¹²⁹ The prevalence of summitry in the modern diplomatic environment is clear but how do Traditionalists interpret its impact?

Broadly, they argue that the direct meeting of statesmen does not affect the diplomatic institution where the bulk of meaningful diplomacy takes place. Summits are merely the rubber stamp to the prenegotiation work the traditional diplomatic institution has undertaken. In other words, summits do not affect the traditional diplomatic institution.

Instead, summit diplomacy is interpreted as an addition or supplement to traditional diplomacy, or as an example of ‘improvised diplomacy’.¹³⁰ Diplomacy and summits are thus interconnected:

¹²⁶ See, for example, David Dunn (ed.). (1996). *Diplomacy at the Highest Level: The Evolution of International Summitry*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 252 – 264.

¹²⁷ Melissen, *Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age*, p. 4.

¹²⁸ *ibid.*, p. 1.

¹²⁹ *ibid.*, p. 3.

¹³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 7.

summit meetings are a supplement to ordinary diplomatic procedures – they are functionally connected with those procedures. They follow ordinary diplomatic negotiations as they are followed by them, each laying the groundwork for the other.¹³¹

While diplomacy and summitry are inextricably linked, Traditionalists are hardly complimentary of summits. A Traditionalist presenting a ‘case for the defence’ of summitry noted the difficulty of the task: ‘summitry has been so roundly anathematised by historians as well as professional diplomats, that it is...not so easy to understand why it remains such an important feature of the international scene’.¹³²

Summits are perceived as detracting from the valuable role of those in the employ of the traditional diplomatic institution. In Traditionalist perceptions of summitry, the value of the pre and post negotiation work of the ‘ordinary bureaucrat’ is often overlooked.¹³³ With summitry, the tireless prenegotiation work of the diplomat is overshadowed, an occurrence which disturbs Traditionalists. For example, Lubers writes that summits ‘conceal the text writers, the endless rehearsal and all the other preparatory work without which that one performance would not take place’.¹³⁴ Melissen supports this notion by highlighting that ‘the visibility of leaders camouflages the extent to which they increasingly tend to rely on professional diplomats, and *ergo* the increasing influence of these professionals on summit outcomes’.¹³⁵ The infringement of leaders (unfamiliar of the intricacies of the art of diplomacy) accounts for Traditionalist hostility

¹³¹ Hans J. Morgenthau. (1978) *Politics among nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. 5th Edition. New York: Knopf, p. 122.

¹³² Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 173.

¹³³ Kaufman, *The Diplomacy of International Relations*, p. 59.

¹³⁴ Lubers in Melissen, *Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age*, p. 7.

¹³⁵ *ibid.*, p. 11.

towards summitry, while at the same time confirming their desire to remain wedded to their time-honoured perception of diplomacy.

Within the traditional canon there are consistent and subtle derogatory undertones levelled at diplomacy by summit. Summitry not only provokes ‘deep unease among professional diplomats’ but also amongst Traditionalist theorists.¹³⁶ Chief among these fears is that the necessity of summitry suggests incompetence on the part of traditional diplomats; if the bosses have to meet face-to-face then they must have done something wrong? Seen through Traditionalist lens, and bearing in mind their sentimental affiliation to all things traditional, any process that detracts from the conventional is treated with suspicion. Summitry is no different, as it effectively removes a significant slice of top-level power from Foreign Ministries and their officials. The subsequent bickering between seasoned diplomats, Traditionalists and inexperienced or incompetent statesmen is well founded in the canon.

The list of statesmen’s uncomplimentary forays into the diplomatic domain is seemingly endless within TDT. For example, Berridge employs the opinion of Philippe de Commines who remarked that ‘two great princes who wish to establish good personal relations should never meet each other face to face but ought to communicate through wise ambassadors’.¹³⁷ In the same fashion, Watt writes that ‘heads of government, with their massive egos, their ignorance of the essential details and their ingrained belief in the

¹³⁶ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 169.

¹³⁷ Commines in Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 170. The Frenchman, Commines (c. 1447 – 1511) was both diplomat and historian who, according to Berridge, ‘wrote the best-known political and diplomatic memoirs of the late fifteenth century’ (p. 170). Commines took the view that two princes should never meet face to face because ‘he generally believed princes were spoiled, vain and badly educated: in short, poorly equipped for diplomacy (p. 170). However, he also noted that ‘the leaders of his time were unusually suspicious persons. A state of mind produced by the many false stories and groundless reports that are brought to their attention by court flatterers, this made them too ready to believe that the prince with whom they were negotiating was up to no good’ (Commines in Berridge, p. 170).

value of back-slapping ambiguity, simply mess everything up' (in Berridge, 2002: 171).¹³⁸ And George Ball provides a substantial list of summits, from Chamberlain in Munich in 1938 to Nixon in Japan in 1970, which resulted in the need for more diplomacy rather than less.¹³⁹ One of the most memorable examples of a head of state damaging a carefully fostered diplomatic relationship was when Boris Yeltsin visited the Republic of Ireland on a summit trip:

Yeltsin, apparently fast asleep, failed altogether to emerge from his Tupolev after it landed at Shannon airport. What was going through the mind of Irish Prime Minister, Albert Reynolds, who was waiting for his guest on the tarmac, complete with band, red carpet, and local dignitaries, is not difficult to imagine.¹⁴⁰

While the behaviour of Yeltsin demonstrates an extreme, Traditionalists claim that heads of state adversely affect carefully crafted diplomatic relations. One theorist, Eubank, after critiquing the great power summit conferences between 1919 and 1960, argued that there was no evidence to suggest that the presence of heads of government at these summits produced better agreements than would have been generated otherwise, while 'often the reverse was true'.¹⁴¹

Ball typifies the Traditionalist attitude, stressing the value of the traditional diplomatic process over the inadequacy of diplomacy by summit. He notes that:

¹³⁸ Watt in Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 171.

¹³⁹ George Ball. (1976). *Diplomacy for a Crowded World*. London: Bodley Head, pp. 29 – 45.

¹⁴⁰ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 183. Yeltsin would have done well to learn from the diplomacy of the snubbed Irish leader. Of the incident Reynolds stated, 'I completely understand – Mr. Yeltsin was acting on the orders of doctors who said it would be better for him not to get off the plane. He suffers from bad blood pressure – when a man is ill, a man is ill.' When he arrived back in Moscow, Yeltsin, in typical blasé fashion, announced 'I feel excellent – I can tell you honestly, I just overslept. The security services did not let in the people who were due to wake me – of course I will sort them out and punish them.' (news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/September/30/newsid_2542000/25429, retrieved 22nd July, 2005.

¹⁴¹ Eubank in Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 172.

summit meetings over the centuries have been a source of grief. The sad fact is that no summit meeting has ever resulted in a breakthrough. Every significant gain has resulted from painstaking diplomacy pursued through traditional methods.¹⁴²

Demonstrating their fierce loyalty to the traditional diplomatic institution, Traditionalists maintain that diplomacy is an activity ‘best left to the professionals’, the diplomats.¹⁴³ Therefore, the traditional ambivalence towards summitry in the canon is somewhat understandable.

2.5.4 The proliferation of NGOs

In the twenty-first century, the proliferation of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and their growing impact upon states has become more noticeable. As a result, Traditionalists have become ‘ambivalent and often hostile’ on the effectiveness of NGOs.¹⁴⁴ Consistently, they are dismissive of ‘the challenge posed to inter-state diplomacy by the growth of civil society and nongovernmental organisations’.¹⁴⁵ For Traditionalists, NGOs have ‘virtually no independent impact on international relations and diplomacy’.¹⁴⁶ There are four common laments that Traditionalists employ to validate their dismissive judgment of NGOs.

Firstly, the participation of NGOs in the IR system is interpreted as a diplomatic nuisance. The infringement of NGOs in international policy environments means that

¹⁴² Ball, *Diplomacy for a Crowded World*, pp. 30 – 31.

¹⁴³ *ibid.*, p. 44.

¹⁴⁴ Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss. (1997). Devolving responsibilities: a framework for analysing NGOS and services. *Third World Quarterly*, 18 (3), p. 446.

¹⁴⁵ Hocking and Cooper, *Governments, Non-governmental Organisations and the Re-calibration of Diplomacy*, p. 362.

¹⁴⁶ Peter Gubser. (2002). The Impact of NGOs on State and Non-State Relations in the Middle East. *Middle East Policy*, IX (1), p. 142.

‘already complex issues become more difficult to handle’.¹⁴⁷ For Traditionalists, NGO participation in negotiation is a hindrance to traditional diplomacy, in that NGOs pose unnecessary and ‘thorny questions’.¹⁴⁸ In other words, including an actor with an often-divergent agenda to the traditional-political agenda complicates diplomatic proceedings, rather than complements.¹⁴⁹

Secondly, Traditionalists argue that the existence of NGOs is dependent on the generosity of states. Significant NGOs, such as World Vision, are reliant upon the state for legitimacy in the international arena and, more importantly, funding. The dependency of NGOs upon the state means that ‘NGOs are losing their roots and getting closer to governments and more distant from the poor and – perhaps most frightening – possibly dis-empowering those whom they seek to assist’.¹⁵⁰ For example, World Vision has been accused of ‘developing increasingly close ties with government agencies in recent years’.¹⁵¹ Traditionalists argue that NGOs are dependent on states financially, and for legitimacy. In other words, nongovernmental organisations are becoming less non and more governmental.

Thirdly, Traditionalists remind us that NGOs can never emulate the broadness of representation that democratically elected governments provide. Those in the employ of NGOs are, after all, unelected and uninterested in compromise, intent on pursuing their

¹⁴⁷ Hocking and Cooper, *Governments, Non-governmental Organisations and the Re-calibration of Diplomacy*, p. 375.

¹⁴⁸ Gubser, *The Impact of NGOs on State and Non-State Relations in the Middle East*, p. 447.

¹⁴⁹ There are several examples where aggressive NGOs have brought positive negotiations to abrupt and unnecessary halts. Specifically, the WTO negotiations in Seattle in 1999 and the successive Doha Development Round in 2003 had the ‘tragic effect of slowing a process that held far greater promise for alleviating global poverty than any plan articulated by the NGO protestors’ (Eizenstat, *Nongovernmental organisations*, p. 18). It was only in July 2005, six years after Seattle, that global trade negotiations and poverty alleviation got back on track at the G8 summit in Scotland.

¹⁵⁰ Joel Montague. (1998). *The Fuss About NGOs – Are They Worth It?* *Nonprofit Management & Leadership*, 9 (1), p. 97.

¹⁵¹ *ibid.*

narrow agendas, possibly at the expense of the greater national/international good and to the exclusion of others actors' wishes.¹⁵² Traditionalists argue that with NGOs concessions to their demands are, all too often, met not with praise and gratitude but with demands for further concessions.¹⁵³ Therefore the parochial focus, determination and single-minded devotion, which preclude the formation of an NGO, can hardly be constitutive of society as a whole. That is why we have elected governments with a broad focus, rather than large numbers of specialised NGOs.

In addition to the undemocratic constitution of NGOs, Traditionalists frequently illustrate, fourthly, the unprofessional nature of NGOs, specifically their tardiness concerning accountability, or lack thereof. NGOs are famous for urging other institutions (corporations, governments and international organisations among them) to make themselves more accountable, while at the same time being loathe to practice what they preach. NGOs have 'demonstrated a notable reluctance to evaluate how accountable they themselves are to the constituencies they purport to represent'.¹⁵⁴ It is undeniable that NGOs share complex relationships with multiple stakeholders, and the intangible nature of the goals they seek to achieve are difficult to account for. However, Traditionalists

¹⁵² Eizenstat, *Nongovernmental Organizations*, pp. 16 – 25. While Eizenstat is largely complimentary of the role of NGOs in International Relations, his preference for Traditionalist, statist interpretations of the role of NGOs in contemporary diplomacy is clearly evident. This favouritism is hardly surprising considering that Eizenstat was Chief Domestic Policy Adviser to President Jimmy Carter. In the Clinton Administration he was US Ambassador to the European Union, Under Secretary of Commerce, Under Secretary of State, and Deputy Secretary of the Treasury. He was also President Clinton's Special Representative on Holocaust-era issues. For a discussion on his views of NGOs see, Stuart E. Eizenstat. (2004). *Nongovernmental Organizations as the Fifth Estate. Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Summer/Fall, pp. 21 – 25.

¹⁵³ Eizenstat, cites an example of the persistent and demanding nature of NGOs from his tenure under the Carter Administration: 'I remember how frustrating it was to work with NGOs interested in adding species to the Endangered Species Act for a truly environmental president, Jimmy Carter. For his efforts, he was blasted by various environmental NGOs for leaving species off the protected list and given very little credit for the many species that had been added to it.' (*Nongovernmental Organizations*, p. 28).

¹⁵⁴ Eizenstat, *Nongovernmental Organizations*, p. 19. An exception to this complaint is the NGO Transparency International, who lists its funders on its website. Few other NGOs do. See www.transparencyinternational.org.

argue that this difficulty does not excuse NGO's distinct unaccountability for the funds they demand and the actions they take. NGO funding, spending and accountability tends to 'be shrouded in mystery'.¹⁵⁵ Government oversight is needed to regulate NGOs to ensure that charities are not used as vehicles for financial exploitation.¹⁵⁶ Left to their own devices, Traditionalists warn, NGOs are an unpredictable entity.

Seen through the Traditionalist lens their response to the growth of NGOs has been predictable, with NGOs 'often portrayed as opponents of government'.¹⁵⁷ In general, Traditionalists seem unperturbed by the rise of NGOs, a phenomenon that is mentioned in passing only in the canon of diplomacy studies.

¹⁵⁵ Eizenstat, *Nongovernmental Organizations*, p. 21.

¹⁵⁶ An infamous example of the unaccountability of NGOs reinforce the financial tardiness of some NGOs. In 2002, an expose by CBS Evening News revealed that the American Red Cross was anything but financially responsible. The news channel reported that local Red Cross fundraisers had used official funds to 'pad their own bank accounts, to embezzle money to buy drugs, and to pay themselves large bonuses', among other abuses. See Sheryl Attkisson. 'Disaster Strikes in Red Cross Backyard', CBS Evening News, July 29, 2002, available at: <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/07/29/eveningnews/main516700shtml>.

¹⁵⁷ Hocking and Cooper, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 147. This sentiment was evident in a 2003 conference sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a Washington thinktank that has been particularly influential with the current Bush administration. The conference was named 'Nongovernmental Organizations: The Growing Power of an Unelected Few' and drew together academics and politicians concerned with the unchecked proliferation of NGOs. Criticism of the role of NGOs in IR, which resonates with Traditionalism, was strongly evident at the conference. Participants at the conference pondered the accelerating growth of advocacy-oriented NGOs and discussed the 'potential of those organisations to undermine sovereignty' (AEI newsletter, 2003). With such a rigid, prejudicial agenda the tirade against NGOs was uncomplimentary. For example, Bate argued that NGOs have been undermining effective government processes; they 'definitely provide benefits in the short run, but in the long run the influence is nearly always malign. The effect of NGOs is particularly damaging' (AEI newsletter, 2003). Anderson, reaffirmed the positive role of the state and the inadequacy of the NGO: 'the sovereign is back not only as a sort of locus of power, but as the ideal to which ordinary people aspire. NGOs are destroying much of civil society, undermining governments and good governance, and this is holding back developing countries from enjoying the same quality of life that we do. It's backfired' (AEI newsletter, 2003).

2.5.5 Traditional Diplomacy and Commerce

Where diplomacy and commerce are concerned, Traditionalists draw a clear distinction between the political and the commercial, associating diplomacy with the former and discounting the latter as inconsequential to diplomatic theory. The reason behind the separation of commerce and diplomacy is simple and twofold. Firstly, Traditionalists view diplomacy as an activity concerned with high political matters, to which commerce bears little importance. The traditional approach ‘to diplomacy privileges political transactions and neglects economic transactions’.¹⁵⁸

The distinction between political and commercial is endorsed by Traditionalists, secondly, based on a sentimental historical perception of diplomacy. Lee and Hudson originate perseverance of this perception to archaic ‘social and cultural’ factors prevalent in the Traditionalist literature.¹⁵⁹ They write specifically that:

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries diplomats (who in Europe were predominantly from aristocratic family backgrounds) held the world of commerce (seen by diplomats as a middle class world) in social contempt. These social and class divisions added to the prominent perception within Foreign/Diplomatic Services that Commercial departments were ‘black holes’, by high ranking diplomats who were horrified by the prospect of wining and dining middle-class businessmen and the downturn in their careers that commercial postings signified.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 358.

¹⁵⁹ *ibid.*, p. 347. For an expansion of this theme, see, D. Lee and D. Hudson. (2004). The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy. *Review of International Studies*, 30, 343 – 360. The 2004 article by Lee and Hudson is an excellent account of the historical and contemporary ambivalence of Traditionalists towards any relationship between commerce and diplomacy.

¹⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p. 347. For validation and examples of the aristocratic snobbery notion see D. C. M. Platt. (1969). *Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy 1815 – 1914*. Oxford: Clarendon Press; E.

A sentimental view of diplomatic history, then, suggests that the separation of diplomacy from commerce is – for Traditionalists - a valid claim. Nicolson adds support here. He comments of the German mission, of the same era; ‘it was regarded as most improper that the German Government should use its embassy at Constantinople to obtain concessions for German industrialists’.¹⁶¹ Such a confluence of political and trade interests was viewed by diplomats in an unsavory manner, because it was considered undignified to concern the diplomat with matters of commerce. More importantly, if ‘commercial competition’ was to be added to ‘political rivalry, the task of the diplomacy would become even more complicated than it was already’.¹⁶²

Traditionalists view modern diplomacy in a similar light. Their focus on traditional interstate high politics in bilateral or multilateral settings remains valuable, however they fail to relate commerce to diplomacy, or vice versa.¹⁶³ Persevering with this portrayal of diplomacy, Traditionalists view commercial work as a departure from the more serious concerns of diplomacy: military, security or political negotiation for example. Modern Traditionalists do not discount commerce entirely from diplomacy; rather they interpret commercial matters as peripheral at best and irrelevant at worst.

Hambloch. (1938). *British Consul: Memories of Thirty Years Service in Europe and Brazil*. London: George G. Harrap.

¹⁶¹ Nicolson, *The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method*, p. 81.

¹⁶² *ibid.*

¹⁶³ See for instance R. P. Barston. (1998). *Modern Diplomacy*. London: Longman; G. R. Berridge. (2002). *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. London: Palgrave; Abba Eban. (1998). *Diplomacy for The Next Century*. US: Yale University Press; Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne. (1995). *The Practice of Diplomacy*. London: Routledge; Elmer Plischke (ed.). (1979). *Modern Diplomacy: The Art and Artisans*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Peter Marshall and J. Spence. (1998). *Positive Diplomacy*. London: Palgrave; Andrew L. Steigman. (1985). *The Foreign Service of the United States - First Line of Defense*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Where Traditionalism is concerned, ‘there is no attempt to present commerce as a significant and integral part of diplomatic practice’.¹⁶⁴

Traditionalists validate this approach by citing the literature of former diplomats, who focus almost exclusively on the high political content of diplomacy when describing their time in public office.¹⁶⁵ Why Traditionalists, evaluating former diplomats, fail to promote the relationship between diplomacy and commerce is problematic, as it constitutes a large part of diplomatic activity, especially in the modern era. One reason may be that commercial negotiations do not sell books when compared with first hand narratives of ‘high’ political diplomacy where tension, intrigue and drama prevail. Nevertheless, this is hardly an excuse for Traditionalists to discount the growing relationship between commerce and diplomacy.

For Traditionalists, the irrelevance of trade to diplomacy can at best be described as a theoretical imagining distanced from the practice of diplomacy. Far from being a departure from traditional diplomacy, commercial aspects are ‘rudimentary to ancient, modern and contemporary diplomacy’.¹⁶⁶ Many diplomatic institutions are effectively moving towards *more* commercial focus, where the state remains central to the global economy, existing symbiotically alongside Mutli-National Enterprises. This type of rhetoric has yet to permeate TDT.

¹⁶⁴ Lee and Hudson, *The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy*, p. 348.

¹⁶⁵ See, for example, H. Brind. (1999) *Lying Abroad: Diplomatic Memoirs*. London: Radcliffe Press; Lord Galdwyn. (1972). *The Memoirs of Lord Galdwyn*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; M. F. Herz. (1987). *Making the World a Less Dangerous Place – Lessons Learned for a Career in Diplomacy*. Lanham: University Press of America; H. Kissinger. (1979). *The Whitehouse Years*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; R. H. Miller. (1992). *Inside the Embassy: The Political Role of Diplomats Abroad*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc.; J. Reeve. (1999). *Cocktails, Crises and Cockroaches: A Diplomatic Trail*. London: Radcliffe Press; Barston W. Strang. (1962) *The Diplomatic Career*. London: A. Deutsch.

¹⁶⁶ Lee and Hudson, *The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy*, p. 347.

2.5.6 Diplomacy and the information revolution¹⁶⁷

The effect of the information revolution does not occupy much print space in the canon of diplomacy studies. Traditionalists, keen to stress the art, the importance of history or the classical nature of diplomacy, are reluctant to tarnish De Callieres or Satow with the triviality of the information ‘revolution’ phenomenon.¹⁶⁸

A close reading of the Traditionalist literature reveals the reasons behind this reluctance. Firstly, Traditionalists remind us that an increase in the quantity of information does not necessarily equate to a similar increase in the quality of information; that knowledge does not necessarily equate to wisdom. Traditionalists are in agreement in relation to this point. For example, Burt and Robison note in jocular fashion that ‘more and faster does not mean better’ and that ‘what might qualify one as a contestant on Jeopardy is hardly adequate for diplomacy’.¹⁶⁹ Kohler adds that ‘more paper does not equal better diplomacy. Data or information is not knowledge, even when

¹⁶⁷ For an extended discussion on the information revolution see Jeffrey R. Cooper. (www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy). According to Cooper the information revolution drove democratisation and globalisation of the flow and content of information. Advanced information technologies provided new communications tools, demanded new organisational processes, and altered existing hierarchies and power relationships among both domestic and global actors, thereby playing a major role in facilitating and spurring revolutions in both the political and economic domains. Beyond those enabling effects, the information revolution and the new international environment that fostered it have made information itself a crucial source of national power and influence. These trends have already had substantial impacts on diplomacy, affecting both the content and the conduct of the diplomatic enterprise necessary for success in the transformed international arena. See also, G. Kramarenko and A. Krutskikh. (2003) Diplomacy and the Information Revolution. *International Affairs*, 49 (5), 115 – 123. Krutskikh and Kramarenko describe the information revolution as the set of processes that ‘are shaping the global electronic environment into which the most important components of political, economic, social and cultural activities are being increasingly transferred. This environment intensifies the exchange of information, view, ideas, services, goods and helps create various virtual communities united by common interests. For a similar breakdown of the impact of the information revolution on diplomacy, see, Evan H. Potter. (2003). *Cyber-Diplomacy: Managing Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

¹⁶⁸ For example, see Stanley Hoffman. (2001). Classic Diplomacy in the Information Age. *Foreign Affairs*, 80 (4), 137 – 142.

¹⁶⁹ Burt and Robison, Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age, p. 16.

repeated endlessly on the Internet'.¹⁷⁰ For Traditionalists, the *quantity* of information is inconsequential for effective diplomacy. However the *quality* of the information that a government demands is important. A professional diplomat should be appropriately trained to interpret and filter information in this desirable and necessary fashion.

Secondly, Traditionalists stress that a diplomat is after all a diplomat, and not an Information Technology (IT) specialist. Focusing too heavily on the implications of the information revolution, therefore, can detract from the traditional role of the diplomat. For example, Kohler warns of this danger where a diplomat 'can collapse under the weight of information, or never have time to respond to the hundreds of emails piling up in his virtual in-basket'.¹⁷¹ And Kaplan says that he finds more and more American diplomats 'sitting in front of their computer screens, losing contact with the societies where they are posted'.¹⁷² Under this view, the sheer volume of complex information and the increased responsibility to effectively manage more and more information overwhelms diplomats, thus detracting from their fundamental purpose (to represent, diplomatically, their country abroad).

As a result, Traditionalists stress the importance of the human aspect of diplomacy. Simply put, revolutionary developments in information gathering and dissemination do not promote stable diplomatic relationships; Information Technology (IT), for example, is no substitute for personal contact in diplomacy. For Traditionalists:

¹⁷⁰ Richard Kohler. (1998). 'Virtual Diplomacy' in Wolfe, Robert (ed.), *Diplomatic Missions: The Ambassador in Canadian Foreign Policy*. p. 133.

¹⁷¹ *ibid.*, p. 132.

¹⁷² Kaplan in Burt and Robison, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age*, p. 61.

IT is not a substitute for human interaction, but an enabler of it. Seeking the balance between human and technological resources is the greatest challenge for diplomacy over the next decade. Just as the status quo is unacceptable, so too is a zealous embrace of unstable and complicated technology that leads diplomats away from the societies in which they specialize to the false comfort of a virtual world.¹⁷³

Traditionalists inform us that computers are tools to facilitate the business of diplomacy, not instruments to replace human judgement, which is a central quality of traditional diplomacy. Olsen supports this, arguing that ‘the internet cannot substitute for the interaction of culture, for the taste and feel of foreign lands, for the empathy that develops as one learns to appreciate a new society’.¹⁷⁴ According to Traditionalists, machines cannot replicate the essential personal skills of diplomacy. Kohler confirms this by arguing that:

technology does not alter the centrality of the ambassador in the conduct of foreign relations because it cannot replace experience, local contacts, and judgements, even as it alters everything around it.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ Burt and Robison, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age*, p. 61.

¹⁷⁴ Jody K. Olsen, ‘Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries’, 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html. This United States Institute of Peace web page is an excellent forum for discussion on the information revolution and diplomacy. The web page contains an online publication of a July 2001 Magazine on Information Impacts, which invited twenty-three American and British academics to postulate on the impact of the information revolution on diplomacy. The diversity of theoretical views made this a valuable source. All of these online authors have had experience of the information revolution and diplomacy. See, www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html - this series of articles was originally released on July 23, 2001. I accessed it on 16th July, 2005.

¹⁷⁵ Kohler, *Virtual Diplomacy*, p. 131.

Thus, Traditionalists caution on embracing the information revolution with open and unsuspecting arms. There is another reason behind this caveat. They argue that the traditional diplomatic institution does not have the luxury of implementing sweeping information system changes; any changes must be carefully thought out and incremental. There are two associated reasons here. Firstly, the sheer size and bureaucratic constitution of a modern Foreign Service means change takes time.¹⁷⁶ Secondly, and more importantly, Traditionalists emphasise that the type of information states deal with is exceptional; particularly the necessity for secure communication and information systems and the propensity for information to be employed for sinister as well as saintly ends.

Kramarenko and Krutskikh, for example, describe the necessity of protecting sensitive information as the ‘most important feature’ of the information revolution.¹⁷⁷ They forecast an apocalyptic scenario where:

the entire array of countries’ information resources becomes simultaneously a target for hostile attacks and the most powerful weapon in information wars. There is a threat that the colossal potential of IT could be used in gaining military and political supremacy on the international scene. The building up of military potentials by employing the latest IT is tipping the global and regional balance of forces, causing tensions between the traditional and emerging centres of strength, and creating new areas of confrontation.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ The size of modern foreign missions is quite staggering. The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, for example, has over 16,000 staff based in the UK and overseas managing a network of 200 diplomatic offices. See, www.fco.gov.uk. Canada has diplomatic and consular offices in over 270 locations in approximately 180 foreign countries. See, www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca. The global distribution of these extensive networks means change can be particularly cumbersome.

¹⁷⁷ Kramarenko and Krutskikh, *Diplomacy and the Information Revolution*, p. 116.

¹⁷⁸ *ibid.*

For Traditionalists, the diplomatic institutions should be praised for remaining vigilant in international information security matters. Such caution should not be misinterpreted as clinging onto outdated methods of information gathering and dissemination. The sensitive nature of diplomatic information necessitates an incremental information systems change and bestows caution. For Traditionalists, this prudence must not be misconstrued as tardiness or reluctance to embrace an information revolution that could undermine international security if embraced too hard and too quickly. These Traditionalist observations, albeit subtle in the canon, challenge the image of an archaic diplomatic institution unwilling or unable to embrace the revolution.

2.6 **The Merits of TDT**

Throughout the six themes, the Traditionalist's preference to theorise on the traditional diplomatic institution over nascent diplomatic actors and environments was evident. Their inherent historical, traditional and statist focus is responsible for a subconscious dismissal of any form of diplomacy outside the traditional realm. The longevity of TDT can be directly correlated to the omnipotence of the traditional diplomatic institution as the predominant conduit for state-qua-state relations. This section seeks to establish if this exclusive state focus remains relevant to the modern diplomatic environment.

In the practical/physical sense, traditional diplomacy has 'become a growth sector'¹⁷⁹ and remains the 'engine room of international relations.'¹⁸⁰ The foreign embassy remains the leading diplomatic actor, where 'the conduct of relations on a state-

¹⁷⁹ Hocking, *The end(s) of diplomacy*, p.169.

¹⁸⁰ Raymond Cohen. (1998). Putting Diplomatic Studies on the Map. *Diplomatic Studies Program Newsletter*, Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, p. 1.

to-state basis, via formally accredited resident missions' forms the bulk of international exchange.¹⁸¹ Therefore, a devoted and ongoing theoretical understanding, mirroring the increase of practical state-qua-state diplomacy, is required. TDT, with its emphasis on the state and its diplomacy, is therefore ubiquitous, valuable and necessary for the diplomatic studies field.

The modern growth of traditional diplomacy confirms the ongoing relevance of TDT. In the centuries preceeding the twentieth, state-qua-state diplomacy was a relatively specialised vocation and an undervalued activity. For example, Denmark had forty-four career diplomats in 1797, twenty-eight in the middle of the nineteenth century, and a mere twenty on the eve of the Great War.¹⁸² In comparison, the British foreign ministry had only fifty employees in 1861¹⁸³ and the Quay d'Orsay in Paris had 115 in 1873.¹⁸⁴ Embassies and foreign ministries were relatively small, and the value of diplomacy in terms of providing peace and security through communication and negotiation was largely underestimated. Mirroring this practical apathy towards diplomacy, diplomatic theory was not of the strength it is today.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸¹ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 105.

¹⁸² Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, 104.

¹⁸³ Keith Hamilton, Keith and Richard Langhorne. (1995). *The Practice of Diplomacy*. London: Routledge, p. 102.

¹⁸⁴ Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*, p. 192.

¹⁸⁵ Keens-Soper informs that between 1625 and 1700, 153 titles on diplomacy were published in Europe. Of these 114 were new contributions to the literature, the others were translations (1973: 497). Most of these works dealt with the virtues necessary to make a successful ambassador – what Keens-Soper refers to as a literary fascination with 'moral physiognomy' (1973: 488). These works were written to enhance perceptions of diplomats, who did not have particularly good reputations at the time. Holsti accredits this poor image to perceptions of diplomacy heavily associated with 'spying and with excesses of theatre and show' (2004: 183). Thus, the early diplomatic literature was designed to promote an image of the diplomat as reliable, trustworthy and honest, which 'belied the actual state of diplomatic conduct' at the time (Holsti, 2004: 183). Therefore, in terms of the rigour, accuracy and analysis contemporary Traditionalist literature demonstrates, the early Traditionalist diplomatic literature was concerned with embellishing an image of diplomacy as it ought to be, rather than it actually was. De Callieres, who published *De la maniere de negocier avec les souverains* in 1716, is generally considered the exception rather than the norm. Keens-Soper writes of De Callieres that he was the first diplomatic author to 'think systematically about diplomacy as a distinct field of political activity' (1973: 500). For an excellent account of De Callieres'

The twentieth century, however, has witnessed ‘a veritable explosion’ in professional diplomacy.¹⁸⁶ The numbers of diplomats, embassies and foreign ministries began a dramatic expansion at the turn of the nineteenth century, a phenomenon that continues in the modern era. For example, twenty-six states formed the League of Nations in 1919, whereas in the contemporary sense we can identify 193 states. Traditional diplomacy has grown accordingly; in London today there are 17,000 foreign diplomats, their families and staff.¹⁸⁷ Similar figures would be apparent in most major capitals. In 1950, the world’s 81 states had an average of 26 other states with which they maintained a resident ambassador and staff.¹⁸⁸ By 1991, 167 states had an average of 46 other states with similar ambassadorial representation.¹⁸⁹

Subsequently, the scope of the professional diplomat has also widened, encompassing a whole range of issues generated by a more global, interdependent IR system. The modern diplomat engages with alternate environments for diplomacy, such as international conferences, which averaged approximately three annually in the middle of the nineteenth century, increasing to more than 3,000 (annually) today.¹⁹⁰ In addition, there are approximately 350 IGOs today (compared with 123 in 1951), all of which operate as venues for official diplomats to ‘bargain, negotiate, inform, learn and exchange views’.¹⁹¹

contribution to diplomatic theory, see Keens-Soper, Maurice. (1973) Francois De Callieres and Diplomatic Theory. *The Historical Journal*, 16 (3), 485 – 508

¹⁸⁶ Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*, p. 191.

¹⁸⁷ Hamilton and Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy*, p. 213.

¹⁸⁸ Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*, p. 191.

¹⁸⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁹⁰ Mark W. Zacher. (1993). ‘The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance’, in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 65.

¹⁹¹ *ibid.*

Alongside these environmental changes for diplomacy, we can similarly speak of a slight agenda change. Although issues such as trade promotion, commercial reporting, security issues and arms control have encroached, the ‘traditional functions of diplomacy have remained intact’.¹⁹² These include promoting friendly relations, symbolic representation, lobbying, clarifying intentions, consular services, reporting, political and other types of analysis, negotiation and persuasion, and advice to decision makers.¹⁹³ These functions are central to the role of the traditional diplomatic institution and ‘cannot be performed as well, if in some cases at all, in its absence’.¹⁹⁴

The omnipotence, scope, flexibility and longevity of the traditional diplomatic institution mean that Traditionalists are unperturbed with the declining diplomacy arguments.¹⁹⁵ The declining diplomacy argument can be summarised as a situation where:

new practices such as contracting out governmental tasks to specialists from academia, business, the media, and politics, the breakup of foreign ministries’ monopoly over relations between governments, and the declining role of ambassadors as the main conduit of communication between governments constitute a trend toward obsolescence.¹⁹⁶

Traditionalists grant little attention to such argument. They propose, quite simply, that more states and more actors require more diplomatic representation. Rather than a

¹⁹² Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*, p. 193.

¹⁹³ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, pp. 117 – 126; Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, pp. 163 – 166; Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*, p. 193.

¹⁹⁴ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 117.

¹⁹⁵ Several ‘declining’ diplomacy arguments are thoroughly critiqued in Chapter Three of this thesis, *Nascent Diplomatic Theory*.

¹⁹⁶ Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*, pp. 198 – 199.

diplomatic crisis, the IR system seems to be witnessing a ‘diplomatic inflation’.¹⁹⁷ Traditionalists remain wedded to traditional state diplomacy, and the quantitative growth in this type of diplomacy provides the fodder for their continued focus.

For Traditionalists, the diplomatic institution remains robust and highly relevant in the modern diplomatic environment. The traditional diplomatic institution is neither in decline nor becoming obsolete, and as such remains an important area of academic focus. Holsti agrees, writing that the traditional diplomatic institution:

is based on sets of ideas that find repeated expression and acknowledgement, practices that have become routine over centuries, and norms and rules whose pedigrees go back at least two hundred years. The evidence does not suggest that diplomacy is yet being replaced by other forms of representation and communication, or that it is on the verge of obsolescence.¹⁹⁸

For Traditionalists, so long as the physical diplomatic institution endures and expands their theoretical input to the diplomatic studies field remains valid, necessary and informative. The traditional diplomatic system ‘remains – albeit sometimes disguised – at the core’ of the contemporary IR system.¹⁹⁹ The diplomatic institution, equally, ‘remains an excellent means by which to support if not lead in the execution of key diplomatic functions’, it is also ‘exceptionally versatile’ and a ‘permanent reminder of the importance and traditions of a state’.²⁰⁰ Through ongoing adaptability and historical longevity, the future of traditional diplomacy is assured. Therefore, TDT must not be abandoned, but consolidated as the core of diplomacy studies.

¹⁹⁷ Reychler, *Beyond Traditional Diplomacy*, p. 6.

¹⁹⁸ Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*, p. 210.

¹⁹⁹ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 112.

²⁰⁰ *ibid.*, p. 128.

2.7 The limitations of TDT

Criticism of TDT is common on the fringes of the canon of diplomacy studies. This section will present these criticisms, as well as assess their validity. In total there are three complaints often leveled at Traditionalist approaches to theory on modern diplomacy.

Firstly, TDT is more concerned with the practice of diplomacy rather than the theory on diplomacy. TDT speaks more to the traditional functionality of diplomacy, what diplomacy does, rather than the ‘bricks and mortar’ of diplomacy, what diplomacy is.²⁰¹ This reliance on functionality results in a limited theoretical understanding of modern diplomacy. For example, Watson notes that in order to foster a clear understanding of international relations we must strive for ‘knowledge on how diplomacy functions’, rather than attempting to understand what modern diplomacy is.²⁰² Such reliance on the functionality of diplomacy is common to TDT. The major concerns in the traditional field of theoretical diplomacy ‘have been its functions and practice’.²⁰³ As a result, Traditionalism has a tendency to be ‘sketchy and rather anecdotal’.²⁰⁴ Subsequently, Traditional *theory* is often vague, loose and flowery, what Nicolson describes as ‘precise although wide’.²⁰⁵

Relating to the above, a second complaint relevant to TDT is that the majority of ‘classic texts’ or works central to the canon of diplomacy studies are prescriptive.

²⁰¹ Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*, p. 12.

²⁰² Watson, in John Bayliss & N.J. Rengger, *Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World*. Oxford: Clarendon, p. 60.

²⁰³ Der Derian, *On Diplomacy*, p. 2.

²⁰⁴ *ibid.*

²⁰⁵ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, p. 5.

Prescriptive guides to modern diplomacy tend to be oriented professionally, not theoretically. While they offer novices an excellent insight into the practicalities and rules of diplomatic interaction, they do little to further the quest for theory that reflects modern diplomacy. If anything, such prescriptive approaches towards diplomacy ‘perpetuate the confusion of what diplomacy is and who diplomats are’, that is they do not further the field’s theoretical understanding of modern diplomacy.²⁰⁶

As a result, several less-traditional theorists argue that the canon must be revised and modernised. They argue that the canon is both dated and unreflective of the complexity of modern diplomacy.²⁰⁷ Hocking, for example, argues that the prescriptive nature of Traditionalist works denies the complexity of the modern diplomatic environment. He notes that:

one of the problems confronting any serious evaluation of the changing nature and role of diplomacy is the lack of analytical as opposed to descriptive material that surrounds it.²⁰⁸

Hocking is suggesting that a renewed type of analysis is required if we are to effectively theorise on modern diplomacy. Writing on a similar theme, Sofer noted that

²⁰⁶ Smith Simpson. (1995). Of Diplomats, Diplomacy and Their Chroniclers. *Virginia Quarterly Review*, 71 (4), p. 757.

²⁰⁷ Broader IR textbooks, which contain dutiful chapters on diplomacy, lack a robust, diffuse and multi-perspective analysis on diplomacy. For example see, John Bayliss and Steve Smith. (2005). *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Kegley Jr., Charles W. and Wittkopf, Eugene R. (2004). *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 9th Edition. Thomson Wadsworth: USA; Glenn P. Hastedt and Kay M. Knickrehm. (2003). *International Politics in a Changing World*. USA: Pearson Education. If theory is proposed it is ‘in ways that admit little attention to diplomats and diplomacy’ (Sharp, *For Diplomacy*, p. 34). Traditional and uncontested notions of diplomacy are explored or included in a token, almost sympathetic fashion.

²⁰⁸ Brian Hocking, ‘Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries’, 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, <www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html>

the conceptual wealth of the literature on (traditional) diplomacy is ‘quite limited and, to a great degree, divorced from the development of meaningful diplomatic theory’.²⁰⁹

The source of both Hocking and Sofer’s frustration stems from the prescriptive nature of traditional guides to diplomacy. Traditionalists, engaged in writing these prescriptive narratives, revise and update the field’s understanding of practical, traditional diplomacy while avoiding more challenging multi-actor theoretical analysis. This limited TDT focus means we ignore ‘many of the dynamic and dispersed factors behind the constitution of modern diplomacy’, preferring to neatly package diplomacy as a statist, historical or bland subject.²¹⁰

The ongoing reliance upon the classic texts suggests that there is an absence of original and innovative theory on modern diplomacy. The preference to theorise on diplomacy in a prescriptive fashion led Watson to lament that ‘no good book on the wider aspects of diplomacy, as distinct from foreign policies of individual states and the details of diplomatic practice, has been written since Harold Nicolson’s classic *Diplomacy* (1939)’.²¹¹

Lee extends this complaint further, arguing that:

²⁰⁹ Sasson Sofer. (1988). Old and new diplomacy: a debate revisited. *Review of International Studies*, 14, p. 196.

²¹⁰ Der Derian, *On Diplomacy*, p. 3.

²¹¹ Watson, *Diplomacy*, p. 12. The opinion from Watson and Lee serves to make the point on the inadequacy of prescriptive works on diplomacy. Similar rhetoric, relating to the paucity of diplomatic literature, has consensus in the diplomatic studies field. For example, Martin Wight lamented that there is no ‘succession of first-rate books about diplomacy’ and that few scholars have ‘made it their business to study the diplomatic community itself’ (*Diplomatic Investigation*, pp. 18 - 22). Similarly, Sofer notes that the ‘wealth of literature on diplomacy is quite limited’ (*Old and New Diplomacy*, p. 196). Der Derian argues that, subsequently, the discussion of diplomacy has become ‘somewhat marginal to international relations’ (*On Diplomacy*, p. 3). Neumann concurs when he adds ‘overall, the scholarly attention paid to diplomacy is a disappointment’ (*The English School*, p. 8). Before answering their own question, Lee and Hudson ask ‘why has diplomacy attracted so little attention?’ (*The old and new*, p. 350). The simple answer is that a statist lens is no longer the only available interpretation of diplomacy. A Traditionalist, partial focus on diplomacy serves only ‘to impose a contrived understanding of diplomacy’ by ‘binding diplomatic identity to a narrow political schema’ (*The old and new*, p. 345 - 349).

The conceptual framework of diplomacy, the definition of diplomacy and the systemic environment of diplomacy has been constant in diplomatic studies from Wicquefort (1606 – 1682). In essence, the very idea of diplomacy – that it is a dialogue between states in an anarchic systemic structure of independent political units – has not changed all that much during some three hundred and fifty years of scholarship.²¹²

That the diplomatic studies field's conceptual understanding of diplomacy has hardly altered during three and half centuries is enlightening.²¹³ However, this theoretical stagnation complaint remains valid in the modern sense. The regurgitation of a familiar practical and regulatory narrative is what led Jackson to claim that the majority of works in the diplomatic studies field are 'mistaking repetition for innovation'.²¹⁴

Prescriptive guides to diplomacy are 'both too narrow and too exclusive', which leads to a third criticism of TDT.²¹⁵ Traditionalists' greatest strength – a rigorous and exclusive focus on the traditional diplomatic institution – is also their greatest weakness. The statist focus inherent to TDT results in a partial, singular and parochial form of diplomatic theory. TDT by its statist nature is constrictive in the sense that nascent forms

²¹² Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 354.

²¹³ Two oft cited works challenging this assumption are James Der Derian (1987). *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement*. Oxford: Blackwell. And Costas M. Constantinou. (1996). *On the Way to Diplomacy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Both works essentially reject essentialist formulations of diplomatic ideas in social theory and practice. Der Derian, for example, argues that much of diplomacy is about representation, the production and reproduction of identities, and the context within which 'people' conduct their relations – in a stateless context. Der Derian avoids a statist focus by presenting a genealogy of diplomacy, which transcends the institutionalisation of the state system in 17th century Europe. He argues, simply, that diplomacy existed before the state and therefore transcends the state. Both authors however, due to their social theory focus, can hardly be described as diplomatic theorists *sui generis*. Sharp informs us that 'they are best regarded as visitors to diplomacy who departed before they got bored, but left some very useful and interesting presents' (For Diplomacy, p. 49). In addition, both works are both slightly dated at the time of submission.

²¹⁴ Jackson, Martin Wight's Thought on Diplomacy, p. 20.

²¹⁵ Constantinou, *On the Way to Diplomacy*, p. 90.

of non-state diplomacy are discounted, ignored or dismissed. In other words, TDT only tells us part of the modern diplomatic story; it reveals only part of the modern diplomatic milieu.

Since the end of the Cold War, diplomacy has ‘become a growth sector’, where unconventional, non-state actors have flourished alongside states.²¹⁶ The recent emergence of new actors in the form of IGOs, NGOs and MNCs requires that a sound and continuous process of communication, amongst not only state actors but also non-state actors, is paramount to ensuring international harmony. And yet, a distinct body of theory accounting for the growth of nascent diplomatic actors, and the diplomacy they practice, is conspicuous by its absence.

The prevalence of TDT means that ‘people find it hard to think about diplomacy in other than state-like terms’.²¹⁷ Protective of their superior disciplinary status, Traditionalists appear loathe to incorporate any theory which challenges their statist bias. Despite the inescapable march of ‘global capital forces, the proliferation of non-state actors and the communications revolution’, traditional state-qua-state diplomacy remains the dominant focus²¹⁸ of the diplomacy studies field.²¹⁹

²¹⁶ Hocking, *The end(s) of diplomacy*, p. 169. For a discussion on the emergence of unconventional or nascent diplomatic actors see Richard Langhorne. (1998). *Diplomacy Beyond the Primacy of the State. Diplomatic Studies Program*, Leicester University, No. 43, pp. 1 – 11; Richard Langhorne. (2000). Full Circle: New principles and old consequences in the modern diplomatic System. *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 1(1), 33-46. And John Bayliss and Steve Smith. (2005). *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 405 – 451.

²¹⁷ Sharp, *The Civilizing Virtues of Diplomacy*, p. 874.

²¹⁸ For examples of the state-centric focus see, M. G. Fry, E. Goldstein and R. Langhorne. (2002). *Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy*. London: Continuum; Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne. (1995). *The Practice of Diplomacy*. London; G. Ball. (1976). *Diplomacy for a Crowded World*. London: Bodley Head; P. G. Lauren. (1976). *Diplomats and Bureaucrats*. California: Stanford; G. R. Berridge. (2002). *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. London: Palgrave; Francois De Callieres. (1983). *The Art of Diplomacy*, edited by M. A. Keens- Soper. and K. W. Schweizer. Leicester: Leicester University Press; H. Nicolson. (1950). *Diplomacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Henry Kissinger. (1994). *Diplomacy*. New York. Simon & Schuster; Adam Watson. (1982) *Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States*. London: Eyre Methuen.

The Traditionalist dominance of the diplomatic studies field has failed to grant the necessary attention towards nascent forms of diplomacy. The need for a more ‘diffuse, multiperspectival’ understanding of diplomacy, mirroring the complex and multi-actor nature of the modern diplomatic environment has yet to filter through to the traditional diplomatic studies field.²²⁰

One non-Traditionalist theorist, Mor, is concerned with the unevenness of diplomatic theory, specifically the lack of multiperspectival and diffuse approaches. He notes that:

Diplomatic theory is still dominated by a concern with government-to-government communication. Influenced to a large degree by the realist framework, this theory prefers to focus on the “hard currency” of international relations, namely objective national power. Thus, diplomatic theory is an impoverished concept, which is not sensitive to the changing nature of the contemporary international system.²²¹

Mor’s theoretical impoverishment argument is appropriate where TDT is concerned, as Traditionalists continue to assume the state is the only diplomatic actor of significance.

The exclusivity of TDT is rife within the canon. The classic texts of diplomacy do not take into account ‘the widening of the concept [diplomacy] by the recent emergence of a variety of internationally significant actors’.²²² This reluctance is perhaps indicative

²¹⁹ John Hemery. (2002). Educating Diplomats. *International Studies Perspectives*, 3, p. 140.

²²⁰ Cooper and Hocking, Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy, p. 362.

²²¹ Ben D. Mor. (2003) Strategic Self-Presentation in Public Diplomacy. Paper presented at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 3 – 6, p. 2.

²²² Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p. xvii.

of the era when the classic texts were published, when non-state actors were not as prominent, influential or diplomatic as they are today. Nevertheless, in the modern era one may ‘wonder what sense it makes to exclude or leave aside the public diplomacy of NGOs, the discreet diplomatic maneuvering of international firms, or even the efforts of private diplomats, when such actors are recognised by states?’²²³ The answer to this question can be found in the majority of popular definitions, which convey a notion of diplomacy as ‘the conduct of relations between states’.²²⁴ The affect of unconventional diplomatic actors – prominent or insignificant – is portrayed as peripheral and thus disregarded.

TDT confines diplomacy to a sort of academic straightjacket, where the conventional, accepted view on diplomacy continues to be endorsed. By focusing exclusively on traditional diplomacy, the diplomatic studies field could be accused of an IR adage: perpetuating the ‘same old melodrama.’²²⁵ This thesis argues that the modern canon should include works that focus on original, multi-actor analysis *alongside* accounts of ‘what one clerk said to another’ and *how* one clerk should address the other.²²⁶ The recent growth of the diplomatic studies field suggests that there is more than enough room for both the traditional, statist works on diplomacy and more innovative, original and analytical work within the canon of diplomacy studies.

²²³ *ibid.*

²²⁴ Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 156.

²²⁵ Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. (1977). *Systems of States*. Leicester: Leicester University Press, p. 9.

²²⁶ D. C. Watt. (1985). What is Diplomatic History? *History Today*, 34, p. 33.

2.7.1 **Implications for diplomatic theory: A caveat for TDT**

If the diplomatic studies field is to comprehend fully the complex multi-actor nature of the modern diplomatic environment, there is a need for a more diffuse theory of contemporary diplomacy. The diplomatic studies field's reliance upon a partial, singular and statist view of diplomacy (TDT) is difficult to comprehend for it serves only to 'impose a contrived understanding of diplomacy'.²²⁷ The traditional approach avoids recognising other diplomatic activity – commercial diplomacy between states and firms for example²²⁸ – as a core element of modern diplomatic practice. Evidence on the linkage between state and non-state actors,²²⁹ for example, is as obvious as the Traditionalist's parochialism and yet the dominance of the TDT remains unchecked.²³⁰ Cooper writes of the Traditionalist's exclusive state focus:

what is striking about the traditional defence of diplomatic theory is the narrowness of its argument. Rather than a dynamic approach to the study of diplomacy, with a solid grasp of the changing context in which contemporary diplomacy must be located and a keen anticipation of the evolution in the role that professional diplomats play, the image presented is a static one.

²²⁷ Lee and Hudson, *The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy*, p. 345.

²²⁸ For an expansion of this theme, see Susan Strange. (1992). States, firms and diplomacy. *International Affairs*, 68 (1), 1 – 15.

²²⁹ See, Brian Hocking. (1997). The end(s) of diplomacy. *International Journal*, 53 (1), pp. 169 – 172; Brian Hocking. (2004). Privatizing Diplomacy? *International Studies Perspectives*, 5, pp. 147 – 152. For two more specific examples on the close relationship between commerce and diplomacy see Bernard E. Brown. (2001). What is the New Diplomacy? *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 23, 3 – 21. Brown discusses the success of the Ottawa Process, where over 1,000 NGOs, private interest groups and 155 states came together in 1996 to sign and ratify the Treaty to ban land-mines. More recently, see Virginia Haufler. (2004). International Diplomacy and the Privatization of Conflict Prevention. *International Studies Perspective*, 5, 158 – 163. The 'Kimberley Process' is a solid example of an NGO, Global Witness, acting as a catalyst to a process in which national diplomats, the European Union (EU) Commission, came together with journalists and De Beers, the global diamond firms. Each of these groups contributed to the establishment of a more humane diamond regime.

²³⁰ The sole purpose of this section is to highlight the deficiency of the Traditionalist approach to contemporary diplomacy. It is premature to provide overwhelming evidence in support of the symbiotic relationships between state and non-state actors here. In the following chapter, Nascent Diplomatic theory, evidence is provided to dispel the contemporary debate between the Traditionalist and the emerging, opposing faction of critical theorists.

Diplomats and diplomatic activity remain associated with a rigid state-centric international system.²³¹

For Traditionalists, such as Berridge, this immovable and ongoing focus on traditional diplomacy is understandable, comforting inasmuch as a focus on traditional diplomacy ensures continuity, familiarity and predictability. However, the claim that Traditionalists are over-protective of their domain is well founded. Hocking agrees, and comments that:

this [view] alone suffices as evidence that all is well within the world; that nothing has changed. Attempts to slot the diplomat into an alternative worldview are at best indicative of a failure of understanding and at worst akin to heresy. That the nature of diplomacy as an activity might be changing is either mistaken (for it denies the essence of the diplomat's role), or of no real interest, froth on the surface of the deep waters of the diplomatic oceans.²³²

Traditionalists appear to be in a state of conceptual denial, where they often overprotect their theoretical domain, claiming there is only one (statist) interpretation that accounts for the majority of diplomatic activity. They are, as Hocking mentions, resistant to notions of change that may discontinue or devalue the dominant role of the state in theoretical considerations of diplomacy. The emergence of alternative forms of diplomacy is described by Traditionalists as nothing more than 'old wine in new bottles. History has witnessed something very much like it before.'²³³

This dismissive rhetoric is problematic for diplomacy studies in that TDT parochialism or 'blindness, produces a partial disclosure of diplomatic practice'.²³⁴ In

²³¹ Cooper, *Beyond Representation*, p. 173.

²³² Hocking, *the end(s) of diplomacy*, p.170.

²³³ Jackson, *Martin Wight's Thought on Diplomacy*, p. 19.

²³⁴ Lee and Hudson, *The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy*, p. 360.

addition, continuing to endorse TDT as the sole conduit for understanding diplomacy is to distance theory from practice. In practical diplomacy, for example, there are increasing links between states and NGOs and yet this symbiotic confluence remains absent in TDT.²³⁵

Criticism against the Traditionalists is not to argue that the field must utterly abandon a focus that has been frustrating innovation for some time. The state is an important, perhaps the most important, diplomatic actor and it is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. However, criticism of TDT appears to be a popular pastime amongst less-traditional theorists. There is a certain validity underlying such criticism. Cooper, for example, suggests that the theory of:

diplomats and diplomacy is too important to be left to the care of many of their keenest defenders. When faced with challenges of legitimacy and relevance, the instinctive tendency among these supporters has been to place both diplomats and diplomacy in a tight institutional shell as a form of protection. To adopt this narrow mode of defence is misguided.²³⁶

What Cooper confirms here is that TDT overprotection can result in a parochial theory on diplomacy. Of parsimonious state-centric theories and theorists, Rosenau is also keen to stress the limitations of their approach.²³⁷ According to Rosenau, Traditionalists:

²³⁵ Empirical evidence in support of the symbiotic state/NGO relationship is provided in chapter four, Innovative Diplomatic Theory. For a discussion of this theme see, Brian Hocking. (2004). Privatizing Diplomacy? *International Studies Perspectives*, 5, pp. 147 – 152.

²³⁶ Cooper, *Beyond Representation*, p. 178.

²³⁷ Rosenau is an IR theorist but comparison can be drawn between his criticism of the IR field and criticism of the Traditionalists within the Diplomatic Studies field. Rosenau cites to the work of a traditional IR theorist, Kenneth Waltz as indicative of a state-centric theorist. A closer examination of Waltz's work reveals the reason behind this labelling. Within, the dominance of the state is never far from Waltz's arguments. For example he posits that while 'states may choose to interfere little in the affairs of non-state actors for long periods of time,' they 'nevertheless set the terms of the intercourse... When the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate.' According to Waltz this

are prisoners of their paradigm, unwilling to escape the premise of state predominance and constantly tempted to cling to familiar assumptions about hierarchy, authority and sovereignty. While conceding that actors other than states have become conspicuous in world politics, they preserve their paradigm by insisting that this conspicuousness acquires meaning only in the context of an environment controlled by states.²³⁸

Sharp also warns on the continuation of this exclusive state/traditional focus. He writes that:

by refusing to reflect on where we are on the [diplomatic] continuum, it is possible to maintain a general disposition against diplomacy. Until recently, we have been acknowledging that it is everywhere, and anticipating its decline while witnessing its expansion, without feeling any compelling need to explain.²³⁹

If the diplomacy studies field remains wedded to TDT then the complex nature of modern diplomacy will continue to confound. On the other hand, ‘if we accept that states and others have arms and legs’, then perhaps we can direct theory towards understanding the diplomacy of non-state actors *alongside* traditional diplomatic actors.²⁴⁰ In doing so, a more complex theoretical tapestry can be woven, one that better conveys the essence of diplomacy in the twenty-first century. Where modern diplomacy and diplomatic theory is

predominance of states is sufficient to ignore or discount calls for a separate form of theory: ‘A theory that denies the central role of states will be needed only if nonstate actors develop to the point of rivalling or surpassing the great powers, not just a few of the minor ones. They show no sign of doing that.’ See, Kenneth N. Waltz. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, pp. 94 – 95.

²³⁸ J. N. Roseneau. (1980). *The Study of Global Interdependence*. London: Francis Pinter, p. 244 – 245.

²³⁹ Sharp, *For Diplomacy*, p. 44.

²⁴⁰ *ibid.*, p. 50.

concerned it is important to realise that ‘traditional or statist diplomacy’ does not mean ‘diplomacy per se.’²⁴¹

Limitations aside, the Traditionalist focus in diplomacy theory is valuable. One central benefit is that categorising this dominant and visible group of theorists lays a strong foundation upon which to introduce other types of diplomatic theories and theorists. Consolidating the category of Traditionalists provides a departure point for analysing and assigning categories to the work of other diplomatic theorists.

²⁴¹ Hoffman, *Reconstructing Diplomacy*, p. 540.

Chapter Three – Nascent Diplomatic Theory (NDT)

The aim of this chapter is to introduce and construct a second type of diplomatic theory. This theory, Nascent Diplomatic Theory (NDT), is less prominent than TDT within the canon of diplomacy studies.¹ This chapter will cement the general characteristics of Nascent diplomatic theorists and present examples of their work. This chapter aims to build a comprehensive profile of the Nascent theorist, with each of the following sections adding layers to this profile.

3.0 The origins of nascent diplomacy

The first step in building the Nascent theorist's profile is to establish the type of diplomacy these theorists postulate on. This type of diplomacy is non-state diplomacy, and has several synonyms: new, unofficial, unconventional or alternate diplomacy, for example. Nascent theorists acknowledge state-qua-state diplomacy, but they are largely uncomplimentary on the traditional conduit for diplomacy.

This form of diplomacy came into its own in the early twentieth century. Although non-state diplomatic actors and environments existed in previous centuries, it was not until the twentieth century that they had an impact on the IR system significant

¹ A body of work reflecting NDT could include: Costas M. Constantinou. (1996). *On the Way to Diplomacy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Jovan Kurbaliga (ed). (1999). *Modern Diplomacy*. Valetta: Mediterranean Academy of Diplomacy Studies; Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.). (1995). *Bringing Transnational Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobsen and R. D. Putnam. (eds.). (1993). *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*. Berkley: University of California Press; Shaun Riordan. (2003). *The New Diplomacy*. Cambridge: Polity Press; A. L. Kennedy. (1922). *Old Diplomacy and new, 1876 – 1922*. London: J. Murray; Arnold J. Mayer. (1969). *Political Origins of the New Diplomacy*. New York: Meridian Books; John Hoffman. (2003). Reconstructing Diplomacy. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 5 (4), 525-542; Richard Langhorne. (1997). Current Developments in Diplomacy: Who are the Diplomats Now? *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 8 (2), 1-15; Richard Langhorne. (1998a). Diplomacy Beyond the Primacy of the State. *Diplomatic Studies Program*, Leicester University, No. 43, pp. 1 – 11; Michael Bruter. (1999). Diplomacy without a state: the external delegations of the European Commission. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6 (2), 183 - 205

enough to constitute a form of diplomacy different from the traditional, state-qua-state form. There are two significant moments in history for this alternate form of diplomacy: its *announcement* following the Great War and its ultimate *breakthrough*, which followed the end of the Cold War.²

The Great War of 1914 – 1918 was a pivotal moment for diplomacy. Before the war, little strain was exerted on the traditional diplomatic machinery; it had the ‘monopoly on foreign policy’.³ However, the outbreak of the First World War was to challenge traditional diplomacy’s monopoly.⁴ The diplomatic system that had dominated Europe for over two hundred years had failed to prevent the Great War.⁵ The balance of

² This idea stemmed from an article by the IR theorist Hans Kung. Although focusing on broader IR themes, Kung’s paradigm shift theory is useful when applied to the inception of nascent diplomacy (2002). Kung identifies three symbolic dates that signal a new paradigm in IR that is ‘slowly and laboriously establishing itself: its announcement (1918), its realisation (1945) and finally its breakthrough (1989)’ (p. 8). For Kung, the breakthrough of the new paradigm has finally signified a ‘move away from the confrontational politics of national power, self interest and prestige’, and put an end to the types of military power politics that lead to the two Great Wars (p.10). Kung notes that that the older IR system (1918 – 1989) ‘always presupposed an enemy, indeed a traditional or ideological enemy, [while] the new paradigm no longer envisions such an enemy. Conversely, the post Cold War system states seek partners, rivals and economic opponents for competition instead of military confrontation’ (p.11). Each of Kung’s paradigm shifts is useful, in that they resonate with the evolution of NDT. For an expansion of these themes, see Hans Kung. (2002). *Global Politics and Global Ethics. Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Winter/Spring, pp. 8 – 20. For a rebuttal to the notion of a new paradigm in IR see, Roberts, Adam. (1991). A new age in international relations? *International Affairs*, 67 (3), 509 – 525. Roberts turns a sceptical eye on arguments which suggest that the international order underwent a transformation after the Cold War.

³ Richard Langhorne. (1998). *Diplomacy Beyond the Primacy of the State*. DSP Discussion Paper, Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, No. 43, p. 1.

⁴ For a discussion on the causes of the Great War and the shape of the pre-war international relations system, see F. S. Northedge. (1976). *The International Political System*. London: Faber and Faber, pp. 1-24; Hudson Meadwell. (2001). The long nineteenth century in Europe. *Review of International Studies*, 27, pp. 165 – 189; David Stevenson. (1997). Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914. *International Security*, 22 (1), pp. 125 – 161; John Keegan. (1993). *A History of Warfare*. London: Random House, pp. 23 – 34. For an excellent account of the pre-war diplomacy between the five great powers, see Ralph Menning. (1996). *The Art of the Possible: Documents on Great Power Diplomacy, 1814 – 1914*. Toronto: McGraw-Hill; R. B. Mowat. (1931). *A History of European Diplomacy, 1914 - 1925*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co; P. G. Gooch. (1927). *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy*. London: Longmans, Green & Co.

⁵ For a synopsis on the consequences of the Great War see Daniel S. Geller. (1998). *Nations at War: A Scientific Study of International Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 156 – 190; Arthur Walworth. (1986). Wilson and his Peacemakers: *American Diplomacy at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co. Also, more briefly, see Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R.

power system was held to be at fault as it ‘provoked rather than prevented wars, was too vague or imprecise to be of practical use and.....now seemed decrepit, moribund, a tattered and unconvincing ghost’.⁶

The outbreak of the First World War was attributed to the inability of traditional diplomacy to mitigate the ‘misperception and miscalculation’ amongst European states that led to the conflict.⁷ Traditional diplomacy was thus portrayed as a ‘central cause of the outbreak of World War One’;⁸ it was held ‘as an immoral institution and identified with war and intrigue’.⁹ If the Great War was to be the war to end all wars, the European diplomatic system needed to be overhauled and a new international order built from the ashes of conflict. While diplomacy changed subtly from ‘ancient times until the twentieth century, it now needed radical new techniques for a new world’.¹⁰ In this context, the period following the Great War was ‘an event of a watershed, allowing us to identify a decisive moment in the development of diplomacy’.¹¹ The emergence of a different type of diplomacy was certainly a watershed moment.

The announcement of nascent diplomacy came after the Great War, which ‘constituted a decisive turning point in the modern era, marking the emergence of a new diplomacy, distinct in both essence and style from that which existed previously’.¹² After the war, as the IR system changed ‘diplomacy, although with a noticeable time-lag,

Wittkopf. (2004). *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 9th Edition. California: Thomson Wadsworth. pp 101 – 106.

⁶ Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, pp. 202 – 203.

⁷ David Stevenson. (1997). *Militarisation and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914*. International Security, 22 (1), p. 126.

⁸ Sofer, *Old and New Diplomacy*, p. 197.

⁹ Morgenthau, *Politics Amongst Nations*, p. 639.

¹⁰ Paul Sharp. (1997). Who needs diplomats? The problem of diplomatic representation. *International Journal*, 52 (4), p. 625.

¹¹ Der Derian, *On Diplomacy*, p. 106.

¹² Sofer, *Old and New Diplomacy*, p. 195.

changed with it'.¹³ Several factors were responsible for this change in diplomacy, for example 'a growing sense of the community of nations; an increasing appreciation of the importance of public opinion to foreign policy; and the rapid increase in communications'.¹⁴ This new form of diplomacy was a call for 'a simpler diplomacy, which involved a flexible kind of self-righteousness, and the unhistorical attitude towards the past'.¹⁵

One man responsible for the wave of self-righteousness was the then US President Woodrow Wilson.¹⁶

saviour of Europe and creator of a new world order, who extrapolated that the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power was abolished. "There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organised rivalries, but an organised common peace".¹⁷

The Americans, under Wilson, imported a zeal for liberalism and a distrust of the European balance of power of system and the diplomacy that lubricated it. Wilson endeavoured to 'fashion a new diplomacy on the basis of a utopian and revolutionary vision'.¹⁸ At the time, Wilson's ideas were a departure from undemocratic and belligerent

¹³ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, p. 36.

¹⁴ *ibid.*,

¹⁵ Butterfield and Wight, *Diplomatic Investigations*, p. 182. Butterfield is critical of the transition from old, statist and realist beliefs to new, non-state and idealistic virtues. In particular Butterfield was suspicious of public involvement in Foreign Policy. Involving the public in foreign policy was dangerous he argued: 'the masses would give way to passions, moral indignations and short-cut forms of reasoning, lacking the patience for the understanding of 'the other party' (the foreigner), lacking the foresight for the pursuit of long-term objects, and failing to realise the things that might be achieved by diplomatic methods' (1966: 182). In short, the advent of new diplomacy, or more generally the idealistic mood sweeping Europe post World War I, was nothing more than 'a facile attempt to pander the self-esteem of the masses' (1966: 182).

¹⁶ For a recent account of Wilson's influence on the post-World War I IR system see Robert W. Tucker. (2004). Woodrow Wilson's "New Diplomacy". *World Policy Journal*. Summer, pp. 92 – 107.

¹⁷ Wilson in Butterfield and Wight, *Diplomatic Investigations*, p. 172.

¹⁸ Sofer, *Old and New Diplomacy*, p. 197.

European diplomacy as they embodied the essentially ‘peaceful nature of man and an underlying harmony of the world’.¹⁹

Foreign policy would no longer be a secretive activity, but based on popular control, what Nicolson refers to as the ‘democratisation of foreign policy’.²⁰ State interaction could not rely upon a balance of power system that would encourage trade wars, arms races and colonial rivalries. New diplomacy would eradicate these pre-war relics from the IR system and bring about ‘disarmament, free trade and self-determination’.²¹

After the Great War, a ‘utopian perception of international society, analogous to the ideal civil society’, developed.²² Notions of international society entered the political vocabulary and the creation of a community of nations, headed by a permanent sovereign institution, was championed. This latter notion would manifest in the formation of the multi-lateral League of Nations in 1919, where statesmen as well as diplomats, would convene in summits. Further significant changes attributed to the *announcement* of nascent diplomacy can be summarised as follows: open as opposed to secret diplomacy; notions of collective rather than individual security; a sentiment of idealism incorporated into a permanent state of multilateralism; notions of world peace; self-determination for all peoples of all nations; and a resurgent belief in the human spirit were championed over the somber balance of power system, heavy militarisation and the permissible

¹⁹ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 222.

²⁰ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, pp. 21 – 54.

²¹ Sofer, *Old and New Diplomacy*, p. 197.

²² For the English school approach to International Society see Hedley Bull. (1977). *The anarchical Society: A study of order in world politics*. pp. 96 – 223. New York: Columbia University Press. Also, for an excellent synopsis of the contributions of the major theorists of the English School to diplomacy and international society, ranging from Manning to Reus-Smit see, Iver B. Neumann. (2002). *The English School on Diplomacy*. Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute on International Relations, ‘Clingendael’, pp. 1 – 28.

conflict of the pre-war period associated with traditional diplomacy.²³ These notions were a dramatic break from the past.

Developments in the post World War II IR system continued this trend. To discuss the many influences on the shape of this IR system is a complex task. Suffice to say that the founding of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods Agreement, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, alongside American economic aid for the rebuilding of Europe and its incorporation into a free trade system, had a profound effect on the IR system.²⁴

Similarly, the list of changes to the IR system at the end of the Cold War (when nascent diplomacy *broke through*) is an exhausting task.²⁵ However, four significant developments relating to nascent diplomacy can be identified. Firstly, we have witnessed

²³ For an expanded account of the differences between old and new diplomacy, the characteristics of new diplomacy and the argument concerning the decline of old diplomacy see Sasson Sofer. (1988). Old and new diplomacy: a debate revisited. *Review of International Studies*, 14, pp. 195 – 211; Harold Nicolson. (1961). Diplomacy Then and Now. *Foreign Affairs*, 40 (1), pp. 39 – 49; T. G. Otte. (1998). Harold Nicolson and Diplomatic Theory: Between Old Diplomacy and New. *Diplomatic Studies Program Discussion Papers*, No. 44. Leicester: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy; Herbert Butterfield. (1966). The New Diplomacy and Historical Diplomacy, in Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield. (1966). *Diplomatic Investigations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; Henry Kissinger. (1994). *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 218 – 243.

²⁴ It is not this paper's intention to enter into a debate concerning the shape of the IR system post World War II. For a mainstream interpretation, see Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf. (2004). *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 9th Edition. California: Thomson Wadsworth. pp 106 – 113; William C. Wohlforth. (1999). The Stability of a Unipolar World. *International Security*, 24 (1), pp. 5 – 41; Randolph M. Siverson. (1980). War and Change in the International System, in K. J. Holsti, R. Siverson and A. George. (1980). *Change in the International System*. Colorado: Westview Press, pp. 211 – 232. For a specific account of the evolution of the IR system and the effect on diplomacy see Richard Langhorne. (1998a). History and Evolution of Diplomacy in Kurbaliga, Jovan (ed), *Modern Diplomacy*. Valetta: Mediterranean Academy of Diplomacy Studies; Robert Dean. (2000). Tradition, Cause and Effect, and the History of International Relations. *Diplomatic History*, 24 (4), pp. 615 – 622;

²⁵ For a summary of events affecting the IR system since the end of the Cold War see Michael Cox. (2005). *From the Cold War to the War on Terror*, pp. 132 - 156 in John Bayliss and Steve Smith. (2005). *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Kenneth N. Waltz. (1993). The Emerging Structure of International Politics. *International Security*, 18 (2), 44 – 79; Joseph S. Nye (Jr.). (1999). Redefining the National Interest. *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 22 – 35. For a country specific discussion, see Bernard E. Brown. (2001). What is the New Diplomacy? *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 23, pp. 3 – 21; Mark Leonard. (2002). Diplomacy by Other Means. *Foreign Policy*, 9, pp. 48 – 55; Mark Grossman. (2004). Challenges for European and American Diplomacy in the 21st Century, *The DISAM Journal*, fall, pp. 54 – 60; Geoff Miller. (2002). Current and emerging challenges to the practice of Australian diplomacy. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 56 (2), pp. 197 – 206.

a ‘tremendous increase in diplomacy as a direct result of the increasing number of international actors’, not only states but MNCs, NGOs and IGOs.²⁶ Secondly, there has been an increase in bilateral and multilateral settings for diplomacy. Thirdly, the ‘growing volume and expanding agenda of diplomatic business’ has ‘transformed the face of diplomacy’; a prominent example central to this new agenda is environmental issues, which are of a transnational and global nature.²⁷ And finally, the notion of diplomacy being the sole conduit for intra-state relations no longer exists, since government departments other than the foreign ministry increasingly have contacts with their counterparts in other countries, which ‘circumvents the foreign ministry and the embassy’.²⁸ To this last point can be added the growing relationships between states and firms, states and NGOs and states and IGOs, for example.

Each of the three periods described above had a profound affect on the IR system, but the principles to emerge after each war were not to the benefit of states. The principles espoused in the first instance by a statesman – Wilson - for a system of states were ultimately embraced by non-state actors. They adopted an agenda and ethos that was originally intended for the state system in 1919. States, due to their historical foundations and traditional focus of national interest and sovereignty, were reluctant to adopt the principles described in this section, which could ultimately undermine them.²⁹

²⁶ Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p. xiv.

²⁷ *ibid.*

²⁸ *ibid.*, p. xxii.

²⁹ The case of France’s obstinacy during the 1919 Paris Peace conference illustrates the stubbornness inherent to early 20th century, traditional power politics. The specters of individualism and national security were central to her objectives during the negotiations. Of the French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau (nicknamed “the Tiger”) Kissinger notes that ‘no other nation either shared or grasped France’s objectives. The clock simply could not be turned back 150 years’ (*Diplomacy*, p. 231). For France, her demands were simple: to guarantee national security over the idealistic harmonisation of mankind. History had bestowed such caution and skepticism on France. France had been ‘the theatre of many a European War and itself a participant in many more, was not to be persuaded that there existed some nebulous, underlying harmony

Non-state actors, *breaking through* after 1989, consolidated a lower political agenda that was first *announced* in 1919.

The work of recent scholars supports this assumption. Hocking, for example, argues the breakthrough of nascent diplomacy (diplomacy not directed by traditional state actors) ‘reflects the expansion of the agenda to embrace human rights and environmental issues, the strengthening of civil society and the growing capacity of groups, particularly NGOs, to operate alongside governments in the international arena and to challenge their [states] authority’.³⁰ The notions that were *announced* in 1919 remain awkward for traditional states. After the Cold War, emerging non-state actors, unconstrained and untainted by traditionalism, have been able to embrace and champion an alternative ethos, a lower political agenda to that of states.

3.1 The central tenets of NDT

Following the end of the Cold War, Nascent theorists agree that ‘the challenge [for diplomacy studies] now is to develop a way of conceptualising and analysing diplomacy that can identify, explain and understand these sorts of changes to diplomatic practice’.³¹ One change central to NDT is the emergence of non-state actors practicing

heretofore hidden from mankind. Two German occupations in the course of fifty years had made France obsessively fearful of another round of conquest. It would aspire to tangible guarantees of its security and leave the moral improvement of mankind to others.’ (*Diplomacy*, p. 233). For a discussion on the personalities involved in the Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles, and the subsequent difficulties in reaching political agreement, see, Kissinger, Henry. (1994). *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster, pp. 218 – 246.

³⁰ Brian Hocking, ‘Catalytic Diplomacy: Beyond Newness and Decline’, in Jan Melissen (ed.). (1999). *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*. New York: Macmillan, p. 32.

³¹ Hocking, *Privatizing Diplomacy?*, p. 345.

‘unofficial’ diplomacy.³² This shift from a statist focus on diplomacy is positive, although embryonic, in terms of broadening the field of enquiry for diplomacy studies.

Whereas TDT accounts for a singular actor (the state), NDT accounts for a diverse range of diplomatic actors including MNCs or NGOs, for example. The key point to note is that these non-state actors lie out with the traditional domain of state-qua-state diplomatic interaction. Nascent theorists do not ignore the state altogether. Instead, their focus is largely on non-state diplomatic actors. NDT, therefore, postulates on non-state actors who practice alternate or unconventional diplomacy. In other words, Nascent theorists distance their theory from the traditional diplomatic institution.

Nascent diplomacy can be distinguished from traditional diplomacy in simple fashion: if traditional diplomacy promotes the state as the unitary actor in IR, is therefore Realist and state-centric, then nascent diplomacy can be classified as an ideal, moral approach that promotes an international society, which does not endorse the state as the only significant actor engaged in international diplomacy. One central tenet of NDT, therefore, is the premise that the ‘the diplomatic expertise for dealing successfully with conflict and peacemaking does not reside solely within government personnel or procedures’.³³

Another central tenet of NDT is that it emerged to challenge the dominant Traditionalist theory on diplomacy. Traditionalist statism, parochialism and dominance played a role in the emergence of this faction of theorists. The statist exclusivity of Traditionalism meant that ‘such a perspective plays into the hands of those forces which view diplomacy [traditional] as increasingly removed from the real problems – and

³² Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 21.

³³ Louise Diamond and John W. MacDonald. (1996) *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press Books for a World That Works, p. 2.

solutions – facing the world in the post Cold War years.’³⁴ Those ‘forces’ are what this thesis refers to as NDT. TDT parochialism encouraged the mustering of Nascent theorists, who have assembled to lead an academic cavalry charge against TDT. Nascent theorists are keen to alter the dominant theoretical perception that diplomacy must be viewed exclusively through a traditional and statist lens. Instead, they promote a view where non-state actors are central to modern diplomatic theory.

Therefore, NDT has ‘a transformational aspect, advocating a change in understanding of a modern diplomatic environment dominated by states’ and the diplomatic theory that interprets the system as such.³⁵ Centrally, NDT advocates an alternate worldview. This worldview can be described as one where:

traditional power politics are bypassed; non-state actors unite if not replace states as the loci of power; humanity and a need to address the human condition supersedes typical strategic power concerns; partnership and inclusivity are preferred over rivalry, antagonism and exclusivity; emphasis is placed on the continuity of international relationships over sporadic or situational relationships between traditional power brokers; and the international community is deemed to address not only the political affairs of global interaction but also humane and environmental issues.³⁶

NDT emphasises the ‘human, humane, non-violent, relational, interactive, shared and mutually empowered aspects of resolving conflicts and building relationships’.³⁷ NDT is essentially reflective of the interdependent, multi-polar and transnational nature

³⁴ Cooper, *Beyond Representation*, p. 173.

³⁵ Diamond and MacDonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, p. 37.

³⁶ *ibid.*, p. 37.

³⁷ *ibid.*, p. 39.

of the modern IR system. In addition, the Nascent theoretical approach to diplomacy is a departure from TDT. For Nascent theorists, the complexity of the IR system since 1989 has induced a ‘diplomatic revolution’ where the incumbent state is ‘undermined and effectively destroyed by complex political, economic, military and ideological developments that have destroyed its homogeneity and effectiveness’.³⁸ Therefore, it should come as little surprise when Nascent theorists claim that to focus on traditional diplomacy ‘is to examine the redundant or the irrelevant’.³⁹

3.2 The general characteristics of Nascent theorists

There are certain assumptions that qualify diplomatic theorists as Nascent theorists. The purpose here is to identify these general assumptions. Firstly, Nascent theorists challenge the dominant assumption that diplomacy be interpreted in a rigid, precise or authoritative fashion, concentrating exclusively on the role of the state. They argue that to understand modern diplomacy, the theoretical focus on the state must be lessened. Lessening the state focus requires a reconceptualisation or reinvention of diplomatic theory. Hoffman, typifies this characteristic: he writes that ‘the concept of diplomacy can and must be reconstructed’, which is only possible ‘if theory on diplomacy is detached from the state’.⁴⁰ This alternate approach (to Traditionalism) suggests that by exploring diplomacy out with the state rewarding insight awaits discovery.

Nascent theorists, secondly, view the state as blocking change to a more pacific IR system. Nascent theorists can thus be described as ‘those who regard the state as an

³⁸ Craig and George, *Force and Statecraft*, p. 287.

³⁹ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 25.

⁴⁰ Hoffman, *Reconstructing Diplomacy*, p. 541.

obstacle to world order'; to them, 'the development of an alternative diplomacy, embracing NGOs and transnational movements, offers the prospect of an international order transcending the state system'.⁴¹ Thus, the traditional institution of diplomacy is 'perpetually under suspicion' by Nascent theorists.⁴² Unless the diplomatic institution can reinvent itself as being receptive to change, Nascent theorists critically implicate it as one of the culprits held responsible for contemporary global problems, through its inability to act proactively rather than reactively.⁴³

Several Nascent theorists, thus, argue that the traditional diplomatic institution is in a period of crisis. This crisis rhetoric, aimed at the incumbent traditional diplomatic institution, is a third general assumption of NDTs. Der Derian, for example, writes of the 'crisis in which diplomacy finds itself today'⁴⁴ and Riordan writes of the continuing 'fragmentation of traditional diplomacy' where 'no country, however powerful, will be immune'.⁴⁵ Langhorne adds, 'there has been a decline, since the first world war, in the role played in international politics by professional diplomacy'.⁴⁶ Nascent theorists believe that traditional/professional diplomacy cannot cope with 21st century problems, and that this type of diplomacy both as a vocation and an area of theoretical focus is defunct.

The crisis of the traditional diplomatic institution leads Nascent theorists to suggest, fourthly, that perhaps it is obsolete. They propose that the traditional diplomatic

⁴¹ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 24.

⁴² Sharp, *Who Needs Diplomats?*, p. 619.

⁴³ For a counter to this argument see Kishan S. Rana. (2004). *Foreign Ministries: Change and Reform*. Paper presented at the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 18th; Brian Hocking. (1999). *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation*. London: Palgrave; Brian Hocking and David Spence (eds.). (2002). *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

⁴⁴ Der Derian, *On Diplomacy*, p. 1.

⁴⁵ Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*, p. 10.

⁴⁶ Langhorne, *Diplomacy Beyond the Primacy of the State*, p. 2.

institution is irrelevant, redundant and rapidly losing the ability to influence an increasingly complex IR system. Nascent theorists portray the traditional institution of diplomacy as unresponsive to change, archaic and capable only of providing out-dated solutions to out-dated problems. Eayrs, for example, describes traditional diplomacy's 'deliquescence' or 'melting away into nothingness'.⁴⁷ Nascent theoretical approaches have therefore 'tended to ignore professional diplomacy or to question its significance' in relation to modern diplomatic theory.⁴⁸ According to Nascent theorists, the traditional diplomatic institution is obsolete, mired in a political and territorial world of a bygone era.

The same criticism is leveled at state-centric diplomatic theories by Nascent theorists. They simply argue that these state-centric theories on diplomacy fail to account for the complexities of the modern diplomatic environment. State-centric/Traditional theories are therefore rejected for 'not being sufficiently inclusive, the need [according to Nascent theorists] is for a more diffuse, multiperspectival approach'.⁴⁹ Nascent theorists often employ TDT to illustrate its weakness and inapplicability to the modern diplomatic environment, while at the same time, to advance their arguments.

The obsolescence accredited to traditional diplomacy theory has led Nascent theorists, fifthly, to focus on alternate diplomatic actors. More promising research, according to Nascent theorists, lies in theorising on non-state diplomatic actors. The modern diplomatic environment has provided 'the opportunity for non-state actors to engage in diplomacy through channels, which replace those employed by governments'.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Eayrs in Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 24.

⁴⁸ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 24.

⁴⁹ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 362.

⁵⁰ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 24.

To construct sound diplomatic theory, claim Nascent theorists, means first to acknowledge the multi-actor nature of the IR system and, secondly, to theorise on the diplomacy that unconventional actors practice within that system.

Sixthly and finally, Nascent theorists are unsure of the value of history to their brand of diplomatic theory. Their reluctance to embrace the distant as well as recent past is understandable as they focus on post Cold War developments in Diplomacy and IR, and are keen to distance their work from the historical obsession of the Traditionalists. Gaddis exemplifies the NDT's attitude towards history. He writes of historians that 'they devote themselves, figuratively at least, to collecting pebbles on the beach, and arranging them in patterns that may delight the eye but rarely stimulate the brain'.⁵¹ Hunt adds that Nascent theorists 'have consigned diplomatic historians to the role of the hewers-of-the-wood and the drawers-of-water in their world of theory'.⁵² For Nascent theorists, relying heavily on the distant past is superfluous when theorising on modern diplomacy.

3.3 The range of NDT: moderate to orthodox

Not all Nascent theorists fit the general characteristics described in the previous section. A closer examination of their body of work suggests that Nascent theory ranges from moderate (not entirely discounting the traditional diplomatic institution) to orthodox (entirely discounting). In the latter sense, Nascent theorists such as Modelski (1972), Hoffman (2003) or Jackson (2002), are hostile in their criticism of statist and traditionalist diplomacy. In other Nascent theoretical approaches, such as those

⁵¹ John L. Gaddis, John L. (1987). Expanding the Data Base: Historians, Political Scientists and the Enrichment of Security Studies. *International Security*, 12 (1), p. 10.

⁵² Michael H. Hunt. (1992). The Long Crisis in U.S. Diplomatic History: Coming to Closure. *Diplomatic History*, 16 (1), pp 115 – 116.

demonstrated by Langhorne (1997, 1998, 2000), Diamond (1996) and Reychler (1996), the rhetoric against traditional diplomacy is more temperate. Both approaches, however, convey the same message: to understand modern diplomacy we first must distance the role of the state in diplomatic theory.

An example of this message from a moderate perspective is the opinion of Diamond and Macdonald, who argue that:

the whole worldview of the last several centuries, which saw the nation-state as the unit of power and the balance of power as the principle of order, is no longer satisfactory to explain all the new conditions and forces at work in the world community.⁵³

The language that Diamond and Macdonald employ is observant rather than hostile. The worldview which is 'no longer satisfactory' to explain the complex and altered modern diplomatic environment is TDT. Diamond and Macdonald are not advocating the complete abandonment of TDT but a possible redirection of diplomatic theory, one that accounts for the emerging force of non-state diplomatic actors.

Although moderate Nascent theorists champion the ascendancy of non-state diplomatic actors, they also believe that the state must not be entirely discounted. They believe that in order to theorise accurately on modern diplomacy, it is important not to discount or abandon statist reverence, and to view nascent diplomacy in relation to the state. Princen and Finger, for example, argue that a theory of modern diplomacy should incorporate both the Traditional and NDT focus:

⁵³ Diamond and Macdonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, p. 23.

although the work of the foreign ministries remains essential for conducting the affairs of state, a much more complex picture of diplomacy emerges when one considers the expansion of issues, global communications, and the involvement of non-state and intergovernmental organisations.⁵⁴

Princen and Finger's advice, that a focus on both traditional and nascent diplomacy sheds light on the complexity of modern diplomacy, exemplifies the tone of moderate NDT. Sharp (1999) also argues for a temperate approach, where diplomatic theory must reflect:

the transformed environment of actors, issues, and modes of communication within which diplomats function; and yet, demonstrate the continuing centrality of conventional diplomats to most of what happens in contemporary diplomacy.⁵⁵

Here, Sharp advocates a continuation of TDT but in relation to nascent diplomatic actors. However, within the NDT faction, the above temperate examples are the current exception, rather than the rule. In its more extreme form, NDT on traditional diplomacy has been hostile. Orthodox Nascent theorists argue that non-state diplomatic actors or forces, such as the information revolution, are eroding the legitimacy of the state and subsequently the traditional diplomatic institution. This line of argument produces extreme opinion, which:

can lead to the conclusion that non-state actors have become more significant on the world stage than governments who are cast into a limbo of growing irrelevance. From this perspective, diplomacy [traditional] is not only of decreasing relevance, it may indeed be dangerous in that it holds back the more benign non-state actors underpinning world society

⁵⁴ Thomas Princen and Matthias Finger. (1994). *Environmental NGOs in World Politics: Linking the Local and the Global*. London: Routledge, p. 31.

⁵⁵ Sharp, *For Diplomacy*, p. 47.

from generating a more peaceful environment than that which has characterised the several centuries dominated by the Westphalian international system.⁵⁶

In this quote, several characteristics of Nascent theorists can be recognised: the notion of the traditional institution 'blocking' change is entrenched, alongside its irrelevance, and the abhorrence Nascent theorists have towards Traditionalism is clear. According to orthodox Nascent theorists, the incumbent state is locked in an awkward relationship with emerging diplomatic actors. In the modern era, we are witnessing a contest for supremacy between state and non-state actors. Orthodox Nascent theorists claim that traditional diplomacy is losing the battle, and that it is in a continuous state of decline. Rapid changes to diplomacy since the end of the Cold War have fuelled that decline as more effective new actors 'breakdown traditional diplomatic domains and activities'⁵⁷.

The opinion of Modelski is characteristic of an orthodox NDT. The answer to his question - 'are diplomats still filling a real need?' - is candid:

Contemporary diplomacy provides neither adequate communication nor faithful or reliable representation; it is (1) technologically redundant; (2) uneconomical and (3) politically harmful to world society....what is special about international diplomacy is the extraordinary length to which relations between organizations of the same type, level and purpose have been fixed, formalized and even fossilized in one particular manner, how inbred and self centred this system has become, and how impervious it is to the general environment.⁵⁸

Here, Modelski interprets traditional diplomacy as archaic, rigid and redundant. Consequently, traditional diplomacy is no longer relevant to the 'general' diplomatic

⁵⁶ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 362..

⁵⁷ Jayasuriya, *Breaking the 'Westphalian' Frame*, p. 12.

⁵⁸ George Modelski. (1972). *Principles of World Politics*. New York: Free Press, pp, 187 – 190.

environment. According to Modelski, traditional diplomacy is the antithesis of increased communication and interaction, it is a ‘well-tried system for minimizing interaction, and for keeping people apart, instead of bringing them together’.⁵⁹ For Modelski, those theorists supporting traditional diplomacy are guilty of endorsing a defunct system of international interaction, a form of diplomacy that is ‘tenaciously maintained and jealously protected’.⁶⁰

The language Modelski employs dictates his labelling as an orthodox NDT. Langhorne provides another example of this hostile language:

All states have suffered a diminution of both internal and external authority in the face of the pressures of the global revolution, which has served to *erode* the spiritual and practical bases upon which the nation state was predicated. At the upper end of the scale, the result is nervous discomfort and uncertainty, at the lower end, it is *disaster* and *collapse*. State collapse renders the traditional way in which other states have responded *irrelevant*: bilateral diplomatic machinery becomes useless.⁶¹

Langhorne’s views on the state and the traditional diplomatic institution are clear: the state and its diplomatic institution have become obsolete in the modern diplomatic environment. Orthodox Nascent theorists portray the state and the traditional diplomatic institution as cynical institutions, self-serving, introspective, morally corrupt and stubbornly resisting change. They promote change to the IR system through the inclusion

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, p. 190.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p. 191.

⁶¹ Langhorne, *Diplomacy Beyond the Primacy of the State*, pp. 3 – 5.

of a moralistic, idealistic and utopian agenda, which pushes the system towards international civil society where the state is gradually replaced by non-state actors.

These notions are evident in the work of Jackson, who views traditional diplomacy as ‘reflecting the values and prejudices of a conservative international order that leaves little or no room for change, particularly fundamental change, to the IR system itself’.⁶² According to Jackson, change is required if we are to ultimately rid the IR system of the conflict, war and morally corrupt practices that conservative state actors indiscriminately promote and realise through the means of traditional diplomacy. Jackson views traditional diplomacy as a ‘self serving barrier to progress’ and ‘standing in the way of an urgently needed international revolution’.⁶³ Traditionalists, similarly, block or frustrate change because, according to Jackson, they tolerate and endorse that which ought to be condemned: ‘compromises that may be unfair or may entail equality, lack of a vision of a better world, failure or refusal to seek to institute such a world by international means’.⁶⁴

Jackson argues that the state system and the traditional diplomacy that greases it must be eradicated, as it is antagonistic to the moral doctrine that non-state diplomatic actors champion. Nascent diplomacy ‘must not be merely fitted into the state system. It must displace the politically pragmatic and morally compromised arrangements of conventional diplomacy’.⁶⁵

⁶² Jackson, Martin Wight’s Thought on Diplomacy, p. 14.

⁶³ *ibid.*,

⁶⁴ *ibid.*, p 15.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*

Hoffman also typifies the ethos of an orthodox NDT. In a 2003 article, he aims for nothing less than to ‘rework radically the concept of diplomacy’.⁶⁶ In blunt fashion, he claims that ‘the state is incoherent, and that this incoherence necessarily extends itself to statist diplomacy...traditional or conventional notions of diplomacy’ must be avoided if we are to understand the nature of modern diplomacy.⁶⁷

Hoffman attempts to theorise on diplomacy with no relation to the state. Relying heavily on Sharp’s observations,⁶⁸ Hoffman champions a ‘deconstructive/reconstructive approach’, which ‘denies the possibility of fixed meanings’ of diplomacy, that is, parochial TDT interpretations.⁶⁹ Hoffman asks us to consider a fluid form of people-to-people diplomacy, with no state foundations. In the modern sense, ‘this new diplomatic function is being exercised by wider and wider circles of people’.⁷⁰ These citizen diplomats ‘subvert and transform existing political arrangements’ and form groups distinct from states, driven by ‘new social movements’ facilitated by information,

⁶⁶ Hoffman, *Reconstructing Diplomacy*, p. 525.

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, p. 526. This argument is expanded upon in the following chapter, however for the purpose of clarity merits a brief introduction. Hoffman argues that the state is conceptually problematic ‘since its very claim to exercise a monopoly of force is premised on the assumption that it does not (and cannot) have one. The very existence of the state assumes that others – whom we generally call terrorists and subversives – will exercise force as well. The state’s claim to exercise a monopoly is challenged, albeit implicitly, by criminals as well. The State therefore is a paradoxical institution since it claims a monopoly of force which it does not, and cannot, possess.’ (*Reconstructing diplomacy*, p. 527). Hoffman is not suggesting an overnight transformation of the role of the state, rather he interprets factors which challenge the incoherence of the state (‘social, economic, technical and military changes’) as transcending rather than rejecting the state (*Reconstructing diplomacy*, p. 527). He adds that ‘the disappearance of the state is a long-term project. It is, and can only be, a gradual process. States will remain significant actors for as long as conflicts of interest exist which cannot be resolved through negotiation’ (*Reconstructing diplomacy*, p. 535). For the origins of Hoffman’s opinions See also John Hoffman. (1995) *Beyond the State*. Cambridge: Polity; John Hoffman. (2003). *Reconstructing Diplomacy*. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 5 (4), pp. 525-542.

⁶⁸ Hoffman relies on Sharp’s observations from a 2001 article entitled *Citizen Diplomats*. In this article Sharp argues that diplomacy has become ‘deprofessionalised so that ordinary citizens take part in an activity traditionally exercised on by state functionaries’ (Sharp, *citizen Diplomats*, p. 4). ‘Revolutions’, Sharp continues, ‘in communications and information technology have strengthened the plausibility of the claim that the ordinary person has finally arrived in international relations’ (*Citizen Diplomats*, p. 4). See Paul Sharp. (2001). *Making Sense of Citizen Diplomats*. *Diplomatic Studies Program*, Leicester University, pp. 1 – 22.

⁶⁹ Hoffman, *Reconstructing Diplomacy*, p 539.

⁷⁰ *ibid.*

technological and communicative revolutions that bypass the state, rendering it irrelevant.⁷¹

Diplomacy, Hoffman concludes, functions ‘much more fully and consistently in a stateless context than in a state centered one’.⁷² Therefore, any interpretation or theory of diplomacy must be undertaken in the absence of the state. Although Hoffman is not specific, it can be assumed that he is referring to non-state diplomatic actors, practicing unconventional diplomacy. He consistently returns to NGOs as an example of ‘more effective’ non-state diplomatic actors, who take advantage of ‘expert, dynamic and innovative thrusts’ which direct the IR system at the expense of the incumbent state.⁷³ While Hoffman’s ‘incoherent diplomacy’ argument is problematic (the state and traditional diplomacy are unlikely to disappear) it is illustrative that novel theory on diplomacy is forthcoming if distanced from the dominant state perspective. This alternate attitude to theorising on diplomacy, moderate or orthodox, is the hallmark of NDT.

3.4 Diplomacy defined from a Nascent theorist’s perspective

NDT is a broad collection of theories. Nascent diplomacy is therefore a difficult term to define succinctly. The difficulty in concisely identifying a neat range of nascent actors is evident, for the simple reason that any organisation outside the state can be considered a nascent diplomatic actor. As nascent diplomatic actors are an embryonic phenomenon (compared to states) with diffuse and varied networks, they have not yet developed either internal organisation and control or the means of representing

⁷¹ *ibid.*

⁷² *ibid.*, p. 533.

⁷³ *ibid.*, p. 540.

themselves, either to each other or to state actors.⁷⁴ Therefore, to write of a concise form of nascent diplomacy in the fashion of traditional diplomacy is, for the time being, a difficult task.

In this context, Nascent theorists do not believe the consolidation of a neat and concise definition of diplomacy is possible. They argue that today there are too many diplomatic actors for one simple definition to account for. For Nascent theorists, this admission is necessary if we are to exact a conceptual jailbreak from our ‘attempts to assert or capture a precise, fixed or authoritative meaning’ of diplomacy.⁷⁵ Nascent theorists are critical of the parochial definitions of the ‘Nicolson genre’ and how their offerings are ‘striking in their attempt to defining authoritatively what true diplomacy is and what it is not’.⁷⁶

The idea of a ‘narrow conception of diplomacy’ is abhorrent to Nascent theorists, who challenge why it is important for the field to ‘capture authoritatively what diplomacy is?’ in a single sentence or two.⁷⁷ Nicolson, for example, believed that the rigidity of traditional diplomacy permitted a definition capturing ‘the true identity or essence of diplomacy through linguistic precision’.⁷⁸ Nascent theorists are less sure that an authoritative, concise definition of diplomacy exists.

White, for example, notes that in the modern era, diplomacy is ‘one of those infuriatingly vague terms’ where precise definitions are no longer adequate ‘to cover the

⁷⁴ Langhorne, *Diplomacy Beyond the Primacy of the State*, p. 6.

⁷⁵ Sharp, *Who Needs Diplomats*, p. 37.

⁷⁶ Constantinou in Sharp, *For Diplomacy*, p. 38.

⁷⁷ Sharp, *For Diplomacy*, p. 39

⁷⁸ Nicolson in Sharp, *For Diplomacy*, p.39.

range of actors' practicing diplomacy.⁷⁹ White questions 'what is diplomacy?' and sets forth a realisation that diplomacy is multi-faceted and cannot be defined in the traditional one-dimensional sense of Nicolson, Berridge or Satow.⁸⁰

The Nascent theorist's reluctance or inability to define nascent diplomacy means that a concise definition is absent in their literature. However, this thesis attempts to introduce a definition, for the purpose of drawing distinction between the fundamental ethos' of different factions of theorists. Nascent diplomacy can be defined as a response to states' failure to embrace a distinctly unconventional or lower agenda that has emerged since the end of the Cold War. Nascent diplomacy is practiced by non-state actors who have risen up the IR hierarchy, as a result of the deficiencies of governments, acting alone or together, in terms of their rapidity or response to global issues. Nascent Diplomacy is characterised by the fostering of equitable, morally interdependent and stable relationships amongst non-state actors. These actors share common low political goals and exchange resources, expertise and knowledge (information) in pursuit of unconventional goals such as environmental, human rights or aid development issues. Nascent or non-state diplomatic actors have capitalised on state deficiencies, to promote their agenda, their position in the IR hierarchy and their alternate but effective techniques at tackling global problems, which states have been reluctant or unable to address. Simply, NDT embodies this alternate worldview.

⁷⁹ Brian White, 'Diplomacy' in Bayliss, John and Smith, Steve. (2005). *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 388.

⁸⁰ *ibid.*, pp. 387 – 390.

3.5 Specific examples of NDT

Nascent theorists are positive on the actors, forces and environments challenging the traditional diplomatic institution and employ them to validate much of their irrelevant state/diplomacy argument. Thus, Nascent theorists are dismissive of types of diplomacy associated with the archaic state. The following six themes are underwritten by a common Nascent theme: that the traditional diplomatic institution is no longer the only diplomatic actor of significance.

3.5.1 Nascent theorists as advocates of the declining state argument

Where NDT is concerned, the ‘case for euthanasia’, ‘obsolescence’ and ‘irrelevance’ of the state and its traditional diplomatic institution is a foundation of their work.⁸¹ Nascent theorists advance several common assumptions in support of their portrayal of the traditional diplomatic institution as redundant. Firstly, they argue that advances in travel, technology and communications allow unconventional state actors (politicians and home-based ministry heads, for example) to bypass the conventional diplomatic channels.⁸² Secondly, the notion of the traditional diplomatic institution as the sole conduit for state-qua-state relations no longer exists. The growth of IGOs, regional organisations, summitry and the like suggests that there are now more effective channels for diplomacy.⁸³ Thirdly, the once central purpose of the traditional diplomatic institution - information gathering and political reporting – is no longer required by the domestic

⁸¹ Two Traditionalists neatly summarize these Nascent declining diplomacy arguments before providing a comprehensive rebuttal to each argument. See G. R. Berridge. (2002). *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. London: Palgrave, pp. 116 – 128; K. J. Holsti. (2004). *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 198 – 210.

⁸² Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*, p. 199.

⁸³ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 116.

state. The ‘huge growth in international mass media’ has meant that alternate and faster sources of information are available to governments.⁸⁴ Fourthly, the ‘democratisation’ of diplomacy has meant private individuals and organisations have detrimentally infringed upon the once hermetically sealed world of traditional diplomacy.⁸⁵ For example, NGOs and private individuals are now incorporated into official delegations; ‘citizen activists’ now have ‘official representative status’.⁸⁶ And finally, in certain hostile countries the traditional diplomatic mission is simply too dangerous to maintain. In the modern era, ‘serious ideological tensions and deepening cultural division mean that the exchange of resident missions by hostile states provides – quite literally – dangerous hostages to fortune’.⁸⁷

These general assumptions lead Nascent theorists to argue that the state (and its diplomacy) is losing relevance. In the complex twenty-first century, the ‘once central and exclusive role of the state has become more vague’.⁸⁸ For Nascent theorists, vagueness equates to irrelevancy. NDT obituaries for the nation state are common. Marie Guehenno, France’s former ambassador to the European Union, went so far as to predict ‘the end of the nation’ as the forces of globalisation and transnationalism grow to suffocate state autonomy.⁸⁹ Nascent theorists such as Langhorne, Coolsaet, Biswas and Berger also

⁸⁴ *ibid.*

⁸⁵ Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*, p. 199

⁸⁶ *ibid.*

⁸⁷ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 116. For certain diplomatic theorists, the targeting and abuse of diplomatic missions through espionage, bribery, kidnapping and coercion has increased, not decreased, following the end of the Cold War. Today ‘Ambassadors or their assistants face increasing threats of assassination and kidnapping’ (Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*, p. 200). There are many infamous cases to support. For example, in April 1979 militant supporters of the new Islamic government seized the US embassy in Iran. Its staff was held for 444 days (Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*, p. 200).

⁸⁸ Coolsaet, *The Transformation of Diplomacy*, p. 4.

⁸⁹ Jean Marie Guehenno and Victoria Elliot (trans.). (1995). *The End of the Nation-state*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 3.

support declining state arguments.⁹⁰ Indeed, there has been much written, particularly during the uncertain post Cold War period, questioning the legitimacy of the state as a ‘viable and durable form of political community and collective identity’, so much so that the state and traditional diplomacy are perceived to be in ‘crisis’.⁹¹

The crisis relates the increasing numbers of non-state actors having ‘some kind of diplomatic role to play’ within the IR system.⁹² The presence of these non-state actors, claim Nascent theorists, is detrimentally affecting state sovereignty. The state is conceding power to these new actors; its influence is being ‘undermined from above and below’.⁹³ Nascent theorists argue that now sovereignty has to be shared both on a level above the state (international law, supranational and international organisations) and on a level below (regions with limited sovereignty, NGOs and multi-national businesses for example) which has led to a ‘reduced sense of the absolute sovereignty of the state’.⁹⁴ In

⁹⁰ For example, see Susan Strange. (1995). The Defective State. *Daedalus*, 124 (2), 55 – 75; Susan Strange. (1997). The Erosion of the State. *Current History*, November, 365 – 369; Richard Langhorne. (1997). Current Developments in Diplomacy: Who are the Diplomats Now? *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 8 (2), 1-15; Richard Langhorne. (2000). Full Circle: New principles and old consequences in the modern diplomatic System. *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 1 (1), 33-46; Rik Coolsaet. (1998). The Transformation of Diplomacy at the threshold of the new Millennium. *Diplomatic Studies Program*, Leicester University, No. 48, 1 – 25; Ian Clark. (1997). *Globalisation and Fragmentation: International Relations in the 20th century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Thomas L. Friedman. (1997). *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York: Anchor Books; Mathew Horsman and Andres Marshall. (1995). *After the Nation-State: Citizen, Tribalism and the New World Disorder*. London: Harper Collins; John Dunn. (1995). *The Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State?*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

⁹¹ Shampa Biswas. (2002). W(h)ither the Nation-state? National and State Identity in the Face of Fragmentation and Globalisation. *Global Society*, 16 (2), p. 176. For an example of the ‘crisis’ rhetoric, see Mark T. Berger. (2001). The nation-state and the challenge of global capitalism. *Third World Quarterly*, 22 (6), pp. 889 – 907; Masao Miyoshi. (1993). A Borderless World? From Colonialism to Transnationalism and the Decline of the Nation-State, *Critical Enquiry*, 19, pp. 726 – 751; Lawrence E. Modiset. (2002). Is this the end of the nation-state? *Naval War College Review*, LV (1), pp. 133 – 140; Ali Mirsepassi. (2002). Globalization and the Nation-State in Crisis, *Nepantla: Views from South*, 3 (3), pp. 547 – 552.

⁹² Richard Langhorne. (1997). Current Developments in Diplomacy: Who are the Diplomats Now? *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 8 (2), p. 3.

⁹³ Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*, p. 174.

⁹⁴ Langhorne, Current Developments, p. 7.

the twenty-first century, 'states have been scaled down' and their 'field of operation has narrowed', now they are 'performing reduced functions'.⁹⁵

The majority of NDT authors convey a similar message: that the state is unreflective of the contemporary IR system, is being challenged by non-state actors and is therefore irrelevant. Other Nascent theorists suggest that perhaps it is just time for the state to bow out from the IR system. Sharp, for example, 'assumes that the state system is fading, and that is not necessarily a bad thing'.⁹⁶ His argument is based upon a perception of an archaic, irrelevant and out of touch institution. Sharp observes that 'we find ourselves inhabiting fading structures imposed by general principles and their particular political and territorial expressions, both of which were established to provide dubious solutions to long-forgotten or outdated problems'.⁹⁷ The archaic state, then, belongs to an era where a traditional military-political agenda overshadowed the IR system. For Nascent theorists, the state is struggling to maintain legitimacy, as it neither has the responsive diplomatic tools, nor the compunction to operate in a radical environment.

Not surprisingly, Nascent theorists consider the future bleak for the traditional diplomatic institution. Familiar and practical diplomatic rules and routines are becoming more and more difficult to uphold as 'governance becomes complex and fragmented across various domains'.⁹⁸ Decision making power is decentralised and dispersed amongst growing numbers of domestic and international agencies and groups. Organisations and structures of civil society are also becoming more prominent, cutting

⁹⁵ Langhorne, *Full Circle*, p. 42.

⁹⁶ Sharp, *Who Needs Diplomats?*, p. 630.

⁹⁷ *ibid.*, p. 619.

⁹⁸ Jayasuriya, *Breaking the 'Westphalian' Frame*, p. 6

across ‘conventional Westphalian images of diplomatic theory and practice’.⁹⁹ According to Nascent theorists, the role of traditional diplomacy is less assured than in the past.

The irrelevance of traditional diplomacy has a strong historical legacy, which suggests some form of continuity in NDT. For example, in 1950 Vansittart argued the professional diplomat is ‘technically obsolete, politically superseded, and placed in a position where [his] own trained judgements matter less and less’.¹⁰⁰ In 1978, Wight and Bull pondered ‘whether traditional diplomatic practices have become obsolete, succumbing to the revolutionary practices, as bad money drives out good’.¹⁰¹ And a decade later Sofer described a worrying predicament for traditional diplomacy:

With the increase in appointments of non-professionals, the foreign ministry has been reduced to the level of technical apparatus. Accordingly, statesmen and politicians accuse diplomats of lacking a comprehensive conception of foreign policy and espousing a parochial and unrealistic viewpoint.¹⁰²

These views suggest that even the traditional diplomats are under attack. Sharp imagines a world without the professional diplomat, ‘replacing them with a new sort of profession defined in terms of the functional skills of negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and conciliation, contracted on a commercial basis’ lacking ‘both the symbolic and political significance of servants of the state’.¹⁰³ Conceivably, then, traditional diplomacy

⁹⁹ Kanishka Jayasuriya. (1999). Globalisation, Law and the Transformation of Sovereignty: The Emergence of Global Regulatory Governance. *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, 6 (2), p. 432.

¹⁰⁰ Vansittart in P.G. Lauren. (1976). *Diplomats and Bureaucrats*. California: Stanford, p. 231.

¹⁰¹ Wight and Bull, p. 121.

¹⁰² Sofer, *Old and New Diplomacy*, p. 206.

¹⁰³ Sharp, *Who Needs Diplomats*, p. 631.

is losing its professional identity as we enter an era referred to as ‘diplomacy without the diplomats’.¹⁰⁴ In this era:

states are being emptied of their functions; globalisation is witnessing the end of the state and, therefore, of foreign policy. Diplomacy is replaced by global governance structures and authority is relocated from public to quasi-public and private [non-state] agencies. Diplomacy as an activity is emptied of special meaning and significance: everyone – or no one – is a diplomat now.¹⁰⁵

This statement is typical of the modern NDT mantra, citing the phenomenon of globalisation and the transfer of authority to structures of non-state governance. The concept that everyone is a diplomat relates to the notion that diplomacy existed before the state, and will continue to exist after the state. Der Derian in his genealogical history of Western diplomacy argued strongly on this point, highlighting that diplomacy has a history that transcends the development of the Westphalian state system.¹⁰⁶ Sharp (1999) and Hocking (2001) similarly assure us that diplomacy is neither synonymous with the state nor is its importance to be judged by the prevalence of the state. After all, diplomacy, in its most rudimentary form, concerns the common problem ‘of living separately and wanting to do so, while having to conduct relations with others’.¹⁰⁷ Diplomacy can therefore exist in a stateless context amongst groups of people wanting to

¹⁰⁴ George F. Kennan. (1997). Diplomacy Without the Diplomats. *Foreign Affairs*, 76 (5), p. 198. For discussion of a similar theme see Paul Sharp. (1997). Who needs diplomats? The problem of diplomatic representation. *International Journal*, 52 (4), 609 – 634.

¹⁰⁵ Hocking, *Privatizing Diplomacy*?, p. 149.

¹⁰⁶ For an objective review of Der Derian’s work see, Costas M. Constantinou. (1993). Late Modern Diplomacies. *Millennium*, 22 (1), pp. 89 – 96.

¹⁰⁷ Sharp, *For Diplomacy*, p. 51.

amicably solve the common problem of living separately. For Nascent theorists, diplomacy needs neither the state nor the diplomatic institution; with or without the state, diplomacy will endure.

3.5.2 The Nascent theoretical portrayal of IGOs as distinct diplomatic actors

Nascent theorists view IGOs as distinct diplomatic actors where ‘the whole may be greater than the sum of the parts’.¹⁰⁸ They argue that the Traditionalist perspective on IGOs (where IGOs are built by states, for states) is ‘relatively static’ and ‘bound to a single level of analysis’.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, the NDT approach¹¹⁰ ‘has disaggregated the state, to the extent that it is no longer considered useful’ when theorising on IGOs.¹¹¹ Abandoning the state axiom, Nascent theorists suggest that IGOs are autonomous political actors, practicing a form of diplomacy distinct from the traditional practice. Nascent theorists propose several assumptions in support of this thesis.

Firstly, Nascent theorists sponsor a view of IGOs as separate from states. Iriye, who proposes a ‘different world’ scenario, encapsulates this view.¹¹² Iriye suggests that when thinking of IGOs it should be assumed:

that there is yet another world, one that is produced by forces that cut across national frontiers.

These forces create diplomatic networks of shared interests and concerns that go beyond

¹⁰⁸ Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom. (1988). *International Institutions at Work*. London: Pinter Publisher, p.4.

¹⁰⁹ *ibid.*

¹¹⁰ This approach has resonance with the Global Politics/Interdependent thesis advanced by Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane in the 1970s. See R. Keohane and J. S. Nye. (1972). *Transnational Relations and World Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; R. Keohane and J. S. Nye. (1977). *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little Brown; J. N. Roseneau. (1980). *The Study of Global Interdependence*. London: Francis Pinter.

¹¹¹ Taylor and Groom, *International Institutions at Work*, p. 21.

¹¹² Akira Iriye. (2002). *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*. California: University of California Press, p. 6.

national interest and concerns. These transnational phenomena, addressed by intergovernmental organizations, may be said to be creating an alternative world, one that is not identical with the sum of sovereign states and nations.¹¹³

Iriye proposes a similar theoretical journey if IGOs role in the modern diplomatic environment is to be truly understood. Of the absence of accurate theory on IGOs (in the Traditional canon), he notes that ‘this scholarly void must be filled. A focus on international organizations, rather than on nations and states, as individual units of analysis provides fresh perspective’.¹¹⁴ Developing this ‘fresh’ perspective requires a diplomatic theory devoid of the state, that is, to interpret IGOs as distinct political actors, with their own rules, regulations and type of diplomacy.

Groom and Taylor also offer a convincing case for ‘analysing IGOs as distinct political systems’.¹¹⁵ For these theorists, IGOs can be distinguished from states as they have built a distinct system where behaviour is not guided by states. Subsequently, IGOs have developed their own organisational, cultural and diplomatic identity, which is dependent on four factors: ‘the ability to maintain effective channels of diplomatic communication internally and externally, the ability to integrate its sub-units, the engendering of loyalty, and the capacity to generate enough self-knowledge to enable it to steer in the sense of being able to set goals reflecting preferred values’.¹¹⁶ IGOs therefore are divergent from states in terms of structure, organisation, affiliation, expertise and agenda.

¹¹³ *ibid.*

¹¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 1.

¹¹⁵ Taylor and Groom, *International Institutions at Work*, p. 21.

¹¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 4.

For Nascent theorists, the alternate agendas of IGOs and states are employed to highlight a further distinction between the two. Whereas states focus on high, traditional political-military concerns, IGOs typically focus on a lower political agenda. The traditional agenda is ill suited to the complex twenty-first century in that it has ‘left major potholes and broken bridges in the highways of global relationships’.¹¹⁷ Expanding on the notion of broken bridges in global state-qua-state relations, Langhorne portrays a dramatic image:

when the consequences of state collapse produce tribal, gang, or economic warfare and/or brigandage, who will stop it? When these events produce utter disasters for human beings – no food, no water, no housing, the break up of families in refugee camps, the spread of disease, episodes of murder and rapine – who will relieve the suffering?¹¹⁸

Not traditional diplomacy according to Langhorne, who argues this radical global agenda ‘renders the way in which other states respond irrelevant: a bilateral approach and the consequent use of bilateral diplomatic and other traditional machinery becomes irrelevant’.¹¹⁹ A new, demanding ‘world of diplomatic activity has thus been created’, one which ‘requires profoundly different authors of international exchanges from those of the past’.¹²⁰ For Nascent theorists, those ‘authors’ will be independent IGOs, who are better equipped to tackle emerging global problems than states are.

These unconventional, global problems will:

¹¹⁷ Langhorne, *Diplomacy Beyond the Primacy of the State*, p. 4.

¹¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹¹⁹ *ibid.*

¹²⁰ *ibid.*, p. 2.

test as never before both the ability of governments to take on new kinds of foreign policy activity and the ability of traditional diplomats to negotiate agreements to meet these challenges. The existing nation-state diplomatic relationships will not suffice.¹²¹

IGOs, according to Nascent theorists, will suffice. By focusing on a lower unconventional agenda, IGOs become empowered through the reluctance or inability of traditional state actors. After all:

decision-making moves naturally to those who possess both the information and the expertise. Foreign ministries have traditionally been unenthusiastic and often ill prepared to take on new areas beyond the normal political aspects of international affairs.¹²²

In other words, IGOs succeed where states fail. The state's inability or reluctance to embrace a different twenty-first century agenda is responsible for the success of IGOs. However, empowerment, increased decision-making capability, a distinct identity and a separate organisational culture is not enough to solve the global problems. The solution, Nascent theorists argue, is that IGOs have instigated a new type of diplomacy, one that is distinct from and more effective than traditional diplomacy at global problem solving.

The advent of this 'new' diplomacy stems from a distrust of the unilateral state. Nascent theorists are suspicious of unilateral state action,¹²³ preferring to champion the

¹²¹ Newsom, *The new diplomatic agenda*, p. 29.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 39.

¹²³ For a development of this theme, see Andy W. Knight. (2002). *The future of the UN Security Council: Questions of legitimacy and representation in multilateral governance* in Andrew F. Cooper, John English and Ramesh Thakur. (2002) *Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, pp. 19 – 38. Knight complains that the UN Security Council, although multilateral in appearance, is 'increasingly unrepresentative and illegitimate' due to frequent and unproductive bouts of state unilateralism, which defeats the purpose of the UN. Knight writes of the

‘beneficial effects of channeling perceptions of national interests through the process of collective evaluation’.¹²⁴ Nascent theorists agree that ‘multilateral diplomacy can be complicated and messy’ but that this is preferable to unilateralism, which ‘can be dangerous and destructive’.¹²⁵ Nascent theorists stress that their distrust in unilateralism and subsequent belief in multilateralism must not be interpreted as ‘wild-eyed idealism run amuck’ but rather as a disdain for an IR system governed by ‘unbridled state control’.¹²⁶

Central to this new type of multilateral diplomacy is the notion that IGOs have become arenas conducive to ‘innovative and non-hegemonic diplomacy’.¹²⁷ The hallmark of this new diplomacy is:

its form (with a heavy emphasis on coalition building), scope (its extension from the economic and the social into the security domain), and its intensity. A tilt has taken place for IGOs, from a “talking shop” to a constructive agent making a difference.¹²⁸

IGOs, then, are no longer ad hoc functional arrangements or tools of opportunism serving particularistic state interests.¹²⁹ The ability to bypass traditional diplomatic

security council, ‘for an apex body to be representative of the broader membership it must portray the values of the larger group; present the ideas or views of that group; be typical of that group’s geographical makeup, population base, and political views; and act as a delegate of that group. The Security Council falls short on all of these criteria.’ (The future of the UN Security Council, p. 19). For a similar condemnation of the organising principles of the Security Council, see also, Ian Hurd. (2004). *Of Worlds and Wars: The Security Council’s Hard Life Among the Great Powers. Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*. Winter/Spring, 69 – 75.

¹²⁴ Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, p. xxvii.

¹²⁵ *ibid.*

¹²⁶ *ibid.*

¹²⁷ Andrew F. Cooper, John English and Ramesh Thakur. (2002) *Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, p. 1.

¹²⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 1 – 2.

¹²⁹ *ibid.*, p. ix.

channels – the speed of the new diplomacy - is characterised by ‘bottom up modes of leadership from the enhanced role of civil society in contemporary diplomacy’.¹³⁰ In other words, IGOs may have been institutionalised by states and for states in the past, but, in the modern era it is independent IGOs that are driving a new form of responsive diplomacy, one which is increasingly important in the modern diplomatic environment.

Nascent theorists do acknowledge the participation of official diplomatic representatives in IGO forums. However, they confer equal importance to the other IGOs and NGOs. Nascent theorists ‘do not imply that state actors and power politics are unimportant, but merely that they are not axiomatic’.¹³¹ By challenging the dominant state axiom to incorporate alternate actors, Nascent theorists view IGOs as practicing polylateral, as well as multilateral diplomacy. In the UN, for example, NGOs have been accorded observer status for some time now, and the power of their international secretariats is substantial.¹³² Nascent theorists suggest that within IGOs there are several polylateral layers of diplomacy, from state to IGO or state to NGO for example. Distinguishing these layers allows Nascent theorists to advance their notion that IGOs are not only facilitators of multilateral diplomacy but distinct diplomatic actors guiding the process of polylateral diplomacy.

Nascent theorists portray IGOs as evolutionary, emerging or changing rapidly to embrace and tackle a global agenda. According to Nascent theorists, this flexibility – as well as their status as distinct diplomatic actors – means that IGOs will continue to grow in significance as prominent, independent and effective modern diplomatic actors.

¹³⁰ *ibid.*, p. vii.

¹³¹ Taylor and Groom, *International Institutions at Work*, p. 4.

¹³² For a discussion of international secretariats as political actors within the UN, see Paul Taylor and A. J. R. Groom. (1988). *International Institutions at Work*. London: Pinter Publisher, pp. 30 – 31.

3.5.2 **Diplomacy as theatre: the Nascent theorist's dismissal of summit diplomacy**

Nascent theorists argue that summitry confers little value to the modern diplomatic environment. They advance several arguments in support of this assumption. Firstly, Nascent theorists argue that the summit is ineffective in terms of meaningful political action. Instead the summit is merely a stage, a theatre¹³³ for statesmen to demonstrate to their voters that they are personally involved in solving the world's problems. Nascent theorists portray summits as nothing more than 'dramatic theatre', where 'carefully orchestrated meetings' are designed to attract media attention, and where statesmen constantly find themselves on public stage and so are obliged to assume 'prearranged roles in the official diplomatic play'.¹³⁴

In this context, summits are little more than publicity stunts. According to Nascent theorists, summits endorse the trend of 'politicians seeking publicity for domestic purposes', where global media beams countless images of statesmen appearing to efficiently process issues that know no national boundaries.¹³⁵ In the modern era, summits are conducted with the public in mind. Negotiation is often broadcast and televised,¹³⁶ and 'all rational discussion is abandoned in favour of interminable propaganda speeches' addressed not to one's political opponent but to the national

¹³³ For a comprehensive history of summit diplomacy as theatre see Constantinou, Costas M. "Diplomacy, Theatre and the Other" in Costas M. Constantinou. (1996). *On the Way to Diplomacy*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Raymond Cohen, "Diplomacy as Theatre" in Cohen, Raymond (1987), *Theatre of Power*. London: Longman.

¹³⁴ Constantinou, *On the way to Diplomacy*, pp. 95 – 97.

¹³⁵ Langhorne, *Current Developments in Diplomacy*, p. 2.

¹³⁶ For further discussion on the relationship between media, statecraft and diplomacy see, Eytan Gilboa. (2001). Diplomacy in the Media Age: Three Models of Uses and Effects. *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 12 (2), pp. 1 – 28; Piers Robison. (1999). The CNN effect: can the news media drive foreign policy? *Review of International Studies*, 25, pp. 301 – 309; Gary Rawnsley. (1999). Monitored Broadcasts and Diplomacy, in Jan Melissen (ed.). (1999) *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*. New York: Macmillan, pp. 135 – 150.

electorate at home and increasingly abroad.¹³⁷ Add to the summit theatre ‘the power of television and sprinkle the surface with exotic locations of great symbolic significance, and it clear why summit diplomacy is an irresistible dish’ for statesmen.¹³⁸ According to Nascent theorists, those political leaders involved in summitry ‘tend to talk as much to the press as they do to one another. The media presence at some summits is now so enormous that the meetings look like staged events’.¹³⁹

The inclusion of publicity into what should be a confidential diplomatic process, leads Nascent theorists to question the diplomatic value of summits. If anything, summits ‘diminish the utility, guile and wisdom of statesmen as they entail much publicity, many rumours and wide speculation in that they tempt those involved to achieve quick, spectacular and often fictitious rules’, and enhance the uncertainty which it is the purpose of sound diplomatic interaction to prevent.¹⁴⁰

In addition, statesmen outline their objectives before the summit has even started. The outcome of the summit is decided before it has even taken place. This means that to renege on very public statements can be viewed as leadership weakness by the public. Therefore compromise, a prerequisite of sound diplomacy, is virtually non-existent in diplomacy by summit. If adjustments need to be made by diplomatic ‘sherpas’¹⁴¹ during the summit then time is against all those involved.¹⁴² For Nascent theorists, all parties’

¹³⁷ *ibid.*, p. 6.

¹³⁸ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 173.

¹³⁹ Melissen, *Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age*, p. 13.

¹⁴⁰ Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, p. 89.

¹⁴¹ The term sherpa was originally applied to personal representatives of the heads of government in 1975. It was coined to account for the work of personal representatives before the initially informal meetings of the leaders of the G7 nations. The sherpas met before economic summit meetings to prepare not only an informal agenda for the summit, but also to agree on formulas for agreement on important issues to be included in the press communiqué. For more on the origins of the term, see, Johan Kaufmann. (1998). *The Diplomacy of International Relations*. Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, p. 60.

¹⁴² Kaufmann, *The Diplomacy of International Relations*, p. 60.

predetermined and rigid positions means, more often than not, that to renegotiate during the summit is almost impossible; especially considering the time that went into prenegotiation and the short nature of the summit. After all, most summits are only two or three days long.

Membership of the exclusive summit club, 'fireside chats' amongst heads of states and the subsequent image of state amicability is, secondly, interpreted by Nascent theorists as a facade. The IR system is anything but a friendly place and is dominated by conflicting national interest, power struggles and inevitable conflict. Big egos mean that personalities can clash. According to Nascent theorists, 'when leaders have disparate backgrounds, customs and languages and, in many cases, ethical attitudes and ideologies, summitry is more likely to produce mistaken and misleading impressions than a clear meeting of minds'.¹⁴³ In addition, negotiating styles and expectations can differ greatly among statesmen from disparate cultures and language problems are 'another source of potential misunderstanding'.¹⁴⁴ For Nascent theorists, the image of personal contact at the summit is nothing more than an 'illusion'.¹⁴⁵

Thirdly and finally, Nascent theorists argue that summits are a waste of money. The venues for summits are often five star, usually located in such grand settings as Gstaad, Nice, Davos, Cancun or Gleneagles. According to Nascent theorists, the cost for

¹⁴³ Ball, *Diplomacy for a Crowded World*, p. 32.

¹⁴⁴ Melissen, *Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age*, p. 3. Melissen employs a summit meeting between Harold Macmillan and Charles De Gaulle to validate this notion. He notes, 'at a meeting in 1962 the British Prime Minister relied on his own French language skills and believed he did not require an interpreter. Misunderstandings between De Gaulle and Macmillan were not helpful in preventing a French veto on Britain's first application for EEC membership' (3). See also, Raymond Cohen. (1995). *Negotiating Across Cultures: Communications Obstacles in International Diplomacy*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace. Cohen provides an amusing example involving US President John F. Kennedy, illustrating how difficult it can be for leaders from different cultures to communicate. Kennedy, keen to show his solidarity with the citizens of West Berlin just after the Berlin Wall had been built, proclaimed "Ich bin ein Berliner". The phrase actually translates as "I am a jelly-filled doughnut," a popular Berlin pastry! (*Negotiating Across Cultures*, p. xi)

¹⁴⁵ Melissen, *Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age*, p. 2.

the taxpayer does not always equate with value for money. On top of the exorbitant cost of holding the summit, the host city/nation also needs to bear the burden of securing the location. With powerful leaders conveniently located in one place, ‘draconian security measures nowadays go hand and hand with multilateral summitry’.¹⁴⁶ The July 2005 G8 summit in Scotland was no different, costing at least ten million pounds and involving 9,000 of Scotland’s 15,000 police officers.¹⁴⁷ All three of these points confirm that NDT on summits is largely derogatory. The ambivalence Nascent theorists exhibit towards any form of traditional diplomacy, involving either the diplomat or the statesman, is also evident.

3.5.3 The central Nascent actor: Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)

As has been already stated, while states are central to TDT, NGOs are central to NDT. The promotion of NGOs as more effective diplomatic actors than states is a common argument of Nascent theorists. Their argument rests upon the assumption that NGOs have ‘become more significant on the world stage than governments’.¹⁴⁸ Nascent theorists portray the state and the diplomacy it practices as cumbersome and overly bureaucratic. The state is depicted as a ‘villain, an intrusive monolith with a propensity to

¹⁴⁶ *ibid.*, p. 17.

¹⁴⁷ The official G8 website set up by the UK government is informative, as it subtly attempts to divert public scrutiny from the massive cost of the summit. Of the cost the UK government claimed that ‘the cost of summit will be kept down as far as possible. G8 Summits have delivered world benefits well beyond the cost of holding them. We want the G8 Summit to really make a difference. This would far outweigh any costs.’ After several paragraphs of dodging the financial burden of the Summit the web page provides a figure, ‘the organisational budget is around ten million pounds, excluding the cost of the security operation’ (www.g8.gov.uk, accessed 22nd July, 2005). The organisers of the G8 summit were wise to exclude the actual cost of the security operation on the web-page. The largest police operation in modern British history involved 9,000 of Scotland’s 15,000 police officers, at a staggering cost of \$250 (USD) million for the three day summit. See, Tom Wall. (2005). Scotland Waits For July Riots. *New Statesman*, 134 (4), p. 30; *The Economist*, July 16, 2005. Between Hype and Hope: The G8 and Aid, 376 (8435), pp. 69 – 70.

¹⁴⁸ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOS and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 362.

lose sight of the real common good in pursuit of its own bureaucratic and diplomatic agenda'.¹⁴⁹ The bloated and inefficient nature of traditional diplomatic bureaucracy serves only to confound social, developmental and economic progress.¹⁵⁰ The 'weakness of the state has stimulated a thriving voluntary sector and with it a strong and vocal global civil society' represented diplomatically by NGOs.¹⁵¹ For Nascent theorists, states are either 'inherently wicked or incompetent'.¹⁵²

Those succeeding at the expense of the wicked state are NGOs, which are portrayed in the NDT literature as increasingly powerful non-state actors. Since the end of the Cold War, NGOs have injected 'unexpected voices into international discourse about numerous problems of global scope'.¹⁵³ Their success has hinged upon their ability to 'bring more orderly and reliable responses to social and political issues that go beyond capacities of states to address individually'.¹⁵⁴ According to Nascent theorists, NGOs are now an intrinsic part of the modern political landscape, and have become 'active in political work once reserved for representatives of states'.¹⁵⁵

Nascent theorists consider NGOs as an alternative to states and representative of 'a world unto itself, with its own philosophy and perspective, purpose, language, attitudes, activities, diversities, culture and membership', and their own brand of diplomacy.¹⁵⁶ NGOs have an independent ability to 'breed new ideas; advocate; protest, and mobilise public support; and to undertake legal, scientific, technical and policy

¹⁴⁹ Alan Whaites. (1998). NGOs, civil society and the state: avoiding theoretical extremes in real world issues. *Development in Practice*, 8 (3), p. 344.

¹⁵⁰ *ibid.*, p. 345

¹⁵¹ *ibid.*, p. 344.

¹⁵² Leon Gordenker and Thomas G. Weiss. (1997). Devolving responsibilities: a framework for analysing NGOS and services. *Third World Quarterly*, 18 (3), p. 445.

¹⁵³ Gordenker and Weiss, *NGOs, the UN & Global Governance*, p. 17.

¹⁵⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ Diamond and Macdonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, p. 5.

analysis'.¹⁵⁷ These fundamental qualities of NGOs are more suited to solving complex twenty-first century global problems.

Nascent theorists envisage a twenty-first century where 'NGOs will pioneer the formation of a new kind of transnational society in which individuals and their voluntary associations replace governments'.¹⁵⁸ For Nascent theorists, NGOs are 'increasingly playing a profound, even crucial, role in fostering and creating a world civil society, largely outside the purview of state control'.¹⁵⁹ The rise of a global civil society, represented diplomatically by NGOs, therefore 'challenges conventional understandings and analyses of world politics'.¹⁶⁰ Central to this challenge is NDT that promotes the NGO at the expense of the irrelevant state.

There are several reasons Nascent theorists advance in support of this assumption. Firstly; NGOs are able to exploit opportunities governments are unwilling or unable to embrace. In NDT, this exploitation is known as 'gap-filling', where 'states, can no longer provide what the people perceive to be adequate services. NGOs are filling a gap left by the state'.¹⁶¹ These gaps occur where 'a vacuum of responsibility has been created'.¹⁶² To fill this vacuum, 'people, represented by NGOs, step forward when citizens feel governments fail to be effective, innovative, and imaginative in dealing with long-standing problems'.¹⁶³

According to Nascent theorists, these gaps are increasing and the emerging need for representation (of civil society groups) has given NGOs greater legitimacy than states.

¹⁵⁷ Jessica T. Mathews. (1997) Power Shift. *Foreign Affairs*, 76, p. 55.

¹⁵⁸ Gordeneker and Weiss, *Devolving Responsibilities*, p. 453.

¹⁵⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ *ibid.*

¹⁶¹ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOS and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 368.

¹⁶² *ibid.*

¹⁶³ Diamond and Macdonald, *Multi-Track Diplomacy*, p. 3.

NGOs have been able to fill these niches because, as Nascent theorists argue, they are more flexible, responsive and effective than the archaic state and its overly bureaucratic diplomatic system.¹⁶⁴ In other words, NGOs have been able to fill unconventional niches that states have been unable or unwilling to address.

A second reason behind the rise of NGOs is that for an increasingly informed global civil society, the lower political agenda is becoming more important than the traditional 'high' agenda. For Nascent theorists, civil society has grown tired of traditional military/security politics. In the complex, modern diplomatic environment:

the classical and strategic matters are no longer the preponderant element of international relations... new political concerns have been added to the diplomatic menu. As a result of globalization, issues - formerly thought to be low politics – have now become increasingly key issues¹⁶⁵ in relations between states.¹⁶⁶

The cumbersome and bureaucratic state is confounded by this lower, unconventional agenda. NGOs have boldly stepped in, according to Nascent theorists, who imply that transnational/global concerns are today more important than the traditional high political agenda. In other words, international or global problems should supercede national, traditional concerns.

¹⁶⁴ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOS and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 368.

¹⁶⁵ Specifically, Cooper cites these low issues as 'refugees, human rights, transnational crime and terrorism, drugs, the environment as well as economics, international trade, financial flows, trade, intellectual property and technology concerns, labour standards and negotiations over technical standards and protocols' (www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy, retrieved 26 July 2005).

¹⁶⁶ Jeffrey R. Cooper, 'Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries', 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, <www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html>

For Nascent theorists, the increasing ability of NGOs to proactively solve these global problems suggests they are gaining legitimacy as political actors, to the detriment of the incumbent state. Where NGOs are concerned, ‘the image that the state is in decline is connected with a depletion in its legitimacy’.¹⁶⁷ NGOs, unconstrained by sovereignty, bureaucracy or national affiliation, are able to promote their own legitimacy at the expense of the declining states. In the modern era, ‘NGOs are more representative than national governments’.¹⁶⁸ Nascent theorists argue that in such a context, there is little need for an expensive and inefficient traditional, national diplomatic institution.

The increase in NGO legitimacy has been prompted by ‘growing doubts about the capacity of the state to cope on its own with the social welfare, developmental and environmental problems that face nations today’.¹⁶⁹ In addition, NGOs are faster at global problem solving, have more expertise and more scope than traditional diplomatic institutions. Nascent theorists consistently argue that NGOs ‘unburdened by governmental bureaucracy and political considerations, move faster and more effectively than government agencies’.¹⁷⁰ Former statesman, Sir David Steel, noted the inefficiency of traditional diplomatic actors:

they [states] are responding to international problems very, very slowly and not very effectively. There seems to be a lack of willingness to adjust, a lack of response to greater internationalism.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁷ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOS and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 369.

¹⁶⁸ Princen and Finger, *Environmental NGOs in World Politics*, p. 34.

¹⁶⁹ Salomon in Eizenstat, *Nongovernmental Organizations as the Fifth Estate*, p. 20.

¹⁷⁰ George Melloan, (June 22nd, 2004). As NGOs Multiply, They expand a New Private Sector, *Wall Street Journal*, p. 19.

¹⁷¹ Interview, April 21st, 2005.

Consequently, Nascent theorists challenge ‘the extent to which the state and the diplomatic system remain, or indeed should remain, as the main vehicle for a global diplomacy’.¹⁷²

This NDT rhetoric is broad and insightful, but the question remains, how do NGOs actually surpass the traditional diplomatic institution? The answer lies within a distinct form of diplomacy, one that Nascent theorists claim is more effective than traditional diplomacy.¹⁷³

According to Nascent theorists, the new diplomacy of NGOs outstrips and outperforms traditional diplomacy in several areas. Firstly, in terms of staff, NGOs have more expertise than traditional diplomatic institutions. NGOs make a point of recruiting highly trained and experienced personnel, many of whom have served in political organisations, including governmental and intergovernmental entities. Nascent theorists highlight that ‘many NGO staff members have capacities and expertise in policy making and supervision of transnational programmes that is more substantial to international civil

¹⁷² White, *Diplomacy*, p. 400.

¹⁷³ Louise Diamond and John MacDonald refer to NGO diplomacy as Track Two diplomacy. In all they construct nine ‘tracks’ to diplomacy. They are: track one, Government or Peacemaking through Diplomacy; track two, Nongovernment/Professional, or Peacemaking through Conflict Resolution; track three, Business, or Peacemaking through Commerce; track four, Private Citizen, or Peacemaking through Personal Involvement; track five, Research, Training and Education, or Peacemaking through Learning; track six, Activism, or Peacemaking through Advocacy; track seven, Religion, or Peacemaking through Faith in Action; track eight, Funding, or Peacemaking through providing Resources; track nine, Communications and the Media, or Peacemaking through Information.. See, Louise Diamond and John W. MacDonald. (1996) *Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*. USA: Kumarian Press Books for a World That Works. The various ‘tracks’ to diplomacy has been a popular idea of late, for another example, see John Davies, Edward Kaufman and Edy Kaufman (eds.). (2002). *Second Track/Citizens’ Diplomacy: Concepts and Techniques for Conflict Transformation*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. For a case specific example of Track two diplomacy, see, H. Agha, S. Feldman, A. Khalidi and Z. Schiff. (2004). *Track II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East*. BCSIA Studies in International Security. Cambridge: MIT Press.

servants'.¹⁷⁴ Unconstrained by the bureaucracy of traditional diplomacy, these former 'professionals' revel in the speed, mission and efficacy of NGO diplomacy.

Secondly, in terms of organisational structures, NGOs are beginning to emulate traditional diplomatic actors. 'NGOs have created their own rules and regulations' as a result of the state's irrelevance in the twenty-first century.¹⁷⁵ As NGOs become larger and more efficient, there comes a need to develop sturdy communicative, organisational and diplomatic structures. Today, many NGOs 'all have at least rudimentary diplomatic machinery; they can communicate their interests and deploy their resources to influence the outcome of negotiations'.¹⁷⁶ Indeed, many NGOs 'have a greater ability to influence the diplomatic process at a global level than smaller states'.¹⁷⁷

Thirdly, NGOs are able to respond rapidly to communication and information-gathering developments, whereas governments – overburdened with bureaucratic diplomacy – are slower to respond. This ability gives NGOs yet another advantage. With regard to the information revolution, 'the flexible and agile structure of NGOs allows them to adapt well to the use of new technologies'.¹⁷⁸ In one Nascent theorist's words:

in drastically lowering the costs of communications, consultation and coordination, information technologies favor decentralised networks of NGOs.....Governments, on the other hand, are quintessential hierarchies, wedded to an organizational form incompatible with all that the new technologies make possible.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁴ Gordenker and Weiss, *Devolving Responsibilities*, p. 448.

¹⁷⁵ Jim Lobe. (2003). US Conservatives Take Aim at NGOs. *New Internationalist*, 359, p. 6.

¹⁷⁶ White, *Diplomacy*, p. 400.

¹⁷⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 368.

¹⁷⁹ Mathews, *Power Shift*, p. 52.

This distinction, between a flexible and responsive form of NGO compared to a cumbersome and archaic state, is consistently reinforced in NDT.

Fourthly, NGOs are able to exist harmoniously with other nascent diplomatic actors, such as IGOs, whereas states have an awkward and often conflictual relationship. Indeed, NGOs owe much to IGOs for their ascendancy in the modern diplomatic environment. In 1948, the United Nations Charter granted Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to certain NGOs. Specifically, article 71 states that:

‘the Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned’.¹⁸⁰

At the time of writing there are 2476 NGOs in consultative states with ECOSOC, and some 412 NGOs accredited to the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD).

¹⁸¹ NGOs are portrayed as ‘the favorite child of official agencies, something of a panacea for the many problems of development’.¹⁸² The multi-lateral IGO environment is a positive one for NGOs, the ‘official funding they are able to extract, the popularity they enjoy, and the increasing access they are offered to diplomatic centers of national and

¹⁸⁰ See, NGO Related Frequently Asked Questions, available at: <http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/faq.htm>.

¹⁸¹ *ibid.* For a discussion on the value the UN places upon NGO participation in multilateral diplomacy, see Gary Johns. (2004). Relations with Nongovernmental Organisations: Lessons for the UN. *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, summer/fall, pp. 51 – 65.

¹⁸² Montague, The Fuss About NGOs, p. 96.

international decision making' represents a major coup for NGOs, at the expense of the state's occasional disdain for IGOs.¹⁸³

With a difference in agenda, diplomatic techniques and organisational foundations Nascent theorists portray the state-NGO relationship as awkward. This mutual discomfort can be traced to the criticism NGOs have of states and 'the inherently controversial nature of their missions, which seek to oppose existing government policies and eventually change them'.¹⁸⁴ NGOs subsequently provoke a defensive reaction from governments; they 'spur visceral resistance and defensiveness from governments they criticise'.¹⁸⁵ For Nascent theorists, however, the battle between states and NGOs will be only heighten as the 21st century agenda, and the solutions required to effectively tackle that agenda, becomes more complex.

¹⁸³ *ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ Gordenker and Weiss, *Devolving Responsibilities*, p. 445.

¹⁸⁵ *ibid.*

3.6 Another nail in the traditional coffin: globalisation and multi-national corporations (MNCs)

Nascent theorists argue that prominent MNCs question the role of the state and traditional diplomacy in the creation of wealth through trade. Nascent theorists believe that powerful MNCs frequently outstrip and outperform states in the creation of wealth.¹⁸⁶ This observation suggests that the state is no longer relevant, as it has lost the principle – wealth creation based on territory and secured by force – that granted it exclusivity and purpose as a sovereign actor.

Nascent theorists commonly cite three factors in support of these assumptions. They are: the impact of globalisation; the loss of state power to generate wealth through territory; and the evolving political and diplomatic nature of MNCs, superceding that of states. These three factors relate to the state and the traditional diplomatic institution's inability to generate wealth, thus rendering both archaic institutions irrelevant.

Employment of the first factor, globalisation (specifically in the economic sphere)¹⁸⁷, is abundant in NDT. For Nascent theorists, the irrelevancy of the state is

¹⁸⁶ See, for example, Rik Coolsaet. (1998). The Transformation of Diplomacy at the threshold of the new Millennium. *Diplomatic Studies Program*, Leicester University, No. 48, pp. 1 – 25; Andrew Coleman and Jackson Maogoto. (2003). After the Party, is there a Cure for the Hangover? The Challenges of the Global Economy to Westphalian Sovereignty. *Legal Issue of Economic Integration*, 30 (1), pp. 35 – 60; Susan Strange. (1992). States, firms and diplomacy. *International Affairs*, 68 (1), pp. 1 – 15; Ulrich Beck. (1999). Beyond the Nation State. *The New Statesman*, pp 25 – 28; Martin Wolf. (2001). Will the Nation-State survive Globalisation? *Foreign Affairs*, 80 (1), pp. 178 – 190; Michael Mann. (1997). Has Globalization ended the rise and rise of the nation-state? *Review of International Political Economy*, 4 (3), pp. 472 – 496.

¹⁸⁷ Globalisation, generally, can be divided into three types: social, economic and political. Bayliss and Smith define globalisation in the broad sense as 'the process of increasing interconnectedness between societies such that events in one part of the world more and more have effects on peoples and societies far away' (*The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 8) or as a historical process involving a fundamental shift or transformation in the spatial scale of human social organisation that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across regions and continents' (*The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 25). See also Giddens, who defines globalisation as 'the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa' (in Bayliss, *The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 25) Gilpin prefers to emphasise the economic element to globalisation, describing it as 'the integration of the world-economy' (in Bayliss, *The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 25) Scholte, emphasises the geographical element, interpreting

proven by comparing it to its traditional, historical role, where state success ‘hinged on military and economic resources – the ability to guarantee control of a new territory against other challengers as well as the capacity and challenges that new expanding markets offered’.¹⁸⁸ States, in the past, demonstrated a form of ‘economic aristocracy’ or exclusivity, which justified their legitimacy and relevancy by creating wealth in this monopolistic fashion.¹⁸⁹ This exclusive right to generate wealth is no longer the case, according to Nascent theorists.

In the modern era, Nascent theorists argue that globalisation has encouraged the rise of MNCs by removing barriers to international trade. While MNCs have become more powerful, states have been unable to control or benefit from globalisation. This transfer of wealth creating ability (from states to MNCs) has further questioned the modern role and relevancy of the state: if the state cannot generate wealth then what purpose does it truly serve? The list of factors responsible for the decline of the state’s ability to generate wealth is exhaustive.¹⁹⁰ For example, there is a long list of:

globalisation as ‘de-territorialisation-or...the growth of supraterritorial relations between people’ (in Bayliss, *The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 25). For a comprehensive discussion on historical and modern globalisation, see Andrew Coleman and Jackson Maogoto. (2003). *After the Party, is there a Cure for the Hangover? The Challenges of the Global Economy to Westphalian Sovereignty. Legal Issue of Economic Integration*, 30 (1), p. 43.

¹⁸⁸ Coleman and Maogoto, *After the Party*, p. 37.

¹⁸⁹ *ibid.*, p. 44.

¹⁹⁰ As mentioned, the literature relating to the State and Globalisation is exhaustive. For a concise account of the theoretical debate see Danielle S. Petito. (2001). *Sovereignty and Globalisation; Fallacies, Truth and Perception. New York Law School Journal of Human Rights*, XVII, pp. 1139 – 1172. Petito highlights several concerns for the state. Among these ‘are perceived fears that globalisation eradicates the identity of the Nation-state, imposes Western ideals on non-Western nations, exploits weak Nation-States to the benefit of powerful, rich nations in essence taking from the poor to feed the rich, dilutes national management, control and politics in favour of international integration, and imposes an international legal process (some may say democracy) upon individual nations through political influence and pressure, resulting in the destruction of national culture.’ (p. 1139).

fiscal termites gnawing at the foundations of state regimes: the increased mobility of skilled labour; the international flexibility of MNCs; technological change; increasing production; greater consumption; the growth of electronic commerce; the expansion of tax havens; and the development of new financial instruments and intermediaries.¹⁹¹

All of these factors, according to Nascent theorists, have challenged the legitimacy of the state and subsequently the traditional diplomatic institution. The ‘haunting specter of globalisation’ continues to make ‘governments weaker and less relevant than before: omnipotent markets mean impotent diplomats’.¹⁹² In the twenty-first century, the globalisation of the world economy ‘with its quest for international integration, arguably provides one of the tools for the chiseling away of sovereignty by decentralising national economies and wrestling control from the State’.¹⁹³ Nascent theorists claim that so long as MNCs continue to benefit from globalisation at the expense of the state they are within their theoretical rights to confirm yet another crisis for the state system and the diplomacy that greases it.

The second factor Nascent theorists commonly cite concerns the state’s irrelevant obsession with territory as a means of generating wealth. Nascent theorists argue that the creation of wealth is no longer a national issue to be realised through the domestic territoriality of the nation state. In the modern era, national territory has become ‘both inefficient and irrelevant for a major part of economic activity’.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹¹ Martin Wolf. (2001). Will the Nation-State survive Globalisation? *Foreign Affairs*, 80 (1), p.185.

¹⁹² *ibid.*, p. 178.

¹⁹³ Coleman and Maogoto, *After the Party*, p. 37.

¹⁹⁴ Coolsaet, *The Transformation of Diplomacy*, p. 4.

In the past, states competed with one another for the possession of territory and ‘wealth creating resources within territories, whether natural or man-created’.¹⁹⁵ Presently, they compete for market share in the world economy where territory is no longer the most important basis for the creation of wealth. Important sources for the creation of wealth have become non-material, such as financial markets and information and communications technology, sources that know no territorial boundaries. These new sources of wealth have been exploited by MNCs, at the expense of the state.

Such a development has led to an ‘important evolution’ in the sense that ‘companies, rather than states, now possess the main keys for the creation of wealth’.¹⁹⁶ Furthermore, states have now become dependent (in terms of the creation of wealth) on sources out with their control in a way which has never occurred before.¹⁹⁷ Under this view states are now reliant and dependent on MNCs, rather than controlling them as they did in the past.

According to Nascent theorists, the major source of financial power in the global 21st century belongs to MNCs. This third oft-cited factor, they claim, determines that the state is no longer an important actor in IR, and has slipped down the hierarchy in terms of significance. Consequently, MNCs have become more significant than states in the global century. This NDT argument suggests that increasingly powerful MNCs owe no allegiance to their country of origin. Their desire for profits overrides any national affiliation or any sentimental attachment to the state and the traditional diplomatic institution.

¹⁹⁵ Susan Strange. (1995). The Defective State. *Daedalus*, 124 (2), p. 55.

¹⁹⁶ Coolsaet, The Transformation of Diplomacy, p. 6.

¹⁹⁷ *ibid.*, p. 6 – 7.

Riordan (2003) is one NDT who argues that the rise and rise of MNCs is ending the state. He writes of MNCs that 'their economic strength, combined with international networks frequently outstrip (and outperform) traditional diplomatic services, this makes them more influential than many states'.¹⁹⁸ He ominously concludes that in the face of such growth 'it is unlikely that the state and the traditional diplomatic service will survive'.¹⁹⁹

To outperform states has required large MNCs to act like states, to even develop their own diplomatic corps. According to Nascent theorists, firms are beginning to act like states in certain respects: 'large companies seek to develop their own task-defined diplomatic structures to serve their particular needs and develop local expertise that national diplomatic services find hard to rival.'²⁰⁰ MNCs, according to Nascent theorists, have been successful in developing a political and diplomatic aspect, harnessing the advantages offered by technology and the opportunities created by global trade, whereas states 'have missed the boat'.²⁰¹ There is empirical evidence in support of the prominence of MNCs:

by the end of the 20th century, half of the top 100 economies in the world were not nation-states but corporations. By the 1980s a third of *all* world trade took place as transactions *within* transnational corporations.²⁰²

¹⁹⁸ Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*, p. 7.

¹⁹⁹ *ibid.*, p. 9.

²⁰⁰ Hocking, *Privatizing Diplomacy?*, p. 149.

²⁰¹ Coleman and Maogoto, *After the Party*, p. 48.

²⁰² Wolf, *Will the Nation-State Survive Globalisation?*, p. 187.

These brief statistics indicate that dynamic, political and diplomatic MNCs, operating in a radical global environment, have the capacity to overtake or bypass a state system mired in attempts to generate wealth through territory. All of the NDT arguments concerning trade, the state and diplomacy cite the state's inability to generate wealth as a harbinger of its eventual downfall.

3.5.6 **Diplomacy and the information revolution**

Where the information revolution is concerned, Nascent theorists argue that control over information has escaped state control. They extend this argument to diplomacy, suggesting that if information gathering is one central purpose of the traditional diplomatic institution, and if it can no longer control or monitor information, then it serves little purpose in an era often referred to as the information age. This development has created a situation where unconventional diplomatic actors now 'trespass on areas of expertise once more or less the sole preserve of [traditional] diplomacy'.²⁰³

Nascent theorists portray traditional diplomats as jealously guarding a sacrosanct domain, unwilling to alter traditional methods of information gathering and dissemination. Thus, diplomats are portrayed as 'wedded to the idea that they are keepers of a diplomatic holy grail'.²⁰⁴ Traditionally, information gathering (political and economic reporting) was carried out by diplomats in the host country, combining 'assiduous reading of the local print media with a network of personal contacts'.²⁰⁵ In this

²⁰³ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 42.

²⁰⁴ Anthony C. E. Quainton, 'Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries', 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, <www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html>

²⁰⁵ Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*, p. 63.

respect, the sources of information were limited, vague and open to much interpretation by the diplomat. In the modern era, this 'previously sacred function' of the diplomat is under threat from the information revolution because many alternative sources of information now exist.²⁰⁶

Jeffrey R. Cooper paints a worrying scenario for these traditional diplomatic gatekeepers:

Diplomats and MFAs [Ministries of Foreign Affairs] have lost the monopoly on information. They do not control the flow of information to and from their government. With the loss of control and increasing limitations on sovereignty, governments no longer have the ability to control the communications, transactions and other interaction among entities in international affairs. These trends have made it impossible for foreign ministries to retain their previous role in controlling foreign relations.²⁰⁷

Central to this scenario is the notion that governments have lost the ability to control information flows. Nascent theorists argue that changes in information gathering and dissemination in the past were controlled by the state, that is, within the state's territorial boundaries and within its own bureaucratic systems. The current 'revolution' in information flows is stimulated by forces operating 'outside boundaries dictated by the

²⁰⁶ *ibid.*

²⁰⁷ Jeffrey R. Cooper, 'Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries', 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, <www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html>

logic of territoriality'.²⁰⁸ This change means that 'the new information services and types of activity are increasingly slipping out of the control of governments'.²⁰⁹

According to Nascent theorists, Governments will struggle to retain control over information flows in a radically different 'information environment'.²¹⁰ The new environment is one where:

the world has changed fundamentally. Images and information respect neither time nor borders. Hierarchy is giving way to networking. Openness is crowding out secrecy and exclusivity. The quill pen world in which modern diplomacy was born no longer exists. Ideas and capital move swiftly and unimpeded across a global network of governments, corporations and NGOs. In this world of instantaneous information, contemporary diplomacy struggles to sustain its relevance.²¹¹

According to Nascent theorists, such a drastic, radical and rapid environmental change has caught states lagging. The state's tardiness has consequences. Burt names three consequences for the 'obsolete, cut off and frustrated state's' inability to adapt to the information evolution.²¹² The first is '*inefficiency*. Without access to state-of-the-art technology, it takes longer to get the job done. The second is a denial of *information and information-processing capabilities* needed for analysis, policy formulation and communication. The third is *conceptual stagnation*. The information revolution is changing the relations of nations through the evolving networked economy, the growth of

²⁰⁸ Brian Hocking, 'Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries', 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, <www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html>

²⁰⁹ Kramarenko and Krutskikh, *Diplomacy and the Information Revolution*, p. 116.

²¹⁰ Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*, p. 63.

²¹¹ Burt and Robison, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age*, p. 34.

²¹² *ibid.*, p. 42.

democracies, and increased connectivity among peoples – all of which will remain abstract to those whose channels are traditional and whose thinking remains linear’.²¹³ They conclude that without embracing the requisite technology, diplomacy ‘will surely become an anachronism’.²¹⁴

Such rhetoric highlights the inability, difficulty and reluctance of the state to adapt to a change not guided by its own hand. This reluctance to change is a common NDT claim to encounter. Under this NDT perception, states are viewed as archaic, unresponsive to change and stubbornly enforcing anachronistic values such as ‘adherence to tradition, secrecy and caution in information gathering’ where change is viewed as ‘the enemy of policy and bureaucratic coherence, continuity and consistency’.²¹⁵ Notions of change, of embracing the revolution, run up hard against ‘profound institutional resistance’.²¹⁶

According to one NDT, Modelski, ‘diplomacy’s tradition-hallowed ways raise serious doubts about its compatibility with advancing technology...diplomacy has been consistently resistant to technological innovation’.²¹⁷

Two other Nascent theorists, Burt and Robison, agree, highlighting that:

diplomacy is too centralised in fortress-like embassies, too light in commercial, information and media centers. Embassy infrastructure is characterised by imposing physical structures, autonomous agencies, and antiquated communication practices. New diplomacy, fuelled by the

²¹³ *ibid.*

²¹⁴ *ibid.*

²¹⁵ Anthony C. E. Quinton, ‘Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries’, 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, <www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html>

²¹⁶ *ibid.*

²¹⁷ Modelski, *Principles of World Politics*, pp. 187 – 188.

information revolution, requires different skills, techniques and attitudes than those found in traditional diplomacy.²¹⁸

Nascent theorists argue that due to its rigid, bureaucratic structure, the traditional diplomatic institution is struggling to develop the different skills (proactive training of senior diplomats, for example), flexibility and attitudes required to benefit from the information revolution. The theme that the 'narrow minded and technically myopic' traditional diplomatic institution is confounded by the information revolution is well founded in NDT literature.²¹⁹ Transition from the 'hierarchical, closed, and classified nature of diplomacy to the openness, flexibility and speed of postmodern information flows' is difficult because of institutional and bureaucratic constraints.²²⁰ Thus, 'states find themselves scrambling to assume authoritative positions in this fluid international landscape.'²²¹ Hemery concurs, claiming 'current conventional wisdom suggests that information technology and the pace of communicative change combine to flatten the pyramid of effective state authority'.²²² For Nascent theorists, the result for states and the traditional diplomatic institution is once more a question of legitimacy: if this state institution no longer controls or filters information then what purpose does it serve?

A second set of common NDT assumptions concerns the ability of the information revolution to transcend the traditional political-military agenda. The information revolution is again responsible in that it has created a highly effective

²¹⁸ Burt and Robison, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age*, p. 39.

²¹⁹ Anthony C. E. Quainton, 'Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries', 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, <www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html>

²²⁰ Howard Cincotta, 'Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries', 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, <www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html>

²²¹ Sheryl J. Brown and Margarita S. Studemeister, 'Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries', 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, <www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html>

²²² Hemery, *Educating Diplomats*, p. 143.

channel for the promotion of transnational or global issues. The traditional *high* politics of military and security are being challenged by *low* politics, promoting an unconventional international political agenda driven by non-state actors.

Traditional political-military concerns endure but are no longer the driving force of IR, according to Nascent theorists, who suggest that the source of power in IR is shifting from control over territory to control over information. Brown, for example, argues that the ‘political transition from territory-based power to information-based power, from sovereign borders to international publics and global constituencies’ has been detrimental to traditional diplomacy.²²³ ‘Because [information] networks are divested of territory’, Brown continues, ‘political mastery transfers from territory to network.’²²⁴ In other words, Nascent theorists suggest that he who controls information flows commands power in the IR system. The diplomatic institution does not control information, therefore does not command power.

Furthermore, a conscious global public, fed by the information revolution, is more interested in championing a good cause rather than a traditional political-military campaign. After all, who can be against clean drinking water, inalienable human rights for all individuals or a campaign to save the whale? The information revolution has spread more attractive, lower agendas (to a disenfranchised public) and changed ‘conventional ideas and approaches that used to be part and parcel of world politics and practices’.²²⁵ The information revolution has pushed the low political agenda to center stage in IR.

²²³ Sheryl J. Brown and Margarita S. Studemeister, ‘Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries’, 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, <www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html>

²²⁴ *ibid.*

²²⁵ Kramarenko and Krutskikh, *Diplomacy and the Information Revolution*, p.123.

The most obvious factor promoting a lower agenda is the increased accessibility that civil society has to information and communications technology.²²⁶ Many homes have a computer, wired up to the Internet, putting them within a mouse-click of international interaction. In this respect, Krutskikh and Kramarenko consider the advantage of the information revolution as ‘its economic and technical affordability to the users and its mass employment on a mass scale which, for its part, influences the shaping of social and political processes and the making of political decisions’.²²⁷ More people are ‘wired up’ to the Internet, and more are informed through a global media. In short, global civil society is engaging a *softer* agenda that is radically different to the previous century where balances of power, territory and military alliances dictated the *harder* foreign policy agenda.

Those benefiting, shaping and controlling softer information flows are non-state actors who ‘access, penetrate, and influence every level of officialdom and at the same time mobilise populations on a host of issues using every variety of communications technology from the radio to the internet’.²²⁸ By embracing the information revolution, non-state actors have been able to ‘challenge traditional hierarchies and control

²²⁶ In 1965, Gordon Moore, the co-founder of Intel, forecast that computing power would double every 18 months. Moore’s law has held for more than 30 years and will continue to bring the price of computing downward for at least another decade. Today’s personal computers, selling for less than a thousand dollars (AUD), operate ten times as fast as a 1970 IBM mainframe computer that sold for nearly \$5 million (USD). For a discussion on the information and communications revolution, see Richard Burt and Olin Robison. (1998) *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age: A Report of the CSIS Advisory Panel on Diplomacy in the Information Age*. Washington: The Centre for Strategic and International Studies. The numbers of PCs has recently snowballed. According to International Telecommunications Union there were 130 million in 1991, 235 million in 1995 and 620 million in 2004 (www.itu.int/itu-ict/statistics/at_glance/keytelecom99.html, accessed 7th July, 2005).

²²⁷ *ibid.*, p. 116.

²²⁸ Sheryl J. Brown and Margarita S. Studemeister, ‘Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries’, 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, <www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html>

structures, heightening the importance of actors other than central governments and their leaders to foreign affairs'.²²⁹

Consequently, we are witnessing a 'parallel diffusion' of the practice of diplomacy amongst non-state actors who have access to new technologies and 'a desire to reach and create global constituencies about specific issues that are based on perceived common values'.²³⁰ The prominence of new information technologies facilitates the realisation of a non-traditional agenda, 'to increase understanding, foster tolerance and ultimately promote world wide peace'.²³¹ This factor, alongside the inability of the traditional diplomatic institution to control information flows, leads Nascent theorists to conclude that, once more, the traditional vulgate of diplomacy is losing relevance.

3. 6 **The merits of NDT**

Broadly, Nascent theorists provide an equilibrium to the Traditionalist interpretation of diplomacy, whether in the orthodox sense of Hoffman (2003) or the more moderate fashion of Sharp (1999) or Cooper and Hocking (2000). This balance results in an evenhanded theory of modern diplomacy, for it is difficult to deny the existence and impact nascent diplomatic actors have on traditional diplomacy.

NDT injects originality into the discipline of diplomacy studies. Cohen, for example, has argued that diplomacy studies 'have generated a disappointing response from scholars in international relations'.²³² He suggested that one solution to this problem

²²⁹ Jeffrey R. Cooper, 'Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries', 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, <www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html>

²³⁰ Sheryl J. Brown and Margarita S. Studemeister, 'Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries', 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, <www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html>

²³¹ Cairncross in Burt and Robison, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age*, p. 16.

²³² Cohen, Putting Diplomatic Studies on the Map, p. 1.

is to ‘open up the area to include, *inter alia*, the involvement of non-state actors’.²³³ This more inclusive and diffuse direction is a hallmark of NDT and a positive impact for diplomacy studies, as it is more reflective of modern diplomacy.

The main strength of the Nascent theoretical approach is that it develops awareness of diplomatic actors and environments outside the Traditionalist interpretation of diplomacy. This may seem an obvious and incidental occurrence, but considering the dominance of TDT, such innovation prompts the field to acknowledge, explore and incorporate unconventional areas of research. For example, Nascent theorists challenge and dismiss the short-sighted notion that IGOs are convenient frameworks set up by states, for states. This may have been true of the inception of many IGOs following the Second World War, but in the modern era, alternate actors are seeking, and finding, a voice in the multilateral forum. These actors are not only NGOs but other IGOs as well, such as the representatives of the European Commission.²³⁴ Nascent theorists argue that we must devote attention to theorising on the types of diplomacy these organisations and actors practice. At the moment, this type of analysis is hardly prominent in the diplomacy studies field.

²³³ *ibid.*

²³⁴ Bruter refers to the external delegations of the European Commission as ‘embassies without a state’ (Diplomacy without a state, p. 183). The European Commission plays a central role in the implementation of the EU’s foreign and other policies and in doing so relies heavily on its over 120 Delegations and Office around the globe. The delegations have grown rapidly and, endorsed by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rights, have attained the status of a ‘comprehensive, organised and consistent network of embassies and representation around the world’ (Diplomacy without a state, p. 183). However, when compared to state diplomatic actors, the external delegations perform a less effective type of diplomacy. They are handicapped not only by the ‘absence of a clearly defined foreign policy, limited material resources, no representative head of state and no professional diplomatic corps’ but also torn between a desire ‘to assert their legitimacy as autonomous embassies and the necessity of taking part in the more global frame of a developing European Foreign Policy’ (Diplomacy without a state, pp. 183 – 185). For a discussion on how the European Commission have organised their work to overcome these handicaps see, Michael Bruter. (1999). Diplomacy without a state: the external delegations of the European Commission. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6 (2), 183 - 205.

The growing presence of NDT opens up new areas of research. If we accept that nascent diplomatic actors are increasing in importance within the IR system then, using TDT as a benchmark, it is pertinent to establish what differentiates nascent diplomatic actors from the traditional diplomatic institution? Similarly, are there diplomatic rules nascent diplomatic actors agree upon, and if so can we identify them? Can we therefore cement certain characteristics of nascent diplomacy, and (again) what are they? These questions are but a few on a promising research agenda awaiting discovery within diplomacy studies and, as Lee commented, ‘the list could go on and on.’²³⁵ This non-traditional research agenda is a promising one and in need of attention if diplomacy studies are to increase in scope and contribution to the broader IR discipline.

The need for a more inclusive approach to the study of diplomacy allows the construction and introduction of a body of alternate (to the Traditional canon) diplomatic literature. The inclusion of this body of work renders the discipline more reflective of the modern diplomatic environment that we seek to theorise upon. This alternate body of literature (NDT) is not:

the sole property of a narrow group of writers on diplomacy. On the contrary, the need for a more flexible approach to the study and practice of diplomacy has been a marked feature of the writings of a number of international relations scholars.²³⁶

Alternate opinion on diplomacy does exist within the canon of diplomacy studies, however it has yet to be established as a separate and distinct body of scholarship.

²³⁵ Correspondence, July 28th, 2005.

²³⁶ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 363.

Through the formulation of a body of alternate diplomatic studies literature, Traditionalist dominance of the diplomatic studies field could be mitigated, and a broader, more inclusive canon constructed. This new direction is not to suggest the abandonment of TDT; rather a body of work which incorporates both TDT and NDT is more reflective of the complex twenty-first century diplomatic environment. The emergence of NDT since the end of the Cold War is promising in this sense. NDT is ultimately beneficial for a diplomatic studies field that intends to truly reflect the multi-actor nature of the modern diplomatic environment.

3.7 **The Limitations of NDT**

The limitations of NDT are similar to those of TDT. Like certain parochial Traditionalists, orthodox Nascent theorists such as Hoffman or Jackson endorse a singular or partial focus on diplomacy. This exclusive belief in non-state diplomatic actors is understandable, and is certainly a rebuttal to the similar state focus that has dominated diplomacy studies. However, choosing to ignore the state's role in the modern diplomatic environment is to deny an actuality: the omnipotence of the state.

Postulating on modern diplomacy should not be a case of further enforcing binary either/or positions. Just as the caveat against traditionalism warned against parochialism, this thesis cautions against a similar blinkered NDT focus on non-state diplomacy. This aggressive posturing, on both sides, can only distort diplomatic theory by cleaving it into two adversarial poles.

Furthermore, criticism of traditional diplomacy is inherent to most of the NDT literature. Many NDT publications include, almost pro forma, a list of the actors or events detrimentally affecting traditional diplomacy.²³⁷ If the Nascent theorists are to be believed then each of these developments, in some way or another, is contributing to the end of traditional diplomacy. A more productive direction would be to focus on the 'ends of diplomacy', including the means by which these are achieved, rather than an 'injurious

²³⁷ These include the advent of permanent international summitry, the effect of commerce on diplomacy, the communications revolution, the declining role of the resident ambassador, and finally the declining role of the nation state and subsequently diplomacy. For employment of these phenomenon, see Luc Reyckler. 1997. *Beyond Traditional Diplomacy*. Diplomatic Studies Program. *Discussion Paper*. University of Leicester; Paul Sharp. 1997. Who Needs Diplomats. *International Journal*; Kanishka Jayasuriya. 2004. Breaking the 'Westphalian' Frame: Regulatory State, Fragmentation and Diplomacy. *Netherlands Institute of International Relations*.

fixation' with the *end* of diplomacy.²³⁸ The NDT literature that aggressively and shortsightedly criticises traditional diplomacy as unresponsive, archaic and unreflective of the current international environment only serves to induce panic when theorising on diplomacy.

This limitation is related to the notion that Nascent theorists are culpable of focusing on short- term developments affecting diplomacy and pay little heed to the rich historical legacy that has moulded contemporary diplomacy (both state and non-state). To prefer the recent past rather than the distant past is unreflective of diplomacy, which has had a strong historical legacy since 'the dawn of history.'²³⁹ The works of Der Derian (1987), Constantinou (1996) and even Nicolson (1950, 1957) acknowledge the importance of history to any conception of diplomacy. To omit or avoid this historical evolution of diplomacy, a typical orthodox NDT position, is an unrealistic approach.

Therefore, Nascent theorists can be accused of questioning traditional diplomacy's modern relevance without a clear understanding of the recent and distant past, which ultimately weakens their theoretical argument. Melissen supports this point, when he notes that such 'preoccupation with the present and too great an emphasis on the notion of change may impede a deeper understanding of diplomacy at the end of the twentieth century.'²⁴⁰ To understand diplomacy, nascent or traditional, requires a healthy respect for history.

NDT does lack historical grounding. The distant past is invaluable to alternate theories on diplomacy, particularly the institutionalisation of unconventional actors and environments for diplomacy during the early stages of the twentieth century. This period,

²³⁸ Hocking, *The end(s) of diplomacy*, p. 171.

²³⁹ Nicolson, *The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method*, p. 2.

²⁴⁰ Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p. xx.

can reveal phenomena that enrich the analysis of alternate theories on diplomacy, such as the advent of idealism, the emergence of public opinion on foreign policy or the first thoughts on notions of international civil society. As Gaddis comments, ‘many subjects that one might have thought to be finished and filed away are in reality waiting to be reawakened to new life by insight, imagination and a sense of relevance’.²⁴¹

A respect for distant diplomatic history would strengthen NDT considerably. Distant history demonstrates that non-state actors are not fleeting post-Cold War developments but have historical longevity, allowing us to confirm an alternate type of diplomacy, and thus strengthen arguments for its inclusion in the canon of diplomacy studies. A strong history accounting for the prevalence of unconventional actors promotes respect and recognition of the nascent form as a coherent typology, a separate paradigm and a significant force in historical and modern diplomacy.

The evidence supporting a distinct faction of Nascent theorists in diplomacy studies is subtle rather than glaring (as was the case with the Traditionalists). However, this group of theorists is steadily increasing in size, scope and field of enquiry, and not before time as Nascent theorists are keen to remind us. There is some validity behind such rhetoric. After all, TDT only tells us part of the modern diplomatic story; it was only a matter of time before a group of theorists identified the lack of theory on non-state diplomatic actors and environments.

In terms of diplomatic theory or theories, this thesis has now introduced and constructed two new categories of diplomatic theorists. Chapters two and three provided evidence which suggests that the Traditional and Nascent Theorists occupy opposite poles in the diplomatic studies field. The middle theoretical ground (a moderate state and

²⁴¹ Gaddis, *Expanding the Data Base*, p. 16.

non-state focus) suddenly appears conspicuous by its absence. However, this thesis believes a third group of theorists occupy this middle ground and can be evidenced within the diplomatic studies literature.

Chapter Four – Innovative Diplomatic Theory (IDT)

This chapter will present the third type of diplomatic theory: Innovative Diplomatic Theory (IDT).¹ This chapter will introduce the general characteristics of Innovative diplomatic theory and theorists (Innovators) and present examples of their work. This chapter builds a comprehensive profile of this type of diplomatic theorist, with each of the following sections adding layers to the profile. Constructing this third diplomatic theory category allows this thesis to highlight IDT's applicability to the modern diplomatic environment.

4.0 The origins of IDT

Unlike the other two types of diplomatic theory, the origins of IDT cannot be primarily correlated to a change in the diplomatic environment itself. Instead, IDT emerged (largely) as a result of different theoretical perceptions within the diplomatic studies field. Various types of diplomatic theorists interpreted the post-Cold War

¹ A body of work reflecting IDT could include: J. Der Derian. (1987). *On Diplomacy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Brian Hocking (ed.) (1999). *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation*. London: Palgrave; Jan Melissen (ed.). (1999) *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*. New York: Macmillan; Brian Hocking. (1993). *Localizing Foreign Policy: Non-Central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy*. London: Palgrave; Brian Hocking and David Spence (eds.). (2002). *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*. London: Palgrave; Andrew F. Cooper. (1997). Beyond Representation. *International Journal*, 53 (1), pp. 173 – 178; A. F. Cooper and B. Hocking. (2000). Governments, Non-governmental Organisations and the Re-calibration of Diplomacy. *Global Society*, 14 (3), 361 – 376; Brian Hocking. (2004). Privatizing Diplomacy? *International Studies Perspectives*, 5, pp. 147 – 152; Paul Sharp. (1999). For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations. *International Studies Review*, 1 (1), 33 – 57; Paul Sharp. (1997). Who needs diplomats? The problem of diplomatic representation. *International Journal*, 52 (4), 609 – 634. On more specific topics: Muhittin Ataman. (2003). The Impact of Non-State Actors on World Politics: A Challenge to Nation-States. *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 2 (1), 42 – 66; G. Ball. (1976). *Diplomacy for a Crowded World*. London: Bodley Head; Jozef Batora. (2003). Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy? *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 'Clingendael'*. No. 87, 1 – 25; Melissen, Jan. (2003) Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age. *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'*, 1 – 21; Sharp, Paul. (2001). Making Sense of Citizen Diplomats. *Diplomatic Studies Program*, Leicester University, 1 – 22.

diplomatic environment, in particular the relationship between the incumbent state and emerging non-state actors.

Since the end of the Cold War, the state's questionable relationship with non-state actors has been a contentious issue within the diplomatic studies field and, more broadly, within the IR discipline. As described in the previous chapters, the argument that the Westphalian state was under threat from the emergence of non-state diplomatic actors prompted a wealth of literature on the topic, mostly portraying a bleak future for the traditional institution.² For example, Ohmae wrote of the 'the end of the state' (1995), Dunn of the 'contemporary crisis of the state' (1995) and Wolf asked if the 'state would survive?' (2001). If this literature was believed, the Westphalian polity was under threat as unconventional actors such as Inter Governmental Organisations (IGOs), Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and multi-national corporations (MNCs) infringed upon its once exclusive authority, sovereignty and legitimacy.

After the Cold War, diplomatic theory mirrored this state/non-state division. Chapters two and three evidenced the encroachment of Nascent diplomatic theory into a discipline dominated, to that point, by Traditionalist interpretations of diplomacy. The exclusive focus of TDT (state) and NDT (non-state) meant that both of these groups moved to occupy opposite poles in the diplomatic studies field.

² These works were particularly dominant after the Cold War, as the international relations field vigorously debated the future of the nation state in light of the demise of the bi-polar order that had endured for almost forty years. Most works suggested a withering, hollowing out and decline in the legitimacy of the nation-state. For examples of these types of work, see Robert Wesson. (1990). *International Relations in Transition*. Inglewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall; Susan Strange. (1995). The Defective State. *Daedalus*, 124 (2), pp. 55 – 75; Susan Strange. (1997). The Erosion of the State. *Current History*, November, pp. 365 – 369; Shampa Biswas. (2002). W(h)ither the Nation-state? National and State Identity in the Face of Fragmentation and Globalisation. *Global Society*, 16 (2), pp. 175 – 198; Glenn P. Hastedt and Kay M. Knickrehm. (2003). *International Politics in a Changing World*. New York: Longman; Kanishka Jayasuriya. (2004). Breaking the 'Westphalian' Frame: Regulatory State, Fragmentation and Diplomacy. *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy. Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'*. No 90, pp. 1 – 21; Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond. (2005). *The Global Future*. California: Thompson.

Both TDT and NDT are unlikely to become more moderate in their diplomatic theories; TDT is unlikely to become less statist while it is unforeseeable that NDT becomes more statist. The simple reason is that discounting or dismissing either the state or the non-state forms the bedrock of both theories. With TDT and NDT, 'such approaches still yield cantilevered bridges at best since their builders do not significantly relax either of the two fundamental assumptions that distinguish the contending research traditions.'³ Through this exclusive focus, both TDT and NDT can be described as somewhat partial, parochial and one-dimensional. Both theories are likely to remain in this state of fundamental opposition.

The result is that the field is left with two different theories on contemporary diplomacy. A middle ground, privileging both the state and the non-state, seems conspicuous by its absence. However, one group of theorists, the Innovators, has emerged as a result of this polarisation, and to occupy the middle ground. This split in the diplomatic studies field created a gap that the Innovators have sought to fill.

³ Rudra Sil. (2000) The Foundations of Eclecticism: The Epistemological Status of Agency, Culture, and Structure in Social Theory. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 12 (3), p. 355.

4.1 The central tenets of IDT

Melissen first introduced the label ‘Innovators’ in the 1999 book *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*. In the introduction, he writes that the Innovator’s work is ‘intended to supplement the analysis of more familiar topics’ in the diplomatic studies literature; these familiar topics are traditional diplomacy (primarily) and unconventional diplomacy.⁴ However, the value of the Innovators is anything but supplementary, their contribution is valuable when theorising on modern diplomacy. When building the initial profile of the Innovators it is impossible to ignore the relationship between the state and the non-state. The acknowledgement and ultimate realignment of this relationship is central to the strength of IDT.

The Innovators are the only group of diplomatic theorists who suggest that a theoretical division exists within the diplomatic studies field. They believe that diplomatic theory is polarised into statist and non-statist theories on diplomacy. This polarisation can be consistently evidenced within the diplomatic studies field, according to the Innovators. On the one hand, there exist Traditionalists who champion the continuity and familiarity of the state system, greased by official diplomacy. On the other, supporters of unofficial or nascent diplomacy, ‘pursuing a moral doctrine’, believe that their vision of a better world must not be subsumed under the state system, and that it ‘must displace the politically pragmatic and morally compromised arrangement’ of conventional, traditional and statist diplomacy.⁵

⁴ Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p. xx.

⁵ Jackson, Martin Wight’s Thought on Diplomacy, p. 15.

For the innovators, this polarisation of diplomatic theory results in three scenarios: the state *versus* the non-state debate; the newness and decline debate; and, consequently, the either/or choice presented to the diplomatic scholar.

Essentially, the state *versus* non-state debate is reflective of an incumbent versus challenger scenario, where one actor, method or theoretical interpretation succeeds at the expense of the other. Under this view, the modern diplomatic environment is governed by adversarial relationship with actors – ranging from traditional states to emerging actors - competing over how best to shape the ‘anarchical organising principle of the international system’.⁶ According to the Innovators, this competition fuels an ‘antagonistic relationship’ between different actors and diplomatic theorists.⁷ Often within diplomacy studies, state and non-state actors are portrayed as ‘inhabiting different environments, working to different rulebooks and occupying very different positions on the scale of importance in world politics. They exist, therefore, in two solitudes with little or no interaction between their worlds’.⁸

For the Innovators, this perceived relationship between state and non-state diplomacy constitutes two central ‘debates about diplomacy: newness and decline’.⁹ The former notion, newness, relates to a world society view advocated by ever-growing numbers of non-state actors, which challenges a state-centric focus in diplomacy studies. The latter notion, decline, is characterised by the rise of the ‘unofficial’, at the expense of the ‘official’.¹⁰ The ‘well rehearsed proposition’ that traditional diplomacy is in decline

⁶ James A. Caporaso. (2000). Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority and Sovereignty. *International Studies Association*, p. 6.

⁷ Jackson, Martin Wight’s Thought on Diplomacy, p. 15.

⁸ Cooper and Hocking, Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy, p. 361.

⁹ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p.21.

¹⁰ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 21.

and under attack from more responsive non-state diplomacy is ‘a common and injurious claim to encounter in diplomacy studies’.¹¹ Commonly cited in the NDT literature of Langhorne (1997, 1998, 2000) and Reychler (1996), for example, is the rise of non-state actors such as NGOs, MNCs and IGOs ‘infringing upon the once hermetically sealed world’ of the diplomat, and practicing more ‘representative’ diplomacy.¹² Under this view, traditional diplomatic actors are often portrayed as disparate with non-traditional actors.

According to the innovators, theory on modern diplomacy adheres to one view or the other: *either* statist *or* non-statist. For the Innovators, acknowledging this either/or split is important because diplomatic theorists and students are forced into make a choice between which view is most applicable to the modern diplomatic environment. For example, one IDT, Sharp, argues that two schools of thought prevail in diplomacy studies; firstly, the ‘no change’ school, which assumes that only traditional diplomacy is significant, and secondly, the ‘all change’ school, which assumes state sovereignty and the traditional diplomatic institution are now irrelevant.¹³ The ‘all change’ school depicts the state system ‘as a town whose buildings have been burned down to shells’.¹⁴ Fuelling the fire are nascent diplomatic theorists who promote the role of non-state actors practicing more effective, faster and more representative diplomacy.

Hocking and Cooper are two other IDTs who agree with Sharp. The study and theory of ‘diplomacy’, Hocking writes, ‘has become an icon for the advocates of two competing perspectives on international politics, the state-centric and world society

¹¹ Hocking, *The end(s) of diplomacy*, p. 169.

¹² Biswas, *W(h)ither the Nation-state?*, p. 175.

¹³ Sharp, *Making Sense of Citizen Diplomats*, p. 16.

¹⁴ *ibid.*

views'.¹⁵ This 'confused and unfocussed' dialogue has resulted in 'two lines of divergent argument' (state versus non-state), which are in danger of widening and bogging the diplomatic studies field in 'sterile and unproductive debate'.¹⁶ Similarly, Cooper draws attention to the 'strong current in the contemporary diplomatic literature', where the relationship between statist and non-statist theories and theorists 'has been riddled with on-going and intractable tensions'.¹⁷

Acknowledging this division in the first place is a unique and central tenet of IDT. Banishing or dismissing such rhetoric as nonsense is a second central tenet to IDT. For example, Sharp suggests that the presence of polarized thought on diplomacy is damaging the field, and that it is wrong to assume that *either* we accept a realist, statist view of diplomacy *or* we assume that the state was a significant actor in the past but is now irrelevant.¹⁸ According to the Innovators, the incumbent state versus nascent challenger notion is particularly unproductive for diplomacy studies and diplomatic theory, and in 'either/or terms has caused us to labor needlessly'.¹⁹ Such fixation frustrates rather than promotes meaningful and robust diplomatic theory, according to the Innovators.

Furthermore, if such needless debates continue we will fail to understand the complexity of the modern diplomatic environment. According to the Innovators, if we continue with these either/or arguments diplomacy studies will remain mired in misperception, confusion and misunderstanding in regard to the relationship between 'old' Westphalian, traditional forms of diplomacy and unconventional, alternative and

¹⁵ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 22.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁷ Cooper, *Beyond Representation*, p. 177.

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ Casparo, *Changes in the Westphalian Order*, p. 4.

‘new’ forms of diplomacy that have emerged since 1918.²⁰ In other words, if we continue to rely on either TDT or NDT, we will not be able to completely understand the diverse forces modern diplomatic environment.

A continuous and objective (re)appraisal of the state/non-state relationship constitutes another tenet of IDT. The Innovators argue that the positive relationship between the state and non-state is a highly visible feature of the modern diplomatic environment. This environment is continually changing and it is important that we concentrate on the features and forces driving this change. Of the Innovators, Melissen notes that they ‘try to provide insights into a transforming diplomatic landscape and the changing modalities and forms of diplomacy within’.²¹ Distancing but not abandoning a state focus, their central purpose is to ‘analyse the effects of drastic change in the international environment on tried and tested diplomatic practices, and to identify the potential for scope and innovation in those practices’.²² By analysing change, the Innovators do not make any rash judgements on the fate of the traditional diplomatic institution. At the same time, they aim to incorporate observations on non-state diplomatic actors into their theory on diplomacy. Within IDT, both the state and the non-state are given equal weighting.

Similarly, both Traditional and Nascent diplomatic theories are given impartial consideration by the Innovators. They believe that the modern diplomatic environment is best understood not in either/or terms but from an approach that values both statist and non-statist diplomatic theory. This is a third central tenet of IDT; to understand modern diplomacy an approach that values both statist and non-statist diplomatic theories is

²⁰ Sofer, *Old and New Diplomacy*, p. 195.

²¹ Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p. xx.

²² *ibid.*

preferable. This form of theoretical bi-polarity is the distinguishing hallmark of this group of theorists.

In this context, there does not appear to be anything particularly ‘innovative’ to IDT. After all, knowledge on the diplomacy of state and non-state actors is clearly visible in the diplomatic studies literature. However, it is not the knowledge that is innovative. Rather an approach that privileges *both* the state and the non-state is novel in terms of diplomatic theory. For the Innovators, rewarding and original scholarship is to be found in theorising on diplomacy from a state and non-state approach. This theoretical orientation of the Innovators suggests a ‘strong demonstration of renewed theoretical innovation in the field, innovation that avoids old patterns and old labels’.²³

4.2 The general characteristics of the Innovators

Sharp, Lee, Melissen, Hocking, Kurbaliga and Cooper are pristine examples of Innovative diplomatic theorists. There are certain assumptions that qualify these diplomatic theorists as Innovators. These are broad assumptions, yet most Innovators demonstrate each of these characteristics. This approach (privileging both the state and the non-state) to theorising on diplomacy is the first characteristic of the Innovators; there is no sliding scale or expansive range of views within this faction of theorists. All of the Innovators appear in agreement with their theoretical approach to diplomacy.

A second characteristic is that Innovators are largely critical of the divergent nature of exclusive TDT and orthodox NDT. They argue that the need to defend these parochial theories on diplomacy can result in conflicting theories on modern diplomacy, which confuses an accurate evaluation of modern diplomacy. The Innovators believe that

²³ Kahler, *Inventing International Relations*, p. 43.

the ambivalent views of exclusive Traditionalists and orthodox Nascent theorists are damaging for diplomatic theory, as they encourage competition of opinion at the expense of accuracy.²⁴ Both these groups of theorists become consumed with defending their theories, and embellishing notions of diplomacy ‘which do not exist’.²⁵ This competition, according to the Innovators, means that a body of diplomatic theory truly reflective of the modern diplomatic environment has yet to emerge.

Innovators, thirdly, perform an arbitrary or mediating role within the diplomatic studies field. They do so by utilising the merits of inclusive Traditionalists and the moderate Nascent theorists. Innovators recognise that the specialised focuses of both the inclusive Traditionalists and moderate Nascent theorists can be employed to construct a more balanced form of diplomatic theory. They consolidate the importance of the inclusive Traditionalist contribution, without entirely discounting the state in interpretations of diplomacy (as do orthodox Nascent theorists). Similarly, they raise the diplomatic studies field’s awareness of nascent forms of non-state diplomacy. Innovators recognise the importance of the contribution of moderate Nascent theorists and the current need to theorise on the impact of non-state actors on diplomacy.

Relating to the above point, the balance inherent to IDT stems, fourthly, from the notion of theoretical eclecticism that they practice. They feed off other theories, extracting the merits, dispelling the parochial limitations and sidestepping adversarial debates (between state and non-state legitimacy, for example) altogether. The end result is an impartial diplomatic theory, which stresses the mutually beneficial nature of state and non-state diplomatic relationships. Innovators can be said to critique other diplomatic

²⁴ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 19.

²⁵ Newson, *The new diplomatic agenda*, p. 30.

theoretical observations, identifying the shortcomings and valuable observations of different factions of theorists.

Innovators, fourthly, demonstrate a similar balance on postulations on the practical diplomatic environment. The Innovator's propensity to moderate and incorporate balance into their theory is related, fifthly, to the symbiotic relationship they believe exists between different diplomatic actors in the modern diplomatic environment. They argue that state/non-state diplomatic relationships are distinctly non-adversarial, symbiotic and complementary. However, before recognition of this symbiotic relationship is confirmed, non-state diplomatic actors must be accepted as an integral part of the modern diplomatic environment, according to IDTs. Lee and Hudson offer a relevant warning for diplomacy studies if non-state actors are ignored, arguing that:

most diplomatic theorists would have us believe that diplomacy is the stuff of high politics, yet we know this position obscures the practice of a diplomacy that is far more complex and multifaceted. Not only do we know this intuitively, diplomats and official government records tell us that this is so. This blindness produces nothing more than a partial disclosure of what constitutes diplomatic practice.²⁶

In order to validate this symbiotic and multi-actor assumption, the Innovators, sixthly, incorporate the opinion of practitioners, diplomats who are conventional and unconventional. This valuable empirical evidence is prominent in their work, as is reliance upon official sources such as government white papers and official data to validate their arguments. Thus, by relying on empirical data to validate theoretical claims,

²⁶ Lee and Hudson, *The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy*, p. 360.

the Innovators are working towards bridging the gap between diplomatic theory and diplomatic practice.

Innovators, sixthly, focus exclusively on the shape of modern diplomacy. The end of the Cold War appears to have been the catalyst for their unique line of enquiry. This environmental change is significant to the Innovators. Melissen expresses the relief that the field has experienced since the ‘intellectual shackles of the cold war preoccupations and an excessive emphasis on things military’ have gradually disappeared, allowing the Innovators to focus on reappraising diplomacy’s role in the modern diplomatic environment.²⁷ Generally, events before the Cold War attract only fleeting attention from the Innovators.

4.3 A Literature Review of IDT: Definitions and Examples

This section will provide examples of IDT, with the aim of substantiating the central tenets and characteristics described in the previous sections. Also, this section will evidence the Innovators ability to selectively borrow from statist and non-statist diplomatic theories in order to enrich their particular theory. Innovators are the eclectic amalgamators of polarised theory, both Traditional and Nascent, which results in a less partial and more balanced type of diplomatic theory.

IDT can be distinguished from other diplomatic theories by presenting their definitions of diplomacy. Critical of the ‘straightjacket approach’ of traditionalist and NDT definitions of diplomacy, Melissen writes that, ‘definitions of diplomacy abound, but not all of them prove helpful in analysing today’s varied manifestations of

²⁷ *ibid.*

diplomacy’.²⁸ Wary of straying into either the Traditionalist or NDT camp and keen to demonstrate balance, Melissen defines diplomacy as ‘the mechanism of representation, communication and negotiation through which states *and* other international actors conduct their business’.²⁹ In this loose definition, the Innovators give equal consideration to both states and nascent diplomatic actors.

The balanced interpretation of diplomacy, between state and non-state, is also evident in Sharp’s work (1997, 1999, 2001, 2003). Sharp commences in apologetic fashion for the dominant Traditionalist focus, noting that the parochialism it promotes ‘is unfortunate, for it constitutes a barrier to the conceptual coherence that the IR field now requires if it is to improve its understandings of diplomacy’.³⁰ Maintaining this ‘authoritative and exclusionary’ statist approach has hampered an effective response to the question ‘what is and is not diplomacy’, according to this Innovator.³¹

Like Melissen, Sharp first identifies the limitations of concisely defining diplomacy, labelling it as a ‘notoriously tricky term’ that can ‘convey many and different things’.³² He prefers to define diplomacy as a term ‘through a consideration of its usage, rather than attempt to capture a precise or fixed meaning’.³³ One such usage is the application of diplomacy to official exchange between states. He notes that the ‘term diplomacy *should* be reserved for the way in which accredited representatives of sovereigns contribute to the making and implementation of foreign policy’.³⁴ In addition, he alludes that if we want to understand diplomacy’s value to the IR system, we cannot

²⁸ *ibid.*, p. xvi.

²⁹ *ibid.*, p. xvii.

³⁰ Sharp, *For Diplomacy*, p. 35.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

³² Sharp, *Herbert Butterfield*, p. 857.

³³ Sharp, *For Diplomacy*, p. 37.

³⁴ Sharp, *Herbert Butterfield*, p. 857.

ignore the historical experience of relations between sovereign states.³⁵

However, it is Sharp's second usage of the term diplomacy that avoids consigning his work to the Traditionalist faction. He also applies the term diplomacy to the 'way in which relations between groups that regard themselves as separate ought to be conducted if the principle of living in groups is to be retained as good, and if unnecessary and unwanted conflict is to have a chance of being avoided'.³⁶ Significantly, Sharp notes the term diplomacy is applicable to *groups*, not necessarily states but nascent actors such as NGOs or MNCs who have an equal interest in a stable IR system. He continues that diplomacy 'is not a process of discovering and affirming what are mistakenly taken to be fixed and objective truths about the nature of diplomacy'.³⁷ Thus, the Innovators suggest that when we attempt to define diplomacy, it must not be from a repetitive angle but from an innovative angle, which challenges the fixed and subjective notion that diplomatic theory can only be statist or anti-statist. What Sharp suggests is that traditional diplomacy must be considered in relation to 'the transformed environment of actors, issues, and modes of communication within which diplomats function; and yet, demonstrate the continuing centrality of conventional diplomats to most of what happens in contemporary diplomacy'.³⁸ This approach to theorising on diplomacy stresses the ongoing importance of the role of traditional diplomacy in *relation* to nascent diplomacy.

Cooper also adopts this dual focus. In 1997, he wrote on the need for a balanced approach to theorising on diplomacy, combining the merits of both statist and non-statist

³⁵ *ibid.*, p. 858.

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ *ibid.*, p. 860.

³⁸ Sharp, *For Diplomacy*, p. 47.

observations. Without specifically identifying the Traditionalist and NDT approaches, he writes that:

these tendencies [in the literature] point to a fundamental duality about the intensity of contemporary diplomacy. On the one hand a greater salience is accorded to an extant base of expertise and administrative capacity. On the other, there appears to be at least some room for a less emotionally detached form of diplomacy that cuts across traditional cleavages in the international system.³⁹

What Cooper is suggesting here is the presence of two possible areas of analysis relating to contemporary diplomacy: the extant base of the Traditionalists, juxtaposed with that distinct form of diplomacy espoused by the Nascent theorists. To understand diplomacy requires an examination of both areas.

Of the Traditionalist form of diplomacy Cooper writes that:

the expanding scope, intensity and form of diplomacy in the globalised and interdependent context of the 1980s and 1990s has not meant that diplomacy and diplomats are any less important. On the contrary, diplomacy appears to have risen in importance precisely because of this added complexity.⁴⁰

For Cooper, a continuous appreciation of TDT is necessary, alongside an approach which centers ‘on the range of diplomatic activity, related to the widening set of actors and agenda of international politics’.⁴¹ In other words, IDT promotes understanding of both traditional and nascent diplomatic actors, their agendas, techniques and relationship.

³⁹ Cooper, *Beyond Representation*, pp. 176 – 177.

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, p. 175.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, p. 177.

Hocking would agree with Cooper.⁴² He has been the fiercest critic of the conflicting state versus non-state arguments, which cloud diplomacy studies. Diplomacy, he writes, ‘has become an icon for the advocates of two competing perspectives on international politics, the state-centric and world society views...and their preoccupation with newness and decline’.⁴³ For Hocking, this ‘confused and unfocussed’ dialogue has resulted in the two lines of divergent argument.⁴⁴ The first championing the role of the traditional diplomatic institution, the other focusing on the emergence and efficacy of non-state actors.

Hocking highlights the constraints this adversarial relationship has imposed upon ‘understandings of diplomacy’.⁴⁵ He argues that understanding modern diplomacy ‘requires that it be extracted from this long standing dialogue of the deaf and the role of diplomats be evaluated outside the constraints which it has imposed’.⁴⁶ Hocking is unforgiving, noting the theoretical ‘failure of diplomacy, unlike war, to stir the passions’ of the IR field.⁴⁷ This apathy he blames on the ‘terminological confusion’ surrounding diplomacy and to the ‘deficiencies of the literature’ relating to diplomacy.⁴⁸

Arguing for a ‘different perspective on the standard debates’, Hocking’s innovative evaluation concerns the introduction of the term ‘catalytic diplomacy’.⁴⁹

⁴² The two authors wrote a combined piece which, at its inception, discusses explicitly the notion of adversity (between state and non-state perspectives) in diplomacy studies. See A. F. Cooper and Brian Hocking. (2000). Governments, Non-governmental Organisations and the Re-calibration of Diplomacy. *Global Society*, 14 (3), 361 – 376.

⁴³ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 22.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, p. 23.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*, p. 21.

⁴⁶ *ibid.*

⁴⁷ *ibid.*, p. 22.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*

⁴⁹ Hocking’s catalytic diplomacy is derived from Lind’s suggestion that the traditional, Westphalian state is being replaced by a new type of state (the catalytic state) as a result of the rapidly changing post-Cold War IR system. The catalytic state, according to Lind, is better able to cope with new twenty first century, global challenges. Lind defines the catalytic state as ‘one that seeks its goals less by relying on its own

‘Catalytic diplomacy’, he claims, transcends ‘the newness and decline’ arguments.⁵⁰ Catalytic diplomacy overcomes the adversarial theoretical relationship by focusing on the ‘growing significance of points of linkage’ between traditional and nascent diplomatic actors, rather than ‘the distinctiveness between official and unofficial diplomacy’.⁵¹ He suggests that there is a ‘growing symbiosis between the activities of state and non-state representative, in which the foreign policy community engages in pursuit’ of common objectives.⁵²

Rather than suggesting that we view diplomacy in a ‘binary either/or’ sense promoting the state over nascent diplomatic actors, or vice versa, Hocking instead stresses the need to ‘identify the adaptive processes which have characterised the evolution of diplomacy’.⁵³ Hocking employs the relationship between traditional and nascent diplomatic actors as an example of adaptive diplomacy, noting that ‘just as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) need access to governments and other agencies, so governments increasingly need the information and expertise (and often the legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens) that NGOs are able to afford them’.⁵⁴

Such collaboration between traditional and nascent diplomatic actors does not reduce the role of the diplomat as the traditional vulgate of diplomacy. Nor does it, in Hocking’s opinion, suggest that the role of ‘the diplomat and that of representative of an NGO or other actor is substitutable. Just the opposite: it is the peculiar qualities that

resources than by acting as a dominant element in a coalition of other states, transnational institutions and private sector groups, while retaining its distinct identity and its own goals’ (1992:3) See M. Lind. (1992). *The Catalytic State. The National Interest*, 27, pp. 3 - 12 . The term is also used in a more normative sense in D. Osborne and T. Gaebler. (1993) *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector*. New York: Plume.

⁵⁰ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 21.

⁵¹ *ibid.*, p. 31.

⁵² *ibid.*

⁵³ Hocking, *The ends(s) of diplomacy*, p. 171.

⁵⁴ *ibid.*

define these roles'.⁵⁵ For Hocking, state and non-state actors perform different but complementary roles in the modern diplomatic environment. Between these two types of actors there is no hostility, only symbiosis.

Like Sharp and Cooper, Hocking is suggesting a theoretical interpretation of diplomacy from *both* the traditional and nascent angle. Within such an equally weighted, bi-polar discussion an original, innovative and accurate diplomatic theory can be found, alongside meaningful and accurate scholarship. Hocking notes that the 'meshing of what has been defined as official and unofficial diplomacy is of interest and significance' to diplomacy studies.⁵⁶ A suggestion that the relationship between traditional and nascent diplomacy will inform modern diplomatic theory is evident, rather than a focus on the virtues, features and characteristics of one type of theory over the other.

Lee and Hudson develop the need for this theoretical 'meshing' further. They agreed that the categorisation of diplomatic theorists, or 'pigeonholing' as she preferred, was a positive direction for diplomacy studies.⁵⁷ Lee and Hudson are more explicit than the other Innovators in that they identify the existence of the traditionalists in the field, whom they considers as perpetuating 'rationalist thinking'⁵⁸ and a 'statist approach underpinning the conceptualisation' of 'orthodox diplomacy studies'.⁵⁹ Although Lee and Hudson do not explicitly label different types of theorists, they are the closest Innovators to subscribe to the notion of conceptualising different types of theorists within the diplomacy studies field.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, p. 172.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*

⁵⁷ correspondence, July 25th, 2005.

⁵⁸ 'For evidence of the rationalist ontological heritage in the theory of diplomacy' Lee asks us to consider Berridge, G. R. (2001). *Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissenger*. London: Palgrave. This work 'clearly defines the canon of theory of diplomacy' (2004: 352). She advises a similar perusal of P. G. Lauren. (1979). *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy*. New York: Free Press.

⁵⁹ Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 352.

Describing the presence of the traditionalists - whom they refer to as the ‘mentors of the theory of diplomacy’⁶⁰ - Lee and Hudson are less than complimentary: while ‘orthodox diplomatic studies might usefully explain traditional interstate high politics in bilateral and multilateral settings, it fails to identify, explain and understand the many changes to diplomatic systems’.⁶¹ The two authors add that these ‘hegemonic interpretations serve to impose a contrived understanding of diplomacy’.⁶² Traditionalists, Lee and Hudson imply, ‘sustain a particular picture of diplomacy – “where diplomatic theory is the constitutional theory of a state-system”⁶³ – that renders much of what goes under the mantle of world affairs invisible and fails to provide a full account of diplomatic practices’.⁶⁴

Lee and Hudson are concerned with the dominance of the TDT in the diplomatic studies field and the ‘analytical obstacles this perpetuity poses for understanding and explaining significant but neglected areas of study’.⁶⁵ One neglected area of study that they identify is the ‘recognition of the widening content of diplomacy and also the emergence of non-state actors as diplomatic agents’.⁶⁶ For Lee and Hudson, recognising the benefit of moderate NDT alongside moderate TDT is a positive direction for diplomacy studies. By adopting this approach ‘we can reveal that diplomacy is multifaceted and much more inclusive than the orthodox literature on diplomacy

⁶⁰ Lee and Hudson cite de Callieres, Kissenger, Nicolson, Richelieu and Wicquefort as mentors (p. 355).

⁶¹ Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 344.

⁶² *ibid.*, p. 345.

⁶³ Lee and Hudson acknowledge this quote is originally from M. A. Keens-Soper, ‘Callieres’ in G. R. Berridge, M. A. Keens-Soper T. G. and Otte. (2001). *Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissenger*. London: Palgrave, p. 101.

⁶⁴ Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, p. 354.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*, p. 353.

suggests'.⁶⁷ 'These other sources' – analysing the content of nascent diplomacy - 'are also significant to the study of world affairs, rather than just one particularly narrow definition of diplomacy'.⁶⁸ Despite the recognition that focus on nascent diplomatic actors would be rewarding, Lee and Hudson note that 'the literature on these new areas of diplomacy has not found its way into the mainstream of diplomatic studies'.⁶⁹ Lee and Hudson, like the other the Innovators, are suggesting diplomacy studies incorporate a dual focus, with diplomatic theory reflective of both traditional and nascent diplomacy.

The equilibrium the Innovators suggest, alongside their mitigating theoretical presence, is the central value of their contribution to the diplomatic studies field. In addition, they raise awareness of the importance of nascent forms of diplomacy, recognising the importance of the contribution of moderate Nascent theorists. They also confirm the importance of the moderate, dynamic traditionalist contribution to diplomatic theory, without abandoning the state, as do aggressive Nascent theorists. The value of the traditionalists, alongside that of the Nascent theorists, must be incorporated if we are to reconstruct diplomatic theory. The ability of the Innovators to transcend both factions of theorists and thus enrich diplomatic theory is evident in the following section.

⁶⁷ *ibid.*, p. 357.

⁶⁸ *ibid.*, p. 351.

⁶⁹ *ibid.*, p. 353.

4.4 Specific examples of Innovative diplomatic theory

In order to illustrate the differences between the three types of diplomatic theory, the respective opinions of the Innovators on six modern themes are now introduced. These themes all concern the impact of changes and challenges upon the traditional diplomatic institution, and are employed to highlight points of divergence among the three factions of theorists. As the Innovators' opinion exists in relation to TDT and NDT, both these theories are consistently encountered in the following six sections.

4.4.1 The ambiguity of declining state arguments

Innovators do not have a general opinion on whether or not the state and the traditional diplomatic institution are in 'crisis' or 'decline'. Instead, they argue that the debate over state crisis or relevancy is dangerous for the diplomatic studies field as it encourages competition between theorists, which equates to inaccuracy. Therefore, the Innovators avoid entering the debate over state (ir)relevancy, except to highlight its futility.

The Innovators refer to this debate as an 'injurious fixation' that exclusive Traditionalists or orthodox Nascent theorists have; one that damages the theoretical productivity of the diplomacy studies field.⁷⁰ The presence of the state/non-state debate in diplomacy studies has only served to 'generate a largely sterile discussion rooted in two competing perspectives on international relations and diplomacy': newness and decline (of the traditional diplomatic institution and its diplomatic method).⁷¹ If we are to

⁷⁰ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 21.

⁷¹ *ibid.*

understand modern diplomacy, the Innovators claim, we must first distance ourselves from such state *versus* non-state rhetoric.

Where diplomacy studies are concerned, the debate is between exclusive Traditionalists and orthodox Nascent theorists, who both have very different opinions on the future of the state and its traditional diplomatic institution. The Innovators argue that the polarisation (state-centrism *versus* non-statism; newness or decline; either/or postulations) is conducive to an adversarial or ‘antagonistic relationship’ between diplomatic theorists, which is in danger of cleaving the field in two.⁷² The Innovators agree that both factions of theorist do present convincing argument. However, they continually remind us of a limitation: each faction is determined to impose their opinion at the expense of the other. Consequently, the Innovators highlight that both arguments miss the point: other than a theoretical disagreement there is no practical reason to suggest the relationship between state and non-state is adversarial.

The Innovators advise a redirection of focus for the diplomatic studies field, one that is founded on the premise that there is a symbiotic relationship between state and non-state actors and environments.⁷³ The Innovators argue that the rise of non-traditional actors can be analysed as an environmental change that states and diplomacy, which evolve very slowly, are reluctant to embrace but are being forced to do so. The Innovators stress that the relationship between traditional and nascent forms of diplomacy is not adversarial but complementary. The physical/practical relationship between state and non-state may have been adversarial in the past but in the contemporary sense is

⁷² Jackson, Martin Wight’s Thought on diplomacy, p. 22

⁷³ Hocking, Catalytic Diplomacy, pp. 21 – 22.

certainly not. IDT presented in the following more specific sections demonstrates their belief in a symbiosis between state and non-state actors and environments.

4.4.2 The impact of IGOs on traditional diplomacy

Innovators stress a symbiosis between traditional state actors and IGOs. Where IGOs are concerned, the Innovators dismiss both TDT and NDT. The opinion of the Innovators on both these lines of divergent argument is presented here, which illustrates the typical IDT perspective on the impact of IGOs on the modern diplomatic environment.

According to the Innovators, IGOs cannot be considered as independent diplomatic actors. The Innovators acknowledge that IGOs⁷⁴ have designs on diplomacy but by conventional standards are not fully-fledged diplomatic actors, because they are not recognised as such by states (the most dominant diplomatic actor). This undiplomatic nature of IGOs is further compounded by their lack of ultimate participation in the decision-making process. Although IGOs can influence prenegotiation and voting, they cannot vote. The Innovators remind us that ‘they [IGOs] cannot make binding commitments that involve national resources, or require national legislation, or take treaty form, without the authorisation of sovereign states’.⁷⁵ Until they achieve this status, IGOs cannot be considered as independent diplomatic actors.

⁷⁴ The United Nations does maintain external offices in selected places. Compared to other IGOs the UN has the largest network, but they are dissimilar to embassies or traditional diplomatic institutions. In sixty-eight cities worldwide the UN maintains ‘information centres’ and ‘offices’, but by conventional/traditional standards cannot be described as diplomatic. For a discussion on the differences (between IGO networks and traditional diplomatic networks) see, Michael Bruter. (1999). Diplomacy without a state: the external delegations of the European Commission. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6 (2), p. 185. or visit the European Commission’s home page at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/delegations, accessed 8th August, 2005.

⁷⁵ Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*, p. 209.

According to the Innovators, a second more obvious disqualifying factor is that IGOs are, after all, *inter-governmental* organisations. As Kaufmann writes of the UN, ‘it can almost certainly be concluded that the UN must still be treated as an organisation of states’.⁷⁶ The Innovators are not endorsing the Traditionalist assumption that IGOs are built by states for states, but do acknowledge their heavy state membership.

Where the new diplomacy of IGOs is concerned, the Innovators stress that new diplomacy is a process, not an institutionalised form of diplomacy. For the Innovators, this distinction is important. In years to come, IGOs may develop a coherent and self-determined foreign policy, a separate institution, be independently funded, and so on, but until then it is unrealistic to assume that IGOs are independent diplomatic actors.

Furthermore, the Innovators highlight that states and traditional diplomats are not ambivalent to this alternate process; if the means suits their ends then they will embrace quicker, more effective avenues of multi-lateral diplomacy. IGOs allow state representatives ‘to handle far more complex issues in less time than the rather fruitless debates took up in past meetings’.⁷⁷ For the Innovators, this form of new diplomacy is not locked in competition for relevance and efficacy over traditional diplomacy. The Innovators suggest that traditional and new forms of diplomacy are complementary.

The Innovators offer a similar caveat for the more extreme ‘alternate world’ scenario suggested by some Nascent theorists. If anything, they claim this type of NDT increases TDT opposition, who will interpret such rhetoric as ‘wild-eyed idealism run amuck’.⁷⁸ For the Innovators, there are no alternate worlds (figuratively or physically) only one world where states and IGOs cooperate and coexist in an amicable fashion.

⁷⁶ Kaufmann, *The Diplomacy of International Relations*, p. 145.

⁷⁷ Cooper, English and Thakur, *Enhancing Global Governance*, p. 12.

⁷⁸ Weiss, Forsythe and Coate, *The United Nations*, p. xxvii.

IGOs and their Nascent theoretical supporters often fall foul of promoting their agenda, and revolutionary multilateral structure and ethos as a panacea to the globe's ills. According to the Innovators, such NDT opinion is a statement of how IGOs ought to be, rather than a practical appraisal of how they are. Indeed, NDT often overlooks the ineffectiveness of IGOs, preferring to endorse the positive features of their presence. The Innovators remind us that IGOs can be ineffective, under funded and corrupt.⁷⁹

For the Innovators, this sort of Nascent rhetoric confirms that the desire to defend respective theoretical opinion equates to an inaccurate understanding of diplomacy and IGOs. Furthermore, NDT also demonstrates how the theory *on* diplomacy is distanced from the practice *of* diplomacy. Such idealistic opinion is fodder for the Traditionalists, according to the Innovators.

However, the Innovators warn that no matter how accurate the Traditionalist interpretation of IGOs is, this triumph must not be used to dismiss IGOs as mere frameworks or forums for states to engage. While the idealistic notions of the Nascent theorists are problematic, so to is the parochialism of the Traditionalists view of IGOs, in particular their reluctance to acknowledge that alternate actors *may* influence the multilateral forum. The Innovators claim that it is unrealistic for Traditionalists to maintain that states are the only significant actors at IGOs; TDT would be more accurate if unconventional actors such as NGOs, and the obvious lobbying and prenegotiation role they play, were acknowledged as significant influences to traditional diplomacy's place within the IGO environment.

⁷⁹ For a UN case-specific discussion see, Jacques Fomerand. (2000). The United Nations and Its Limits. *Seton Hall Journal of International Relations*. Summer/Fall, 51 – 59; Frank Vogl. (2004) The UN Convention Against Corruption. *UN Chronicle*, (3), 15 – 18; 'Corruption Charges Threaten Valuable UN Role in Iraq. USA Today, 4/5/2004.

The Innovators argue that the fallibility of both the Traditionalists and the Nascent theorists (moreso) is evident in the diplomatic literature, which results in skewed or polarised diplomatic theory in IGOs. The need for a balanced interpretation between Traditionalists and Nascent theorists is required if an accurate theory on the relationship between states, IGOs and diplomacy is to be advanced. TDT and NDT literature ignores this obvious practical confluence.

For the Innovators, recognising the respective focus of states and IGOs in turn suggests a symbiotic relationship between the two. For example, in the contemporary IR system it is evident that global problems, such as environmentalism, mass migration and poverty, cannot be dealt with as effectively through traditional bilateral diplomacy. Three Innovators, Cooper, English and Thakur, note of the global agenda, ‘the general issue here is that individual countries, however big and powerful, can no longer handle such problems themselves or in small groups but that these have to be tackled by the international community as a whole’.⁸⁰ Therefore states, conscious of this unconventional, lower agenda, encourage the growth of IGOs, who, when consensus exists, can be more effective at solving global problems. The Innovators claim that despite the problems inherent to IGOs, such as complexity, universal membership and public transparency, states do value multilateral fora over the inherent difficulty of reaching consensus bi-laterally.

At the same time, the Innovators note that IGOs do not have the ability to resolve traditional problems. The UN, for example, is ill equipped to deal with the tensions that were released with the end of the Cold War. The UN is unable to cope with nationalist rivalries, movements of religious fanaticism, unsolved territorial disputes, ancient

⁸⁰ Cooper, English and Thakur, *Enhancing Global Governance*, p.32.

prejudices and rancours, and the sense of exclusion and discrimination affecting underdeveloped countries.⁸¹ The ineptitude of the IGO in traditional political-military matters, or a high political agenda, could thus be interpreted as a failure.

For the Innovators, the relationship between states and IGOs becomes productive when there is a confluence of interests. In the modern era, this mutual reciprocity occurs commonly where the lower, global agenda is concerned. However, in terms of traditional politics, IGOs will continue to have little impact. Schuller and Grant frame this dichotomy explicitly, noting two scenarios '1) unilateralism in seeking the success of goals defined primarily with the domestic political system; and 2) multilateralism in seeking mutual understanding among the broader international political system'.⁸² However, the Innovators suggest that an acknowledgement of the respective specialisation of both states and IGOs (the former able to address the high agenda and the latter, through multilateralism, able to address the lower agenda) is viable.

The opinion of one IDT illustrates how viable they consider the relationship between traditional diplomacy and multilateral IGO diplomacy. Melissen stresses that both the state and the IGO are the ultimate beneficiary of multilateral diplomacy. He argues that:

Much diplomacy is of an experimental nature and innovations in diplomatic practices are so by definition. Many of the now accepted diplomatic methods first emerged as ad hoc devices. They only became more widespread or institutionalised when they appeared to fill a void or meet the demands of changing circumstances better than existing methods. Summitry and

⁸¹ Abba Eban. (1998). *Diplomacy for The Next Century*. US: Yale University Press, p. 121.

⁸² Frank C. Schuller and Thomas D. Grant. (2003). Executive Diplomacy: multilateralism, unilateralism and managing American power. *International Affairs*, 79 (1), pp. 44 - 45.

multilateral diplomacy are probably among the best examples of the insitutionalisation of modes of international dialogue that were preciously ad hoc.⁸³

According to the Innovators then, the ad-hoc IGO became a permanent feature of the modern diplomatic environment because it filled a niche that states believed needed addressing. The state/IGO relationship is thus a symbiotic one, and of benefit to both. Diplomatic theory, according to the Innovators, should acknowledge this obvious confluence of interests, diplomatic techniques and symbiosis between state and IGO.

4.4.3 Research wanted: diplomacy by summit

Where the efficacy of summit diplomacy is concerned, the Innovators again adopt a balanced, moderate opinion. For the Innovators, it is important to consolidate the benefits of summitry whilst acknowledging its limitations. They also seek to reconcile divergent views on summitry. The Innovators are critical of these divergent opinions Traditionalists and Nascent theorists have of diplomacy by summit. For the Innovators, the conflicting views of both the Traditionalists and Nascent theorists means the value of summitry remains undecided: ‘as always, one can see the summit cup as half full or half empty’.⁸⁴

For the Innovators, that we still cannot theoretically agree on the value of summitry to diplomacy is indicative of several ailments with diplomatic theory. The culprits, according to the innovators, are parochial theorists, in particular Nascent theorists and Traditionalists. Maintaining a non-state focus, Nascent theorists interpret the

⁸³ Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p. xxi.

⁸⁴ Kaufmann, *The Diplomacy of International Relations*, p. 62.

summit as serving no purpose. They propose that non-state actors could achieve a better result, at less cost and in less time. Nascent theorists portray an exclusive ‘club’ image of summits, with non-state actors begging for scraps from the summit table. This is untrue, according to the Innovators,⁸⁵ and illustrative of the inaccuracy one skewed opinion can bestow upon an accurate theoretical interpretation of diplomacy at the summit.

On the other hand, Traditionalists advocate several benefits to the summit process, particularly the positive or negative impact summits can have in stalled negotiations. However, Traditionalists are critical of ‘amateurs’ infringing upon carefully crafted diplomatic relationships. The Innovators argue that such criticism confirms the parochial focus of the Traditionalists, who are keen to interpret diplomacy in purely traditional terms, that is, the diplomat and the diplomatic institution as the only diplomatic actors of importance. For the Innovators, Traditional opinion fails to recognise that summits involve much more asymmetric diplomacy, between not only heads of state or diplomats, but also significant non-state actors, and individuals from academia, business and industry.

For the Innovators, these shallow observations on diplomacy by summit polarises opinion and leaves the diplomatic studies field confused as to the relationship between summitry and diplomacy. With both Traditionalists and Nascent theorists endorsing their divergent interpretations of summitry, they inhabit opposite poles in the diplomatic studies field, which ultimately leads to a split diplomatic theory. For the Innovators, both the Traditionalists and the Nascent theorists present an overly simplistic portrayal of

⁸⁵ For a sound example of balanced, Innovative Diplomatic Theory on summit diplomacy see Jan Melissen. (2003) Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age. *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, pp. 1 – 21; David Dunn (ed.). (1996). *Diplomacy at the Highest Level: The Evolution of International Summitry*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 247 – 269.

summitry, where two or more heads of state meet for a casual and expensive ‘fireside chat’. The Innovators remind us that summitry (in the practical sense) is anything but simple, an exclusive state exercise or a meaningless gathering.⁸⁶

The example of the Copenhagen Social Summit of 1995 illustrates the diffuse nature of contemporary summits, where many actors – state and non-state - staked a claim to the process. At the Summit:

187 governments sent a total of 5,741 accredited delegates. Their activities were monitored, lobbied and criticized by 2,315 accredited representatives of non-governmental organizations, 2,863 media personnel, 405 United Nations Staff and a parallel private NGO forum of about 10,000 representing 2,000 activists groups.⁸⁷

Not only do these figures demonstrate the non-state interest and influence at summit conferences but they also illustrate how the 5,741 official representatives were overshadowed by almost 16,000 non-state representatives. Although these non-state representatives did not directly participate in official meetings and negotiations (reserved for accredited state representatives) their presence was noticeable.

As the quote indicates a non-state forum was held three days before the official summit. The major recommendations to emerge were presented to the official, state representatives. These recommendations were welcomed by state representatives as the Copenhagen Summit’s purpose was to tackle ‘social development and human well being

⁸⁶ This is not to argue all summits are a raging success, as the WTO summit in Cancun demonstrated. However, the success of a summit should not be judged on measurable outcomes, on fixed results. The exercise of getting negotiating parties round the table should be judged a success. The opportunity for all parties to state publicly their position on an agenda, although increasing complexity of negotiations, allows all actors a say. Communication, negotiation and representation are, after all the foundations of any form of diplomacy.

⁸⁷ Holsti, *Taming the Sovereigns*, p. 193.

for all and to give these goals the highest priority both now and into the 21st century.’⁸⁸ With such a non-traditional and unfamiliar agenda the NGO expertise and opinion was tolerated, accepted and incorporated into the final Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social Development.⁸⁹ An indication of ‘official’ appreciation towards NGOs was the recommendation that their ‘accreditation and participation be increased should another such meeting be convened’.⁹⁰ Five years later a second meeting was convened, in Geneva. The number of accredited NGO representatives increased from 2,315 in Copenhagen to 3,497 in Geneva.⁹¹ Some of those NGO representatives without official accreditation were invited to form part of the specialised state delegations. These delegations were directly involved in much of the Geneva Social Summit, whose mission statement gives an idea of the enhanced respect for non-state participation:

To realise the Summit’s goals it is imperative to open the debate to a much wider range of actors. The Forum will be a unique opportunity for NGOs, parliaments, trade unions, business and industry, professional associations, academics, governmental and intergovernmental representatives, civil society groups and the media, to join in the debate on social development. In a dynamic meeting with roundtable discussions, debates, lectures, exhibitions and multimedia presentations, all the participants in Geneva 2000 will come

⁸⁸ <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/wssd/agreements/index.html>, retrieved 9th July, 2006.

⁸⁹ Central to the Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social Development were five elements: An Enabling Environment for Social Development, Eradication of Poverty, Expansion of Productive Employment and Reduction of Unemployment, Social Integration and measurable Implementation and Follow-up. For an expansion of these themes visit

⁹⁰ See, Note by Secretariat. (1995). Accreditation of non-governmental organizations in accordance with the rules for their participation set out on Preparatory Committee decision 2. Available at <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/037/33/IMG/N9503733.pdf?OpenElement>, retrieved 9th July, 2006.

⁹¹ <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/geneva2000/> retrieved 9th July, 2006.

together to share experiences, identify examples of good practice, discuss obstacles and how to overcome them.⁹²

From the above quote it is evident that the relationship between states and non-state actors has become more diffuse. Indeed the 1995 Copenhagen summit paved the way for more NGO participation and accreditation in ‘official summits’.⁹³ As of 2006, it is clear that NGOs participate vitally in the international system. They contribute valuable information and ideas, advocate effectively for positive change, provide essential operational capacity in emergencies and development efforts, and generally increase the accountability and legitimacy of the global governance process, of which states are a part.

Although these are but two gatherings, an extrapolation is applicable to most large summits. The Innovators use such practical evidence to confirm that the relationship between state and non-state actors is not conflictual but complementary, with the summit environment ensuring an amicable atmosphere prevails. By relying on such empirical evidence, which confirms the symbiotic relationship between state and non-state, the Innovators find it difficult to understand why both the Traditionalists and Nascent theorists continue to endorse theories that are distanced from summit reality.

For the Innovators, rather than enforce divergent opinion, balance is needed alongside an admission that ‘summits do work, but not with predictable efficiency’.⁹⁴ During the twentieth century, summitry has changed from sporadic to regular meetings, although theoretical perceptions have not changed, according to the Innovators. Melissen

⁹² *ibid.*

⁹³ For several examples of growing NGO state partnership and increasing [NGO] accreditation see Appendix A., State/NGO Symbiosis.

⁹⁴ Group of Thirty. (1991). *The Summit Process and Collective Security: Future Responsibility Sharing*. Washington: Group of Thirty, p. 8.

describes this summit evolution adroitly, suggesting ‘the world in which summitry takes place is no longer bilateral or multilateral, but is increasingly polylateral,’ suggesting a move towards international society involving a great variety of governmental and nongovernmental actors.⁹⁵ For the Innovators, research geared towards a more accurate theoretical understanding of summit diplomacy is needed.

4.4.4 The symbiotic relationship between states and NGOs

Where NGOs and the traditional diplomatic institution are concerned, the Innovators are particularly keen to stress the symbiotic relationship. The Innovators achieve this by firstly tackling common theoretical misperceptions of NGOs, and secondly, by relying heavily on practical evidence to validate their state/NGO symbiosis claims.⁹⁶

Firstly, the Innovators challenge the notion that the rise of NGOs has taken the state completely by surprise. The end of the Cold War (1989) is often cited as the year signaling the massive proliferation of NGOs. The Innovators argue that while it is undeniable this period has seen an unprecedented growth in NGOs, it is not unique in the history of the IR system.⁹⁷ To accurately understand the modern relationship between

⁹⁵ Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p. 8.

⁹⁶ For a balanced, innovative approach to theorising on the relationship between the state and NGOs, see Thomas G. Gordenker and Leon Weiss. ‘Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions’, in Thomas G. Gordenker and Leon Weiss (eds). (1996). *NGOs, the UN & Global Governance*. Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, pp. 17 –51; Bosire Maragia. (2002) Almost There: Another Way of Conceptualizing and Explaining NGOs quest for Legitimacy in Global Politics. *Non-State Actors and International Law*, 2, 301 – 332.

⁹⁷ NGOs have been part of the IR system for over one hundred and fifty years. The founding of two major NGOs can be traced to the nineteenth century: the International Red Cross (in 1863) and the International Olympic Committee (in 1896). In 1874, there were thirty-two registered international NGOs; by 1914, this number had increased to 1083. These early NGOs are small in comparison to today’s tens of thousands of NGOs, however a rise in quantity does not suggest a revolution. For a historical perspective on the emergence of NGOs, see Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldar (eds.). (2001). *Global Civil*

state and NGO, an evolutionary approach is more appropriate than the dramatic revolutionary one.

Secondly, the Innovators argue that the general sanctimonious portrayal of NGOs must be abandoned. For them, it is misguided to broadly herald *all* NGOs as a panacea to *all* international problems; ‘in focusing on NGOs as if they had a common role and common characteristic, we may conceal the failure of many to measure up to the ideal’.⁹⁸ The Innovators remind us that some NGOs are ineffective, corrupt or utterly useless, but they do not cease to be NGOs. A portrayal of NGOs as saviors or messianic challengers to the morally corrupt state is not one the Innovators are keen to endorse. To them, the presence of some NGOs can do more harm than good. The anti-governmental NGOs, for example, only entrench our theoretical perception of an adversarial relationship. A practical comment helps validate this notion; Marcie Friedman of the American Red Cross (ARC) commented:

wing-nut crazy NGOs that stir up trouble are more of a help than a hindrance to promoting civil society, and a common state/NGO agenda. Wise NGOs help the government, whilst helping themselves.⁹⁹

For the Innovators, a further misrepresentation in the diplomatic studies literature is the notion that NGOs are more efficient than the state in achieving a low political agenda, which erodes state legitimacy and purpose. For the Innovators, this type of

Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press; Iriye, Akira. (1999). A Century of NGOs. *Diplomatic History*, 23 (3), 421 – 435; David Reiff. (1999). Civil Society and the Future of the Nation State: The False Dawn of Civil Society. *Nation*, 268 (7), 11 – 16.

⁹⁸ Pearce in Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 367.

⁹⁹ Marcie Friedman, interview, March 10th, 2005.

rhetoric is nonsense. They remind us that, practically, NGOs *are* more effective in aid distribution or humanitarian relief for example. The Innovators stress that NGO specialisation is not contested but welcomed by the incumbent state. One IDT, Cooper, refers to this function as a ‘sub-contracting/facilitative role that supports the work of government’.¹⁰⁰ If anything, the state welcomes the opportunity to outsource unconventional problems to organisations geared entirely towards a single issue. Governments are utilising such specialisation and have found it ‘useful to include NGOs in their delegations as advisors’ in order to harbour their vast practical expertise, which for the Innovators is further evidence of an ‘ever thickening texture in international diplomacy’.¹⁰¹

The Innovators contend that NGOs are more specialised than governments in individual areas, which does not necessarily suggest a legitimacy crisis for the state. Instead, NGO participation allows states to concentrate on the high traditional agenda they evolved to represent. The Innovators stress that NGOs also have a useful function as a ‘kick-starter’; that is, they often have a catalytic function where ‘proactive behaviour on the part of the NGOs helps frame the agenda for action by the government’.¹⁰² Therefore, the presence of NGOs illustrates the useful purpose they provide to the modern diplomatic environment where low political issues are just as important as high political issues. The Innovators agree that NGOs are able to act on the former, states on the latter.

For the Innovators, this specialisation of focus has led to a symbiotic relationship between the incumbent state and NGO in the diplomatic arena. NGOs are a welcome addition to state apparatus, as they differ markedly in terms of their agenda, methods

¹⁰⁰ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 372.

¹⁰¹ Langhorne, *Current Developments in Diplomacy*, p. 13.

¹⁰² Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 370.

employed and guiding principles. However, the Innovators argue that because the methods, standards and norms of NGOs and states differ does not mean their relationship has to be conflictual. In areas where there is a ‘clear mutuality of interest’, there exists strong cooperation between governments and NGOs.¹⁰³ The Innovators reel out several practical examples to validate the symbiotic relationship.¹⁰⁴ A few of the more common examples within the IDT literature, used to illustrate cooperation between states and NGOs, are the Ottawa Process,¹⁰⁵ the class action suits of the Swiss Nazi Gold¹⁰⁶ and the Kimberley Process.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ *ibid.*, p. 367.

¹⁰⁴ For a broad overview of state/NGO symbiosis see David Hulme and Michael Edwards. (1997). *NGOs, States and Donors: Too Close for Comfort*. New York: St Martins Press. This book establishes an analytical framework and presents overviews of key issues in the relationships between NGOs, states and donors. For a specific example of NGOs, States and military working together see Bronwyn Evans-Kent and Roland Bleiker. (2003). Peace Beyond the State? NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *International Peacekeeping*, 10 (1), 103 – 126; Oliver P. Richmond. (2003). Introduction: NGOs, Peace and Human Security. *International Peacekeeping*, 10 (1), 1 – 11.

¹⁰⁵ In December 1997, 122 countries assembled in Ottawa to sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of the Anti-Personnel mines and their Destruction. The Convention can be considered a major achievement. It is far stronger than previous attempts to address the egregious human consequences of anti-personnel mines. Beyond the Convention’s direct accomplishments, the process that brought about the treaty itself has been heralded as a model for cooperation between governments and NGOs. For more on the history, process and outcomes of the Ottawa meetings, see Nicola Short. (1999). The Role of NGOs in the Ottawa Process to Ban Landmines. *International Negotiation*, Vol. 4 Issue 3, pp. 483 - 502; John English. (1998). The Ottawa Process: Paths followed, paths ahead. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 52 (2), pp. 121 – 133.

¹⁰⁶ NGOs exerted significant influence in almost every mediation undertaken on behalf of class action suits concerning the whereabouts of dormant accounts once held by Holocaust victims. Initial negotiations focussed on stolen assets that had been deposited in Swiss banks during World War II. Later negotiations were focussed on reparations for slave and forced labour, insurance, looted art, and other confiscated Nazi property. Although the official parties in these negotiations were traditional state actors – Germany, Austria, France, the United States and the lawyers on both sides of the issues – all parties knew that no final agreement was possible without first obtaining the consent of key NGOs, such as the World Jewish Council, The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, and several German-Eastern European reconciliation commissions that had been established in Belarus, the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia and Ukraine. These NGOs, in effect, ‘were the ultimate arbiters as to whether an agreement between governments and the lawyers would be acceptable’ to those initially affected (Eizenstat, Nongovernmental Organizations, pp. 17-18). Their blessing was ‘essential for political and diplomatic negotiations. Even though they were not parties to the lawsuits, they had a formal role at the negotiating table’ (Eizenstat, Nongovernmental Organizations, p. 18). For a concise description of the process, see, John Authers, and Richard Wolffe. (2002). *The Victim’s Fortune: Inside the Epic Battle over the Debts of the Holocaust*. New York: HarperCollins.

¹⁰⁷ The Kimberley Process was designed to tackle the sale of illegal ‘conflict’ or ‘blood’ diamonds. The Kimberley Process is a sound example of where an NGO, Global Witness, acted as a catalyst to a process

For the Innovators, the development of NGOs within the modern diplomatic environment, alongside an amicable bondage with the state, has enhanced ‘the relationship between state and societal actors’.¹⁰⁸ The Innovators claim that the modern state is more representative of its constituent parts as a result, but is instilled with a sense of historical pragmatism. The presence of NGOs in the modern diplomatic environment ‘has provided another example of how existing parts of the diplomatic system can provide the means of responding to the needs of the current situation and to some degree actually shape them’.¹⁰⁹ Consequently, the Innovators suggest that NGOs are now of a permanent feature of the complex twenty-first century. Their prevalence, in turn, confirms a desire by both states and NGOs to address low as well as high political issues, and to work together in pursuit of common objectives.

For the Innovators, theoretically understanding the relationship between state and NGO is ‘not well served by assumptions that the representatives of state and non-state actors inhabit different worlds any more than an appreciation of the significance of NGOs

in which officially accredited diplomats (the British, American and the European Union Commission in particular) worked alongside journalists and De Beers, the Global Diamond firm. The purpose of this multi-stakeholder collaboration was to establish a humanitarian diamond regime instead of the brutal and cruel system that had existed previously. The Kimberley Process is designed to eliminate conflict diamonds by keeping countries with inadequate rough import and export controls from importing diamonds into the legitimate stream of commerce. When the Process went ‘live’, fifty-two countries had signed up. The Republic of Congo was the first country to experience the wrath of the Kimberley Process, when in October, 2004, it was suspended from the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). The decision was reached after a KPCS delegation visited the country and discovered that Congo was exporting far more diamonds than it produced or legally imported. Victoria Gomelsky, a spokeswoman for Global Witness, noted ‘removing the Republic of Congo is a major step to ensuring the Kimberley Process is working effectively and has teeth. This decision sets an important precedent for how to deal with countries and diamond traders that are not complying with the Kimberly Process’ (Kimberley Endorsed, p. 2). Virginia Haufler also notes that the Kimberley Process was a beneficial example of ‘a trend in which international institutions, NGOs and governments pressure foreign investors to engage in conflict-prevention initiatives’ (International diplomacy, p. 158). For more on the development and impact of the Kimberley Process, see Victoria Gomelsky. (2002). Kimberley Endorsed; NGOs Welcome Certification Scheme. *National Jeweller*, 96 (23), 1 - 3; Victoria Gomelsky. (2003). Noncompliant Countries Will No Longer Be Able to Trade Diamonds Internationally. *National Jeweller*, 97 (12), 30 - 34; E. Abloh-Odjidja. (2003). Conflict Diamonds: The Kimberley Process for Corruption. *New African*, August/September, 40 – 43.

¹⁰⁸ Cooper and Hocking, Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy, p. 363.

¹⁰⁹ Langhorne, Diplomacy Beyond the Primacy of the State, p. 8.

is best understood by assuming that their activities herald the imminent demise of the state'.¹¹⁰ The Innovators demonstrate balance combined with a stronger link to practical diplomacy, which, they argue, ultimately renders a more accurate theoretical portrayal of the amicable and symbiotic state/NGO relationship.

4.4.5 Open for business: The traditional diplomatic institution and commerce

The Innovators argue that commerce is central to diplomacy; that it always has been and always will be. Where traditional diplomacy is concerned, there should be no separation of the political and the commercial, as both are central to modern diplomacy. Dispelling this myth allows the Innovators to demonstrate, once more, the symbiosis between the traditional diplomatic institution and their trading partners, typically MNCs. The Innovators employ practical evidence in support of this assumption, which allows them to dispel another myth: that MNCs are challenging the legitimacy of the state in its central role of the creation of wealth.

The Innovators remind us that governments, for example, have restructured their diplomatic institutions to integrate (horizontally) commerce departments. Some states, for example Canada, Australia and Belgium, have merged their commerce and foreign ministries into one department.¹¹¹ Other states, such as the Britain and the Czech

¹¹⁰ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 376.

¹¹¹ Other countries with combined trade and foreign ministries include Albania (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Austria (The Austrian Foreign Ministry), Fiji (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade), Republic of Korea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Mauritius (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cooperation) and New Zealand (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade).

Republic, have created joint bodies of commerce and diplomatic ministries to coordinate and exploit commercial opportunities.¹¹²

In all of these instances, the Innovators argue that there are clear and formal government/business partnerships, incorporated in essentially diplomatic structures. In states that have not gone so far as to institutionalise commerce and diplomatic partnership, formal government/business partnerships are equally evident. The US, South Africa, Germany, Norway, Brazil, Sweden and Tunisia, for example, have introduced organisational reform, which renders them more commercial. This practical confluence – between commerce and diplomacy - is used by the Innovators to demonstrate that governments the world over are prioritising commercial diplomacy as an intrinsic part of their foreign policy objectives, equal in importance to the high political agenda. Some theorists go a step further, arguing ‘economic management and industrial policies may often be even more important for governments than conventional foreign policies as typically conceived’.¹¹³ It is clear then, that foreign and commercial policy enjoy a symbiotic existence, where one is just as important as the other. For the Innovators, an insistence on a distinct separation of commerce from diplomacy can, at best, be described as a sentimental interpretation of diplomacy.

IDT clarifies that diplomacy ‘has always been concerned with commerce. Ambassadors have traditionally been their countries’ chief commerce promotion

¹¹² Britain’s joint body is called the United Kingdom Trade and Investment (UKTI) department. The creation of UKTI forms part of the contemporary institutional reform of the FCO, with a particular emphasis on commercial diplomacy: the development of firm to government partnerships in current diplomatic practice. For more information on UKTI, visit <https://www.uktradeinvest.gov.uk/ukti>. For a theoretical slant on the origins and constitution of UKTI see Donna Lee. *The Embedded Business-Diplomat: How Institutional Reform Upholds the Role of Business in UK Diplomatic Practice*. Paper prepared for the Panel ‘Diplomacy & Business: Beyond the Hegemony of the State’, 45th Annual ISA Convention, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17 – 20, 2004.

¹¹³ Strange, Susan. (1992). States, firms and diplomacy. *International Affairs*, 68 (1), p. 2

officers'.¹¹⁴ The Innovators have difficulty understanding why other diplomatic theorists continue with the parochial separation of political and commercial diplomacy, for this argument only serves to highlight the distance their theory has from actual, real developments in diplomacy. IDT suggests we know intuitively of the historical and contemporary linkage between commerce and diplomacy. We know that commerce has always been 'embedded in diplomatic practice; diplomats have always undertaken commercial activities'.¹¹⁵ For the Innovators, not only do official government statements tell us that this is a so, but diplomats, practitioners and ambassadors also testify to the inextricable bondage between diplomacy and commerce.

The Innovators employ practical opinion to validate this testament. For example, retired Indian Ambassador Kishan Rana, states that during his career 'over fifty percent of my time was devoted to economic work'.¹¹⁶ British Ambassador to Iran Anthony Parsons also argues that much of his embassy's time was dominated by commercial work:

By the end of 1975 I had, with the approval of the Foreign Office, reorganized the Embassy staff to meet our priorities. First came export promotion in all its aspects – dealing with the flood of business visitors and commercial enquiries, helping to organize commerce promotions and commerce delegations, seeking new commercial opportunities and feeding them back into the export promotion machine back home.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Lee and Hudson, the old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 345.

¹¹⁵ For a plethora of historical examples of this occurrence see, Donna Lee and David Hudson. (2004). The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy. *Review of International Studies*, 30, pp. 349 – 350.

¹¹⁶ Kishan Rana. (2000). *Inside Diplomacy*. Manas: New Delhi, p. 117.

¹¹⁷ A. Parsons. (1984). *The Pride and the Fall: Iran, 1969 – 1982*. London: Cape, p. 37.

British Ambassador Christopher Meyer also hinted at the increasingly close relationship between the commercial and the diplomatic worlds. He wrote that:

it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between what is political in diplomacy and what is economic, and indeed, whether there is dividing line between the two which has any validity at all.¹¹⁸

By employing practical opinion, the Innovators question the relevance of the any approach that enforces a gulf between the political and the commercial. For the Innovators, TDT is affected by a historical stereotype of diplomacy and reflects how they think diplomacy ought to be conducted, rather than how it really is. This provincial attitude is hardly productive for diplomacy studies, according to the Innovators. As long as theories of diplomacy continue to divorce the political from the commercial, an accurate theory of this visible aspect of modern diplomacy will remain elusive.

The Innovators level the same tirade against arguments which suggest that revolutionary globalisation, the failure of the state to create wealth, and the growing power of MNCs question the need for the state and the traditional diplomatic institution.¹¹⁹

For the Innovators, the revolutionary globalisation argument illustrates, firstly, that theorists (whom this thesis has labeled Nascent theorists) have no sense of history.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸ Meyer in Lee and Hudson, the old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 346

¹¹⁹ For a critique of the types of works that introduce and advance these phenomenon, see Mark Beeson. (2004). Governance goes global: power, authority and order in the twenty-first century. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 58 (4), pp. 511 – 521.

¹²⁰ For an example of the fallacy of authors who suggest that globalisation is a radical departure from the past, see, Thomas W. Zeiler. (2001). Just Do It! Globalisation for Diplomatic Historians. *Diplomatic*

The Innovators remind us that ‘today’s growing integration of the world economy is not unprecedented’, as similar trends ‘occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.’¹²¹ Indeed, empirical evidence¹²² suggests that the current wave of globalisation is not that remarkable or drastic. An examination of the historical IR system illustrates that states have experienced similar *global* phenomena in the past, emerging stronger, more streamlined and more commercially potent than before. Therefore, arguing that the current phase of globalisation is a radical departure from the past and predicating the end of the state is ill founded. Despite the many economic changes that have occurred during the twentieth century, ‘neither the markets for goods and services nor those for factors of production appear much more integrated than they were a century

History, 25 (4), pp. 529 – 551; Danielle S. Petito. (2001). Sovereignty and Globalisation; Fallacies, Truth and Perception. *New York Law School Journal of Human Rights*, XVII, pp. 1139 – 1172.

¹²¹ Wolf, Will the Nation-State survive Globalisation?, p.179.

¹²² For example, see, Martin Wolf. (2001). Will the Nation-State survive Globalisation? *Foreign Affairs*, 80 (1), 178 – 190. Wolf provides statistics which suggest that ‘the proportion of world production (that is traded on global markets) is not that much higher today than it was in the years leading up to World War One. Commerce was comparably significant in 1910, when ratios of trade (merchandise exports plus imports) to GDP hit record highs in several of the advanced economies. Global commerce then collapsed during the Great Depression and World War II, but since then world trade has grown more rapidly than output. The share of global production traded worldwide grew from about 7% in 1950 to more than 20% by the mid 1990s; in consequence, trade ratios have risen in almost all of the advanced economies. In the United Kingdom, for example, exports and imports added up to 57% of GDP in 1995 compared to 44% in 1910; for France the 1995 proportion was 43% against 35% in 1910; and for Germany it was 46% against 38% in the same years. But Japan’s trade ration was actually lower in 1995 than it had been in 1910. In fact, among today’s five biggest economies, the only one in which trade has remarkably greater weight in output than it had a century ago is the United States, where the ratio has jumped from 11% in 1910 to 24% in 1995. Wolf also highlights a second informative comparison between different global epochs: ‘by the late nineteenth century many countries has already opened their capital markets to international investments, before investments, too, collapsed during the interwar period. As a share of GDP, British capital investments abroad – averaging 4.6% of GDP between 1870 and 1913 – hit levels of unparalleled in contemporary major economies. More revealing is the correlation between domestic investment and savings (a measure of the extent to which savings remain within one country) was lower between 1880 and 1910 than in any subsequent period. (pp. 179 – 180). For a similar example of historical global eras rivalling the current wave of globalisation see Andrew Coleman and Jackson Maogoto. (2003). After the Party, is there a Cure for the Hangover? The Challenges of the Global Economy to Westphalian Sovereignty. *Legal Issue of Economic Integration*, 30 (1), pp. 35 – 60. In this article the two authors trace similar ‘global’ eras from the Roman Empire to the modern ‘global’ IR system.

ago'.¹²³ For the Innovators, globalisation should be interpreted as an evolution, rather than a revolution.

In relation to the second oft-cited argument, the inability of the state to generate wealth, an equally simple IDT rebuttal illustrates the weakness of this argument. The Innovators highlight that domestic territory, including the basic factors of production (land, labour and capital), remain an important sources of wealth for a state and its inhabitants.

The argument that the global and borderless nature of financial and information markets, which escape the Spartan pockets of government treasuries, is problematic for the Innovators. They claim that states are harnessing the global market to generate wealth. A democratic government that ignored the massive pecuniary rewards of financial deregulation and economic integration would soon feel the wrath of its capitalistic public. Globalisation actually 'enhances a nation's economic well-being – indeed, experience suggests that the opening of commerce and most capital flows enriches most citizens in the short run and virtually all citizens in the long run'.¹²⁴ For the Innovators, Globalisation is of financial benefit to all concerned: states, firms, diplomacy and individuals.

The Innovators remind us that after the Second World War in order to monitor and control traditional and unconventional sources of wealth states began implementing global financial, economic and commercial systems with a view to governing and regulating the emerging global market.¹²⁵ These systems are concerned with developing

¹²³ Wolf, *Will the Nation-State survive Globalisation?*, p. 181.

¹²⁴ *ibid.*, p. 183.

¹²⁵ As the earlier footnote by Wolf suggests, unconventional forces, factors and sources of wealth are (mis)associated with the current wave of globalisation. Capital and trade flows, for example, have always

standards and ‘general regulatory principles’ that allow institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF),¹²⁶ the World Commerce Organisation (WTO)¹²⁷ or the United Nations Conference on Commerce and Development (UNCTAD)¹²⁸ to essentially manage and guide the global economy.¹²⁹ For the Innovators, it must be emphasised that these regulatory institutions are composed of networks of state agencies acting on behalf of states, not the independent multi-lateral institutions chipping away at state sovereignty and legitimacy that some theorists imagine (Nascent theorists in particular).

In short, these global regulatory institutions may be heavily influenced by state as well as MNC representatives.¹³⁰ Their introduction was a response to the decline of the

been a source of wealth for the international state. Whereas territorial acquisition was a major source of wealth during the colonial phase of the IR system, capital, trade, financial and information sources of wealth are the *de jure* source of state wealth.

¹²⁶ The IMF was established in 1945 with headquarters in Washington D.C. Membership in 2004 amounted to 184 states. Essentially the IMF monitors short-term cross-border payments and foreign exchange positions. When a country develops chronic imbalances in its external accounts, the IMF supports corrective policy reforms, often called ‘structural adjustment programmes’. Since 1978, the IMF has undertaken comprehensive surveillance both of the world-economy as a whole. The IMF also provides extensive technical assistance. In recent years the Fund has pursued various initiatives to promote efficiency and stability in global financial market. For more see www.imf.org

¹²⁷ The WTO was established in 1995 with its operation based in Geneva, Switzerland. In 2004, its membership consisted of 146 states. The WTO is a permanent institution designed to replace the provisional General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, which was established in 1947). It has a wider agenda than GATT, covering services, intellectual property, and investment issues as well as merchandise trade. The WTO also has greater powers of enforcement through its dispute-settlement mechanism. The organisations Trade Policy Review Body conducts surveillance of members commercial measure. For more information see, www.wto.org

¹²⁸ UNCTAD was established in 1964, with its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. In 2004 146 states were members. UNCTAD monitors the effects of world trade and investment on economic development, especially in the South. It provided a key forum in the 1970s for discussions on the emerging International Economic Order. For more information see, www.unctad.org

¹²⁹ Coleman and Maogoto, *After the Party*, p. 45.

¹³⁰ Perhaps the most obvious and infamous example of the omnipotence of regulatory institutions is the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. If anything the Crisis revealed the need for more, not less, global financial market regulation. What began as a recession in Thailand turned into one of the worst global economic disasters in history. The Asian ‘tiger’ states – Hong Kong, Thailand, Singapore, Republic of Korea and Malaysia – watched helplessly as a number of factors caused widespread panic and economic chaos. The contagion was caused by a number of investors and banks withdrawing their capital from the ‘tiger’ nations. Weak banks in one country called in loans from other countries, leaving economic disaster in their wake. For example, Brazil, for a time, lost reserves at a rate of USD 1 billion per day. Like a row of dominoes, one by one, nations succumbed to the contagion. By the time the worldwide crisis concluded,

territorial aspect of generating wealth and an attempt to control and/or exploit emerging forms of wealth generation, such as financial or information markets. For the Innovators, the influence of these multi-lateral state institutions in the global arena is clear. Revolutionary postulations on the nature of globalisation fail to appreciate that states control the global economy, and not vice versa. For the Innovators, states, the dominant political and economic entity of the past three hundred and fifty years, are hardly likely to engineer their own economic downfall. IDT runs contrary to the argument that states are calling ‘for freer markets without noticing this threatens their own lifeblood, that they are becoming their own gravediggers’.¹³¹ States, exposed historically to similar *globalisations*, are demonstrating the ability not only to generate wealth through a number of markets but also the desire to control, govern and regulate such markets through international institutions.

Finally, the non-statist theorist’s third obsession, that firms are becoming more like states and developing political and diplomatic tools, is a broad argument that is problematic for the Innovators. This development would suggest that ultimately, firms become so similar to states that they negate the need for states and traditional diplomacy. For the Innovators, this is unlikely to happen. According to the Innovators, a clear distinction can be drawn between the fundamental purpose of a firm and that of a state: firms serve their shareholders, whereas governments serve their domestic populations,

the currencies of such disparate nations as Canada, Chile and Australia had plummeted. For a brief and concise account of how the crisis unfolded, see Robert Gilpin. (2003). A Postscript to the Asian Financial Crisis: The Fragile International Economic Order. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 16 (1), 79 – 89; Sharon L. Bush. (2005). The Asian Financial Crisis: Regional Capitulation or Re-direction? *Journal of Third World Studies*, 22 (1), 253 – 260; Stephan Haggard. (2001). Politics, Institutions and Globalization: The Aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis. *American Asian Review*, 19 (2), 71 – 99; Ming-Yu Cheng and Sayed Hossain. (2000). The Asian financial crisis. *New Economy*, 7 (4), 224 – 229; Stephan Haggard. (2000). The politics of the Asian financial crisis. *Journal of Democracy*, 11 (2), 130 – 145.

¹³¹ Ulrich Beck. (1999). Beyond the Nation State. *The New Statesman*, p. 25.

with functions ranging from tax revenue to health or education provision. In short, states and firms occupy different niches in the modern diplomatic environment. Beck agrees, noting that ‘nation-states are responsible for all their citizens, corporations are concerned for their shareholders only’.¹³²

For the Innovators, this distinction is proof enough that firms are unlikely to become state-like. Firms are motivated by profit, whereas the collective good of the domestic population motivates states. The Innovators remind us that these two motivations are not interchangeable; both actors exist to serve very different functions in the modern diplomatic environment.

For the Innovators, states remain able to affect the profitability of an MNC and vice versa, so both are mutually dependable. The relationship is one of symbiotic and reciprocal partnership. In the early 20th century:

nation-states realising that corporations and the market economy would assist them in the struggle for survival in the international community created an environment conducive for corporations to develop.¹³³

According to the Innovators, an intrinsic link between government cooperation and business corporations exists. While firm/government structures – political and/or diplomatic – may eventually mirror one another, the end products of both firms and states, irrespective of their size, will always justify the independent demand/need for the two. The Innovators consistently highlight that firms and states are very different entities,

¹³² *ibid.*, p 25.

¹³³ Coleman and Maogoto, *After the Party*, p. 39.

providing different functions for, and occupying different niches within, the IR system. The relationship between firms and states is not adversarial or competitive; for either to flourish they need one another, as they have always done.

4.4 6 Diplomacy and the information evolution

The Innovators stress an information evolution rather than a revolution. As a result, the Innovators are able to dispel the image of an archaic diplomatic institution unwilling or unable to embrace the revolution. They argue that the traditional diplomatic institution's willingness, necessity and drive to embrace radical new information technologies.

The Innovators argue that the information revolution is not driving a wedge between states (ambivalent to the revolution) and non-state actors (embracing the revolution); it is bringing them closer together. Diplomacy in the information age must be reflective of both hard and soft politics that drive state and non-state actors. For the Innovators, modern diplomacy 'must integrate a broad range of economic, sociocultural, environmental, scientific, and legal considerations, as well as the traditional political and military factors'.¹³⁴ Effectively achieving such a broad and unconventional range of interests will confound the state and the foreign ministry. A complex foreign policy agenda (low and high) means state and non-state actors need to work together in collusion rather than competition, utilising developments in information technology as a mechanism to pool resources, expertise and knowledge in dealing with a more complex IR system. For the Innovators, this collusion is indicative of 'the growing symbiosis

¹³⁴ Jeffrey R. Cooper, 'Net Diplomacy: Beyond Foreign Ministries', 2002, retrieved 26 July 2005, <www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/14.html>

between state and non-state actors' where the information revolution fuels 'significant processes whereby the state, while remaining a key player in world politics, is joined in the management of complex policy issues by a network of nongovernmental actors.'¹³⁵

In this context, the innovators dismiss arguments which suggest the traditional diplomatic institution is suffering as a result of the information revolution. These arguments tend to overlook the central premise of the information and communication revolution: that more communication and information is better than less. Increased communications means that political entities, be they states, NGOs or IGOs, are more aware of one another's ethos, skills and agenda. Common interests can be realised and exchanges of expertise are therefore becoming widespread in the modern diplomatic environment.¹³⁶

The Innovators stress that the advent of communicative technology, such as the Internet, can be viewed as 'improving' communication, a 'high-tech add-on to traditional communication systems' or another layer added to a traditional process.¹³⁷ New technology provides broadened information opportunities, a greater range of information

¹³⁵ *ibid.*

¹³⁶ In December 2001, the UN General Assembly demonstrated such collusion in relation to the information revolution. The UN General Assembly approved by consensus Resolution 56/183, which essentially called for a world summit on 'information society'. The Summit's objective was to draw the attention of political leaders in as many countries as possible to global problems and the opening up of opportunities offered by shaping the global information society, to define the main principles and directions of international cooperation in the process of creating such a society, as well as the roles of various participants in this process (states, business circles and civil society represented by NGOs). The result of the world summit was consensus across three objectives: 1. Access to Information Technology (IT) for all 2. IT should become an engine of economic and social development and reaching the goal of the millennium development goals written into the UN millennium declaration 3. Confidence and security in using IT. The latter goal sought to assuage fears that IT could be used for purposes incompatible with the protection of international stability and security and the need to prevent the use of information resources and technology for criminal and terrorism purposes. Point three championed the development of countermeasures and the setting up of UN organisations for rapid reactions to violations of information related security matters. The Summit was a success, and demonstrated the ability, necessity and desire of a collusion between state and non-state actors. The entire process was facilitated by an IGO. For a similar discussion, see G. Kramarenko and A. Krutskikh. (2003) Diplomacy and the Information Revolution. *International Affairs*, 115 – 123.

¹³⁷ Riordan, *The New Diplomacy*, p. 63.

is forthcoming and much time is saved with figures and instant reporting available at the touch of a button. Both state and non-state actors experience this similar benefit. According to the Innovators, there is no crisis for the traditional diplomatic institution as a result of an ill conceived revolution; the day is still far off when ‘diplomats are replaced by computers’.¹³⁸

For the Innovators, the notion that we must caution on the replacement of the human element in diplomacy with machines demonstrates how unrealistic the information revolution debate has become. Rather than inducing panic or conjuring images of diplomats and diplomatic institutions in terminal decline, a more moderate, balanced understanding of the revolution is required, according to the Innovators. The Innovators are the first to acknowledge that:

information technology is changing our lives, our society, our institutions, our culture. Yet there remain many constants, including time and human relations. Traditionalists who insist diplomacy need not change are wrong. So, too, are those who insist that it must change completely. Finding the intersection which honors the past and respects the future is the challenge.¹³⁹

In other words, to understand the modern relationship between diplomacy and information means diplomatic theory must be distanced from the ‘crisis effect’ the revolution is having/not having on the traditional diplomatic institution.

¹³⁸ Kennan, *Diplomacy Without the Diplomats*, p.207.

¹³⁹ Burt and Robison, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age*, p. 17.

For the Innovators, there is no doubt that the information evolution is having a transforming effect on spheres of ‘economics, politics, security, social affairs, science, culture and education’.¹⁴⁰ The Innovators agree that the evolution is improving communications, providing a broader agenda which incorporates high as well as low politics and facilitating a more representative IR system. When considering the impact of the current information evolution an historical analogy serves a purpose. The telephone had a similar revolutionary effect on diplomacy but after a hundred years has been accepted as a communicative necessity of the diplomatic system, rather than a force tearing it down. More people are *connected* to telephone networks which have also escaped the central control of the foreign ministry, and yet the diplomatic institution endures.

The central premise of IDT is that an information revolution must not be confused with a diplomatic evolution. Diplomacy has always been characterised by patterns of communication based on information; for the Innovators, there is an inseparable link between communication, information and the technologies which grease the basic functions of diplomacy. The information evolution, and subsequent diplomatic evolution, helps further regulate interaction between separated communities, be they states, NGO, IGOs, MNCs or individuals. After all, more communication, more information is better than less.

¹⁴⁰ Kramarenko and Krutskikh, *Diplomacy and the Information Revolution*, p. 122.

4.5 The merits of IDT

The central benefit of the Innovators' work to this thesis, and the diplomatic studies field more broadly, is that by challenging both Traditional and Nascent diplomatic theory they have laid the groundwork for the categorisations of diplomatic theorists. Although they do not explicitly identify, label or categorise diplomatic theorists in the field, as this thesis does, it is within their discussions between 'world society and state centric' views, for example, that supporting theoretical evidence could be subtly discerned.¹⁴¹ The Innovators often discuss the relationship between competing views on diplomacy but stop short of assigning labels to the associated theorists.

In terms of its contribution to the diplomatic studies field, IDT is valuable for several reasons. Firstly, as their moniker suggests their theoretical approach is innovative, a different method to theorising on diplomacy. These theorists consistently demonstrate that an original and novel approach to postulating on modern diplomacy can yield fresh insight for the diplomatic studies field. The prominence of theorists such as Melissen, Hocking and Sharp within the canon suggests an acceptance of innovative theorising by the diplomatic studies field. Furthermore, the emphasis on a different approach to postulating on diplomacy suggests that more rewarding insight on diplomatic theory awaits discovery. Innovators suggest a promising research agenda exists by 'thinking outside the traditional square' or adopting an unconventional approach to standard diplomatic theory.¹⁴² The scope for this possible redirection of theoretical exploration is immense. A devoted account of the diplomacy of NGOs, MNCs, IGOs and even individuals offers at least four immediate areas in need of rigorous attention. These gaps

¹⁴¹ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 22.

¹⁴² Sofer, *Old and New Diplomacy*, p. 207.

ought to be filled, if we are to build a complete body of theory on the modern diplomatic environment.

By adopting a different approach, Innovators also, secondly, avoid or dispel debate that is becoming unproductive in relation to the modern diplomatic environment. One such ‘sterile and injurious’ debate concerns the future relevancy of the state (and its diplomacy) in the face of the proliferation of non-state diplomatic actors.¹⁴³ Innovators believe that any debate that claims the state and its diplomatic institution is in decline ‘is a distortion of reality’.¹⁴⁴ By sidestepping the state versus non-state debate, IDT is therefore more closely related to the practical diplomatic environment, where symbiotic relationships between the state and the non-state can be evidenced. This practical symbiosis is central to IDT, which adds further legitimacy to their approach to theorising on the modern diplomatic environment.

Thirdly, Innovators acknowledge that while they are engaged in the enterprise of diplomatic theory, they also believe that empirical evidence can be employed to enrich theory. The Innovators believe that ‘data linked to theory is more powerful than data alone’.¹⁴⁵ Not only do Innovators ensure that diplomatic theory and diplomatic practice remain close but also that empirical evidence is a sound testing ground for diplomatic theory.

¹⁴³ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 21.

¹⁴⁴ Brian Hocking. (1999). *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation*. London: Macmillan, p. 3.

¹⁴⁵ Bates in Rudra Sil. 2000) The Foundations of Eclecticism: The Epistemological Status of Agency, Culture, and Structure in Social Theory. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 12 (3), p. 375.

4.6 The limitations of IDT

The limitations of IDT are a consequence of the different theoretical categories this thesis has identified as inherent to the diplomatic studies field. The bulk of the limitations of IDT are therefore forwarded by other groups of different theorists. An exception to this rule, however, concerns their engagement with diplomatic theory *sui generis*. The Innovators fail to engage with diplomatic theory as an independent topic. This is expected, as their discussions largely concern the practical interaction of diplomatic actors where theory is often encountered in perfunctory fashion. In short, like the majority of diplomatic theorists, they do not identify, explore or postulate on the central tenets of diplomatic theory.

Secondly, Innovators have a tendency to side-step dominant debates within the diplomatic studies field. For example, when Hocking proposes his robust ‘catalytic diplomacy’ hypothesis, he stresses the need to move diplomatic theory beyond the sterile debates, the divergent lines of argument and the competing perspectives of other diplomatic theorists (Traditionalist and NDT).¹⁴⁶ While his approach is understandable, this thesis argues that in order to truly dispel the state versus non-state debate, the motivations (the reasons why the two other groups continue with such debate), the theoretical orientation and the constitution of each faction of theorists must be addressed before suggesting a solution. Innovators can, at times, be too innovative, abandoning the valuable, albeit parochial, work of their theoretical predecessors. Over-innovation means that they can be accused of abandoning the field, rather than building on it.

Related to the above point, Innovators naturally shy away from the value of history to diplomacy. Although they flirt with history, it is hardly central to their work.

¹⁴⁶ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 21.

For example, Melissen states at the outset of *Innovation* that ‘this book examines some of the ways in which diplomatic practice since 1945 has adapted to fundamental changes in international relations’,¹⁴⁷ later he also states that ‘the divide of 1989 as a watershed in international relations should not be neglected by students of diplomacy’.¹⁴⁸ Diplomacy is a historical activity and greater understanding of its modern shape is conferred by an examination of the distant as well as recent past. The Innovators have jumped ahead of the game, arguing for a balanced relationship without understanding how each traditional or nascent diplomatic actor came into being; no attempt to promote each of these actor’s founding principles, respective ethos’, tools, objectives or methods is evident in IDT.

Fourthly, theorists who belong to the TDT and NDT categories are naturally critical of the symbiosis that Innovator’s believe exists between state and non-state diplomatic actors. Both TDT and NDT focus exclusively on the state and the non-state, respectively, and therefore are dismissive of Innovative theory, which gives equal weighting to all diplomatic actors.

Fifthly, Innovators, like the two other factions, are attempting to cement a singular definition, theory or form of diplomacy. In their work they portray diplomacy as one form, a composite of traditional and non-state diplomacy, rather than the separation or tripartiality that this thesis proposes. Hocking, for examples, argues for catalytic diplomacy (singular) rather than for catalytic diplomacies. Lee also writes of a singular form of commercial diplomacy, associated exclusively with the traditional diplomatic institution. This thesis argues that, alongside IDT, there are two other distinct theories of diplomacy, a clearly identifiable traditional form and a less concrete nascent form.

¹⁴⁷ Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p. xiv.

¹⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p. xxi.

Innovative diplomatic theory is the third and final category this thesis introduces. Alongside Traditional and Nascent diplomatic theory, Innovative diplomatic theory completes a broad spectrum of different theoretical views on modern diplomacy. If Traditional and Nascent diplomatic theories occupy different poles in the diplomatic studies field, then IDT inhabits the middle ground, privileging both the state and non-state diplomatic actors and highlighting the symbiotic and productive relationship that these two types of actors share. Occupying three different theoretical positions, however, presents a problem: through disparity it may prove difficult to reconcile these divergent and opposed diplomatic theories as central to the strength of modern diplomacy studies. Reconciliation of these divergent theoretical views becomes the task of the following chapter.

Chapter Five – Reconciling divergence amongst TDT, NDT and IDT

5.0 Introducing Reconciliation

The aim of this chapter is twofold: firstly, to describe the existing relationship between the three groups of theories and theorists. The purpose of this appraisal is to determine if the relationship is antagonistic and competitive. If this is the case, a solution will be offered to mitigate isolation and competition between the three disparate theories. The ultimate aim of the chapter therefore (secondly) becomes the reconciliation of the three divergent diplomatic theories.

Currently, the relationship between TDT, NDT and IDT is characterised by isolation between the groups, disagreement over the best theory (with which to interpret the modern diplomatic environment) and parsimony. This thesis contends that reconciliation of the three diplomatic theories is fundamental to better understanding the modern diplomatic environment. This argument is built on the rationale that no single diplomatic theory is able to account for the complexity of the modern diplomatic environment.

In essence, our understanding of modern diplomacy will remain ‘impoverished if our thinking is confined to only one of them’, to TDT, NDT or IDT.¹ This chapter identifies a novel methodology aimed at accommodating *all* three diplomatic theories within diplomacy studies. Central to this proposed methodology is the notion of learning from an academic discipline that has encountered and overcome the need to reconcile

¹ Stephen M. Walt. (1998). One World, Many Theories. *Foreign Policy*, 110, p. 29. This is a citation from an IR theorist, speculating on the divergence that exists between disparate IR theories, such as Realism, Liberalism and Pluralism. However, this idea resonates with the three types of diplomatic theory this thesis has introduced.

divergent theories. In this instance, the discipline to be learned from is International Relations (IR).

5.0.1 The current relationship between the three diplomatic theories

Having three different theories should be valuable for diplomacy studies. Disagreement amongst alternate theories is normally a healthy sign for any theoretical field, but this is not the case with diplomatic theory. Hitherto, there is no consensus that all three diplomatic theories have validity. Instead, we are led to believe that there is only room for one dominant form of diplomatic theory: TDT, NDT or IDT. This situation is problematic as it encourages isolation and theoretical disintegration. This has certainly been the case with other academic disciplines with divergent theories, where ‘the objective is not to encourage theoretical integration but to ward off the standard criticisms each approach typically faces from proponents of competing approaches.’² Diplomacy studies is no different, the three diplomatic theories are currently competing for dominance within the discipline. This competition is natural for such a young theoretical field. Granted, TDT has had a long historical legacy of scholarship, but alternate diplomatic theories have only truly emerged since the end of the Cold War.

The relationship between the three groups of theories can be described as antagonistic. The relationship is clouded by disciplinary disagreement over the optimal theory, with different groups of diplomatic theorists arguing that their theory is better grounded and more rigorous than other types of theory. The central problem with the disagreement over one diplomatic theory is that it leads to confusion over which theoretical interpretation is most applicable to the modern diplomatic environment. We

² Sil, *The Foundations of Eclecticism*, p. 372.

are asked to make a choice between the three theories: which one is most useful when interpreting modern diplomacy?

This unfortunate situation has the propensity to ‘encourage scholars to emphasize their differences rather than their similarities and thus to go their separate ways in isolation’.³ Isolation and divergence of opinion has led to fragmented and partial diplomatic theories. Despite the fact that diplomatic theorists are all engaged in the enterprise of diplomatic theory, they ‘stand on the same island, albeit on different promontories’.⁴ Pre-ordained to defend the state or the non-state, or both:

neither camp finds it easy to take the other seriously. They prefer to leave each other alone, for contacts usually take the form of the occasional shell lobbed across the cease-fire line.⁵

This isolation amongst the diplomatic theorists is expected; all three groups have contrasting opinions on the nature and shape of the modern diplomatic environment. Each offers a different lens with which to interpret the modern diplomatic environment. The central problem, however, is that we are asked to see modern diplomacy through only one lens, which makes the task of understanding modern diplomacy quite difficult. Modern diplomacy is complex, involves many actors and historical influences, and cannot be understood by adhering exclusively to TDT, NDT or IDT.

³ P. G. Lauren. (1976). *Diplomats and Bureaucrats*. California: Stanford, p. 4.

⁴ Stephen H. Haber. (1997). Brothers under the Skin: Diplomatic History and International Relations. *International Security*, 22 (1), p. 43.

⁵ Sharp, For Diplomacy, p. 43.

5.0.2 Confirming the existence of fundamental theoretical disagreement

The disagreement that exists between the three groups of theorists is best illustrated by revisiting the six themes prevalent in the modern diplomatic literature. When the three respective diplomatic theories on each of these themes are presented *alongside* one another, it becomes clear there are few points of convergence, and many points of divergence.

Consider the debate over the future of the state and the traditional diplomatic institution. Where NDT is concerned, the obsolescence and irrelevance of the traditional diplomatic institution are central foundations of their work. There is little point in theorising on traditional diplomacy, they claim, because ‘diplomacy becomes redundant in a world in which the state suddenly disappears’.⁶ According to Nascent theorists, the archaic state system and the traditional diplomacy that lubricates it belong to a by-gone era. For Nascent theorists, conventional, statist and traditional diplomacy is today incoherent, irrelevant and obsolete.⁷ This is one reason why Nascent theorists focus on emerging, non-state diplomatic actors.

In stark contrast, Traditionalists counter that the traditional diplomatic institution is anything but irrelevant. Traditionalists are convinced that the institution plays a fundamental, invaluable and central role in modern international relations. Traditionalists are unconvinced by obsolete, irrelevant and declining diplomacy arguments. They

⁶ Hoffman, *Reconstructing Diplomacy*, p. 535.

⁷ *ibid.*, p. 525.

counter, simply, that if the traditional diplomatic institution is obsolete then why does it continue to exist?⁸

According to Traditionalists, the traditional diplomatic institution has ridden out similar criticism before. It has consistently evolved since the 17th century, reacting positively to changes in the IR system.⁹ For Traditionalists, this consistent adaptability confirms that the traditional diplomatic system ‘remains at the core’ of the modern IR system.¹⁰ The 21st century is no different. For Traditionalists, to deny the diplomatic institution is to deny an actuality, the omnipotence of official diplomacy as the traditional and enduring conduit for inter-state relations.

The third group of theorists, the Innovators, fall somewhere in between these two contrasting views. They first acknowledge that the ‘well rehearsed proposition’ on whether or not the traditional diplomatic institution is in decline depends on respective theoretical foundations.¹¹ Traditionalists champion the traditional diplomatic institution, whereas Nascent theorists promote the role of nascent diplomatic actors. This fundamental difference means, according to Innovators, that ‘the debate about the decline of diplomacy turns on contending images of how the world works – or should work’.¹² Traditionalists are therefore concerned with the reality of diplomacy, whereas Nascent theorists have a future vision of how the IR system and diplomacy should work. In other

⁸ For examples of this approach, see Berridge, G. R. (2002). *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. London: Macmillan, pp. 116 – 128; Holsti, K. J. (2004). *Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 198 – 210.

⁹ Several diplomatic theorists propose and evidence the argument that the traditional diplomatic is evolutionary. See, Hocking, Brian. (1999). *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation*. London: Macmillan; Hocking, Brian and Spence, David (eds.). (2002). *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Robertson, Justin (ed.). (1998). *Foreign Ministries in Developing Countries and Emerging Market Economies*. *Dalhousie Journal of International Affairs*, 14; Rana, Kishan S. (2004). *Foreign Ministries: Change and Reform*. Paper presented at the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 18th.

¹⁰ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p.112.

¹¹ Hocking, *The end(s) of Diplomacy*, p. 169.

¹² *ibid.*

words, TDT explains the reality of how the IR system *is*, whereas NDT postulates on how the IR system *ought* to be. None of these disparate views provide us with a conclusive answer on the (ir)relevance of the state and the traditional diplomatic institution. All theories are convincing, all approaches have their merits.

The same pattern of disagreement exists over the impact of IGOs on modern diplomacy. Traditionalists argue that IGOs are constructed by states, for states. For Traditionalists, IGOs are only as great as the sum of their state parts. The IGO is a supplement to traditional diplomacy; after all ‘states use international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions accordingly’.¹³ Traditionalists are therefore dismissive of the notion that IGOs are distinctive diplomatic actors; they warn that ‘it is misleading to think of international institutions as outside forces or exogenous actors, they are the self-conscious creation of states’.¹⁴

These views are in direct opposition to those espoused by Nascent theorists, who argue that IGOs *are* distinct diplomatic actors where ‘the whole may be greater than the sum of the parts’.¹⁵ Nascent theorists argue that the universal effectiveness of IGOs and multilateral diplomacy questions the need for the traditional diplomatic institution. For them, the IGO is more effective at global problem solving than the incumbent traditional diplomatic institution. For Nascent theorists, IGOs:

have become more significant on the world stage than governments who are cast into a limbo of growing irrelevance. [Traditional] diplomacy is not only of decreasing relevance, it may be

¹³ Koremenos, Lispon and Snidal, *The Rational Design of International Institutions*, p. 762.

¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵ Taylor and Groom, *International Institutions at Work*, p. 4.

dangerous in that it holds back the more benign non-state forces underpinning world society from generating a more peaceful environment.¹⁶

Nascent theorists suggest that the traditional organs of state interaction are villainous, blocking or frustrating change heralded by the more pacific IGO. This view is in contrast to Traditionalists, who portray IGOs as too complex, too complicated and simply anti-diplomatic.¹⁷

If the IDT lens is adopted, we remain unclear on the role and relevancy of IGOs to modern diplomacy. For the Innovators, IGOs are neither built by states for states nor are they independent diplomatic actors. Innovators highlight that IGOs, 'while remaining instruments of national policies, can also rise above the fray of politics and act as an indispensable mechanism for the collective legitimisation of new norms, standards and principles of universal application'.¹⁸ Innovators stress a symbiosis between traditional state actors and IGOs. The state/IGO relationship is thus a complementary one, and of benefit to both.

Once more we are presented with three very different answers to the question 'do IGOs really matter?' In terms of the three diplomatic theories, the indecisiveness of the Innovators combined with the parochialism of the Traditionalists and the 'different world' scenario of the Nascent theorists means we are unable to conclusively determine if IGOs really do matter.¹⁹ In this instance, confusion reigns over the modern diplomatic worth of IGOs.

¹⁶ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 362.

¹⁷ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 159.

¹⁸ Jacques Fomerand. (2000). The United Nations and Its Limits. *Seton Hall Journal of International Relations*. Summer/Fall, p. 57.

¹⁹ Iriye, *Global Community*, p. 6.

Opinion on diplomacy by summit is equally confusing. For once though, Traditionalists and Nascent theorists are in agreement. Both groups of theorists concur that summitry is of questionable value to modern diplomacy and the IR system. However, this similar judgement is influenced by two very different theoretical journeys.

For Traditionalists, summitry is ‘the target of biting criticism’ over its efficacy as a viable diplomatic tool.²⁰ Comparing summitry to the ‘art’, ‘specialised vocation’ and subtle nuances inherent to traditional diplomacy supports this argument.²¹ For Traditionalists, statesmen make poor diplomats, as is evidenced by the repeated failure of meetings of the upper echelons of power.²² Within the TDT literature, there exist four common assumptions, which constitute the typical TDT case against statesmen-diplomats. Firstly, statesmen are largely ignorant of the intricacies of policy.²³ Secondly, they are vain, ignorant and egotistical.²⁴ Thirdly, they are oversensitive to the whims of their fellow heads of state, whom they regard as members of the same ‘trade union’.²⁵ And finally, aware of the massive media presence, statesmen perform like minor celebrities, keen to exploit the global publicity machine to their political and personal advantage.²⁶ All of these qualities, according to Traditionalists, are anti-diplomatic and many ‘disadvantages for diplomacy flow’ from the infringement of statesman on intricately fostered diplomatic relationships.²⁷ In essence, Traditionalists conclude that the summit devalues diplomacy. They are more likely to remind us of the failings of summits rather than interpret them as a valuable supplement to traditional diplomacy.

²⁰ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 169.

²¹ Der Derian, *On Diplomacy*, p. 2.

²² See chapter two, section 2.5.3: The questionable efficacy of summit diplomacy

²³ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 169.

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ Ball, *Diplomacy for a Crowded World*, p. 27,

²⁶ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 170.

²⁷ *ibid.*

Similarly, Nascent theorists share little affinity for the summit process, but advance different reasons. For Nascent theorists, the argument that summits are ineffective is employed as evidence of another nail in traditional diplomacy's figurative coffin. That statesmen have to meet face-to-face, claim Nascent theorists, suggests a deficiency in the conventional channels of state-qua-state diplomacy. In addition, Nascent theorists suggest that summits are nothing more than dramatic theatre; summits are mere publicity stunts; summits portraying statesmen as close allies is a consequent façade; and summits are a waste of time and money, as they rarely produce any meaningful results.²⁸

Innovators also appear confused as to how to interpret summit diplomacy. Their indecisiveness leaves the field in doubt concerning the continuing practice of summitry. Once more, they take a middle-ground stance on the value of summitry. For Innovators, the value of summitry remains undecided; 'as always, one can see the summit cup as half full or half empty'.²⁹ Innovators agree that 'summits do work, but not with predictable efficiency'.³⁰

Interpreting summitry through any of the three lenses does not provide an explanation of either the omnipotence or the occasional ineffectiveness of diplomacy by summit. The confusion that reigns over the relevance of summitry to modern diplomacy suggests the current theoretical frameworks for analysis are inadequate to fully explore/explain the function and purpose of diplomacy by summit.

Similarly, the massive proliferation of NGOs since the end of the Cold War has apparently confounded the diplomatic studies field. This changing dynamic 'has been

²⁸ These themes are expanded upon in chapter three, section 3.5.3: Diplomacy as theatre, the NDT dismissal of summit diplomacy.

²⁹ Kaufmann, *The Diplomacy of International Relations*, p. 62.

³⁰ Group of Thirty, *The Summit Process*, p. 8.

viewed through a variety of lenses and is the subject of differing interpretations'.³¹ The result is 'interpretive tensions' between the three groups of theorists, who judge the impact, value and efficacy of NGOs to modern diplomacy quite differently.³²

For Traditionalists, the impact of NGOs upon the hallowed profession of traditional diplomacy is often described as secondary, peripheral or inconsequential.³³ Whatever their activities, NGOs 'hardly relate to the world of diplomacy'.³⁴ Some Traditionalists 'choose to ignore the phenomenon: others continue to relegate NGOs – or indeed any challenger to state-centered assumptions – to the margins of the discussion'.³⁵ They are dismissive of 'the challenge posed to inter-state diplomacy by the growth of nongovernmental organisations'³⁶ and assume that NGOs have 'virtually no independent impact on international relations and diplomacy'.³⁷

On the other hand, Nascent theorists counter strongly that NGOs are a far more significant diplomatic actor than Traditionalists would have us believe. The dismissive nature of TDT is perhaps responsible for the fierceness of the NDT rebuttal. In this respect, Nascent theorists claim that NGOs have 'become more significant on the world stage than governments'.³⁸ The 'weakness of the state' is responsible and 'has stimulated a thriving voluntary sector' represented diplomatically by NGOs.³⁹

³¹ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 361.

³² *ibid.*

³³ For example, Berridge in *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* (2002) only mentions NGOs three times, on pages 18, 147 and 164 respectively.

³⁴ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 361.

³⁵ *ibid.*

³⁶ White, *Diplomacy*, p. 401.

³⁷ Peter Gubser. (2002). The Impact of NGOs on State and Non-State Relations in the Middle East. *Middle East Policy*, IX (1), p.142.

³⁸ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 362.

³⁹ Alan Whaites. (1998). NGOs, civil society and the state: avoiding theoretical extremes in real world issues. *Development in Practice*, 8 (3), p. 344 .

For Nascent theorists, NGOs are benefiting at the expense of the state: they are now an effective and intrinsic part of the political landscape, and have become ‘active in political work once reserved for representatives of states’.⁴⁰ ‘NGOs have created their own rules and regulations’ as a result of the state’s increasing irrelevancy in the twenty-first century.⁴¹ Subsequently, ‘NGOs, increasingly alienated by a lack of government leadership’ are pursuing ‘their international obligations independently’, effectively and diplomatically.⁴² Nascent theorists argue that NGOs are flourishing on unconventional and unfamiliar ground for traditional state actors. In other words, NGOs are flourishing while the state is floundering.

Innovators do not favour the state over the NGO, or vice versa. Rather, they focus on the modern symbiotic relationship between traditional state actors and emerging NGOs. Seen through the IDT lens, NGOs and states are working closely together. For example, Hocking informs us that:

NGOs need access to governments and other agencies, so governments increasingly need the information and expertise (and often the legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens) that NGOs are able to afford them. This is not to deny or down grade the role of the diplomat as a representative of government. It is most certainly not to suggest that the role of the diplomat and that of representative of an NGO or other actor is substitutable. Just the opposite: it is the peculiar qualities that define these roles.⁴³

⁴⁰ Gordenker and Weiss, *NGOs, the UN & Global Governance*, p. 17.

⁴¹ Lobe, *US Conservatives Take Aim at NGOs*, p. 6.

⁴² Burt and Robison, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age*, p. 32.

⁴³ Hocking, *The end(s) of diplomacy*, p. 172.

Hocking respects the distinction between traditionalism and modernity in diplomacy, while acknowledging the positive changing nature of the modern state/NGO relationship. Interpreted through the IDT lens, states and NGOs *do* ‘inhabit different environments’, but their relationship is positive, symbiotic and complementary.⁴⁴ Therefore, both states and NGOs have important but different roles to play in the modern IR system. Neither one is more important than the other. In sum, these three very different diplomatic theories on NGOs and modern diplomacy suggest further disagreement in the diplomatic studies field.

The fifth theme, diplomacy and commerce, is no different. The relationship between commerce and diplomacy is a source of contention amongst the three types of theorists. With each group disagreeing with the other on the relevancy of commerce to diplomacy, we become perplexed as to the modern relationship, if it exists at all.

Nascent theorists view the traditional diplomatic institution and firms as two separate and conflicting entities, which have created a rivalry between the state organ and mercantile firms. Nascent theorists argue that powerful MNCs frequently outstrip and outperform states in the creation of wealth.⁴⁵ Consequently, the state is no longer as relevant in this globalised century as it has virtually surrendered the principle – wealth creation based on territory and secured by force – that granted it exclusivity and

⁴⁴ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 361.

⁴⁵ See, for example, Coolsaet, Rik. (1998). The Transformation of Diplomacy at the threshold of the new Millennium. *Diplomatic Studies Program*, Leicester University, No. 48, pp. 1 – 25; Coleman, Andrew and Maogoto, Jackson. (2003). After the Party, is there a Cure for the Hangover? The challenges of the Global Economy to Westphalian Sovereignty. *Legal Issue of Economic Integration*, 30 (1), pp. 35 – 60; Strange, Susan. (1992). States, firms and diplomacy. *International Affairs*, 68 (1), pp. 1 – 15; Beck, Ulrich. (1999). Beyond the Nation State. *The New Statesman*, pp 25 – 28; Wolf, Martin. (2001). Will the Nation-State survive Globalisation? *Foreign Affairs*, 80 (1), pp. 178 – 190; Mann, Michael. (1997). Has Globalization ended the rise and rise of the nation-state? *Review of International Political Economy*, 4 (3), pp. 472 – 496.

legitimacy as a sovereign actor. Nascent theorists commonly cite three economic factors as responsible for this situation, which ‘spells the end of the nation-state’ and traditional diplomacy.⁴⁶ They are: the impact of globalisation; the loss of state power to generate wealth through territory; and the evolving political and diplomatic nature of MNCs, superseding that of states in terms of efficacy.⁴⁷ These three factors relate to the state’s inability to generate wealth, thus rendering the archaic institution, and its diplomacy, obsolete and irrelevant. The basis of their argument (that state and firm must be considered as separate) is an unusual one in that it has resonance with TDT.

Several Traditionalists continue to make a similar distinction between the political and the commercial, associating diplomacy with the former and discounting the latter as inconsequential in their theory of diplomacy.⁴⁸ These theorists view diplomacy as an activity concerned with high political matters, of which commerce bears little importance. Thus, the traditional approach ‘to diplomacy privileges political transactions and neglects economic transactions’.⁴⁹ This portrayal of diplomacy suggests that commercial work is a departure from the more serious concerns of diplomacy: military, security or political negotiation, for example.

Conversely, other Traditionalists see commerce as central to modern diplomacy, although these theorists are in the minority. For example, Rana observes that, since the 1960s, ‘commercial work has generally been regarded as a top priority within a unified

⁴⁶ Wolf, Will the Nation-State survive Globalisation?, p. 179.

⁴⁷ For an expansion on these points see chapter three, section 3.5.5: Diplomacy and commerce.

⁴⁸ See for instance R. P. Barston. (1998). *Modern Diplomacy*. London: Longman; G. R. Berridge. (2002). *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. London: Palgrave; Abba Eban. (1998). *Diplomacy for The Next Century*. US: Yale University Press; Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne. (1995). *The Practice of Diplomacy*. London: Routledge; Elmer Plischke (ed.). (1979). *Modern Diplomacy: The Art and Artisans*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research; Peter Marshall and J. Spence. (1998). *Positive Diplomacy*. London: Palgrave; Andrew L. Steigman. (1985). *The Foreign Service of the United States - First Line of Defense*. Boulder Colorado: Westview Press.

⁴⁹ Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 358.

diplomatic service'.⁵⁰ Similarly, Berridge comments on the necessity of a solid relationship between commerce and diplomacy.⁵¹ He informs us that one purpose of the modern diplomatic institution is the 'use of the resident mission's resources to promote not only exports but also inward investment'.⁵²

For these Traditionalists, one of the central purposes of the modern diplomatic institution is to facilitate commerce between the host and home nation. However, this opinion is largely the exception rather than the rule. Within the majority of TDT, 'there is no attempt to present commerce as a significant and integral part of diplomatic practice'.⁵³ And even those theorists who acknowledge the relationship are hardly extensive in their comment.⁵⁴

Differing once more are the Innovators, who argue that modern diplomacy and commerce are inherent to one another. In a series of articles,⁵⁵ two IDTs note that:

countries diplomatic systems are being overhauled so that the commercial activities of diplomatic services have been centralised, the commercial activities of diplomats have been extended, and business interests have been formally integrated within diplomatic systems...new diplomatic practices based upon the ascendancy of business interest within diplomatic systems have begun to emerge.⁵⁶

⁵⁰ Rana, *Inside Diplomacy*, pp. 96 – 97.

⁵¹ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 125.

⁵² *ibid.*

⁵³ Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 348.

⁵⁴ For example, Berridge in *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* (2002) includes only one small section on Commercial Diplomacy, from pages 124 – 125.

⁵⁵ See, Lee, Donna. *The Embedded Business-Diplomat: How Institutional Reform Upholds the Role of Business in UK Diplomatic Practice*. Paper prepared for the Panel 'Diplomacy & Business: Beyond the Hegemony of the State, 45th Annual ISA Convention, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17 – 20, 2004; Lee, D. and Hudson, D. (2004). The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy. *Review of International Studies*, 30, pp. 349 – 350;

⁵⁶ Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 343.

For the Innovators, extensive commerce/diplomacy relationships exist within diplomatic systems as well as diplomatic institutions, which are commonly an amalgamation of international trade and foreign affairs departments. Innovators are keen to realign diplomatic theory to acknowledge the growing relationship between diplomacy and commerce, to remind us that ‘diplomatic practice is and always has been much more than the traditional interstate high politics that it has largely been portrayed as...commercial diplomacy has always been an integral part of diplomatic practices’.⁵⁷

This type of IDT rhetoric is valuable, yet the relative neglect of the commercial aspects of diplomacy within diplomacy studies is quite exceptional. The recognition of commercial and diplomatic relationships is ‘uncommon in the canon of diplomacy studies, rendering them invisible in most accounts of the theory of diplomacy and practice’.⁵⁸ The difference of opinions between the three theories on commerce and diplomacy are significant, a common occurrence with most of these forces and factors affecting the modern diplomatic environment.

Where the information revolution is concerned, a similar amount of disagreement and confusion exists. Describing the modern relationship between information and diplomacy as a revolution, as a drastic change detrimentally affecting the state and its diplomacy, is a view that Nascent theorists are keen to stress. Nascent theorists such as Modelski (1973), Burt (1998) and Brown (2001) reinforce the notion of a competitive zero-sum game where state and non-state actors share different perceptions on the applicability of new methods of gathering, disseminating and utilising information. The

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, p. 345.

⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p. 344.

NDT literature relating to diplomacy and the information revolution suggests that states have lost control of information flows whereas nascent diplomatic actors have seized on the opportunities offered by the revolution to creep up the IR hierarchy.

For Nascent theorists, the current information revolution confirms ‘the diminishing importance of the state and increasing importance of new social and political entities, such as NGOs’.⁵⁹ Responsive non-state actors are clearly winning the information game, whereas traditional actors are confounded by their loss of control over information flows.

In response, Traditionalists hardly mention the information revolution; it does not occupy much print space in the canon of diplomacy studies. Traditionalists, keen to stress the art, the importance of history or the classical nature of diplomacy, are reluctant to relate De Callieres or Satow to the triviality of the information revolution debate. Furthermore, Traditionalists argue that the traditional diplomatic institution has coped with and survived similar revolutions before, in each instance emerging stronger and more efficient.

In the previous century, diplomacy witnessed several notable changes in information and communications capabilities.⁶⁰ Traditionalists remind us that these developments complemented the role of the diplomat. In the past, diplomacy responded well to changes in information gathering, harnessing new technology, transportation and communication to its advantage. More effective modes and methods of communication combined with greater access to information were of great benefit to traditional

⁵⁹ Jovan Kurbaliga. (1999). *Modern Diplomacy*. Valetta: Mediterranean Academy of Diplomacy Studies, p. 187.

⁶⁰ Some examples are ‘the widespread availability of convenient long-distance air travel, direct dial intercontinental voice telephone circuits and worldwide real-time media, among myriad technological developments’ (Cooper, J., www.usip.org).

diplomacy. Traditionalists argue that the current revolution will have a similar, beneficial affect on traditional diplomacy.

The central function of the traditional diplomatic institution, appropriately ‘gathering information on political, military and economic developments’, remains important and it is ‘difficult to see this function ever being adequately performed in any other way’.⁶¹ For Traditionalists, the term revolution should not be mistaken for evolution, which stresses state continuity and incremental change in information gathering and dispersal techniques, albeit slower than the lightning quick pace that the ‘new world of cyber diplomacy’ promotes.⁶²

The final groups of theorists, Innovators, highlight that arguments suggesting the traditional diplomatic institution is suffering tend to overlook the central premise of the information and communication revolution: that more communication and information is better than less. Increased communication means that political entities, be they states, NGOs or IGOs, are more aware of one another’s ethos, skills and agenda. Common interests can be realised and exchanges of expertise therefore become widespread in the modern diplomatic environment.

Innovators suggest that rather than inducing panic or conjuring images of the diplomatic institution in peril,⁶³ a more moderate, balanced understanding of the revolution is required. Innovators acknowledge that ‘Traditionalists who insist diplomacy need not change are wrong. So, too, are those who insist that it must change completely. Finding the intersection which honors the past and respects the future is the challenge.’⁶⁴

⁶¹ Berridge, *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*, p. 122.

⁶² Burt and Robison, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age*, p. 3.

⁶³ This was the theme of a 1999 conference hosted by Wilton Park, *Diplomacy: Profession in Peril*.

⁶⁴ Burt and Robison, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age*, p. 17.

In other words, to understand modern diplomacy means diplomatic theory must be extracted from the 'crisis effect' the information (r)evolution is having/not having on the traditional diplomatic institution.

When the three different theories on factors and forces influencing the modern diplomatic environment are presented *together*, the split between the three theoretical camps becomes apparent. Each theory favours or dismisses factors and/or forces affecting the traditional diplomatic institution in the modern diplomatic environment. Consequently, each theoretical group remains in isolation and in competition over the 'right' theoretical interpretation, which has the propensity to confound the field's understanding the complex modern diplomatic environment. This ambivalence begs the question 'why do the three groups of theorists feel it necessary to offer such different theoretical observations?'

5.0.3 The motivations driving the theoretical disagreement

There are several reasons contributing to the disagreement between the three groups of theorists. Primarily, the source of theoretical disagreement can be traced to the difference in each group's theoretical foundations. TDT, for example, focuses exclusively on traditional diplomacy; non-state diplomatic actors are of secondary importance and are often discounted. Conversely, NDT is distinctly anti-statist and advocates a theory on diplomacy that discounts the irrelevant traditional diplomatic institution. IDT stresses a symbiosis between state and non-state and is thus dismissive of the parochialism inherent to the first two theories. By competing over the respective actor(s) central to diplomatic theory the groups are destined to disagree.

Thus, isolation amongst these groups is not surprising. It is particularly evident in TDT and NDT, where both groups champion two very different actors as central to their theories. Both claim that the state and the non-state do not collaborate in the practical realm, so why propose collaboration in the theoretical realm. State and non-state diplomatic actors are portrayed by Traditionalists and Nascent theorists as:

inhabiting different environments, working to different rulebooks and occupying very different positions on the scale of importance in world politics. They exist, therefore, in two solitudes with little or no interaction between their worlds.⁶⁵

Furthermore, Traditionalists and Nascent theorists argue that there is only room in the international relations environment for one dominant form of diplomacy: statist or alternate (non-state). Thus, the portrayal of the traditional diplomatic institution

⁶⁵ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 361.

competing with nascent diplomatic actors over the exclusive right to manage the international relations system is well endorsed. This notion leads to the assumption that the relationship between state and non-state diplomacy is seen (by theorists) as competitive where one diplomatic form can only succeed at the expense of the other.

This state *versus* non-state rhetoric suggests a deficiency in diplomatic theory. All three groups of theorists tend to avoid diplomatic theory. Traditionalists, due to their supremacy, appear to practice a form of theoretical aristocracy, mentioning diplomatic theory in passing. They are dismissive of any challenge to their dominance and continue to theorise on the practice of traditional diplomacy, rather than ‘theory on the theory’.⁶⁶ Nascent theorists, in response, become aggressive and at times emotive. They appear to practice a form of extremity of argument, discounting sentimental affiliation for the traditional diplomatic institution and ignoring TDT. And Innovators appear to be engaged in creating a symbiotic form of diplomatic theory, untainted by statist or non-statist theoretical precursors but certainly not sufficiently developed to sustain life alone.

Few of the works reviewed for this thesis tackled diplomatic theory effectively; many of the works rarely mentioned diplomatic theory.⁶⁷ The ambivalence towards diplomatic theory is strange, leading one to wonder why the field is devoid of critical analysis on diplomatic theory? It is possible that either we *assume* that TDT is diplomatic theory and De Callieres will continue ‘to tell us all we need to know’ *or*, as this thesis suggests, that diplomatic theory is a topic in need of frank appraisal and deeper

⁶⁶ Elman and Elman, *Progress in International Relations Theory*, p. 7.

⁶⁷ For examples of theoretical works that avoid tackling diplomatic theory, see Ball, G. (1976). *Diplomacy for a Crowded World*. London: Bodley Head; Berridge, G. R. (2002). *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice*. London: Macmillan; Craig, Gordon A. and George, Alexander L. (1995). *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Lauren, P.G. (ed.). (1979). *Diplomacy: New Approaches History, Theory, and Policy*. New York: Free Press.

exploration. Perhaps, the three groups of theorists avoid diplomatic theory because it 'doesn't, at first glance, exist'.⁶⁸

Diplomatic theory, as chapter two, three and four demonstrated, does exist. Hitherto, the three alternate theories on modern diplomacy had not been identified and firmly categorised. Therefore, many of these problems relating to diplomatic theory had remained unexplored as we assumed there to be one big block of theory on diplomacy. Now that the three diplomatic theories have been identified, these problems and their impact on diplomatic theory are more visible. Should these problems endure, several consequences for the diplomatic studies field will emerge.

5.0.4 Consequences of theoretical disagreement for diplomatic theory

Should the disagreement, isolation and competition continue amongst the three groups of theorists then several consequences will also endure. Chief among these consequences is the notion that a sound understanding of the modern diplomatic environment will remain elusive. If theorists continue to compete over one dominant and all-encompassing theory on diplomacy then it is unlikely that we will understand the complexity of modern diplomacy where state *and* non-state actors are clearly engaged in diplomacy. No single diplomatic theory capably accounts for the complexity of the modern diplomatic environment. In other words, our understanding of modern diplomacy will remain insolvent if our thinking is confined to TDT, NDT or IDT.

Currently, diplomatic theory can be likened to IR theory, which resembles 'a disassembled jigsaw puzzle scattered on a table before us' where 'each piece shows a

⁶⁸ Wight, *Why is there no international theory?*, p. 17.

fragment of a broad picture'.⁶⁹ Presently, the pieces (TDT, NDT and IDT) remain in isolation, which obscures a complete picture of modern diplomacy. If the pieces remain scattered then so too will theory on diplomacy. Furthermore, some of the pieces are more prominent than others, which creates further problems including preferencing.

For example, TDT is the most prevalent 'piece' of the diplomatic studies jigsaw. Its dominance results in an imbalanced form of diplomatic theory. TDT is applicable to only the state part of the modern diplomatic environment. Until balance between the state and the non-state is introduced to diplomatic theory, TDT will continue to tell us only part of the rich and varied modern diplomatic story; it will only reveal part of the metaphorical jigsaw puzzle.

A body of theory that accounts for *both* the state and the non-state as central to modern diplomacy is absent from the canon of diplomacy studies. Although Innovators forward symbiosis theories, their particular theory has only recently emerged, and will take some time to develop robustness. So far, IDT has failed to alter the conventional assumption that diplomacy is only practiced by official state-representatives. The work of Innovators, alongside that of Nascent theorists, remains peripheral to diplomacy studies, which are still largely concerned with what Marshall refers to as 'the political foreground'.⁷⁰

Both IDT and NDT struggle to maintain a foothold in a field dominated by TDT. This is problematic; knowledge on nascent diplomatic actors is scarce in diplomacy studies. The diplomatic studies field has yet to explicitly conceptualise the type of new diplomacy practiced by unconventional actors, if it exists at all. The impact of significant

⁶⁹ Puchala, Donald J. 1994. Some World Order Options for Our Time. *Peace Forum*, 11, 17, p. 17.

⁷⁰ Marshall in Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 353.

IGOs, NGOs or MNCs on the diplomatic system cannot be ignored for much longer. In the modern era, one may ‘wonder what sense it makes to exclude or leave aside the public diplomacy of NGOs, the discreet diplomatic maneuvering of international firms, or even the efforts of private diplomats, when such actors are recognised by states?’⁷¹ In response, it makes little sense to exclude non-state actors in diplomatic theory. The diplomacy of nascent, alternative actors remains a vastly under researched area, one that is in need of attention if the complexity of modern diplomacy is to be understood.

TDT dominance means that the diplomatic studies field ‘is perpetually under suspicion by other academics’.⁷² The ‘troubled state of diplomatic studies’ is a consequence of the TDT domination and their desire to regard diplomacy and diplomatic theory in singular, partial and statist terms.⁷³ Several theorists agree.⁷⁴ Strange is one who attributes the imbalanced shape of the diplomatic studies field to the ‘intellectual apartheid’ that the Traditionalists practice, and warns that ‘the study must move with the times, or be marginalized’.⁷⁵

Cohen also observes that diplomacy studies ‘have generated a disappointing response from scholars in international relations’.⁷⁶ He suggested that one solution to this problem is to ‘open up the area to include, *inter alia*, the involvement of non-state

⁷¹ Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p. xvii.

⁷² Sharp, *For Diplomacy*, p. 43.

⁷³ Sharp, *Making Sense of Citizen Diplomats*, p. 1.

⁷⁴ The ‘unrealistic narrative’ of contemporary diplomacy led Craig to complain that diplomacy, as a field of theoretical study, has ‘failed to engage the attention of the International Relations profession’ (1983: 2). Puchala also wrote of his ‘frustration with the intellectual sterility of many present-day renderings’ concerning diplomacy (1995: 2) and Sharp complained that ‘the study of diplomacy remains marginal to and almost disconnected from the rest of the field’ (1999: 34). For a discussion on reinvigorating diplomacy studies see Sharp, Paul. (1999). *For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations. International Studies Review*, 1 (1), pp. 33 – 37. Within Sharp ‘makes an argument for why more international relations scholars should be studying diplomacy’ (1999: 33).

⁷⁵ Strange, *States, firms and diplomacy*, p. 11.

⁷⁶ Cohen, *Putting Diplomatic Studies on the Map*, p. 1.

actors’.⁷⁷ Although the Innovators have begun this process, it is important to consolidate this more inclusive and diffuse approach, as it is more reflective (than TDT or NDT) of modern diplomacy. A focus on both the state and the non-state may mitigate the dominance of the Traditionalists, and create a more balanced form of diplomatic theory. This direction would be positive for diplomatic theory: a continued focus on traditional diplomacy but *alongside* nascent diplomacy, practiced by non-state actors.

However, avoiding further marginalisation and ‘moving with the times’ would mean abandoning certain fixed assumptions. The first assumption to go would be the state versus non-state debate. For diplomacy studies, this incumbent state *versus* nascent challenger notion is particularly unproductive, and in ‘either/or’⁷⁸ terms has caused us to labor needlessly’.⁷⁹ By continuing the binary *either/or* argument diplomatic theory will remain mired in misperception, confusion and misunderstanding of the relationship between ‘old’ Westphalian, traditional forms of diplomacy and unconventional, alternative and ‘new’ forms of diplomacy that have emerged since the end of the Cold War.⁸⁰

This either/or debate has now become an unnecessarily ‘long standing theme’ in diplomacy studies, and has ‘generated a largely sterile discussion rooted in two competing perspectives on and diplomacy’; the state *versus* non-state.⁸¹ This awkward, antagonistic relationship between state and non-state does not dominate in the practical world, so why persist with the debate in the theoretical realm? Diplomats, conventional

⁷⁷ *ibid.*

⁷⁸ The term ‘either/or’ is also employed briefly in Hoffman, John. (2003). *Reconstructing Diplomacy. British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 5 (4), pp. 525-542.

⁷⁹ Caporaso, *Changes in the Westphalian Order*, p. 4.

⁸⁰ Sofer, *Old and New Diplomacy*, p. 195.

⁸¹ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 21.

and unconventional, value state/non-state linkages, indeed practical opinion suggest that they are part of the rich tapestry of the modern IR system.⁸² The reluctance or inability to abandon this debate is one consequence of the disagreement inherent to each group of theorists.

This obsession with a sterile debate (one that is unlikely to be resolved) has meant that diplomatic theory is becoming increasingly removed from diplomatic practice. By avoiding the growing state/non-state linkages, theory *on* diplomacy is becoming more distant from the reality *of* diplomacy. Within diplomacy studies, the gap between theory and practice is widening. Gyngell and Wesley frame this divide eloquently and accurately:

the gap between academics and practitioners is large. They speak different languages. Empirical to their bootstraps, practitioners tend to regard theory as an artificial template imposed on an uncertain world. For their part, theorists consider practitioners dangerously limited by their failure to understand, or to have regard for the broader patterns shaping international events.⁸³

Most practitioners would agree with the division Gyngell and Wesley discuss. Interviews with several diplomats have revealed doubts of the value of diplomatic theory to practical diplomacy. For example, Ambassador Laverdure of Canada's DFAIT took a healthy swipe at diplomatic theorists:

⁸² This practical opinion will be presented in chapter six: Using TDT, NDT and IDT to better understand the modern diplomatic environment

⁸³ Alan Gyngell and Michael Wesley. (2003). *Making Australian Foreign Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. vii.

I get into so many arguments with Canadian Professors, and I keep threatening them that one day I'll take the stage and exact my revenge. In international affairs we need academics, professors and PhDs, but can't we get closer to one another? Because they [academics] write big books stating how the world should be run, it doesn't mean they understand the practice.⁸⁴

Similarly, Ian Kemish of Australia's DFAT alluded to the growing distance of diplomatic theory from practice:

we [DFAT] consider theory part of the foreign policy process, it is invaluable and important that we engage with the academic community but on a productive basis, not this one of distance that seems to endure at the moment....if theoreticians really want to accurately understand diplomacy then I suggest they step into my shoes for a few days.⁸⁵

This cynicism from practitioners was evident during several interviews; the value of academia to diplomacy was not as clear. However, when asked if she respected academic opinion on diplomacy, Lydia Morton, also from DFAT, replied:

absolutely, it's another opinion that we must consider and in many cases employ. Academics are an interest group and we must represent that opinion, otherwise we're not doing our jobs.⁸⁶

Morton's answer however was the exception, rather than the rule. Most diplomats are, naturally, very diplomatic in their answers. The majority were subtly disdainful of

⁸⁴ Ambassador Claude Laverdure, interview, Paris, France. May 9th, 2005. As of January 2006, Claude Laverdure is the Canadian Ambassador to France.

⁸⁵ Ian Kemish, interview, July 13th, 2004. As of January 2006, Ian Kemish is the Australian Ambassador to Germany.

⁸⁶ Lydia Morton, interview, July 13th, 2004. As of January 2006 Lydia Morton is First Assistant Secretary, International Organisations and Legal Division and concurrently, Ambassador for People Smuggling Issues, DFAT.

diplomatic theory, or had little idea even what diplomatic theory was. Ambassador Les Luck noted that ‘in reality diplomacy is very different from theory’, so what does that tell us about diplomatic theory?⁸⁷ The theoretical reality of diplomatic studies is that theory, consumed by competitive *either/or* debates, is somewhat distant to ‘real’ diplomacy:

not only do we know this intuitively, diplomats tell us that this is so. This [theoretical] blindness produces nothing more than a partial disclosure of what constitutes diplomatic practice.⁸⁸

It is unfair to level all the blame for the widening gap on the theoreticians. Several of the diplomats interviewed took unnecessary swipes at the academics, Ambassador Laverdure claimed: ‘I enjoy teasing professors, because I know that they’re probably the guys that failed the exam for the foreign services...How does the expression go? “if you can’t do, teach”’.⁸⁹ While such comment is hardly conducive to lessening the gap, it illustrates how divorced diplomatic theory has become from practice. Bridging the gap is no easy task. Both sides – academic and practitioner – ‘express alarm at the inability of the other to step out of a limited perspective’.⁹⁰ For the practitioners of diplomacy, the term ‘academic has a pejorative ring, and is used to mean irrelevant’.⁹¹ However, the simple acceptance that there should be a division between theory and practice is an

⁸⁷ Ambassador Les Luck, interview, July 13th, 2004. As of January 2006, Ambassador Luck is the Australian Ambassador for Counter Terrorism.

⁸⁸ Lee and Hudson, *The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy*, p. 360.

⁸⁹ Ambassador Claude Laverdure, interview, May 9th, 2005.

⁹⁰ Pamela Aall. (2002) *Scholars as Peacemakers: The Contribution of Academic/Practitioners to Conflict Management. International Studies Perspectives*, 3, p. 145.

⁹¹ *ibid.*

example of accepting a fixed assumption where diplomacy is concerned.

To banish the gap altogether would be impossible, but we can lessen it by distancing diplomacy studies from narrow, competitive and partial theories on diplomacy and by engaging with state and non-state diplomats. This author believes that to solidify and strengthen diplomatic theory the diplomatic community can be engaged.⁹² The onus to reorient theory to practice is the responsibility of the diplomatic theorists. The practitioner need not worry on whether or not the gap is widening: he will continue to be a diplomat. The academics, however, should worry. Diplomatic theory, more than other IR subjects, is heavily reliant on a practical, clearly defined and visible profession. It is therefore important that theory should be closely related to practice.

The widening gap between theory and practice is but one consequence of the disagreement between different types of theorists. The three groups of theorists are so busy defending their respective theories that the problems described here are becoming unavoidable: the marginalisation of diplomacy studies; the isolation and competition leading to more disagreement between theorists; and the ongoing frailty of diplomatic theory.

Ultimately, a sound understanding of modern diplomacy will remain elusive if the notion of a one-piece jigsaw persists. The notion of one piece or one ‘lens’ through which to postulate on modern diplomacy is insufficient if modern diplomacy is to be truly understood. The reason this ‘theoretical myopia’ persists is related to the disagreement

⁹² Building theoretical bridges with the practitioners is not a difficult task. In the various rounds of interviews undertaken for this study *all* diplomatic institutions were more than keen to schedule rounds of interviews, ranging from Ambassadors to fledgling diplomats. This is a rich source of data, which in turn can be employed to enrich theoretical analysis. This source is a largely untapped pool of resources, which can be employed to enhance any of the three diplomatic theories.

and competition amongst the three groups of theorists, which encourages isolation.⁹³ Subsequently, if the three theories are not reconciled the above problems are likely to worsen. The isolation within diplomacy studies and from other IR disciplines is likely to increase. Reconciliation (finding room for all three theories) banishes these inherent problems, which allows a better understanding of the complex tapestry of modern diplomacy.

⁹³ Lee and Hudson, *The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy*, p. 360

5.1 Redirection of the relationship between the three diplomatic theories

The first half of this chapter identified several problems with the current relationship between the three groups of theorists and theories; the second half proposes a solution to those problems. The first step to understanding modern diplomacy, this thesis proposes, was the recognition, categorisation and construction of the three different types of diplomatic theory, acknowledging the pieces of the ‘disassembled jigsaw puzzle’.⁹⁴ Now that the pieces have been identified, we can begin the next step, asking how do these pieces fit together and what picture do they exhibit when they are appropriately fitted?

Fitting the ‘pieces’ together has not been attempted with the three diplomatic theories in mind, for the simple reason that previously they had not been identified, constructed and distinguished. Now, a suitable method of fitting the ‘pieces’ together is proposed in the remainder of this chapter advanced. This section proposes that *all* three diplomatic theories have validity in relation to understanding the complexity of the modern diplomatic environment. The aim here is to grant the three diplomatic theories equal weighting within diplomacy studies.

⁹⁴ Puchala, *Some World Order Options for Our Time*, p. 17.

5.1.1 Learning from IR theory: Making room for the three diplomatic theories

An appropriate method for reconciling the three diplomatic theories is to learn from another academic discipline that has encountered and overcome similar problems. In order to be useful this discipline has to meet certain criteria: firstly, the presence of three or more divergent theories; secondly, a consensus amongst its academics of the necessity of alternate theories as important and central to modern scholarship; and, thirdly, the discipline had to consider the accommodation of divergent theories and theorists as paramount to modern understandings of its subject. Meeting all three criteria is the International Relations discipline.

In International Relations, there are many different types of theories⁹⁵ that explain world politics, however among the most widely accepted theories are Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism. All three theories are vastly different. Their foundational differences and central tenets can be seen in the table below.⁹⁶

Table 1. Comparative IR theories

Feature	Realism	Liberalism	Constructivism
Philosophical Outlook	Pessimistic	Optimistic	Neither optimistic or pessimistic
Human Nature	Competitive	Cooperative	Believes in the potential for humanity to engineer changes that either improve or harm future global conditions
Key Political Units	States	Nonstate actors, institutions transcending states	Social groups
Core Concern	Increase military power, war and security	Promote policy coordination, institutionalising peace	Social collectivities' shared meanings and images of contemporary international life; the theoretical implications of these visions

⁹⁵ For works discussing all IR theories see, Cynthia Weber. (2001). *International Relations Theory: a Critical Introduction*. London: Routledge; J. Friedrichs. (2004) *European Approaches to International Relations Theory*. New York: Routledge; Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater. (2005). *Theories of International Relations*. London: Palgrave.

⁹⁶ This table is primarily from Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p. 136. For the purpose of lucidity, this author has revised and condensed the original table.

Structure of global system	Anarchy	Anarchy amongst states and transnational networks linking nonstate actors	Ideas; identities; ideals; images – all as socially constructed by various groups
Approach to Peace	Balance of Power	Collective security	Tracing assumptions within various theoretical traditions
Future vision	Continuity: great-power competition for power	Change: cooperation as democratic regimes, open markets, and international institutions spread	Advocacy of normative innovation through construction of new images

This table highlights that there are several foundational differences between each International Relations theory. Each theory contains ‘a set of mutually exclusive assumptions’.⁹⁷ This exclusivity could suggest that all three theories are ‘competing for dominance’ within the International Relations discipline.⁹⁸ This is not the case, since the ‘three perspectives complement each other’.⁹⁹ By fitting the ‘pieces’ of Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism together a complete theoretical picture of the modern IR system emerges. This tripartite form of theorising is invaluable in relation to accurately understanding the modern IR system.

One theory is unable to account for the complexity of the modern IR system. The IR system ‘has become so complex and differentiated today that single or universal answers on how to approach a problem are becoming increasingly unsatisfactory’.¹⁰⁰ There are simply too many actors – state and non-state – for one theory to fit all. The presence of different International Relations theories is therefore useful in that they ‘provide a map, or frame of reference, that makes the complex, puzzling world around us

⁹⁷ John Bayliss and Steve Smith. (2005). *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 291.

⁹⁸ Hastedt and Knickrehm, *International Politics in a Changing World*, p.28.

⁹⁹ Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse. (2006). *International Relations*. London: Pearson Longman, p. 4.

¹⁰⁰ Hastedt and Knickrehm, *International Politics in a Changing World*, p.29.

intelligible'.¹⁰¹ As a result 'IR scholars do not agree on a single theory to explain IR...no single theoretical framework has the support of all IR scholars'.¹⁰² Instead they 'benefit from the existence of several theories of world politics from which they can draw guidance'.¹⁰³

Each of the International Relations theories is fundamentally distinctive; 'each is a lens through which the world looks different and different things seem important'.¹⁰⁴ The presence of these three theories offers the International Relations scholar a choice, where he can choose a particular 'theory to heed' dependent on the shape of the IR system.¹⁰⁵ IR scholars draw guidance from particular theories that resonate with certain occurrences in the IR system. For example, during the inter war period of 1919-39 Liberalism was the dominant paradigm, whereas during periods of international tension (such as the Cold War) Realism returned to the fore. These theoretical swings were followed by the introduction of Constructivist theories, alongside Liberalism and Realism. Furthermore, IR theorists do not co-exist in an amicable fashion; however they do respect the necessity of one another's presence. International Relations scholars agree that 'they need more than one catholic theory' in order to understand the modern IR system.¹⁰⁶

The theoretical conundrum a tripartite theoretical approach resolved in International Relations has resonance with the field of diplomatic theory. Diplomatic theory would equally benefit by practicing a similar form of theoretical tripartiality.

¹⁰¹ Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond. (2005). *The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World Politics*. California: Thomson Wadsworth, p. 24.

¹⁰² Goldstein and Pevehouse, *International Relations*, p. 4.

¹⁰³ Kegley and Raymond, *The Global Future*, p. 24.

¹⁰⁴ Goldstein and Pevehouse, *International Relations*, p. 4.

¹⁰⁵ Kegley and Raymond, *The Global Future*, p. 24.

¹⁰⁶ Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p. 12.

Should diplomacy studies accept that in order to comprehensively understand the modern diplomatic environment it is necessary to have several distinct yet complementary types of diplomatic theory, then a broad base of theory could be constructed. This direction is not only important in terms of understanding the modern diplomatic environment but also in terms of reconciling divergent theories. Traditionalists are unlikely to become less statist, just as it is improbable that Nascent theorists will become more statist in their theoretical orientation. If we insist diplomatic theory must be singular then of course Traditionalists, Nascent theorists and Innovators will continue to compete over the right-to-theory. If, however, we respect the need for tripartite diplomatic theory then there is no singular form over which to compete.

Instead of disagreement, competition and isolation between the three diplomatic theories, it would be beneficial for diplomacy studies if these diffuse theories on diplomacy could be accommodated. With diplomacy now being practiced by state and non-state actors, perhaps diplomacy studies, like IR, needs more than one lens in order to effectively navigate the terrain of modern diplomacy.

5.1.2 Reconciling the three diplomatic theories through an interdisciplinary confluence with IR theory

It is now necessary and possible to identify the valuable relationship to be teased out between IR and diplomatic studies.¹⁰⁷ This final section offers a method for reconciliation: an interdisciplinary confluence between diplomatic theory and IR theory.¹⁰⁸ To reconcile the three diplomatic theories is to relate TDT, NDT and IDT to Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism (respectively) and to draw parallels and differences between the theories in the two fields. If points of theoretical convergence can be established between the two fields, this thesis can then propose that just as IR theory needs Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism to understand the modern IR system, then so too does diplomatic theory need TDT, NDT and IDT in order to understand the modern diplomatic environment.

Establishing similarities also consolidates, strengthens and further enriches the three diplomatic theories. Borrowing from the three IR theories adds layers to each diplomatic theory, which is especially important for NDT and IDT, two of the newer diplomatic theories. Bridges linking these research agendas are helpful if we are to strengthen and enhance the overall body of diplomatic theory. The challenge is to strengthen the bridges and provide for more interaction and collaboration between diplomatic theory and IR theory.

¹⁰⁷ For an example of an interdisciplinary approach between IR and diplomacy studies see, Lee, D. and Hudson, D. (2004). The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy. *Review of International Studies*, 30, 343 – 360. They two authors link diplomacy studies with the Internal Political Economy (IPE) approach in order to enrich their analysis of the relationship between diplomacy and commerce.

¹⁰⁸ For another example of interdisciplinarity, this time between IR and diplomatic history, see, Elman, Colin & Elman, Miriam F. (1997). Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory. *International Security*, 22 (1), pp. 5 – 21; Haber, Stephen H. (1997). Brothers under the Skin: Diplomatic History and International Relations. *International Security*, 22 (1), pp. 34 - 43.

5.1.3 TDT and Realism

Realism and TDT share certain similarities and can be clearly distinguished by the primary actor on which each focuses: the former on the state, the latter on the traditional diplomatic institution. TDT is not Realism, however, just as Realism endures at the center of IR, so too does TDT hold centre stage in diplomacy studies.

Realism and TDT share certain similarities. The observation that the traditional diplomatic institution is a servant of the Realist state enforces this conclusion. After all, the emergence of diplomacy in its institutionalised form coincides with the emergence of the nation state. In the 17th century, the diplomatic institution and the Westphalian state system evolved as mutually reinforcing concepts. The Traditionalist belief in diplomacy as an institution of the state has similarities with the Realist belief in the state as the unitary actor in IR.

This actor belief is the first similarity between TDT and Realism. For Realists, the state is the main actor in IR. The state is sovereign: it has supreme power over its domestic territory and populace, a condition guaranteed by the legitimate use of force within that territory.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, Traditionalists endorse, advocate and relate the historical omnipotence of the traditional diplomatic institution to diplomatic theory. They contend that the diplomatic institution remains the most important diplomatic actor in the modern diplomatic environment. After all, TDT explains ‘diplomacy by reference to the business of a multiplicity of states, and [the theorists] who are persuaded of its indispensable usefulness – amounting to necessity – to the diplomatic-system’.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ For an interesting discussion on the historical origins of this state principle see, Diamond, J. (1999) *Guns, Germs and Steel*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, pp. 265 – 291.

¹¹⁰ Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger*, p. 3.

A second similarity between TDT and Realism concerns the reliance of both theories on history. History forms the bedrock of Realism. Using history as a guide, Realists stress continuity, stability, and familiarity, based on tried and tested methods of state interaction. Realists argue that ‘the same basic patterns that have shaped international politics in the past remain just as relevant today’.¹¹¹ Thus, Realists endorse a ‘conservative world view’, which ‘generally values the maintenance of the status quo and discounts the element of change in IR’.¹¹² Similarly, the ‘propensity to treat the future as an extension of the past’ is a central feature of TDT. TDT focuses on ‘explaining not change, but rather enduring regularities’ in diplomacy.¹¹³ In other words, TDT, like Realism, is concerned with promoting continuity and tradition in diplomacy, and a gradual diplomatic evolution of its techniques over drastic revolution.

Thirdly, Liberal views which stress the increasing importance of non-state actors in IR and diplomacy, are treated with disdain by both groups of theorists. Realists complain that theories promoting non-state actors are unreflective of the omnipotence of the state. Realists believe that non-state actors ‘cannot stop states from behaving according to balance-of-power logic’.¹¹⁴ Thus, the impact of non-state actors, and those Liberal theories championing their role in the modern IR system, are peripheral to IR theory. For Realists, academics that endorse Liberal and non-state approaches to IR are ‘blind to the requirements of power politics’.¹¹⁵ They promote a sense of ‘feckless

¹¹¹ Bayliss and Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 161.

¹¹² Goldstein and Pevehouse, *International Relations*, p.4.

¹¹³ Kahler, *Inventing International Relations*, p. 42.

¹¹⁴ John J. Mearsheimer. (1994/95) The False Promise of International Institutions. *International Security*, 19 (3), p. 7.

¹¹⁵ Kahler, *Inventing International Relations*, p. 21.

utopianism' that had 'cast a shadow of academic disrepute over the field' through their 'excesses of sentimentalism'.¹¹⁶

Similarly, Traditionalists are sceptical of alternate theories that discount the role of the traditional diplomatic institution in the modern diplomatic environment. For Traditionalists, official diplomacy does not seem to suffer from real decline despite the appearance on the international scene of new actors and new working methods. The role of non-traditional actors in the modern diplomatic environment is therefore of secondary importance to traditional diplomacy. Theorists endorsing an anti-statist view are engaged in 'the foolish searching for something beyond current international realities'.¹¹⁷ Their theories have 'proved sterile...and have been shattered time and time again by actual political developments'.¹¹⁸

While the two theories share similarities they also have their differences. Perhaps the most obvious difference is that Realism focuses on a state's foreign policy objectives, whereas Traditionalism focuses on diplomacy, or on the methods used to achieve a state's foreign policy objectives. Realists focus on the *ends* of foreign policy, while Traditionalists concentrate on the *means* employed to realise foreign policy objectives.

A second point of divergence between both Realism and TDT is their interpretation of the relationship between war, anarchy, power and diplomacy. For example, Realists argue that between states anarchy persists. Consequently, they 'tend to see war as the natural order of things, a necessary evil for which one should always be

¹¹⁶ Grayson Kirk. (1947). *The Study of International Relations*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, p.p. 4 – 5.

¹¹⁷ David Long. (1991). J.A Hobson and idealism in international relations. *Review of International Studies*, 17, p. 286.

¹¹⁸ John H. Herz. (1951). *Political Realism and Political Idealism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 36.

prepared'.¹¹⁹ For Realists, war is not actively sought; it is an unfortunate occurrence of the anarchical nature of the state system. International state posturing is thus a perpetual bargaining game, which ultimately concerns the power a state is able to exert over another. Central to Realism is the notion of power: the factors that enable one state to manipulate another's behaviour against its preferences.¹²⁰ Power contests thus create anarchy, which in turn can lead to war. Realists do not grant much currency to diplomacy when it is related to the omnipotent specters of war, power and anarchy.

Traditionalists, on the other hand, promote diplomacy as the antithesis to anarchy, war and power. For Traditionalists, the purpose of diplomacy is to allay the anarchical nature of the IR system and facilitate peaceful relationships amongst sovereign states. Traditionalists see diplomacy as a continuous and valuable activity aimed at mitigating the uncertainty and turbulence of the system through familiar, historical channels of state diplomacy.

Batora's Traditionalist opinion on diplomacy illustrates the purpose of the traditional diplomatic institution operating within the anarchical IR system:

Diplomacy is something they [states] have in common that enables them to communicate in a predictable and organised manner. Diplomats are the primary guardians and promoters of national interests of the states they represent but are at the same time members of a transnational group of professionals with a shared corporate culture, professional language, behavioural codes, entry procedures, socialisation patterns, norms and standards.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Goldstein and Pevehouse, *International Relations*, p. 5.

¹²⁰ Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p. 37.

¹²¹ Batora, Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy?, p. 1.

Traditionalists agree that the purpose of diplomacy is to avoid or mitigate confrontation, to lessen the unpredictability and disorganisation inherent to an anarchical IR system composed of individualistic states. Through common diplomatic understanding, the turbulence, anarchy and unpredictability of the international relations system is lessened by the acceptance of a common set of rules, standards and norms governing state behaviour. Where Realists see war as a consequence of the anarchic IR system, Traditionalists would argue that war breaks out as a failure of the traditional diplomatic system; ‘diplomacy fails because no one [including leaders motivated by realists concerns] wants it to succeed’.¹²²

Traditionalists clearly place much more value on diplomacy than Realists. They portray it as an unsung activity preserving the fragile stability of the IR system. In the words of one diplomatic theorist, ‘no one cares that diplomacy works, so long as it works.’¹²³ One could replace the ‘no one cares’ with ‘Realists do not care’ in this quote. What concerns Realists are breakdowns in the diplomatic system, why they occur, what results from them and if a pattern – in relation to past breakdowns – can be discerned. Traditionalists, on the other hand, consistently theorise on the continuities of diplomacy and how the modern diplomatic system works, not breaks down.

These points of theoretical divergence and convergence between TDT and Realism are compelling. They suggest that realism and Traditionalism can be distinguished, but share certain similarities. In the context of this thesis these similarities suggest that just as Realism is central to IR so too must TDT remain central to diplomatic theory/diplomatic studies.

¹²² Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, p. 8.

¹²³ Paul Sharp, Correspondence, July 15th, 2005.

5.1.4 NDT and Liberalism

Perhaps the most obvious similarity between NDT and Liberalism is the uncomplimentary opinion both theories have of the incumbent state. For Liberalists, the state is an ‘evil institution that encourages people to act selfishly and to harm others’.¹²⁴ Similarly, in the NDT literature the state is depicted as a ‘villain, an intrusive monolith with a propensity to lose sight of the real common good in pursuit of its own bureaucratic and diplomatic agenda’.¹²⁵

Both groups of theorists see the state and the state system as a hindrance to international harmony. Nascent theorists view the state as blocking change to a more peaceful IR system. Nascent theorists are ‘those who regard the state as an obstacle to world order’; for them ‘the development of an alternative diplomacy’ which ‘offers the prospect of an international order transcending the state system’ is paramount to international stability.¹²⁶ Similarly, Liberalists see the state and the state system as a hindrance. They believe ‘the condition of anarchy, the uncertainty and insecurity involved with it, poses an obstacle to progress in international affairs’.¹²⁷ For Liberalists, the state is a significant obstacle to achieving a harmonious IR system, so much ‘that we have made of national sovereignty a god; and of nationalism a religion, so that even when the most solid advantages for international cooperation are offered they are rejected impulsively’.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p. 34.

¹²⁵ Whaites, NGOs, civil society and the state, p. 344.

¹²⁶ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 24.

¹²⁷ Jackson, Martin Wight’s Thought on Diplomacy, p. 6.

¹²⁸ Angell, Norman. (1933). ‘The International Anarchy’, in L. Woolf (ed.) *The Intelligent Man’s Way to Prevent War*. London: Victor Gollancz, p. 27.

Both groups of theorists hold the incumbent state responsible for this constant rejection. For Liberalists, the state ‘no longer serves the needs of the people in an age when nothing short of the governance of all mankind offers promise of protecting men from the evils of anarchy’.¹²⁹ Nascent theorists differ slightly here in that their opinion is confined to the traditional diplomatic institution, but the message is the same: in the 21st century, the traditional diplomatic institution is irrelevant and rapidly losing the ability to control the increasingly complex IR system. Nascent theorists portray the traditional diplomatic institution as ‘unresponsive to change, archaic and capable only of providing solutions to out-dated problems’.¹³⁰ Consequently, both groups of theorists suggest that the existing international order – dominated by states and greased by traditional diplomacy – must be incorporated into a more effective, institutional system.

For both Liberalists and Nascent theorists, thirdly, a more effective institutional system would be to invest faith in the principle of international organisation, which could overcome the endemic ills of the state system. The former believe in the principle of ‘collective security’ enshrined in the form of an ‘international organisation to facilitate peaceful system change, disarmament and arbitration’.¹³¹ Liberalists, thus, place great faith in universal ‘international institutions, new actors (transnational corporations, nongovernmental organisations) and new patterns of interaction’ such as economic interdependence and integration.¹³² Similarly, Nascent theorists focus on the role of non-state diplomatic actors (NGOs, IGOs and MNCs) when theorising on diplomacy. Fundamentally, Nascent theorists believe that the modern IR system has provided ‘the

¹²⁹ F. L. Schuman. (1952). *The Commonwealth of Man*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 481.

¹³⁰ Hoffman, *Reconstructing Diplomacy*, p. 537.

¹³¹ Bayliss and Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 195.

¹³² *ibid.*

opportunity for non-state actors to engage in diplomacy through channels which replace those employed by governments'.¹³³

Liberalists claim that by allowing these non-state actors and institutions to flourish, the frequency of conflict and international anarchy can be reduced and ultimately banished from the IR system.¹³⁴ Similarly, Nascent theorists promote the more peaceful ethos of non-state actors over the incumbent traditional diplomatic institution.

Consequently, both groups of theorists question the value of employing history as a guide to the future; NDTs more so than Liberalists. This focus on 'looking backwards instead of forwards' is only conducive to repetition, rather than progress.¹³⁵ Liberalists are therefore seeking 'change in an unchangingly repetitive realm'.¹³⁶ The 'Liberal world view values reform of the status quo through an evolutionary process of incremental change'.¹³⁷ For some Liberal theorists, to change the IR system means discounting a retrospective view, to abandon history. Where history is concerned, Nascent theorists tend to avoid the distant past altogether. This is natural for Nascent theorists whose theory is concerned with post cold-War developments in the IR system and the emergence of non-state actors challenging the incumbent state and the traditional diplomatic institution. By focusing on events since the end of the Cold War, Nascent theorists demonstrate uncertainty on the value of history to diplomatic theory.

The fourth and final similarity between the two groups of theorists is their opinion of theorists who endorse the centrality of the state and the traditional diplomatic in theoretical postulations. Both groups of theorists see state-centric theories as archaic and

¹³³ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 24.

¹³⁴ Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p. 34.

¹³⁵ Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, p. 7.

¹³⁶ Long, J.A Hobson and idealism, p. 286.

¹³⁷ Goldstein and Pevehouse, *International Relations*, p. 5.

unreflective of the modern IR system. For Liberalists, the disparity of views is enshrined in an ‘ongoing debate’¹³⁸ where Liberalists continue to lock theoretical horns with Realists.¹³⁹ Consistently, Liberalists maintain that:

In a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute. It is ill-suited to the new era.¹⁴⁰

Those endorsing this ‘cynical calculus’ are state-centric theorists who:

alienate themselves from the complex reality of international relations. This theory is an instrument used to endorse a certain world order, while rejecting others as threatening their preferred order.¹⁴¹

Nascent theorists also argue that the state-centric theories on diplomacy fail to account for the complexities of the modern IR system. These theories are thus rejected for ‘not being sufficiently inclusive, the need [according to Nascent theorists] is for a more diffuse, multiperspectival approach’.¹⁴² Nascent theorists also portray the dominant Traditionalists as jealously and unfairly protecting a sacrosanct theoretical domain, one that is fast losing relevance.

Despite these similarities the two theories can be distinguished from one another. These differences emerge when the similarities are revisited. While this observation may

¹³⁸ See appendix 6, the Myth of the Great Debate.

¹³⁹ Kegley and Raymond, *The Global Future*, p. 27.

¹⁴⁰ Clinton in Kegley and Raymond, *The Global Future*, p. 32.

¹⁴¹ Reyhler, *Beyond Traditional Diplomacy*, p. 6.

¹⁴² Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 362.

seem paradoxical, at a deeper level of analysis (a closer cross examination) real differences begin to emerge. The following are subtle differences but confirm that the two types of theory can exist as independent sets of individual, interconnected assumptions.

Returning to both theories' opinion on the value of history it is clear that Liberalism has a richer, deeper view of history, and how that history is employed to shore up its theoretical foundations. Much of Liberalism was conceived in the false calm of the Inter-war period (1918 – 1939), and looking further back was influenced by the work of early liberal thinkers. NDT on the other hand see no relevancy in the distant past, and states quite clearly its focus is on 'seismic shifts in the political landscape since 1989'.¹⁴³ This is a distinct difference. Liberalism can trace its roots to the distant as well as recent past, whereas NDT cannot.

The difference in the depth of history employed highlights a second distinction between the two theories. Liberalism has a deep, philosophical grounding, whereas NDT does not. Liberalism, for example, stems from the core belief of certain early philosophical writers that 'the equality, dignity and liberty of the individual are greater than the glory of the state'.¹⁴⁴ Indeed, philosophers such as David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Jean Jacques Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, Thomas Jefferson, John Locke, and even further back, Thomas More are often seen as the catalysts for the introduction of thoughts postulating the existence of a 'better world' outside the political machinery of the day.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p. 32

¹⁴⁴ *ibid.*, p. 33.

¹⁴⁵ For an expansion on the central tenets of each of these thinkers, see, Michael W. Doyle. (1995). *Liberalism and World Politics Revisited*, in Charles W. Kegley, *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 83 – 106; Michael E. Howard. (1978). *War and the Liberal Conscience*. New York: Oxford University Press; Mark W. Zacher and Richard A. Matthew. (1995). *Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands*, in

There are even some liberal writers who credit the Magna Carta as the beginnings of ‘an ideal, a moralistic movement challenging the egregious nature of the ruling state.’¹⁴⁶ In the face of such a rich, philosophical and historical tradition, NDT with its exclusive insistence on post Cold War events appears somewhat paltry by comparison. NDT is a newer and narrower theory, relating primarily to non-state diplomacy while Liberalism is a far older and broader body of theory, first grounded in philosophy but evolving to emphasis global cooperation (in the face of introspective and individual state motives) through international institutions, law and disarmament.

A third and final point of distinction between the two groups of theorists is their regard for the incumbent state. Orthodox Nascent theorists, such as Hoffman and Modelski, are scathing in their criticism of the state and its traditional diplomatic institution. From a diplomatic point of view their central premise is that diplomacy can be performed far more effectively by non-state actors. Liberalists, after the disaster of the Second World War, changed their base theoretical assumption of international society superseding the incumbent state to arguments that acknowledged ‘the state will endure. If positive change is to occur, it must begin with the state.’¹⁴⁷ It took a disaster on the scale of the Second World War to convince these post War Liberalists that change must begin in the ‘real’ world of the nation-state. It is foreseeable that NDTs may realise, in time, the futility of ignoring the incumbent and dominant international political actor.

These base differences between the two theories confirm that two different but similar theories can be evidenced in the IR discipline and the diplomacy studies field.

Charles W. Kegley, *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 107 – 149.

¹⁴⁶ Melvyn Bragg. (2006). *Twelve Books that Changed the World*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, p. 66.

¹⁴⁷ Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p. 34.

The four similarities between Liberalists and Nascent theorists suggest that just as Liberalism is central to IR so too must NDT become central to diplomatic theory/diplomatic studies.

5.1.5 IDT and Constructivism

Both Innovators and Constructivists interpret state/non-state linkages in different ways, but both advocate the same message: growing state and nonstate linkages are central to the stability and harmony of the modern IR system. The most obvious similarity between IDT and Constructivism is that they are both relatively new theories, having only truly emerged since the end of the Cold War. A second obvious commonality between IDT and Constructivism is that both theories offer ‘alternative ways of thinking’ about modern diplomacy and IR.¹⁴⁸ That is, ways of thinking which are different from Realism and/or TDT and Liberalism and/or NDT. Thus, both IDT and Constructivism offer alternate lenses with which to interpret the current shape of the IR system. This lens does not restrict thinking in binary either (state) or (non-state) terms, but both.

While both IDT and Constructivism postulate on continuities within the modern IR system, such as state omnipotence, they advocate an equal focus on emerging factors and forces transforming that system. At its core, Constructivism ‘looks into why the world is organized in the way it is, considers the different factors that shape the durable forms of world politics, and seeks alternative worlds’.¹⁴⁹ Similarly, Innovators ‘try to provide insights into a transforming diplomatic landscape and the changing modalities and forms of diplomacy’.¹⁵⁰ Distancing but not abandoning the state focus, their purpose

¹⁴⁸ Michael Barnett, ‘Social Constructivism’, in John Bayliss and Steve Smith. (2005). *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 269.

¹⁴⁹ *ibid.*, p. 268.

¹⁵⁰ Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p. xx.

is to ‘analyse the effects of drastic change in the international environment on tried and tested diplomatic practices’.¹⁵¹ Both Innovators and Constructivists focus on ‘how state and non-state actors reproduce the structure’ of the IR system and ‘at times transform it’.¹⁵² In other words, both groups of theorists are interested in enduring regularities in the system, *alongside* emerging phenomenon.

Both theories perform a valuable mediating role between dominant, disparate and conflicting theories within their respective disciplines. Strictly speaking, Constructivism is ‘not a theory of international politics’ but rather helps ‘clarify the differences and relative virtues’ of alternate IR theories.¹⁵³ Constructivism therefore ‘attempts to bridge the gap’ between the disparate theories of Realism and Liberalism by ‘accepting many key assumptions shared by both approaches’.¹⁵⁴ Innovators too practice a balanced approach to diplomatic theory. They perform a mediating role within the field, utilising the merits of *both* the statist and non-statist diplomatic theories. They recognise that there is a need to theorise on both state and non-state actors if the modern diplomatic environment is to be understood. Innovators draw on both statist and non-statist theories to enrich their theory; they do not believe one single diplomatic theory is able to fully explain the modern diplomatic environment. Similarly, at the heart of Constructivism is the contention that:

¹⁵¹ *ibid.*

¹⁵² Barnett, *Social Constructivism*, p. 252.

¹⁵³ A. Wendt. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 5. Constructivism is a social theory and not a substantive theory of international politics. Social theory is ‘broadly concerned with how to conceptualise the relationship between agents and structures and substantive theory offers specific claims and hypotheses about patterns in world politics’ (Barnett, 2005: 258). For a discussion on the origins of Constructivism, its rise and incorporation into IR theory see, Barnett, Michael. (2005). Social Constructivism, in Bayliss, John and Smith, Steve. (2005). *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 251 – 270.

¹⁵⁴ Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p. 53.

because there are a great number of alternative, and sometimes incomplete, ways of organising theoretical inquiry about world politics, the challenge of interpreting the world's political problems cannot be reduced to any one simple yet compelling account (such as Realism or Liberalism).¹⁵⁵

Equally, Innovators propose enhanced cooperation, dialogue and balance in place of the theoretical hostility and parochialism inherent to either state-centric or anti-statist theories on diplomacy. The notion of existing 'somewhere in between' dominant theoretical perspectives on IR and diplomacy is thus central to both IDT and Constructivism.¹⁵⁶

Therefore, it can be argued that both theorists do not favour any one theoretical opinion over the other. But this indecisiveness does not suggest Innovators or Constructivists exist in a state of theoretical purgatory. Their impartiality is a consequence of their belief in both state and non-state actors as having an equal influence in world politics. For example, Innovators believe a symbiotic relationship exists between modern diplomatic actors (state and non-state). In the modern diplomatic environment, they argue that state/nonstate diplomatic relationships are distinctly non-adversarial, symbiotic and complementary.

Similarly, Constructivism advocates consideration of both the state and the non-state if we are to understand the modern IR system. Whereas the Innovators advocate the growing physical and practical relationships between state and non-state actors,¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵ *ibid.*, p. 49.

¹⁵⁶ Barnett, *Social Constructivism*, p. 249.

¹⁵⁷ See chapter four, Innovative Diplomatic Theory.

Constructivism sees an ontological connection between ‘socially accepted ideas, norms and values held by powerful state and non-state actors’.¹⁵⁸ Not only do ‘ideational structures shape how the very actors define themselves – who they are, their goals, and the roles they believe they should play’ – but also they shape the ‘prevailing ideas in each age about the global condition and the prospects for humanity to escape the problems posed by states in an anarchic arena’.¹⁵⁹

According to both groups of theorists, social linkages between modern peoples occur in many different guises in the modern IR system, not just state-qua-state relations (political linkages) as the sole conduit for international exchange. For Constructivists, seeing the modern IR system through one statist lens is today insufficient. They argue, for example, that Realist approaches which focus exclusively on ‘power politics, anarchy, and military force cannot explain’ the modern IR system.¹⁶⁰ Instead, these factors must be considered in tandem with the impact ‘institutions, norms and changes in identity’ have on modern IR.¹⁶¹

Similarly, Innovators argue that to understand the modern diplomatic environment state and non-state actors must be considered in tandem. Innovators stress that modern diplomacy must be considered in relation to ‘the transformed environment of actors, issues, and modes of communication within which diplomats function; and yet, demonstrate the continuing centrality of conventional diplomats to most of what happens in contemporary diplomacy’.¹⁶² This approach to theorising on diplomacy is valuable, stressing the role of traditional diplomatic actors in *relation* to nascent diplomatic actors.

¹⁵⁸ Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p. 54.

¹⁵⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ Goldstein and Pevehouse, *International Relations*, p. 111.

¹⁶¹ *ibid.*

¹⁶² Sharp, *For Diplomacy*, p. 47.

In the case of both theories, it is the shared ‘ideas and norms’ between state and non-state, ‘rather than power and self-interest’ of disparate actors, which shapes the modern IR system.¹⁶³ Fundamentally, both Constructivism and IDT claim that ‘in our theoretical exploration of world politics, we must avoid the temptation to embrace one worldview and abandon another without any assurance that their relative worth is permanently fixed’.¹⁶⁴

As both theories are relatively new they have not yet achieved the breadth and depth of more well established theories such as Realism or Traditionalism. The youth of both theories means that differences between Constructivism and IDT are not as obvious as the other two diplomatic and IR theories. For example, Constructivism is not sufficiently broad enough to have explored fully certain fleeting postulations. Where diplomacy is concerned, Constructivism simply mentions that ‘diplomacy is an agent for change’ in international relations.¹⁶⁵ However, this valuable observation is not expanded upon. An extrapolation could suggest the centrality of socialisation, dialogue and the diffusion of norms to Constructivism makes diplomacy an essential element of world politics, as well as an agent of change. IDT differs here because through its inherent balance between state-centric and non-statist theory it encourages ‘both change and continuity’ in international relations.¹⁶⁶

A second related difference lies in the very notion of theory according to both groups of theorists. Constructivism, like Realism and Liberalism, claims to be individual and distinct body of theory. They can be distinguished from one another because each

¹⁶³ Goldstein and Pevehouse, *International Relations*, p. 112.

¹⁶⁴ Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p. 55.

¹⁶⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p. xx.

contains different sets of assumptions, each of which attempts to make sense of the complex international relations system. For Constructivists, different theoretical ‘perceptions about world politics must be organized for inquiry to be conducted’.¹⁶⁷ IDT, on the other hand, prefers disorganisation and diffusion. IDT consistently highlights the futility of adhering to one theory of the other as it confines diplomatic theorists to parochial factions (in the context of this thesis, to Traditionalism or NDT). IDT, therefore, champions an eclectic approach to theory, borrowing from *all* types of theory. For IDTs, ‘any interpretation [of diplomacy] is as valid as any other, and there is no point in attempting to develop a shared conception of the world’.¹⁶⁸ This line of enquiry is confusing; after all how can an eclectic *body* of theory stand as an independent *category* of theory? This question will become easier to answer as both Constructivism and IDT broaden further. For the moment, this difference between Constructivism (as striving to stake a claim to independence, in relation to other independent theories) and IDT (as embracing the value of eclecticism, of diverse and disparate views) serves to highlight that the theories share both differences and similarities. Once more, the similarities between the two theories suggest that just as Constructivism is emerging as central to IR so too is IDT central to diplomatic theory/diplomatic studies.

5.2 Implications for diplomatic theory: benefits of reconciliation

This thesis contends that there are several benefits for diplomacy studies of reconciling TDT, NDT and IDT. The majority of these benefits mitigate the problems of theoretical diversity identified in section 5.0.3, which characterise the current relationship

¹⁶⁷ Kegley and Wittkopf, *World Politics*, p 52.

¹⁶⁸ Melissen, *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, p. v.

between the three groups of diplomatic theories and theorists as one of isolation and competition (over the optimal diplomatic theory). Reconciliation provides a method to sidestep these problems and breathe new life into the diplomatic studies field. There are many other associated benefits.

Firstly, reconciliation encourages the banishment of disagreement and competition between theorists over one, all-encompassing form of diplomatic theory. If the notion of one comprehensive type of diplomatic theory endures then diplomatic theorists will continue to compete. If, however, there is no singular theory to compete over and diplomatic theory is viewed as tripartite then we have three lenses (instead of one) with which to view the modern diplomatic environment. Reconciliation allows the three theories to become specialised instead of viewed as extreme, irrelevant and parochial by other competing groups of theory. The key to durable reconciliation is to no longer view each group as parochial, exclusive and parsimonious but *specialised*, where each theory has a unique contribution to understanding modern diplomacy. ‘Recognizing the different kinds of insights each approach has to offer’ is important to the future strength of a broadening diplomatic studies field.¹⁶⁹ (354)

For example, Traditionalists could become specialists of the state and the traditional diplomatic institution. Their exclusive focus, historical knowledge and insistence on the state as the only diplomatic actor is thus appreciated, rather than dismissed as an archaic, sentimental theory by other ‘competing’ groups. At the same time, in order to understand the complex multi-actor nature of modern diplomacy it is necessary to develop a body of theory on non-state diplomatic actors. Thus, the specialisation of Nascent theorists is accepted as crucial to this area of modern diplomatic

¹⁶⁹ Sil, *The Foundations of Eclecticism*, p. 354.

theory. Nascent theorists become specialised in alternate and non-state diplomacy. The relationship *between* state and non-state diplomatic actors becomes the domain of the Innovators, who stress a symbiosis between the two. In addition, the Innovator's insistence on validating theory with practical opinion becomes valuable to modern diplomatic theory in that it lessens the divide between theoretical and practical diplomacy. Bridges are thus built between the theoretical and practical diplomatic domains.

Under the suggested tripartite form of theoretical organisation, the diplomatic studies field becomes more orderly, with each group of theorists aware of the borders of their respective domains. Their purpose then is not to defend their theory but to enhance knowledge within their own specialised sub-field.

A third benefit suggests that by reconciling the three divergent theories on diplomacy, the sterile and unproductive state *versus* non-state type debates can be sidestepped, or even expelled from the diplomatic studies field. Perhaps the field has become subconsciously distracted by the competition between different actors central to their respective theories. Now that this thesis has suggested a way to reconcile the three views, a complete picture of the modern diplomatic environment can be conceived.¹⁷⁰

A fourth benefit is that reconciliation through interdisciplinarity mitigates the marginalisation of the diplomatic studies field. This gesture must come from the diplomatic studies field; there are few murmurs of marginalisation directed towards the IR field. For the marginalised diplomatic studies field, the danger of continuing to avoid interdisciplinarity perhaps highlights the need for it. Elman and Elman broadly agree, noting that:

¹⁷⁰ This 'picture' will be conceptualised in the following chapter.

as long as disciplines provide inward looking socialisation and training for their prospective members, scholars will emerge...grounded in their own field, but virtually ignorant of developments and applications beyond the boundaries of their own discipline.¹⁷¹

Writing specifically with the diplomatic studies field in mind Gaddis stresses the need for the discipline to engage with other disciplines, otherwise scholarship in diplomacy is likely to stagnate. He writes of the diplomatic studies field that:

without occasional bumps against those that lie nearby there is a tendency for fields – and the minds that inhabit them – simply to replicate themselves without evolutionary progress. It might be a good thing for disciplines to consider whether they are in fact bumping up against their neighbors with sufficient regularity to move beyond the monotony of self replication.¹⁷²

As of 2006, it is difficult to argue that diplomatic studies ‘bumps’ into any other disciplines, even IR. The discipline’s isolation is problematic. Considering that the field of diplomacy studies is dominated by TDT, scholars are prone to theoretical myopia, replication instead of innovation and distance from real, multi-actor postulations on modern diplomacy. In this context, building theoretical linkages between diplomacy and IR is productive for diplomatic theories and theorists because ‘if we cannot understand one another, if we cannot bring together, in a mutually comprehensible way, the various

¹⁷¹ Colin Elman and Miriam F. Elman. (1997). Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory. *International Security*, 22 (1), p. 17.

¹⁷² John L. Gaddis. (1990). New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of American Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. *Diplomatic History*, 14 (3), pp. 405 – 406.

perspectives that our discipline has to offer then we will remain cut off'.¹⁷³ A confluence between IR and diplomacy studies would lessen the latter discipline's marginalisation and help push 'the study of diplomacy to the center stage of international studies where it rightly belongs'.¹⁷⁴ Building bridges between IR and diplomacy studies 'could well result in a more general understanding that it [diplomacy] is not a peripheral and even somewhat esoteric subject, but by its fundamental nature and role should be at the heart of any instruction in the elements of international relations'.¹⁷⁵

The positive benefits described above are all consequences of reconciliation, the main beneficiary being diplomatic theory and the diplomatic studies field. Reconciliation is important where diplomacy studies are concerned because Traditionalists are not going to become less statist, Nascent theorists less anti-statist and Innovators less symbiotic. All three groups of theorists have obvious strengths, but when these are employed to defend their respective diplomatic theory the propensity to entrench adversarial debate is inevitable.

The fourth, final and most important benefit of reconciling and strengthening the three diplomatic theories is that it helps us understand the modern diplomatic environment better. If diplomatic theory can be considered as tripartite, 'we will be in a better position to analyse the contemporary changes in diplomacy'.¹⁷⁶ By using the three lenses of TDT, NDT and IDT, we can 'begin to address crucial issues which as yet have largely been ignored, remain paradoxical or unanswerable in the current diplomatic

¹⁷³ Gaddis, *Expanding the Data Base*, p. 4.

¹⁷⁴ Lee and Hudson, *The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy*, p. 340.

¹⁷⁵ James, Alan. (1993). *Diplomacy and Foreign Policy. Review of International Studies*, 1993 (1), p.100.

¹⁷⁶ Lee and Hudson, *The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy*, p. 345.

studies schema'.¹⁷⁷

Those issues that have been ignored relate to the diplomacy of non-state actors. Those issues that remain paradoxical concern the coexistence of state and non-state diplomatic actors. And those issues that remain unanswerable relate to the confusion surrounding debates postulating on the nature and constitution of the modern diplomatic environment. The following chapter will attempt to mitigate the ignored, the paradoxical and the unanswerable from the current diplomatic schema by validating the worth of interpreting modern diplomacy through the three lenses of TDT, NDT and IDT.

¹⁷⁷ *ibid.*, p. 346.

Chapter Six – Using TDT, NDT and IDT to better understand the modern diplomatic environment

Now that the three diplomatic theories have been reconciled, we can begin the next step, asking how do these three theories fit together and what picture do they produce when they are appropriately fitted? The aim of this chapter is to paint an accurate theoretical picture of the modern diplomatic environment, by using the three diplomatic theories together. Where points of convergence (amongst the theories) are evident, several theoretical assumptions are advanced. Each of these assumptions relates to the six themes, factors and forces present throughout this thesis. Ultimately, the picture that emerges (by using the three lenses) is not a fragmented diplomatic environment composed of disparate actors and diplomatic environments but a multi-layered system of diplomatic networks.

6.0 Methodology: using the three diplomatic theories work together

With a view to better understanding the modern diplomatic environment, a formula is proposed and tested in this chapter. Central to the proposed formula are three ingredients: firstly, the diplomatic theories of TDT, NDT and IDT; secondly, this thesis' consequent theoretical observations; and thirdly, empirical diplomatic evidence. Blending these three ingredients together – in relation to each of the six themes – results in a more lucid interpretation of the modern diplomatic environment.

Firstly, it is argued that using the three diplomatic theories together – in relation to a particular theme – is more beneficial than considering them in isolation. Currently, one theory is unable to account for the complexity of the modern diplomatic

environment. There are simply too many actors – state and non-state – for one theory to fit all. The presence of different diplomatic theories is therefore useful in that they ‘provide a map, or frame of reference, that makes the complex, puzzling world around us [more] intelligible’.¹ Each of the three diplomatic theories is fundamentally distinctive, since each is a lens through which the modern diplomatic environment looks different and different things seem important. Each of the three theories has something different to say on each particular theme.

By using the three theories together – in relation to each particular theme - the necessity of the second ingredient is confirmed. By considering the individual theoretical observations of each group of diplomatic theorists alongside one another, this thesis is able to propose a number of meta-theoretical assumptions. These assumptions are this thesis’ theoretical propositions on the modern diplomatic environment. Some of these assumptions exist already but are in need of consolidation, whereas others are novel, emerging as a result of the interplay of the three theories.

Only by using the three theories together do these assumptions emerge. If points of convergence amongst the three theories can be established the subsequent theoretical assumption can be confirmed as accurate, as consensus exists amongst two or more of the diplomatic theories. This occurrence is rare, however. More common, are points of contention and theoretical divergence amongst the three theories, which leads to the third ingredient necessary to enhance understanding of the modern diplomatic environment.

Thirdly and finally, empirical evidence can be employed in an arbitrary capacity. If contention and divergence amongst the three theories is apparent (and in most of the six themes, factors and forces this is the case) then empirical evidence can be used to

¹ Kegley and Raymond, *The Global Future*, p. 24.

settle the conflicting and individual theoretical differences. By using the three theories together (firstly) a set of theoretical assumptions (secondly) emerges. If these assumptions can be confirmed with empirical evidence (thirdly) then this thesis can propose a more accurate and composite body of theory on each of the six themes, forces and factors prevalent in the modern diplomatic environment. By using empirical evidence each of the theoretical observations proposed in this chapter is enriched and substantiated.

The empirical evidence used in this chapter comes from ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ diplomatic sources. In the following six sections, evidence from three diplomatic institutions is employed to validate this thesis’ theoretical assumptions: the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). Several NGOs and IGOs are also employed, such as the International Red Cross, the American Red Cross and the United Nations. Considering evidence from both traditional (state) and unconventional (nascent) diplomatic actors reveals a cross section of the modern diplomatic environment.

In addition, using empirical evidence is a tentative step towards bridging the gap between theory and practice. Diplomatic studies and theory are closely related to the practical, real world of diplomacy. The theory of the field must therefore take into consideration the official, professional and real activity of diplomacy. By relating theory to practice, diplomatic theory becomes more robust, relevant and informative. After all, and borrowing from an International Relations adage, ‘theory linked to data is more

powerful than either data or theory alone'.² These three 'ingredients' and their subsequent employment constitute this thesis' final postulations with a view to better understanding the modern diplomatic environment.

This approach has faint resonance with the broader IR field, in particular the notion of theoretical eclecticism proposed by Katzenstein and Okawara.³ It must be noted, however, that their novel approach is focused more on the practical application of a loose idea of theoretical eclecticism, rather than on a thorough explanation of the methodology behind the idea.⁴ However, certain central notions of Katzenstein and Okawara's methodology can be extracted.

Firstly, the two authors approach 'stresses the need to build bridges between multiple analytical perspectives', advice which could easily be applied to diplomatic theory.⁵ This thesis agrees by similarly arguing that 'bridges' need to be built between the three diplomatic theories of TDT, NDT and IDT. The antagonistic debates and competitive opinions (amongst the three diplomatic theories) on diplomacy are sidestepped in order to construct a more diffuse and multiperspectival form of diplomatic theory. The 'bitter, repetitive and inherently inconclusive' nature of the battle over one, all encompassing diplomatic theory is thus written off.⁶ Released from the constraints of

² Bates in Sil, *The Foundations of Eclecticism*, p. 375.

³ See, Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobou Okawara. (2001/2002). Japan, Asian-Pacific Security and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism. *International Security*, 26 (3), 153 – 185. The two authors argue that compelling, eclectic and accurate analyses of the Asia-Pacific Security dilemma are better served through 'combining realist, liberal and constructivist modes of explanation' (2001: 177). See also, Rudra Sil. (2000) *The Foundations of Eclecticism: The Epistemological Status of Agency, Culture, and Structure in Social Theory*. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 12 (3), 353 – 387.

⁴ Specifically, Katzenstein and Okawara apply theoretical eclecticism to Japan and Asian-Pacific Security. They employ empirical evidence to Asian regional security issues and sidestep 'the controversies about the merits of neoliberalism, rationalism, and Realism' (2001: 153). Instead, they propose all three theories have a (combined) valuable and specialised contribution to enhancing IR knowledge on Asian regional security issues.

⁵ Katzenstein and Okawara, Japan, Asian-Pacific Security and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism, p. 183.

⁶ *ibid.*

defending or promoting respective and individual diplomatic theories, a more complete picture of the modern diplomatic environment can be realised.

A second tenet of eclectic theorising that the two authors suggest is the need for more ‘innovation and originality’ within the IR field.⁷ Diplomatic studies also could benefit from a similar fresh approach. The dominance of the Traditionalists has stymied innovation and detracted ‘scholars from the primary task at hand: recognizing interesting questions and testing alternative explanations’ in relation to modern diplomacy.⁸ Two such ‘interesting’ questions this thesis addresses in this chapter are: is the modern diplomatic environment better understood as a dual enterprise involving state and non-actors practicing distinct but complementary forms of diplomacy? and if so, is an eclectic approach (using the three lenses/theories selectively) better able to interpret the multi-actor nature of modern diplomacy?

This approach offers much to theorising on diplomacy, since originality, deconstruction and reconstruction – from an innovative angle – is important if diplomatic theory is to be modernised. As the first half of this thesis demonstrated, the diplomatic studies field continues to broaden. There is a subsequent correlation with increased possibilities for innovation. As the field broadens there is both the need and possibility for new approaches to theorising on modern diplomacy. In addition, considering the multi-actor complexity of modern diplomacy, perhaps it is time to move away from, but not abandon, the heavy TDT (statist) focus. To better understand modern diplomacy, we need to ‘think outside the traditional square’.⁹ By using an innovative approach, this direction becomes inevitable.

⁷ *ibid.*, p. 182

⁸ *ibid.*, p. 183.

⁹ Sofer, *Old and New Diplomacy*, p. 207.

A third feature of theoretical eclecticism that Katzenstein and Okawara suggest is its ability (and necessity) to challenge hegemonic or dominant IR theories, which constrain understanding of the modern IR system.¹⁰ The reliance on one theoretical perspective, they argue, results in a limited understanding of the complexity of the modern IR system.¹¹ For the two authors, relying solely on Realism or Liberalism, as one example, is problematic because:

these parsimonious theoretical explanations conceal different layers and connections. Eclecticism protects us from taking as natural partial assumptions about the political world. It regards with discomfort the certainties that derive from relying solely on a single paradigm. Adequate understanding requires analytical eclecticism, not parsimony.¹²

Again, diplomatic theory could benefit from applying a similar, multi-paradigmatic approach to theorising on modern diplomacy. More theoretical attention needs to be devoted to the ‘layer’ of nascent diplomatic actors in the modern diplomatic environment. Within the diplomatic studies field, there is a distinct lack of traditionalist-type depth of knowledge on nascent diplomatic actors, the diplomatic techniques they employ, their common practitioners, their institutional make-up and organisational structures, to name the more obvious elements. Currently, the individualistic, parochial and parsimonious posturing of Traditionalists, Nascent theorists and Innovators conceals the many different layers and connections at work in modern diplomacy. These connections can be, for example, traditional (state to state) or unconventional (state to

¹⁰ Katzenstein and Okawara, Japan, Asian-Pacific Security and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism, p. 183.

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² *ibid.*, p. 185.

NGO, NGO to IGO or even IGO to the individual). These many different layers will remain concealed should the reliance on one theory or one lens persist.

By adopting an eclectic approach (using the three diplomatic theories together), knowledge and theory of nascent diplomacy is promoted *alongside* the established knowledge of traditional diplomacy. The robust body of TDT can be used as a strong foundation on which to build, compare and evaluate alternate forms of diplomatic theory. This mutual respect for all theories therefore promotes not an either/or approach but a multiperspectival theory of diplomacy. In other words, eclectic diplomatic theory recognises and advances knowledge of both state and non-state diplomatic actors and their respective forms of diplomacy. No one theory is held to be better than the other. All have equal weight; all have a valuable and specialised contribution to enhance understanding of the 21st century diplomatic environment.

6.1 Seeing the modern diplomatic environment through the three lenses: TDT, NDT and IDT

The following six themes all relate to the future of the traditional diplomatic institution. The notion that we are in the midst of a period of transformation from tried and tested methods of diplomatic interaction to a new form of polylateral diplomatic interaction is prevalent in the diplomatic studies literature. The purpose of the following six sections is to rigorously test this claim, which is possible by considering the three diplomatic theories together and in an eclectic fashion.

6.1.1. The ongoing evolution of the state and its traditional diplomatic institution

The present and future relevance of the traditional diplomatic institution is central to understanding the modern diplomatic environment. Theorising eclectically confirms that the institution is not in decline, irrelevant or obsolete. Rather, the institution remains central to the modern IR system.

To arrive at and consolidate this hypothesis, the interplay between alternate diplomatic theories is invaluable. Using the three theories eclectically recognises ‘interesting questions’ and tests ‘alternative explanations’ in relation to the fate of the traditional diplomatic institution.¹³ Eclecticism therefore encourages the diplomatic theorist to ask: does the traditional diplomatic institution remain relevant and, if so, how can this be proven? In response, three observations emerge.

The first observation, from considering the three theories together, is the value of the vibrant debate between the three theories. The future of the traditional diplomatic

¹³ Katzenstein and Okawara, Japan, Asian-Pacific Security and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism, p. 183.

institution has generated much debate within the diplomatic studies field. At the moment, this debate is polarised: *either* the institution is *or* is not relevant.

For example, where NDT is concerned, the case for euthanasia, obsolescence and irrelevance of the traditional diplomatic institution is a foundation of their work. According to Nascent theorists, on the one hand, the archaic state system and the traditional diplomacy that lubricates it belong to a by-gone era. Furthermore, the recent proliferation of non-state actors questions the relevance of the traditional diplomatic institution, as Nascent theorists claim them to be more effective diplomatic actors. On the other hand, Traditionalists argue that the traditional diplomatic institution is anything but irrelevant, as it continues to play a fundamental, invaluable and central role in modern international relations. For Traditionalists, the traditional diplomatic institution maintains the monopoly on foreign policy. Non-state actors are thus of peripheral or secondary importance.

These polarised views are useful in that they encourage diplomatic theorists to settle the issue: how can we prove if the institution is or is not relevant? In response, the IDT lens becomes useful. Innovators build on both NDT and TDT. They first acknowledge that the proposition on whether the traditional diplomatic institution is irrelevant depends on respective theoretical foundations. Foundationally, Traditionalists champion the traditional diplomatic institution, whereas Nascent theorists promote the role of non-state entities as more effective diplomatic actors. This fundamental difference means, according to Innovators, that the debate about the decline of diplomacy turns on opposing images of how the diplomatic world works – or should work. Traditionalists are concerned with the reality of diplomacy, whereas Nascent theorists with a future vision of

how the IR system and diplomacy should work. In other words, TDT explains the reality of how the IR system *is*, whereas NDT postulates on how the IR system *ought* to be.

Consideration of these three theoretical views leads to a second observation: that the relevance of the traditional diplomatic institution can be settled by considering the reality of the modern diplomatic environment. In other words, empirical evidence may help settle the debate. If the evidence – the reality, the *is* – of the modern diplomatic environment confirms the omnipotence and growth of the traditional diplomatic institution then its ongoing relevancy can be agreed upon. On the other hand, if the evidence confirms the mass proliferation of non-state actors at the expense of the institution, then its irrelevancy can be confirmed.

Both of these observations are valid. As of 2005 the UN recognised that there were 191 states in the IR system, an increase from 45 in 1945 and 26 in 1919.¹⁴ In order to operate in the international environment, all of these states must practice some form of ‘official’ diplomacy, which adheres to traditional vulgates of diplomatic interaction such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rights. On this evidence, the growth of the traditional diplomatic institution and its diplomatic methods suggest it continues to be relevant: more states mean more traditional diplomacy. After all, as Traditionalists argue, if traditional diplomatic institutions were obsolete then why do they continue to exist and expand?

However, the empirical evidence also supports the NDT argument that non-state actors are increasing in number. The 2005/6 statistics confirm there are 20,928 NGOs, an increase from the 997 in 1954, and 4,518 in 1988. In 2005/6 there are 1,963 IGOs, an

¹⁴ These figures were obtained from the United Nations, retrieved 4th February 2006, <<http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html>>

increase from the 118 in 1950, and 309 in 1988.¹⁵ However, this evidence does not suggest that the rise of these non-state actors is correlated to a decline in traditional state actors. If diplomacy is the activity of representation then an increase in diplomatic actors – state and non-state – only suggests that there are more groups in need of international representation. There *are* more non-state actors emerging and they *are* practicing a form of unofficial diplomacy. Despite this increase in diplomatic actors, this evidence still does not conclusively confirm if the traditional diplomatic institution is relevant. Eclecticism may provide a new way of settling the issue.

A return to the three diplomatic theories suggests a third observation: that the fate of the traditional diplomatic institution concerns its willingness to change in accordance with a radical modern diplomatic environment. The future of the traditional diplomatic institution can thus be conclusively determined by assessing its ability to change.

According to Traditionalists, the traditional diplomatic institution (since its inception in the 17th century) has consistently evolved and reacted to changes in the IR system. For Traditionalists, this continual environmental adaptability confirms that the traditional diplomatic institution remains at the core of the modern IR system. The 21st century is no different: the traditional diplomatic institution is adapting, albeit slowly, to changes in the modern diplomatic environment.

As one Traditionalist, Rana, notes:

The world over, foreign ministries (MFAs) are undergoing transformation, adapting to the changing environment of world politics and their countries' needs. The simultaneous

¹⁵ From Part A: Statistical Data Graphics, Figure 1.1.1. (a): Overview of number of international organisations by type [types A-G,] of the Yearbook of International Organisations, Edition 42, 2005/2006, edited by the Union of International Associations, Lausanne, Switzerland.

congruence of a number of factors (such as the greater participation of varied departments of the government and the domestic publics in foreign affairs, changes in communications and information technology, and transformation in the task that professional diplomats are required to handle) has virtually forced MFAs to reengineer their diplomatic structures and processes.¹⁶

Again, empirical evidence proves useful in ascertaining the extent to which traditional diplomatic institutions have reengineered core structures and processes. If empirical evidence – the reality, the *is* – of the modern diplomatic environment confirms the evolutionary nature of the traditional diplomatic institution then its future role is assured. On the other hand, if the practical evidence suggests that the institution remains static, inflexible and unresponsive to change then its irrelevancy can be confirmed.

Empirical evidence and practical opinion leans towards the evolutionary nature of the traditional diplomatic institution and its ongoing relevance. For example, former Australian Ambassador to France John Spender argued that:

The [traditional] diplomatic institution will remain the most important influence in the international relations system. It will change, as it has always done. To speak of its decline and irrelevancy is problematic. The reason state diplomacy endures and will continue to endure at the heart of the foreign affairs is that no other entity has been able to challenge its supremacy. It endures, because it works.¹⁷

For Ambassador Spender, continuity and a continual evolution and refinement of the tools and techniques of traditional diplomacy confirms the modern relevancy of the

¹⁶ Rana, *Inside Diplomacy*, p. 1.

¹⁷ John Spender, Interview, Gold Coast, Australia. February 25th, 2004.

state diplomatic institution. The rhetoric that the state is in decline, Ambassador Spender concludes, is nothing more than ‘a flight of the imagination’ of diplomatic theorists.¹⁸ Theoretical imagination of an institution in peril is a notion that Ambassador Robert Gordon also highlights. For him:

diplomacy has a certain mystique which in a sense is very attractive. As a result, many scholars fill the vacuum or the void of knowledge with all sorts of imagined notions of how they think diplomacy should be. Some of them are true but most of them are less true.¹⁹

The notion that the institution is in decline and in a state of irrelevance or obsolescence does appear to be one of the ‘less true’ pieces of knowledge. Further opinion suggests that the institution is evolving. The traditional diplomatic institution continues to react to changes in the modern diplomatic environment. Justifying its modern relevance and purpose (and changing accordingly) can be clearly evidenced. Ambassador Gordon noted of this point:

In Britain, we had quite a profound rethink in the last two years of the purpose and execution of foreign policy and its relevance to our citizens. This has now spawned a new FCO (Foreign & Commonwealth Office) ten-year strategy, which is aimed at ensuring the ongoing relevance, accountability and efficiency of the FCO and its diplomatic capacity.²⁰

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ Ambassador Robert Gordon, Interview, Hanoi, Vietnam. March 9th, 2005. As of January 2006, Robert Gordon is the British Ambassador to Vietnam.

²⁰ *ibid.*

The strategy Ambassador Gordon refers to is part of a major reform process to streamline, modernise and justify the relevance of the FCO in 'this complex interdependent²¹ world'.²² A radically different twenty-first century agenda has 'challenged the traditional methods of conducting relations between states'.²³ In other words, the 'complex' modern diplomatic environment has demanded that the FCO must change and evolve if it intends to remain relevant.

A shift in the FCO's agenda is one factor driving its organisational change. This new global agenda is 'like no other before it' and is dominated by a 'volatile security setting, ideology and religion, economics, population growth, environmental change, decreasing energy resources, technological innovation and wider participation of non-state actors in world politics'.²⁴ If the FCO is to adapt and remain relevant it:

will need to be focused on new priorities,²⁵ more flexible in responding to change,²⁶ more open²⁷ and better equipped to serve the public.²⁸ This will require a program for internal change in the FCO, changes to our structures and working practices and far-sighted management.²⁹

²¹ For the origins of Interdependence theory, see Keohane, R. and Nye, J. S. (1972). *Transnational Relations and World Politics*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press; Keohane, R. and Nye, J. S. (1977). *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little Brown; Roseneau, J. N. (1980). *The Study of Global Interdependence*. London: Francis Pinter.

²² The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Annual Report 2004. UK: Public Records Office, p. 3.

²³ Foreign and Commonwealth Office Strategy. (2004). UK: Public Records Office, p. 12.

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ Specifically, the FCO wants to focus their resources on new priorities more efficiently. In order to achieve this they are 'introducing new resource management systems which will improve our ability to assess the costs and activities of our Posts. This should help us to match financial resources to changing priorities in a more dynamic way. As a guiding principle we should be capable of shifting at least five per cent of staff and budget from lower to higher priorities in any three-year spending period' (FCO Strategy, p. 16). These changes have been successful, according to the FCO, who claim they have moved 'ten per cent of resources from administration function in London to front line policy and service functions over the last three years (as of 2004)' (FCO Annual Report, p. 161)

²⁶ These changes refer to the FCO's desire and ability to 'respond fast to changing circumstances' (FCO Strategy, p. 17). Specifically, 'to achieve greater financial flexibility we have decided to retain a Departmental Reserve of equivalent to two per cent of our budget resources from the start of each year. We will extend the concept of rapid reaction teams for consular work to crisis management in other areas of

Despite these changes, the FCO will retain much of its traditional make-up. As Ambassador Gordon pointed out, 'it is important not to throw the baby out with the bathwater'.³⁰ The FCO 'must preserve the diplomatic expertise, knowledge and professionalism that are its core strengths, rightly admired across the world'.³¹ In essence, Gordon claims that the FCO's evolutionary experience suggests both continuity and change. Continuity in terms of preserving core diplomatic functions, such as diplomatically representing their host nation abroad, and change in terms of how they perform and execute these core functions.

The above is strong evidence of one traditional diplomatic institution changing its structure, ethos and organisational culture in response to a radically different international

FCO work. And we are considering a new, centrally-managed cadre of reserve staff who can be switched quickly to new priority work. We will also exploit opportunities that technological advances provide, for example in video conferencing, our intranet and mobile telephony, especially in confidential remote working. Using this new technology our working practices can become more flexible and less compartmentalised.' (FCO Strategy, p. 17).

²⁷ The FCO aims, by 2007, to employ and come to rely on a 'wider range of people, skills and experience' (FCO Strategy, p. 19). This diversity is necessary if the FCO is to achieve its ambitious agenda of change: 'to undertake such a varied range of activities we shall need to continue to recruit high calibre staff, with a wide variety of skills, and offer them motivating and rewarding opportunities. It will be essential to ensure that our internal appointment process and reward system give fair recognition to the diverse skills of all our staff, including experience gained outside the FCO. Our efforts, in this respect, are aimed at developing more interchange with the public, private and voluntary sectors.' (FCO Strategy, p. 20). This type of evidence lays to rest the stereotypical claim that diplomacy is a hermitically sealed world, best left to the professionals.

²⁸ In a signal of its intention to 'engage' with the British public more, the FCO states: 'across the whole range of our activity – including our core policy work – we will focus on delivering targeted and specific outcomes. This must involve making our policy processes more open. We are also giving greater priority, including through regular, published stakeholder surveys, to ensuring that we have public feedback on our performance.' (FCO Strategy, p. 21)

²⁹ FCO Strategy, p. 14. This type of rhetoric is aimed at increasing the FCO accountability to a demanding British public. To appease their (the public's) concern that there is real action behind the words, the FCO employed (in 2000 and 2005) an independent auditing firm, Collison Grant Limited, to assess their progress. The report from Collison Grant Limited was positive; it stated that the FCO realised 'overall saving of 48 million pounds, achieved as a running rate, in 2004, with the full benefit to be obtained during the financial year of 2005/2006'. The 2005 Report by Collison Grant Limited, entitled 'Efficiency, Effectiveness and the control of costs in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office', is available at www.fco.gov.uk/publications.

³⁰ Ambassador Robert Gordon, Interview, March 9th, 2005.

³¹ FCO Strategy, p. 2.

environment. The FCO is not alone in this respect. Canada's DFAIT too acknowledges that:

international policy execution is more complex today than it has ever been in the past. The traditional staples of diplomacy – war and peace, trade and commerce – have been joined by a wide and growing range of issues – the environment, health, global poverty and migration. In this complex environment, it is important that DFAIT be able to critically assess and address the world around us, identify the trends and issues that matter most and respond creatively and effectively. The Strategic Policy branch [of DFAIT] is constantly seeking new methods that allow us to fulfill our valuable role better, faster and cheaper.³²

Like the FCO, DFAIT realises that the 'complex' environment in which it operates requires new techniques, structures and responses. To deal with the new challenges in the international environment, DFAIT intends to:

implement a plan for renewal and transformation consisting of a renewed mandate; a rebuilt policy capacity and ability to ensure government-wide foreign policy coherence; a strengthened global presence; structural changes and an enhanced departmental toolkit; and better service to Canadians, especially timely consular support.³³

To realise these changes, DFAIT will 'renew its capacity through re-allocation of existing resources and through the development of new strategies and instruments',

³² Canada's International Policy Statement is available in pdf format from < <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-en.asp>>, retrieved 18th December 2005, p. 3

³³ Canadian International Policy Statement, (2005), p. 30.

which constitutes ‘complete internal restructuring and consolidation of Foreign Affairs’.³⁴

All of these proposed changes to DFAIT operations are aimed at ‘streamlining and modernising’ their diplomacy ‘for greater effectiveness’.³⁵

A second factor driving organisation change to traditional diplomatic institutions the world over is the public demand for greater accountability. Publics are demanding that traditional diplomatic institutions make the optimum use of Foreign Ministry budgets. This demand creates pressure for traditional diplomatic institutions in the face (often) of shrinking financial resources. These challenges necessitate the creation of more modern and streamlined working practices, with the result being:

that Foreign Ministries are having to work to an overarching strategy, to restructure, to prioritise, actively seek new business, to promote awareness of their skills and services within government and the outside, and to sell their countries’ image abroad while also expanding the relevance of foreign policy [formulation and execution] to domestic audiences.³⁶

³⁴ Specifically, DFAIT aims to restructure the department by 2007. The list of proposed reforms is large. DFAIT aims to ‘include a more focussed North America branch, a global issues branch concentrating on multilateral reform, more strategic management of bilateral relations and international security, and a stronger emphasis on strategic foreign policy development and public diplomacy. Secondly, it aims to increase policy capacity, to better anticipate emerging issues and provide leadership in forging a government-wide response. Thirdly, to establish a Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START) to ensure that there is longer term-planning for early responses to international crises and that the required government skills and expertise are at the ready. Fourthly, to develop new program capacity, including a \$100-million Global Peace and Security Fund, to provide security assistance, as well as resources for post stabilization and recovery. Fifthly, to strengthen its field presence, particularly in regions of growing interest to Canada (such as Asia), and to improve capacity in key third languages such as Mandarin and Arabic. Finally, to pursue a more robust and aggressive public diplomacy strategy, to ensure that Canada’s voice and ideas are clearly heard and understood, enabling us to build the coalitions we need to achieve our goals’ (International Policy Statement, pp. 2-3)

³⁵ Canadian International Policy Statement, (2005), p. 15.

³⁶ Ann Lane. (2005). *Diplomacy Today: Delivering Results in a World of Changing Priorities*. Report on Wilton Park Conference, March 3rd to 6th.

This ‘radical transformation’ is unprecedented, overdue and welcomed (by publics) as a necessity in the complex modern diplomatic environment.³⁷ Given the self-motivated need for evolutionary change, it can be confirmed that the traditional diplomatic institution is not in decline, obsolete or irrelevant. Traditional diplomacy ‘remains a major and ubiquitous activity of governments in our time, and therefore of importance to us all’.³⁸ Diplomacy, after all, is the ‘story of how nations deal with each other, their actions in specific cases and the modalities they employ’ to ensure international political stability.³⁹ Traditional diplomacy’s ongoing relevance is closely related to its evolutionary capacity. Granted, the traditional vulgate of diplomacy is slow to change, to react to environmental developments, however it does change and evolve to suit its immediate environment.

These observations are more accurate than the splintered and fragmented form of theory on the fate of the traditional diplomatic institution that currently exists. Thus, by theorising eclectically, it can be confirmed that the institution has demonstrated, once more, its adaptability and keen sense of awareness of the ever-changing environment within which it operates. These theoretical observations, when supported with empirical evidence, confirm the central, enduring and valuable role of the traditional diplomatic institution in the modern diplomatic environment.

Reaching this assumption would have been impossible had the three diplomatic theories remained in isolation and competition. However, used together, and in eclectic fashion, the debate between the three theories will remain a valuable enterprise when

³⁷ *ibid.*, p. 1. For a breakdown of the motivations and responses of Britain’s FCO to the modern complex modern diplomatic environment see, Ann Lane. (2005). *Diplomacy Today: Delivering Results in a World of Changing Priorities*. Report on Wilton Park Conference, March 3rd to 6th.

³⁸ Watson, *Diplomacy*, p. 13.

³⁹ *ibid.*

theorising on the role and fate of the traditional diplomatic institution. NDT, and IDT to a certain extent, are useful in that they continually encourage the field to prove in some fashion (in this section the method employed was empirical evidence) that the traditional diplomatic institution is not irrelevant or obsolete. For Traditionalists, it is no longer adequate to argue that the institution is not irrelevant or obsolete simply because it continues to exist. Instead, we are encouraged to demonstrate how and why the institution is adapting to yet another radical diplomatic environment. Thus, novel, valuable and deeper knowledge is continually added to the diplomatic studies field.⁴⁰ The debate between various statist and non-statist theorists, if their divergent theoretical approaches are respected, is productive in that the specialised work of the Traditionalists ultimately becomes more robust.

6.1.2 Do IGOs really matter?

By using the three diplomatic theories together, the important role, purpose and function of IGOs in the modern diplomatic environment can be confirmed. Each theory has a valuable contribution in reaching this understanding. By using the three diplomatic theories in an eclectic manner five observations emerge, all of which are validated by practical evidence.

Firstly, IGOs are not distinct diplomatic actors. This observation runs contrary to NDT, which claims that IGOs *are* distinct diplomatic actors where the whole is greater

⁴⁰ Since 1999, this new knowledge has come to light in the diplomatic studies field, and only adds to the scope of diplomacy studies. For three approaches demonstrating the value of such additional knowledge, see Brian Hocking. (1999). *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation*. London: Macmillan; Brian Hocking and David Spence (eds.). (2002). *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*. London: Macmillan; Rana, Kishan S. (2004). *Foreign Ministries: Change and Reform*. Paper presented at the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 18th.

than the sum of their state parts. For Nascent theorists, the IGO is more effective at global problem solving than the incumbent traditional diplomatic institution, which means IGOs have become more significant on the world stage than governments who are cast into growing irrelevance.

This rhetoric is useful, as it challenges statist theorists to prove otherwise. According to Traditionalists, this distinct-diplomatic-actor thesis is difficult to prove, since IGOs are *inter-governmental* organisations after all. States and statesmen initially instigated the concept; therefore Traditionalists argue that IGOs are built by states, for states. Consequently, Traditionalists caution that it is misleading to think of IGOs as outside forces or exogenous actors. IGOs are the conscious creation of states and their success depends on the will of their state members. IDT does not subscribe to either of these arguments but suggests that an appraisal of practical evidence will help settle the debate.

Susan Spencer of UNICEF (Vietnam) admitted that although her IGO confers massive advantage on development issues it struggles to make an impact politically:

We're not politicians or diplomats, we're aid workers. UNICEF does like to push the line that it is a political organisation.... we are aware of political issues, however our priority remains making sure children survive and thrive and get a good start in life. There is a difference [between individual states] in terms of agenda, and in essence this renders us apolitical. We may not be as strong as the state, but we have a lot of knowledge and a lot of expertise. You can't put a price on that; its worthwhile listening to us.⁴¹

⁴¹ Susan Spencer (UNICEF), interview, Hanoi, Vietnam. March 10th, 2005.

In other words, IGOs are not independent political actors but facilitators of expertise available to states if required. The different focus and approach of IGOs means they occupy a specialised niche in the modern diplomatic environment; they perform a different role and function to traditional a state actor, which perhaps alludes to why NDT continue to endorse the distinct-diplomatic-actor thesis. However, despite their different purpose, function, and focus, IGOs remain controlled by states. This is a point evident in much of the official rhetoric espoused by traditional, state actors.

Britain, for example, acknowledges that ‘the UN is nothing more than the aggregate of its member states’ and ‘can only be as strong as its members states allow it to be’.⁴² Similarly, Australia’s DFAT highlighted that the UN is ‘anachronistic...it is up to the member states to encourage the organisation to becomes a relevant and effective 21st century actor.’⁴³ DFAT is suggesting that the success, and future relevance, of the UN is dependent on its member states. Consequently, IGOs *are* viewed only as great as the sum of their state parts and prone to state manipulation. States use IGOs to further their own goals, and will continue to design international institutions accordingly.

This conclusion suggests a second theoretical observation: IGOs are a supplement to traditional state-qua-state diplomacy. Once more, this observation runs contrary to NDT. Nascent theorists highlight that IGOs are not only fora for states but also for non-state actors, such as NGOs and other IGOs. They claim that non-state actors are finding a voice within IGOs and are being accepted as part of a process once reserved for states. How then can IGOs be a supplement to traditional diplomacy? While these observations are correct, Traditionalists remind us that the success of any IGO largely depends on the

⁴² FCO Annual Report, p. 143.

⁴³ DFAT’s Annual Report is available in pdf format from < http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/annual_reports/>, retrieved, 18th December 2005, p. 18.

whims of its dominant state members. Non-state actors influence the process of multilateralism but it is states that take the decisions. Until IGOs dispel the member-state-servant image, they will continue to supplement traditional diplomacy. Traditionalists reluctantly acknowledge the emergence of non-state actors in IGOs but seem unperturbed by this occurrence. States form the bulk of the IGO membership; they are the only actors of real consequence.

This observation is supported with empirical evidence. DFAT's Bob Davis noted of IGOs and multi-lateral diplomacy that:

they are useful for the bilateral opportunities they present....we do need multi-lateral forums but their efficacy has yet to be really proven, particularly in conflict situations. The business end of diplomacy will remain for some time in the bilateral relations between nation states.⁴⁴

Acknowledging that IGOs and multilateralism are useful add-ons to the traditional bilateral machinery, Davis reveals his statist preference in his interpretation of the worth of IGO forums. This is not uncommon for diplomats. Ambassador Les Luck, also of DFAT, jovially agreed that:

Where IGOs are concerned, the multilateral process is tedious, long and often nothing more than a token gesture. Where we [DFAT] achieve real progress is in the unofficial meetings, in the corridor, the car parks and the hotel lobbies. Often we achieve far more with our counterparts over a quick one-on-one chat than at a full day's meeting.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Bob Davis, interview, Canberra, Australia. July 15th, 2004. As of January 2006, Bob Davis is the Assistant Secretary, Open Source Collection Branch, DFAT.

⁴⁵ Ambassador Les Luck, interview, Canberra, Australia. July 15th, 2004.

Thus, IGOs are a forum, a meeting place where many traditional actors are gathered at the same time; multi-lateral IGOs constitute another level of diplomacy, which exists *alongside* the traditional bi-lateral form of diplomacy. Therefore, the real benefit of the multilateral IGOs is the bilateral opportunities that emerge. This type of argument further impinges upon the Nascent theoretical notion of IGOs as distinct diplomatic actors.

If IGOs are not distinct diplomatic but supplementary actors then what relationship do they share with the state? NDT informs us that the relationship is adversarial, with both IGOs and states competing over a right to manage and solve 21st century global problems. However, theorising eclectically provides confirmation that the state/IGO relationship is symbiotic. IDT confirms this third point unequivocally. For Innovators, IGOs are neither built by states for states nor are they independent diplomatic actors. Innovators prefer to focus on a symbiosis between traditional state actors and IGOs. The state/IGO relationship is thus a complementary one, and of benefit to both.

The practical evidence suggests that states, largely, value IGOs. Ambassador Laverdure of DFAIT was positive on the value of multilateralism to Canada. He acknowledged:

we would never be an important power if multilateralism did not exist, we're a small country, that's why we believe the only way to make a difference to the world is to work through the UN and the Commonwealth, and we've achieved great success with that.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ Ambassador Claude Laverdure, interview, Paris, France. May 9th, 2005. As of January 2006, Ambassador Laverdure is the Canadian Ambassador to France.

Ambassador Laverdure's Minister Plenipotentiary Laurette Glasgow was equally positive, stating that:

the modern international system is evolving to the point where states cannot coexist without international institutions. In our [Canada's] case, multilateralism has been valuable. We can create partnerships, reach common agenda and increase the well-being of Canadians in ways previously unimaginable. Multilateralism allows us to bypass the tried and tested methods of traditional bilateral interaction. I can't imagine how the system would function as effectively without international institutions.⁴⁷

Traditional diplomatic institutions further validate these comments. Most diplomatic institutions see the UN as a necessary part of the modern IR system. For example, Britain's FCO writes of the 'indispensable' UN that it plays a vital role for a 'strong and secure international community'.⁴⁸ Because of its 'universal membership and comprehensive mandate, the UN is the only institution capable of giving legitimacy to decisions taken by and on behalf of the international community'.⁴⁹

Similarly, Canada's DFAIT notes that:

⁴⁷ Laurette Glasgow, Interview, Paris, France. May 9th, 2005. As of January 2006 Laurette Glasgow is the Canadian Ministre Plenipotentiaire to France.

⁴⁸ FCO Annual Report, p. 146.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, p. 141.

today, UN multilateral cooperation is more important than ever. It is the only option open to us if we are to usefully tackle emerging global issues, to protect people around the world against violence, and to give them the opportunity to build prosperous fulfilling lives.⁵⁰

For states such as Canada and Australia, the IGO is a valuable addition to traditional diplomatic methods in the 21st century. The favorable rhetoric that such states confer on IGOs such as the UN leads into the fourth theoretical observation: that any positive relationship between states and IGOs is dependent on commonality of agenda. In the modern diplomatic environment, the common agenda is often global, rather than national. Thus, Nascent theorists remind us that traditional bilateral diplomacy is not as efficient or effective at global problem solving as multilateralism. Similarly, Innovators also stress that IGOs are more effective than states at global problem solving by highlighting the inadequacy of traditional diplomatic techniques to tackle global problems. IGOs are more useful as they provide an international forum, multilateral mechanisms and quicker solutions to international problems. Although Traditionalists have little to say on this matter (the notion of a successful IGO detracts from their loyal affiliation to the traditional diplomatic institution), they do agree that states will use IGOs if it suits their own agenda. With the global agenda affecting more and more states, their reliance on IGO and multi-lateral diplomacy is only likely to increase.

This situation is certainly the prevailing impression in the official publications. The emerging global issues and the need to address them through multilateralism are mentioned in many Foreign Affairs documents. DFAIT provides one example by highlighting that ‘issues that were not high on the international agenda decades ago are

⁵⁰ Canada’s International Policy Statement, (2005), p. 15.

now critical, such as climate change, fragile states, terrorism and internally displaced persons'.⁵¹ To tackle these issues, DFAIT, and many other diplomatic institutions, invest great faith in the 'more focused multilateral cooperation.'⁵²

Ambassador Robert Gordon mentioned a similar preference for multilateralism when tackling global problems. He noted that:

As the agenda shifts and evolves so too must the method change. This change in diplomatic method, or the means if you prefer, is especially important when tackling emerging global problems such as terrorism or environmental degradation. If traditional methods are not as effective as multilateral methods then the FCO will naturally use the most effective channel in the hope of achieving the most effective result.⁵³

In other words, traditional diplomatic actors will engage with alternate diplomatic methods, depending on the problem/issue at hand. With the diplomatic agenda becoming increasingly global states will persevere with IGOs and multilateralism, particularly when it suits their interests. The theory and evidence suggests that IGOs will continue to be utilised for global problem solving.

When the counter-side of this notion is considered, a fifth theoretical observation emerges. If agreement or commonality (of agenda) is absent then the IGO becomes little more than a state talking shop, plagued by complexity, distrust and inefficiency. Individual states will not endorse a decision that runs contrary to their own national interest for the sake of the IGO's legitimacy, credibility and well-being. This is a claim

⁵¹ Canada's International Policy Statement, (2005), p. 19

⁵² *ibid.*

⁵³ Ambassador Robert Gordon, Interview, Hanoi, Vietnam. March 9th, 2005.

both Traditionalists and Innovators advance, although the notion has deeper resonance with the former diplomatic theory. Traditionalists portray IGOs as too complex, too complicated and simply anti-diplomatic. IGOs are anti-diplomatic due to their large membership where each state has a different, and often conflicting, individual interest.

Nascent theorists avoid this obvious drawback of IGOs and the difficulty of reaching agreement multilaterally. Instead, they (incorrectly) assume the mere presence of an IGO is a panacea to all international ills. This type of rhetoric is uncomfortable for diplomatic practitioners. For example, Paul Wilson, of DFAT, complained that:

the sanctity with which some people treat the UN is difficult to take. French Foreign Minister De Villepin is indicative of this attitude, and I quote, “in this temple of the UN we are the guardians of a conscience”.....let’s be pragmatic about what they set out to do and what they actually can do. I’m sceptical of the view that getting together is a good thing, especially if you get together and don’t do anything.⁵⁴

Jane Madden, DFAT’s Permanent Delegate to UNESCO, mentioned the difficulties the complexity of IGO forums bestow upon traditional diplomacy. IGOs, in her opinion, are:

⁵⁴ Paul Wilson, interview, Paris, France. May 10th, 2005. As of January 2006, Paul Wilson is DFAT’s Deuxieme Secetaire to France.

not entirely effective, decision making in multilateral institutions – due to the size and scale of their task, and their membership numbers – is often slow, cumbersome and awkward. Reaching consensus in large organisations, where everyone has different perspectives, is not easy.⁵⁵

Madden provides firm, practical evidence of the diplomatic practitioner's lament of complexity through universal membership. Thus, the theory and the empirical evidence suggest that IGOs are complex diplomatic environments where disagreement is just as common as agreement.

Despite the drawbacks of multilateral diplomacy, IGOs will continue to play a vital and valuable role in the modern diplomatic environment. IGOs are becoming an increasingly positive environment for non-state actors, with NGOs and other IGOs finding a voice and gaining entry into processes once reserved exclusively for states. The traditional members – states – will continue to endorse diplomacy by multilateralism if it suits them (for global problem solving), for bilateral opportunities or even to symbolise a mythical unity of mankind. IGOs will remain important diplomatic environments for state and non-state actors.

Nascent theorists are valuable in this respect as they will continue to encourage awareness of the notable proliferation of IGOs during the 20th century⁵⁶ and the multilateral diplomacy they practice, no matter how effective or ineffective. This NDT

⁵⁵ Jane Madden, interview, Paris, France. May 10th, 2005. As of January 2006 Jane Madden is DFAT's Permanent Delegate of Australia to UNESCO.

⁵⁶ In 1909, there were 37 IGOs, by 1962 this number had risen to 163 and by the years 2005/6 the modern diplomatic environment had 1,963 IGOs. See, Part A: Statistical Data Graphics, Figure 1.1.1. (a): Overview of number of international organisations by type [types A-G,] of the Yearbook of International Organisations, Edition 42, 2005/2006, edited by the Union of International Associations, Lausanne, Switzerland

focus suggests that IGOs are unlikely to disappear and we must therefore continue to theorise on how these actors fit in to the modern diplomatic environment.

The words of one statesman adroitly sums up the role of IGOs in the modern diplomatic environment. British Prime Minister Tony Blair noted that:

The UN, for all its imperfections, is a force for good and our desire is that it does more, not less. If the UN did not exist we would be forced to invent it. It may be imperfect but it was not designed to take us to Heaven, it was conceived to save us from another hell....The United Nations provides the opportunity to find solutions, it is up to the nations to will the means for us all to succeed.⁵⁷

From the above, it is clear that IGOs *do* matter. But matter for reasons other than those believed by the three diplomatic theories and theorists independently. By using the three theories in an eclectic fashion a block of theoretical observations, some novel and others existing, can be proposed: multilateralism is a supplement to traditional diplomacy; it can be a complex process and thus ineffective or difficult to reach consensus; and, in DFAIT's case certainly, multilateral fora can be of some benefit to the traditional state, if they suit the state's interests; IGOs are only as great as the sum of their state parts, yet are now a valuable and intrinsic part of the modern diplomatic environment; IGOs are only likely to succeed when points of agenda convergence amongst states are startlingly obvious. When these observations are supported by empirical evidence, a more complete picture of IGOs, and their place in the modern diplomatic environment, can be confirmed.

⁵⁷ Prime Minister Tony Blair, retrieved 22nd December 2005, < www.fco.gov.uk/speeches/blair >

6.1.3 Diplomacy by Summit

Where summitry is concerned, the opinion of the three groups of theorists is similar. This is unusual and is the only one of the six themes where such agreement occurs. All three groups of theorists employ different arguments but all agree that summitry is of questionable value to modern diplomacy. Thus, diplomatic theory is apathetic towards diplomacy by summit. This rare consensus amongst theorists is valuable, particularly in terms of identifying where future research and theory should be directed.

For Traditionalists, summitry is the target of criticism over its efficacy as a viable diplomatic tool. Comparing summitry to the art, specialised vocation and subtle nuance inherent to traditional diplomacy supports this argument. In essence, Traditionalists conclude that the summit devalues diplomacy. There is little affinity for a glamorous summit process that detracts from traditional diplomacy. Traditionalists are more likely to remind us of the failing of summits rather than interpret them as a valuable supplement to traditional diplomacy.

Similarly, Nascent theorists share little affinity for the summit process, although for different reasons. That statesmen have to meet face to face, claim Nascent theorists, suggests a deficiency in the conventional channels of state-qua-state diplomacy. In addition, Nascent theorists suggest that summits are nothing more than dramatic theatre; summits are mere publicity stunts; summits portraying statesmen as close allies is a subsequent façade; and finally that summits are a waste of time and money, as they rarely produce any meaningful political results.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ These themes are expanded upon in chapter three, section 3.5.3: Diplomacy as theatre, the NDT dismissal of summit diplomacy.

Innovators, too, appear reluctant to endorse diplomacy by summit. Predictably, they take a middle-ground stance on the value of summitry. For Innovators, the value of summitry remains undecided, ‘as always, one can see the summit cup as half full or half empty’.⁵⁹ Innovators agree that summits are loosely significant for modern diplomacy, but not essential to international political stability. Their indecisiveness leaves us in doubt concerning the continuing practice and efficacy of diplomacy by summit.

Interpreting summitry through any of the three lenses does not provide us with an explanation for the prevalence of summit diplomacy. Seeking commonality amongst the three theories, however, is valuable in ascertaining why theorists are generally dismissive about summitry.

There is a different reason behind each group’s motives in dismissing the value of summitry. The Traditionalists’ dismissal of summitry can be traced to their loyal and sentimental devotion to the traditional diplomatic institution. Any process that detracts from or hinders the work of the institution is unlikely to be viewed in a favorable light. Conversely, for the Nascent theorists, any process that questions the value and worth of the traditional diplomatic institution is dwelt upon. For Nascent theorists, the argument that summits are ineffective is employed as evidence of another nail in traditional diplomacy’s figurative coffin. Where IDT is concerned, they are willing to reserve judgement on the summit process; ‘research pending’ as one theorist expresses.⁶⁰

These different motives suggest reluctance by the majority of diplomatic theorists to include summitry under the heading of diplomacy. For diplomatic theorists, the summit itself essentially involves statesmen and therefore should fall under the study of

⁵⁹ Kaufmann, *The Diplomacy of International Relations*, p. 62.

⁶⁰ Melissen, *Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age*, p. 19.

statecraft and not diplomacy. Granted the pre and post negotiation work *is* pure diplomacy but the summit itself is not. All summits involve diplomacy to a certain point but the summit itself has hardly any resonance with *any* of the diplomatic theories. This diplomacy/statecraft division appears to be the source of the theorists' disdain for summitry, as well as the reason opinion and theory on diplomacy by summit is largely avoided in the diplomatic studies field.

Similarly, many of the diplomats, Ambassadors and practitioners interviewed were uncomplimentary about the summit process. Their attitude somewhat vindicates the ambivalence diplomatic theorists also have towards diplomacy by summit. If the practitioners are uncomplimentary on summitry then the theorists will also mirror this apathy.

For example, DFAIT's Laurette Glasgow questions:

at what point does the meeting of statesmen become statecraft and not diplomacy? Statesmen are not diplomats; they have a much wider and less specialised role in modern international relations. Yes, the statesman is in essence the diplomat-in-chief, but he is not a classical diplomat by any stretch of the imagination.⁶¹

However, Glasgow is also quick to point out that 'summitry is part and parcel of the modern diplomatic system, we just haven't figured out which part, as yet'.⁶² Most diplomats share a similar, vague attitude on diplomacy by summit. All those interviewed had some derogatory comment on the summit but all agreed it was a necessary and, at

⁶¹ Laurette Glasgow, Interview, May 10th, 2005.

⁶² *ibid.*

times, valuable manifestation of the evolution of inter-state relations. For example, Ian Kemish of DFAT notes that:

the only time we see action [at the summit] is when the television cameras appear. Most of the diplomacy, that is the negotiation and subsequent agreement, has already taken place before the summit. However, getting the rubber stamp on prenegotiation work from the “bosses” adds something to any international agreement. It shows solidarity, progress and commonality amongst sovereign states. This can only be positive for international relations and diplomacy.⁶³

Summitry is an omnipotent occurrence in the modern diplomatic environment, the summit itself may not be relevant to diplomacy but the process and the outcome most certainly is.

But is this too shallow a view of diplomacy by summit? Ambassador Claude Laverdure, the former Canadian ‘sherpa’ to the G8, claims there is more diplomacy going on at the summit than the above statements would have us believe. He reminds us that:

the importance of summitry must not be devalued. We often overlook the fact that it is not only statesmen who meet at summits but also diplomats of every rank and status. There is far more diplomacy goes on at any summit than you may think.⁶⁴

In this context, it could be argued that the summit is a valuable forum for diplomacy, as well as statecraft, and will continue to be so. Ambassador Laverdure’s statement mirrors the official organisational ethos prevalent in modern diplomatic

⁶³ Ian Kemish, Interview, July, 15th, 2004.

⁶⁴ Ambassador, Claude Laverdure, Interview, May 9th, 2005.

institutions. In the Annual Reports, White Papers and official statements, few mentions were made of the negative impact of the summit process itself. These publications stressed the invaluable role of diplomacy pre and post summit. For example, Australia's DFAT, writing on the 2003 WTO summit in Cancun, mentions that:

Despite our best endeavors, progress was disappointingly slow, highlighted by the failure of WTO members to reach agreement at Cancun. However we will continue to look for ways forward. The culmination of complex and intense negotiations on the part of the department is responsible for the progress before Cancun and future success is dependent on a similar level of hard work and commitment.⁶⁵

The fundamental role of DFAT in pre and post summit negotiations is clear from the above statement. Similarly Britain's FCO sees itself as an intrinsic part in any summit. For example, during the July 2005 G8 Summit the FCO was:

heavily involved in negotiating many of the summit outcomes. Several other [British] government departments have a strong interest in the policy, and lead in some cases, but the FCO ensures the policy is coherent and consistent by, for example, acting as a channel for policy papers and briefings and regular co-ordination meetings. The FCO is responsible for organising the summit as well as a number of preparatory events.⁶⁶

This practical rhetoric confirms that diplomacy and the summit are closely related; in the above case the very success of the summit depended on the role of the

⁶⁵ DFAT Annual Report (2004), p. 8.

⁶⁶ FCO Annual Report, p. 105.

FCO before, during and after the G8 summit. The reluctance, therefore, of the majority of diplomatic theorists to positively address summit diplomacy is perplexing.

Currently, diplomatic theory fails to recognise that summits involve much more multi and polylateral diplomacy, between not only heads of state or diplomats but also significant non-state actors. Some diplomatic theorists present an overly simplistic portrayal of summitry, where two or more heads of state meet for a casual fireside chat. Summitry, in the practical sense, is anything but simple, an exclusive state exercise or a 'meaningless gathering of theatre actors'.⁶⁷

At the moment, diplomatic theory is restrictive in that we have only scratched the surface of diplomacy by summit. The common dismissal (of diplomacy by summit) inherent to each of the three diplomatic theories is therefore valuable in the sense that a gap in the research can be confirmed, and a means of filling that gap suggested. The prevailing dismissive mood surrounding summitry suggests two possible directions for diplomatic theory on summitry: either it is wholeheartedly included under the banner of diplomacy studies or it continues to be treated with disdain and largely avoided. The former direction would be more beneficial for diplomatic theory as the summit does involve a considerable amount of diplomacy.

More research is needed to enhance our understanding of summitry's place within the modern diplomatic environment. Central to this exploration could be a frank appraisal over the relevancy of summitry to diplomacy and where, if at all, the study and research of summitry fits in the diplomatic studies field. Indeed, the three groups of diplomatic theorists could build on the practitioner's various opinions on diplomacy by summit. The practitioners, and the official statements, are subtly complimentary on this form of

⁶⁷ Constantinou, *On the Way to Diplomacy*, p. 12.

diplomacy, although not overwhelmingly so. In other words, they are uninterested in relegating this form of diplomacy to the margins of the professional activity.

This being said, the responsibility for exploring the role of diplomacy by summit should fall under the ambit of the diplomatic theorist. In the practical sense, summitry is no longer an ad hoc and sporadic means of conducting inter-state relations; it is a permanent feature of the modern diplomatic environment. Practitioners – statesmen or diplomats – have accepted its existence, no matter how expedient a means of diplomacy summitry is. Therefore, diplomatic theory, if it intends to accurately mirror the practical realm of diplomacy, needs to tackle the topic of diplomacy by summit in a less parsimonious and more positive fashion. Such a contribution is unlikely to come from the Traditionalists or the Nascent theorists, as their respective state and non-state focus precludes them from tackling diplomacy by summit in an objective manner. The Innovators, with their impartial and balanced form of theory, may be the most appropriate group of theorists for a revised account of diplomacy by summit's place in the modern diplomatic environment and in the diplomatic studies field.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ For two notable examples of balanced, innovative theory on diplomacy by summit, see Jan Melissen. (2003). Summit Diplomacy Coming of Age. *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 1 – 21; David Dunn (ed.). (1996). *Diplomacy at the Highest Level: The Evolution of International Summitry*. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 247 – 269.

6.1.4 The niche diplomacy of NGOs

In 1909, the Yearbook of International Relations informs us there were 176 NGOs.⁶⁹ This number had increased to 997 by 1954 and to a staggering 20,928 in 2005/6.⁷⁰ Opinion on the impact of the now swelling ranks of NGOs is divided within the diplomatic studies field. On the one hand, some theorists portray NGOs as a nuisance to professional diplomacy, and of secondary or peripheral importance.⁷¹ On the other, champions of NGOs view their impact as a watershed moment for diplomacy and international relations, heralding the rise of a pacific actor more effective than the incumbent state and its traditional diplomatic institution.⁷² By theorising eclectically, the role and impact of NGOs in the modern diplomatic environment can be better understood. There are five subsequent theoretical observations this thesis proposes, each of them supported by practical opinion and evidence.

Firstly, it is postulated that NGOs *are* important diplomatic actors. NGOs emerged in response to changes in the diplomatic environment after the Cold War, and appear likely to increase in number, professionalism (of approach) and technique (of diplomatic method). The presence of NGOs in the diplomatic system ‘has provided another example of how existing parts of the diplomatic system can provide the means of responding to the needs of the current situation and to some degree actually shape them’.⁷³ In other words, NGOs have filled a niche in the modern diplomatic environment

⁶⁹ From Part A: Statistical Data Graphics, Figure 1.1.1. (a): Overview of number of international organisations by type [types A-G,] of the Yearbook of International Organisations, Edition 42, 2005/2006, edited by the Union of International Associations, Lausanne, Switzerland.

⁷⁰ *ibid.*

⁷¹ See Chapter Two, section 2.5.4: The proliferation of Non-Governmental Organisations.

⁷² See Chapter Three, section 3.5.4 The central Nascent actors: Non-Governmental Organisations.

⁷³ Langhorne, Full Circle, p. 33.

that traditional diplomatic actors were unwilling or unable to address. Subsequently, traditional actors have welcomed this evolutionary development.

For example, Britain's FCO has clearly responded to a change in the modern diplomatic environment and enhanced their state/NGO partnership. They note that 'international relations are no longer channeled solely between governments....we now work as openly as we can with representatives of NGOs and the public'.⁷⁴

Both Anne Plunkett and Bob Davis of DFAT also agreed that 'there is no more state exclusivity' in terms of formulating and delivering foreign policy.⁷⁵ Lydia Morton, also of DFAT, adopted a similar tack, stating:

NGOs have an important role in foreign policy, they always will. They have their own identity, their own mentality but their opinion matters, their expertise matters. They [NGOs] are part of the national interest, part of the foreign policy formulation process.⁷⁶

With this endorsement from the dominant diplomatic actor, it can be suggested that NGOs are now an integral 'part' of the modern diplomatic environment.

This assumption leads to a second observation: NGOs have been accepted in a diplomatic environment dominated by states as they provide a valuable diplomatic role. There are now at least three significant forms of state/NGO interface; firstly that of a kick-starter, where proactive behaviour on the part of NGOs helps frame the agenda for action by the government; secondly, NGOs can take on a subcontracting/facilitative role,

⁷⁴ FCO Annual Report, p. 2.

⁷⁵ Bob Davis and Anne Plunkett, interviews, July 13th, 2004. As of January 2006 Anne Plunkett was Head of Protocol Division, DFAT.

⁷⁶ Lydia Morton, interview, July 13th, 2004. As of January 2006, Lydia Morton is DFAT's Ambassador for People Smuggling Issues to Australia.

such as active mediation or aid distribution, that supports the work of government; finally, as a joint manager, where the activity of NGOs lends itself to certain types of institution building with governments.⁷⁷ Some examples illustrate these three forms; The Kimberley Diamond Process and Nazi Gold are among the better-known cases on states and NGOs working together diplomatically to achieve a common agenda.

Britain's FCO acknowledges that NGOs 'have acquired great power to drive the international agenda by forming public attitudes and generating pressures on governments'.⁷⁸ The role of NGOs is only going to become 'more important' in the future; they 'will contribute to stronger popular demands for accountability, and to pressure for governments to focus on the environment, poverty and other aspects of the global agenda'.⁷⁹ For the FCO, it is 'essential to foster, cement and encourage a close partnership with NGOs'.⁸⁰ Practically, traditional diplomatic institutions have acknowledged the emergence of NGOs, an occurrence that must be incorporated into the mainstream of diplomatic theory.

From this conclusion a third observation can be advanced: that the state/NGO relationship is not adversarial or competitive but symbiotic and complementary. This observation was reached by examining the interplay between the three theories. In the diplomatic studies literature, the treatment of NGOs by two of the three groups of theorists suggests that the relationship is adversarial. Traditionalists, for example, consider NGOs as peripheral or of secondary importance to traditional diplomacy. Some Traditionalists 'choose to ignore the phenomenon: others continue to relegate NGOs – or

⁷⁷ Cooper and Hocking, *Government, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 370 – 373.

⁷⁸ FCO Annual Report, p. 4.

⁷⁹ *ibid.*

⁸⁰ *ibid.*, p. 5.

indeed any challenger to state-centered assumptions – to the margins of the discussion’.⁸¹

The Traditionalists dismissive treatment of NGOs is understandable. Their focus on the traditional diplomatic institution reminds us of its ongoing importance as a central diplomatic actor. TDT suggests that we must not become carried away with the modern phenomenon of NGOs.

The lens of TDT is thus somewhat restrictive, as it does not provide understanding of the significant proliferation of NGOs since the end of the Cold War. Their parochialism led to the mustering of an alternate faction of theorists who argued that NGOs were no longer peripheral or of secondary importance in the modern diplomatic environment. The TDT rejection of NGOs as emerging diplomatic actors laid down a challenge to theorists to prove that NGOs were effective diplomatic actors. Traditionalist opinion (or lack thereof) on NGOs bred an opposing faction of theorists who argued that NGOs *are* important diplomatic actors. This group, Nascent diplomatic theorists, thus develops awareness, draws attention to NGOs and conceptualises on how they are impacting the modern diplomatic environment. It is unlikely this aggressive response would have occurred if TDT had been less dismissive of NGOs.

The NDT contribution to understanding the state/NGO relationship is therefore equally valuable for diplomatic studies. Firstly, through developing awareness of NGOs in the modern diplomatic environment they promote research supporting their observations. Thus, their opinion serves as a valuable counterweight to dismissive TDT. Secondly, Nascent theorists highlight that if adherence to TDT continued an understanding of NGOs in the 21st century will remain elusive. In other words, they identified an existing gap in the knowledge and sought to address it. In this capacity,

⁸¹ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 361.

NDT adds to the field, to our diplomatic knowledge. And thirdly, their scholarship generates interesting debate and questions, such as ‘due to their increasing numbers and increasing efficacy, are NGOs more important diplomatic actors than states and their traditional diplomatic institutions?’ Many Nascent theorists would have us believe that NGOs have ‘become more significant on the world stage than governments’.⁸² This different attitude promises a vibrant debate between alternate groups of diplomatic theorists, which breathes life into a diplomatic studies field dominated by TDT.

However, this is where NDT, like TDT, becomes restrictive. NGOs are not more significant on the world stage than traditional diplomatic actors. Confirmation of this assumption is left to the third group of theorists.⁸³ Using both TDT and NDT, Innovators take the knowledge a step further. They argue that NGOs are important diplomatic actors, but not as important as states and their traditional diplomatic institutions. Interpreted through the IDT lens, states and NGOs *do* ‘inhabit different environments’, but their relationship is positive, symbiotic and complementary.⁸⁴ For Innovators, both states and NGOs have important but different roles to play in the modern diplomatic environment. Again, it is unlikely that IDT would have emerged if TDT and NDT were less parochial.

This conclusion is supported by empirical evidence. Ambassador Laverdure first discussed the notion of adversarial relationships, before confirming the growing synergy between state and NGO:

⁸² *ibid.*, p. 362.

⁸³ For example, see Gordenker, Thomas G. and Weiss, Leon. *Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions*, in Gordenker, Thomas G. and Weiss, Leon (eds). (1996). *NGOs, the UN & Global Governance*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 17 –51; Maragia, Bosire. (2002) *Almost There: Another Way of Conceptualizing and Explaining NGOs quest for Legitimacy in Global Politics. Non-State Actors and International Law*, 2, 301 – 332.

⁸⁴ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p.361.

I'd say they [adversarial relationships] might have been the case ten or fifteen years ago, when we realised there were other international players. We had suspected them but were inclined to close our eyes and say "they don't know what they're talking about, we know the business and we don't need new partners". The relationship was initially adversarial because many NGOs had a tendency to be themselves adversarial, because they were always negative about what we were doing and it got into the streets, for example the Seattle WTO negotiations and the G8 protests. All these people [NGOs] were suggesting that we in our traditional diplomacy never address the real questions, that we don't talk about global employment, human rights or poverty in the world. It took us quite a while to realise that these people were not going to disappear, to realise that if we're to work together it might be in the interest of our own country and world society. Nowadays, we deal with these people on a daily basis. They are not necessarily taking over our responsibility; we're all interested partners. Now it's more of a team effort, we don't see them as a threat and they've discovered we don't live on another planet.⁸⁵

A modern diplomat, then, identifies the reason behind the division in the diplomatic studies literature and the changing nature of the state/NGO relationship. Both state and NGO, it would appear, are valuable actors in the modern diplomatic environment. Each has a different, specialised and complementary role to play. This was a notion Marcie Friedman of the American Red Cross was keen to stress. Of the state and the NGO, she highlighted that:

we're like different animals, sometimes we fight but most of the time we get along. We respect each other's territory. The value of NGOs to diplomacy and international relations is that we reflect different approaches, different ways of doing things, different ideas. We're there to

⁸⁵ Ambassador Claude Laverdure, interview, May 9th, 2005.

balancing things off, to test out ideas. Our great ability is the freedom to make statements because we don't have any political affiliation....we're a useful addition. But to argue we're out to get the state, to steal its legitimacy? C'mon.⁸⁶

From the above opinion then it can be deduced that the state/NGO relationship is not adversarial, with states suppressing recalcitrant NGOs, or aggressive NGOs challenging the state and questioning its legitimacy.

The symbiotic relationship between state/NGO and the acknowledgment of their diplomatic actor status leads to a fourth observation: states clearly value the participation and role of NGOs in the modern diplomatic environment. For example, Canada's DFAIT clearly values the contribution of NGOs to its foreign policy execution. One government initiative concerns leveraging:

the impact of these groups internationally, to promote sharing of knowledge and expertise, to build synergies amongst them, and to better publicise their work to Canadians. DFAIT will continue to promote greater outreach and dialogue with non-governmental organisations.⁸⁷

For DFAIT, 'achieving our international objectives requires the active participation of civil society, as NGOs are international actors in their own right'.⁸⁸ Consequently, NGOs are often included in Canadian delegations to meetings of international organisations where 'practice permits' and 'when the discussion concerns a

⁸⁶ Marcie Friedman, interview, May 9th, 2005. At the time of the interview Friedman was the American Red Cross Country Representative to Vietnam.

⁸⁷ Canada's International Policy Statement (2005), p. 29.

⁸⁸ *ibid.*

shared subject matter'.⁸⁹ The state/NGO partnership is one that DFAIT values; they are 'committed to working more closely with NGOs to strengthen information sharing, consultative and participatory mechanisms'.⁹⁰

DFAIT clearly believes that NGOs are a useful tool in achieving its foreign policy objectives. Canada's Deputy Foreign Minister, V. Peter Harder, expressed a similar sentiment, noting that:

we couldn't have achieved our agenda without the involvement of NGOs. Maybe fifteen years ago the relationship was adversarial but back then they [NGOs] weren't global, and they didn't know what we were up to. Now we discuss issues that are of real concern to them [NGOs]. Now, we work together.⁹¹

This type of rhetoric is more than a token acknowledgement of NGO's worth to Canadian Foreign Policy execution. In other words, the NGO/DFAIT relationship is deeper than lip service paid by the Canadian Foreign Office. Perhaps the best-known example of DFAIT/NGO cooperation is the Ottawa Process, where the Canadian government worked in close partnership with several NGOs on the successful campaign to ban landmines.⁹²

Similarly, Britain's FCO highlights that a close relationship with NGOs is central to their future success. The FCO will ultimately benefit from increased collaboration with NGOs. The FCO is 'seeking to tap into the expertise and experience of a range of groups

⁸⁹ *ibid.*

⁹⁰ *ibid.*

⁹¹ Minister Peter Harder, interview, May 9th, 2005.

⁹² See Appendix Six for this and several other examples of state/NGO collusion.

and communities throughout this country [Britain]...the aim is to set up strategic partnerships and networks in the UK to work towards common goals'.⁹³

This empirical evidence clearly confirms the symbiotic state/NGO relationship, with partnership becoming a hallmark of the modern diplomatic environment. However, a final observation must be advanced: states largely guide the role of NGOs in the modern diplomatic environment. This observation is consummate with TDT. These theorists remind us that the state and the traditional diplomatic institution remain the primary diplomatic actors in the modern IR system. The NGO/state relationship is a subservient one with NGOs reliant on the state for legitimacy, funding in many cases, and for access into the official and dominant channels of diplomacy.

Consequently, the state/NGO relationship is not always a positive one, from both sides of the practical fence. Paul Wilson, speaking of recalcitrant NGOs, warned of the danger of incoherence and lack of government oversight on NGOs, stating that:

NGOs are good for Australian diplomacy, if they are doing certain things. If they are doing other things, that's not necessarily good. It's not the existence of these alternate actors which creates problems, it's the lack of coherence.⁹⁴

State/NGO cooperation is only likely to occur where both share a common goal. States are unlikely to support, endorse and build partnerships with NGOs that are ambivalent to their foreign policy goals. One NGO representative agreed, stating that:

⁹³ FCO Annual Report, p. 71.

⁹⁴ Paul Wilson, interview, May 10th, 2005.

wing-nut crazy NGOs that stir up trouble are more of help than a hindrance to promoting civil society, and a common state/NGO agenda. Wise NGOs help the government, whilst helping themselves.⁹⁵

Richard Kohler, also of DFAIT, confirms the hierarchical relationship between the state and NGOs. He noted ‘NGOs will continue to rely on state to create the frameworks within which they operate – they will always have an influence on nation states but never control’.⁹⁶ The inference here is that states largely control the modern diplomatic environment and NGOs place within it.

Despite this tentative negativity, the empirical evidence combined with the eclectic contributions from each of the three diplomatic theories is compelling. It suggests that states and NGOs are ‘attracted towards each other’ in search of international stability and Foreign Policy realisation.⁹⁷ The immediate problem that arises is that NGOs, like the dilemmas they address, are unpredictable and do not manifest themselves in consistent patterns. Instead, there is a considerable *ad-hoc* element built into the state/NGO relationship where short-term focus is promoted alongside a flexible issue-by-issue approach. Contacts, coalitions and relationships are built on an improvised foundation and importance is given to the bargaining and flexibility of both actors.

This lack of practical consistency in the state/NGO relationship may be responsible for the confusion in the diplomatic studies field. Without firm, consistent and recognisable patterns of state/NGO collusion the relationship can become confusing. However, it is time to agree that NGOs are important, and are emerging diplomatic actors

⁹⁵ Marcie Friedman, interview, March 10, 2005.

⁹⁶ General Consulate Richard Kohler, interview, September 4th, 2004. As of January 2006 Richard Kohler is the Canadian General Consulate to Australia.

⁹⁷ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 370.

working (largely) in tandem with dominant state actors. A view advanced by one IDT is perhaps the most applicable to the modern relationship between states and NGOs:

Foreign policy is no longer primarily about the conduct of state-to-state relations, even while this remains a major activity. Rather, it involves an array of government and non-government actors and networks which require new ways of managing international politics. Effective networking with non-governmental bodies is critical to the success of diplomacy today.⁹⁸

Robust, historical and productive networks of state/non-state linkages are prevalent, and can be consistently evidenced, in the practical modern diplomatic environment. However, the acceptance of these relationships has yet to filter through to the theoretical diplomacy field. This is a situation that will eventually change. Theoretically understanding the relationship between state and NGO is ‘not well served by assumptions that the representatives of state and non-state actors inhabit different worlds any more than an appreciation of the significance of NGOs is best understood by assuming that their activities herald the imminent demise of the state’.⁹⁹ Using the three diplomatic theories together allows complete endorsement of this sage advice. To alter existing and parochial perceptions on the state/NGO relationship is to first acknowledge that divergent and categorical views on diplomacy exist. Only then can we test each of these views against empirical evidence from the practical, modern diplomatic environment. This section has hopefully demonstrated the merit behind such an approach.

⁹⁸ Lane, *Diplomacy Today*, pp. 1 – 4.

⁹⁹ Cooper and Hocking, *Governments, NGOs and the Recalibration of Diplomacy*, p. 376.

6.1.5 The mutual relationship between commerce and diplomacy

The close relationship between trade and diplomacy is often overlooked in the canon of diplomacy studies. One reason for this occurrence is the fragmented and disagreeable nature of various theorists' opinion. Currently, there is no clear consensus on the relationship between commerce and diplomacy. Only the Innovators consider commerce central to diplomacy, while TDT and NDT are dismissive of any link between the two. However, using the three theories eclectically, a clearer picture of the amicable, productive and growing bond between commerce and diplomacy can be seen. Three theoretical observations are relevant here.

Firstly, the notion that trade is central to diplomacy must be confirmed. This view runs contrary to the dominant Traditionalist group of theorists. Several Traditionalists continue to endorse a distinction between the political and the commercial, the classical view of diplomacy and the modern.¹⁰⁰ For Traditionalists, commercial work is a departure from the more serious concerns of diplomacy: military, security or political negotiation for example. The Traditionalists create no illusion that their focus is on the high, political aspect of diplomacy. Traditionalists are not ignoring the link between trade and diplomacy; they simply believe it does not merit their theoretical attention. Commercial diplomacy does not fall under their specialist focus.

Similarly, Nascent theorists argue that commerce and diplomacy are also separate, however for different reasons. They suggest that states, and their diplomatic institutions, are unable to control increasingly powerful multinational corporations (MNCs). Due to their size and their ability to generate independent wealth, these MNCs are becoming

¹⁰⁰ See for instance Barston, *Modern Diplomacy*; Berridge, *Diplomatic Theory and Practice*; Eban, *Diplomacy for the Next Century*; Hamilton and Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy*; Plishcke, *Modern Diplomacy*; Marshall, *Positive Diplomacy*; Steigman, *The Foreign Service of the United States*.

diplomatic actors in their own right. According to Nascent theorists, the growth of MNCs in this respect has been to the detriment of states and their traditional diplomatic institutions. This type of rhetoric, as shall become apparent, is problematic.

The Innovators are the only group of theorists who correctly argue that commerce is central to diplomacy. Innovators are keen to realign diplomatic theory to acknowledge the growing relationship between diplomacy and commerce, to remind us that:

diplomatic practice is and always has been much more than the traditional interstate high politics that it has largely been portrayed as...commercial diplomacy has always been an integral part of diplomatic practices.¹⁰¹

Thus, extensive commerce/diplomacy relationships exist within diplomatic systems, as well as diplomatic institutions, which are commonly an amalgamation of international trade and foreign affairs departments.

All of the diplomats interviewed were perplexed when I mentioned the theoretical separation of trade and diplomacy. For example, Ambassador Claude Laverdure observed that:

I initially signed up [for DFAIT] because of my interest in foreign affairs. I might have chosen a different vocation if I'd known how much business is involved! 65% of my work is concerned with trade, economics and commerce. Furthering the interests of the Canadian economy occupies most of my time.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ Lee and Hudson, *The old and new significance of diplomacy*, p. 345.

¹⁰² Ambassador Claude Laverdure, interview, May 9th, 2005.

British Ambassador to Vietnam Robert Gordon similarly highlights that much of his embassy's time is dominated by commercial work:

Part of my job is realising our priorities, one of which is the well being of British commerce. Export promotion is paramount to my work – dealing with business visitors and commercial enquiries, helping to organise trade negotiations, promotions and delegations, seeking new commercial opportunities and feeding them back into the export promotion machine back home. We work very closely with business. It's not an “us versus them” mentality. We're all on the same page.¹⁰³

This opinion further suggests that commerce is central to diplomacy. The latter part of Ambassador Gordon's statement leads to a second observation. States and firms are not locked in an adversarial relationship; they share a growing and symbiotic relationship.

This observation runs contrary to Nascent theorists, who view traditional diplomatic institutions and firms as two separate and conflicting entities. This separation has created a rivalry between the state organs and mercantile firms. Nascent theorists argue that powerful MNCs frequently outstrip and outperform states in the creation of wealth.¹⁰⁴ For Nascent theorists, this development has rendered the archaic state, and its diplomacy, obsolete and irrelevant. These views are understandable and perhaps an

¹⁰³ Ambassador Robert Gordon, interview, March 9th, 2005.

¹⁰⁴ See, for example, Coolsaet, Rik. (1998). The Transformation of Diplomacy at the threshold of the new Millennium. *Diplomatic Studies Program*, Leicester University, No. 48, pp. 1 – 25; Coleman, Andrew and Maogoto, Jackson. (2003). After the Party, is there a Cure for the Hangover? The challenges of the Global Economy to Westphalian Sovereignty. *Legal Issue of Economic Integration*, 30 (1), pp. 35 – 60; Strange, Susan. (1992). States, firms and diplomacy. *International Affairs*, 68 (1), pp. 1 – 15; Beck, Ulrich. (1999). Beyond the Nation State. *The New Statesman*, pp 25 – 28; Wolf, Martin. (2001). Will the Nation-State survive Globalisation? *Foreign Affairs*, 80 (1), pp. 178 – 190; Mann, Michael. (1997). Has Globalization ended the rise and rise of the nation-state? *Review of International Political Economy*, 4 (3), pp. 472 – 496.

expression of NDT's exasperation over the ignorance towards commerce in the diplomatic studies field.

This type of parochial nascent opinion is, however, useful. It 'opens up the subject [of trade and diplomacy] to wider debate', which leads to a more accurate theory on trade and diplomacy.¹⁰⁵ Nascent theorists thus encourage the field to prove otherwise: that states and firms are not locked in competition over an exclusive right-to generate wealth. Innovators take offence with this type of NDT rhetoric. They argue that the state and firms share a symbiotic relationship. If anything, the relationship between the traditional diplomatic institution (the state's international actor) and globally minded firms is growing ever-closer.

Practical evidence supports this observation. For example, it is undeniable that governments have restructured their diplomatic institutions to horizontally integrate trade departments. Some states, for example Canada,¹⁰⁶ Australia¹⁰⁷ and Belgium,¹⁰⁸ have

¹⁰⁵ Kishan S. Rana. (2004). Foreign Ministries: Change and Reform. Paper presented at the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 18th, p. 10.

¹⁰⁶ In Canada's International Policy statement of 2004 the Prime Minister, Paul Martin, illustrated the importance and centrality of DFAIT to promoting international commerce. Prime Minister Martin writes that, 'Canada will step up its engagement with other mature nations, as well as with those that today are emerging as the global titans of tomorrow. That's why we signed a science and technology agreement with India and launched discussions on new economic frameworks with Japan and Korea. That's why we will undertake market access negotiations with Mercosur in the context of the Free Trade Area of the America's. And that's why we are pursuing major opportunities with China in tourism, technology and resources, where our expertise and other value added capabilities make us a formidable global player. These are crucial opportunities and we will not let them pass us by. DFAIT is central to these desires'. Further comments from Prime Minister Martin on this issue are available at <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca>, accessed 9th July, 2005. For a theoretical portrayal of trade and diplomacy see Potter, Evan H. (2004). Branding Canada: The Renaissance of Canada's Commercial Diplomacy. *International Studies Perspectives*, 5, 55 – 60; Clark, Joe. (1997). The First International Country. *International Journal*, 52 (4), 539 – 545.

¹⁰⁷ In DFAT's Annual Report (2004), the head of operations, Dr. Ashton Calvert, reaffirmed Australia's desire to pursue 'an ambitious trade agenda for improved access to overseas markets for Australian business' (5). The Trade Policy 'is geared towards increasing economic activity, creating jobs and getting a fair deal for Australia in the international marketplace', essentially ensuring 'better trade conditions for Australian products' (5). DFAT pursues these goals at three levels: 1) Multilaterally through the WTO by negotiating trade agreements which provide the legal ground rules for international trade; 2) Regionally, through the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) by strengthening regional trade links and pursuing

merged their Trade and Foreign Ministries into one department.¹⁰⁹ Other states, such as the Britain and the Czech Republic, have created joint bodies of Trade and diplomatic Ministries to coordinate and exploit commercial opportunities.

For example, Britain has recently created a joint body called the United Kingdom Trade and Investment (UKTI) department. The creation of UKTI forms part of the wider institutional reform of the FCO, with a particular emphasis on commercial diplomacy: the development of firm to government partnerships in future diplomatic practice. UKTI is made up of staff from the FCO and the Department of Trade. In the FCO's 2005 Annual Report, the strategic priority of UKTI is stated as the 'promotion of UK economic interests in an open and expanding global economy'.¹¹⁰ Working closely with the FCO the objective of UKTI is to further develop economic flows in and out of Britain. Through UKTI, the FCO and Department of Trade aim to work closely together for 'enhanced competitiveness of companies in the UK through overseas trade and

common trade and economic goals; 3) Bilaterally, through the negotiation of free trade agreements that deliver substantial gains to Australia, we also work to expand markets and address market barriers' (7). The government, through DFAT, places a high priority on consultation with domestic business to ensure 'trade policy objectives developed by the government sufficiently reflect the views, concerns and ambitions of the Australian public' (5). DFAT, alongside Austrade, plays an integral part in this process, offering service to Australian business to access overseas markets. They aim to 'make trade easier, by making Australia's network of diplomatic missions work for your business' (6). DFAT provides business with up to date information on 'export grants and financial assistance, customs and export clearance procedures' (6). And they consult 'extensively with the business community, State and Territory Governments and community groups in coordinating, developing and advancing Australia's trade objectives'. Finally, DFAT plays an integral role in attracting investment to Australia, 'providing support for investors and information on establishing a business in Australia' (8). It is clear then that DFAT has a major contribution to developing and encouraging commerce that benefits Australia. See also, Harris. S. (1989), *The Amalgamation of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Occasional Paper*. Melbourne: Australian Institute of International Affairs.

¹⁰⁸ For discussion on the Belgian case, see Coolsaet, Rik. (2004). *Trade and Diplomacy: The Belgian Case*. International Studies Perspectives, 5, 61 – 65.

¹⁰⁹ Other countries with combined trade and foreign ministries include Albania (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Austria (The Austrian Foreign Ministry), Fiji (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade), Republic of Korea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Mauritius (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cooperation) and New Zealand (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade).

¹¹⁰ FCO Annual Report, p. 92.

investments; and to ensure a continuing high level of quality foreign direct investments through UKTI'.^{111 112}

Similarly, The Canadian government has combined the Foreign Affairs Department and the International Trade Department. This combination is aimed at identifying points of convergence between the two. One purpose of Foreign Affairs, for example, is 'to ensure that we get the both the domestic business climate and our international economic relations right while providing the services that Canadian and Foreign businesses need.'¹¹³ Similarly the International Trade Department notes that:

Canada's international commercial performance must meet the challenges of the 21st century global economy. To ensure our ongoing success we will continue to work in close partnership with the Foreign Affairs Department. We both share the common goal of enhancing Canada's trading prowess in the global economy.¹¹⁴

Australia's DFAT describes a similar close relationship between their Foreign Affairs Department and their Trade Department, noting that the benefits of the global market are 'not automatic. They come from the effective policies and institutions put in

¹¹¹ *ibid.*

¹¹² The impact has been rewarding. In 2004 UKTI helped UK based companies 'develop business opportunities around the world. More than 813 inward-investment projects – 60% of them knowledge-driven – created 59,614 associated jobs – of which 25, 614 were new - in the UK, and protected a further 34,000' (96). UKTI, through its diplomatic network, encourages domestic firms to benefit from their expertise and extensive foreign, physical locations, for examples they provide 'UK based companies with local knowledge and contacts in 115 countries. A further 330 international trade advisers, experts in doing business overseas, are based throughout the English regions' (93). UKTI has been of major benefit to UK domestic firms in reaching foreign markets, hitherto difficult to penetrate. The presence of UKTI clearly demonstrates a symbiotic partnership between commerce and diplomacy. See also, <https://www.uktradeinvest.gov.uk/ukti>. For a theoretical slant on the origins and constitution of UKTI see Lee, Donna. *The Embedded Business-Diplomat: How Institutional Reform Upholds the Role of Business in UK Diplomatic Practice*. Paper prepared for the Panel 'Diplomacy & Business: Beyond the Hegemony of the State', 45th Annual ISA Convention, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, March 17 – 20, 2004.

¹¹³ Canada's International Policy Statement (2005), p. 32.

¹¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 23.

place by government and executed by DFAT and its commercial partners [firms].¹¹⁵ Interestingly, DFAT is one of the few institutions to acknowledge the declining state argument in relation to globalisation. DFAT is keen to stress the dominant and ongoing role of the state and its diplomacy in the creation of wealth. They argue that:

the nation state has not been superseded by economic integration. Countries or groups of them still provide the legal and political frameworks within which companies operate.¹¹⁶

DFAT reminds us of the central role of the state and traditional diplomacy to international trade, either in bilateral relationships, or in multilateral institutions such as the IMF or WTO. Ultimately, DFAT is responsible for advancing ‘the interests of Australia and Australians internationally by supporting Australian business through market access and export advice and assistance and promoting trade and investment in and out of Australia’, alongside the more traditional/political aspects of diplomacy.¹¹⁷

If anything, the relationship between commerce and diplomacy will be further enhanced in the years ahead. DFAT intends to ‘intensify our consultation with Australian and Foreign business and trade advocacy with the Australian public more generally’ which will ‘ensure industry groups and other interested parties are sufficiently well informed of market developments, and to contribute their views with respect to key trade developments’.¹¹⁸ The current and future close partnership between DFAT and Australian business is unmistakable.

¹¹⁵ DFAT Annual Report (2004), p. 12.

¹¹⁶ *ibid.*

¹¹⁷ *ibid.*, p. 16.

¹¹⁸ *ibid.*, p. 9.

An extrapolation can be extended to most modern diplomatic institutions: commerce and diplomacy are moving ever closer. While firms 'are becoming more diplomatic', traditional diplomatic institutions are also becoming more businesslike.¹¹⁹ For example, many traditional diplomatic institutions are borrowing techniques from corporate practice such as 'introducing incentive and competition-based program techniques, human resource management and performance optimization.'¹²⁰ This mutual exchange of expertise, knowledge and working practices is often overlooked in the diplomatic studies literature. Non-statist theorists are keen to invent and endorse yet another factor damaging the legitimacy of the traditional diplomatic institution. These theorists are engaging in falsehood however, commerce and trade are now inseparable in the modern diplomatic environment.

For all of the above objectives to succeed, there has to exist clear and formal Foreign Office/business partnerships incorporated in diplomatic structures. In states that have not gone so far as to institutionalise trade and diplomatic partnership, formal government/business partnerships are evident. The US, South Africa, Germany, Norway, Brazil, Sweden and Tunisia, for example, have introduced organisational reform in this fashion.¹²¹ Governments the world over are prioritising commercial diplomacy as an intrinsic part of their foreign policy objectives, equal in importance to the traditional high political agenda.

¹¹⁹ Hocking, *Privatizing Diplomacy?*, p. 149.

¹²⁰ For an expansion, evidence and debate relating to this notion (that diplomatic institutions are becoming more businesslike) see, Rana, Kishan S. (2004). *Foreign Ministries: Change and Reform*. Paper presented at the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 18th; Hocking, Brian. (1999). *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation*. London: Macmillan; Hocking, Brian and Spence, David (eds.). (2002). *Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan; Robertson, Justin (ed.). (1998). *Foreign Ministries in Developing Countries and Emerging Market Economies*. *Dalhousie Journal of International Affairs*, 14.

¹²¹ Lee and Hudson, *The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy*, p. 343.

The changing nature of the state/firm relationship suggests a third and final observation: that states, through diplomatic negotiation and international agreement, largely control the global commercial environment. This, in turn, suggests that firms are subservient to and heavily dependent on states and traditional diplomatic institutions.

This is a view that Laurette Glasgow from Canada's DFAIT is keen to stress. She argued that:

The international relations system, including the international market place, is governed and shaped by states. Through diplomatic interaction, we [DFAIT] negotiate free trade agreements, which positively affect the prosperity of multi-national corporations. In these negotiations, we often have representatives of the business community as advisors, but it is DFAIT – working as the official representative of the Canadian government – that takes the final decision.¹²²

Similarly, Australia's DFAT is keen to stress its ability to shape the international market place. In their 2004 Annual Report, they claim that DFAT led 'intensive negotiations with the United States for a free trade agreement', 'successfully led negotiations with Thailand on a comprehensive Thailand-Australian Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA)' and 'furthered prospects for trade opportunities by establishing a 'FTA between ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand'.¹²³ None of these agreements, which will ultimately benefit Australian firms, 'would have been possible without the expertise and contribution of DFAT'.¹²⁴

¹²² Laurette Glasgow, interview, May 9th, 2005.

¹²³ DFAT Annual Report (2004), p. 70.

¹²⁴ *ibid.*

This evidence suggests that states, their diplomacy, and firms have an inseparable partnership in the modern diplomatic environment. Globalisation actually ‘enhances a nation’s economic well-being – indeed, experience suggests that the opening of trade and most capital flows enriches most citizens in the short run and virtually all citizens in the long run’.¹²⁵ Globalisation, thus, has been of significant benefit to all concerned: states, firms, diplomacy and individuals.

Far from being a departure from traditional diplomacy, commerce is, and has always been, central to diplomacy. Diplomacy has always been ‘concerned with trade with diplomats acting as their countries chief trade promotion officers’.¹²⁶ Not only do we ‘know this intuitively, diplomats and official government records tell us that this is so’.¹²⁷ Only by piecing the three theories together can we unequivocally confirm the close relationship between diplomacy and trade.

One then wonders what sense it makes to continue to relegate commercial diplomacy to the margins of the diplomatic studies field? The former Australian Ambassador to France, John Spender, suggested a reason why. He highlighted that:

traditionally, politics and economics have been treated as two exclusive topics and activities. In the practical sense, it is only recently that trade and diplomacy have visibly grown closer. In academic circles, this division remains, since theory always takes a while to catch up with practice. Add to this the tedium of economics when compared to political drama and intrigue

¹²⁵ Wolf, Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?, p. 182.

¹²⁶ Nicholas Bayne. (2004). *New Economic Diplomacy: Decision-making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations*. Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate Publishing Company.

¹²⁷ Lee and Hudson, The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy, p. 360.

and it may be the case that statistics, pie charts and graphs don't stimulate the diplomatic scholar's gray-matter!¹²⁸

This is a valuable observation; we seem to have a stereotypical view of diplomacy as an activity based on political negotiation, bargaining and communication. To challenge this view is to reconstruct our basic theoretical understanding of diplomacy. The above empirical evidence suggests that this reconceptualisation of diplomacy is inevitable. Most, if not all, traditional diplomatic institutions are restructuring their internal organisation to incorporate commerce as an essential and visible function of diplomacy. Thus, the separation of commerce from diplomacy is no longer a viable theoretical exercise.

The interplay between the three diplomatic theories is central to proposing such an observation. The central tenets of the three different types of theorists on commerce and diplomacy are useful in that they present the diplomatic scholar with three choices. Both TDT and NDT inform us – for different reasons – that the amicable relationship between states and firms is difficult to substantiate, whereas IDT argues the contrary: that states and firms share a symbiotic relationship that manifests in readily identifiable diplomatic-to-firm structures. All three theories present compelling argument, which encourages a deeper appraisal of the state/firm relationship. Before the end of the Cold War, the Traditional view would have gone unchallenged, however with the field and the modern diplomatic environment broadening this view begins to look increasingly frail. Similarly, NDT would have appeared the most appropriate theory during the globalization period in the decade following the Cold War.

¹²⁸ John Spender, Interview, February 24th, 2004.

The recent emergence of IDT suggests an evolution in the way in which diplomatic theorists view the modern diplomatic environment, and commerce's place within it. When TDT failed to suffice, NDT emerged, followed by IDT. This is an encouraging sign for the diplomatic studies field, and suggests a consistent growth in the field knowledge. All three theoretical views on commerce and diplomacy still endure, which hints at further promise: that the debate on the relevancy of commerce to diplomacy will only encourage diplomatic theorists to prove that their theoretical view is most appropriate.¹²⁹ Again, the field benefits as we will see the texture of the knowledge on commercial diplomacy thicken as the theory catches up with the practice.

6.1.6 What revolution? The information evolution

The interplay between the three groups of theorists is valuable in ascertaining the impact of the so-called information revolution on modern diplomacy. If considered in isolation, the three theories – and their divergent views – present three fragmented views. Used together in eclectic fashion, a more accurate picture of modern diplomacy and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) emerges.

Nascent theorists portray a dismal situation for the traditional diplomatic institution. They describe the modern relationship between information and diplomacy as a revolution, as a drastic change detrimentally affecting the state and its diplomacy. For Nascent theorists, states have lost control of information flows whereas nascent

¹²⁹ For an example of how knowledge on diplomacy and commerce evolves and produce a more appropriate body of theory, see Donna Lee. *The Embedded Business-Diplomat: How Institutional Reform Upholds the Role of Business in UK Diplomatic Practice*. Paper prepared for the Panel 'Diplomacy & Business: Beyond the Hegemony of the State, International Studies Association annual conference, Montreal, Canada, March 17 – 20, 2004; D. Lee and D. Hudson. (2004). The old and new significance of political economy in diplomacy. *Review of International Studies*, 30, 343 – 360.

diplomatic actors have seized on the opportunities offered by the revolution to creep up the IR hierarchy, at the expense of states. Thus, the current information revolution confirms ‘the diminishing importance of the state and increasing importance of new social and political entities, such as NGOs’.¹³⁰

The notion of yet another factor asking questions of the traditional diplomatic institution is natural for this group of non-statist theorists. However, if this fundamental assumption is temporarily sidestepped, the valuable contribution of NDT can be realised. NDT develops awareness that there are other diplomatic actors besides the traditional diplomatic institution. These non-state actors execute a form of information gathering and dissemination outside the traditional state-qua-state diplomatic interface. These new information flows are difficult for *all* governments to monitor *all* of the time. NDT thus challenges other theorists to prove otherwise, that the information revolution is not diminishing the importance of the state.

TDT challenge this assumption in a rather unusual fashion. Largely, they ignore the debate altogether. Traditionalists hardly mention the information revolution; it does not occupy much print space in the canon of diplomacy studies. Their silence speaks volumes on this matter: if they’re not worried then why are they not worried? Simply, they argue that the traditional diplomatic institution has coped with and survived similar *revolutions* before, in each instance emerging stronger and more efficient. Traditionalists maintain that the traditional diplomatic institution remains the most important diplomatic actor. Their currency is the gathering and dissemination of a particular type of information that alternate sources cannot provide to governments. For Traditionalists, it is

¹³⁰ Jovan Kurbaliga, *Diplomacy in the Age of Information Technology*, in Jan Melissen (ed.), *Innovation in Diplomatic Practice*, New York: Macmillan, p. 187.

not the method of gathering information that is important; it is the content, quality and nature of the information that counts.

Initially, this dismissive treatment of the information revolution appears to be a redundant contribution to understanding information and modern diplomacy. However, this is not the case. TDT reminds us that there is nothing ‘revolutionary’ about the information revolution. The traditional diplomatic institution has coped with and survived similar revolutions before. Perhaps developments in ICT are revolutionary for nascent diplomatic actors but not for the centuries old traditional diplomatic institution. For Traditionalists, the current information revolution is another benefit or add-on to the toolkit of diplomacy. Their attitude reminds us that it is not the mode of information gathering and dissemination but the message that is important to sound diplomacy.

IDT endorses, enhances and builds on the observation of both TDT and NDT. Innovators contribute to our knowledge by agreeing that rather than inducing panic or conjuring images of the diplomatic institution in peril, a more moderate, balanced understanding of the revolution is required. Innovators acknowledge that:

Traditionalists who insist diplomacy need not change are wrong. So, too, are those who insist that it must change completely. Finding the intersection which honors the past and respects the future is the challenge.¹³¹

In other words, to understand the information revolution and modern diplomacy means theory must avoid the ‘crisis effect rhetoric’ (the effect the information (r)evolution is having/not having on the traditional diplomatic institution).¹³²

¹³¹ Burt and Robison, *Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age*, p. 17.

From the above three contributions, a theoretical jigsaw puzzle of modern diplomacy and the information revolution can be pieced together. Firstly, it can be agreed that control over *all* information has escaped state control, but control of the official diplomatic information channels has not. Governments continue to demand a particular type of information that only the traditional diplomatic institution can provide. Other non-state actors do not have free access to this information unless the traditional diplomatic institution deems it necessary. For traditional diplomatic actors, nothing has changed save for a more efficient manner of exchanging information through official diplomatic channels. If anything the so-called revolution has made the task of traditional diplomacy easier, cheaper and faster. Traditional diplomatic institutions thus embrace changes in ICT.

A second theoretical notion that can be extracted from the interplay of the three theories is that state-qua-state information flows (through diplomacy) are no longer the sole conduit for the exchange of international information. Non-state actors – akin to the traditional diplomatic institution – also exchange specialised forms of information. There are now several different levels and conduits of information exchange. These different and specialised levels of information flows create specialised networks where entities, be they states, NGOs or IGOs, are more aware of one another's ethos, skills and agenda. Common interests can be realised and exchanges of expertise become more widespread in the modern era. All actors in the IR system benefit, as more communication across more levels is better than less.

The practical evidence now considered validates much of the theory presented so far. If it can be established that the traditional diplomatic institution is embracing

¹³² Bayliss and Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics*, p. 489.

sweeping ICT changes (albeit slower than the lightning quick pace the revolution demands) then the above theoretical observations can be unequivocally confirmed.

Canada's DFAIT is one example of a diplomatic institution embracing the information revolution. General Consulate to Australia, and former Chief Information Officer for DFAIT, Richard Kohler made this very clear.¹³³ The basic currency of diplomats, according to Kohler, was that of good faith based on reliable, accurate and timely information flows. Canadian diplomats, and many other nations too, seek out the most cost effective means of transmitting and storing that information. Thus, any developments on further improving ICT within DFAIT are aggressively championed as it makes the diplomats job easier, but more importantly it makes their job more cost effective.¹³⁴ Kohler argued that the information revolution changes, for the better, the fundamental methods of gathering and disseminating information.

Kohler identified three specific benefits to DFAIT's embracement of improvements in ICT. Firstly, these improvements have supported Canadian foreign policy in a general sense, offering 'smoother capabilities that have never existed before'¹³⁵. Secondly, their new information systems allow for a 'virtual or instant

¹³³ The following information comes from an interview with General Consulate Kohler, which took place September 4th, 2004.

¹³⁴ Kohler quantified this matter, after noting that the 'information revolution allows us to transmit and store information more cheaply. With all of our local networks linked telex has disappeared, we have fewer secretaries and communications technicians are rare. While the new network is expensive, the savings from shutting down the old telecommunications system have paid for a significant investment in new technology. DFAIT now handles 24 million email messages per year, something the old system could never have supported. The [new] network leases cost about \$25 million Canadian per year to handle all voice and data communications; if we were to rely on private carriers instead, the cost would exceed \$75 million per year for the same traffic load, a boon for taxpayers'.

¹³⁵ Kohler specifically stated that 'technology supports but does not drive the department'. He noted that in the era of 'virtual' diplomacy, 'every post can be staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week. During non-business hours, the telephones of more than 50 posts are forwarded to Ottawa for response to consular enquiries. Should the situation be an emergency that warrants the head of mission becoming involved, staff in Ottawa know how to reach him or her, or mission staff. A Canadian traveller is simply a phone call away

mission' to be established with a 'plane ticket, a portable computer, and a dial tone' anywhere in the world.¹³⁶ And thirdly, the new technology allows a 'virtual team to be assembled to tackle any policy operations issue without having to physically move people'. Significantly, these teams are composed of not only DFAIT representatives but of representatives from the non-state sector too.¹³⁷ The main benefit to DFAIT that Kohler consistently returned to, however, was that 'information facilitated by electronics allows for much better unity of focus, of message, across our foreign service; it underpins collective clarity; and it allows mandarins to focus on pure foreign policy'.

Kohler's personal rhetoric naturally stems from the wider organisation mantra of the Canadian Foreign Ministry, which states that 'achieving our international objectives depends largely on seizing and capitalising on developments in information technology'.¹³⁸ DFAIT's activities in relation to the information revolution are replicated within other diplomatic institutions.

Australia's DFAT also promotes the benefits of the information revolution, acknowledging that the 'rapid development of information technology has vastly

from consular services anywhere in the world.' The information revolution, has allowed DFAIT to develop enhanced responsiveness to a range of unconventional 21st century issues.

¹³⁶ Regarding the 'virtual' mission Kohler proudly noted that 'the department can respond to a crisis anywhere, anytime. The head of mission can put up a brass plate outside a hotel room door and be operational almost immediately after arriving in a trouble spot, which has huge implications for the mobility of DFAIT operations. This approach was used to establish a new embassy in Zagreb, Croatia, at the height of the Bosnian Conflict'. This virtual mission, according to Kohler, faced many difficulties operating out of a hotel room, but it was operational within hours of staff landing in Croatia. He concluded that DFAIT can now establish a small diplomatic mission in hours, a task that took previously weeks or even months. This flexibility both enhances DFAIT's foreign policy and is cost effective, especially in cases when DFAIT does not need to establish a 'physical', permanent mission.

¹³⁷ Kohler stated that the 'team members can be drawn entirely from within the department, anywhere in the world, but the team can also include officers of other departments in Canada, even other governments, as well as academics and civil society organisations'. Associated benefits were a reduction in the cost of hosting meetings and travelling costs, as members of the virtual team do not need to meet face to face. Interestingly Kohler posited that 'perhaps in the future we will see hybrid, just-in-time virtual teams, drawn throughout the diplomatic and NGO communities, as the operational norm, rather than the novelty that such teams are today'.

¹³⁸ Canada's International Policy Statement (2005), p. 29.

expanded the amount and nature of information that can be transmitted quickly and widely'.¹³⁹ More efficient means of gathering and disseminating relevant information has been of benefit to DFAT, these developments 'have conferred greater efficiency on the department'.¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, developments in ICT are being 'embraced' by DFAT, in the hope of making their 'mission, purpose and expertise available to wider spheres of people with a direct interest in foreign affairs'.¹⁴¹

This type of rhetoric is equally visible in Britain's FCO, who went so far as to produce an ICT Strategy document.¹⁴² This document confirms their desire to remain a viable and effective international actor by embracing the revolution. The goal of reforming their ICT capabilities is 'to get the right information to the right place at the right time so that the right decisions can be taken and the right actions put in hand'.¹⁴³ This statement confirms the FCO's desire to enhance their ICT capabilities. The focus of the 2004 ICT strategy is to 'provide the FCO with the ICT it needed to operate as a single global online organisation,¹⁴⁴ to make those structures as flexible as possible, particularly by enabling remote and mobile working at classified levels, to streamline and simplify our processes so that people can work faster, more efficiently and more flexibly and to improve the ICT connection between the FCO and the rest of Whitehall'.¹⁴⁵ Throughout

¹³⁹ DFAT Annual Report (2004), p. 72.

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.*, p. 189.

¹⁴¹ *ibid.*, p. 173.

¹⁴² E-Diplomacy: the FCO Information and Communication Technology Strategy. UK: Public Records Office.

¹⁴³ *ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁴⁴ The early results of the FCO's new global system, Firecrest, indicate the volume of information flowing between Post and the FCO. As of 2004 Firecrest had over 11,000 users, using over 1000 servers, spread across 153 countries. It connects 192 posts and handles up to 1 million e-mails per day and 7.5 million uses of web-browsing per day' (E-Diplomacy, p. 10).

¹⁴⁵ E-Diplomacy, p. 3.

the Strategy document, the benefits of updating their ICT capabilities outweigh the costs of not doing so.

This new FCO strategy will provide several benefits for the realisation of diplomatic objectives, including ‘new and flexible types of diplomatic representation, swifter responses to emergencies, more flexible team-working including the rapid creation of specialised teams and video conferencing, and the ability for staff to work from home’.¹⁴⁶ The strategy projects that, in 2005, savings of over one-hundred million pounds will be realised through savings in telephone, fax and communications staff costs, for example.¹⁴⁷ The improved quality of the FCO’s ICT capabilities has been beneficial. It:

has made the FCO considerably more effective. The relationship between Post and FCO London has improved markedly, with staff overseas feeling they are consulted more often, and able to contribute to policy making. The future benefits will continue to reap similar dividends.¹⁴⁸

For traditional diplomatic institutions, the purpose of introducing new strategies for enhanced and secure information gathering and dissemination is to make the modern diplomatic institutions work faster, smarter, cheaper and with greater flexibility. To realise this direction has taken some time, because traditional diplomatic institutions just do not have the luxury of being able to implement sweeping and rapid organisational change. State actors have to be particularly sure that information networks remain secure.

¹⁴⁶ *ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁴⁷ *ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p. 16. This information was corroborated by an independent auditing firm, Collison Grant Limited.

Perhaps this prudence has been misconstrued in the more non-statist diplomatic literature as a reluctance or inability of traditional diplomatic institutions to embrace the information revolution too quickly.

What the three theories suggest, alongside the practical evidence, is that enhanced ICT capabilities are positively affecting all diplomatic actors. After all, the information revolution is about facilitating better information flows and removing obstacles to communications between entities, be they state or non-state. Admittedly, the pace of communication and information gathering, delivery and reaction has increased exponentially. However, this does not lead to more complexity; rather, more accountability, greater speed, necessity of pro-action and reaction and more communication between all diplomatic actors. In other words, developments in ICT have enhanced the effectiveness of modern diplomacy.

The information revolution is unlikely to change the basic function of diplomacy: building relationships with foreign peoples. Richard Kohler of DFAIT stressed this point, noting that:

The art of diplomacy is thriving, as much today as in the time of ancient Greece. Yes, time passes and technology advances, but human nature and human communications are constant. A computer and a globalized network will never be able to replace body language and tone of voice; one doesn't develop "trust" in a CPU.¹⁴⁹

Developments in ICT are tools to facilitate the business of diplomacy, not instruments to replace human interaction or judgement, which are central qualities of any

¹⁴⁹ Richard Kohler, Interview, September 4th, 2004.

form of sound diplomacy. Thus, it can be argued that while the tools of diplomacy are changing its central foundations, purpose and functions are not.

Information is at the heart of diplomacy; it always has been and always will be. A typical foreign ministry is comprised of people who collect information, who analyse and interpret information, who compile reports and policy advice based on information, and people who feed that information back to their home governments. The centrality of information to diplomacy – getting it, interpreting it, passing it on to other governments – is fundamental to traditional diplomacy. Diplomacy, based largely on fluid information flows, facilitates the smooth interaction and regulation of affairs between states and non-state actors, when relevant.

The interplay of the three theories alongside the practical evidence conveys a simple message: the information revolution must not be confused with a diplomatic evolution. Diplomacy has always been characterised by patterns of communication based on information; there is an inseparable link between communication, information and the technologies which facilitate the basic functions of diplomacy. The information revolution improves interaction between separated communities, be they states, NGOs, IGOs, MNCs or individuals.

This observation was reached only by considering the three diplomatic theories in eclectic fashion. TDT is useful in the respect that the crisis rhetoric is mitigated in the debate between theorists over the impact of the information evolution on the incumbent traditional diplomatic institution. Traditionalists remind us, appropriately, that diplomacy has survived many similar ‘revolutions’. NDT is equally valuable because awareness of other diplomatic actors (outside the state) is further developed and debate encouraged.

And IDT is appropriate not only due to its emphasis on symbiosis and balance but also because this theory pushes us to seek out practical and empirical evidence, which will help settle the debate whilst adding to the field's knowledge. These three specialised focuses, if recognized as such, will create a far broader and inclusive body of theory on diplomacy and the information (r)evolution than that which currently exists.

6.2 The lucidity of tripartite diplomatic theory

The aim of this study has been to deconstruct, modernise (reconstruct) and strengthen diplomatic theory. The views of two well-known authors, Wight and Der Derian, were employed as an initial departure point for this overdue task. By returning to their central points, the success of this study's intention to deconstruct, modernise and strengthen diplomatic theory can be gauged.

Wight's ideas on international theory were found to resonate with diplomatic theory. Essentially, Wight was concerned with addressing and alleviating the 'theoretical impoverishment' of international theory.¹⁵⁰ Central to his observations was the claim that 'international theory does not, at first sight, exist' due to its 'recalcitrance to being theorised about'.¹⁵¹ For Wight, international theory was an 'impression' or an assumption that international relations scholars had taken for granted; consistently they failed to question the origins, rigor or depth of the 'notion of international theory'.¹⁵²

Adopting a different topic but a similar ethos to Wight, Der Derian sought to tackle the 'intellectual poverty' of diplomatic theory head on. However, Der Derian's book, combining over 3,000 years of history alongside the philosophical alienation

¹⁵⁰ Wight, *Why is there no international theory?*, p. 20.

¹⁵¹ *ibid.*, pp. 17 – 33.

¹⁵² *ibid.*, p. 26.

theory, was perhaps too ambitious. In other words, he took diplomatic theory too far, too quickly. Many of his observations on diplomacy and theory were compelling and useful in terms of germinating the approach behind this thesis. However, many of his observations were also ‘largely repellant and intractable in form’.¹⁵³

This thesis sought to address these claims. Diplomatic theory does appear to be an impression or an assumption that the diplomatic studies field has taken for granted. In addition, the subject of diplomacy, with an emphasis on its practical nature, does appear to be resistant to theory. However, these claims are a ‘first’ impression.¹⁵⁴ This thesis believed that there was much potential behind the idea of extracting and postulating on the topic of diplomatic theory *sui generis*. By exploring diplomatic theory as an independent topic, and as a much deeper topic than the initial ‘impression’ or assumption suggests, the claims of Der Derian and Wight began to look increasingly frail.

Indeed, the thesis has shown that three different types of diplomatic theory exist and can be found within the field of diplomacy studies. In addition, the presence of three diplomatic theories demonstrates that diplomacy is not, as Der Derian and Wight lamented, ‘resistant to theory’¹⁵⁵ or showed a ‘recalcitrance to being theorised upon’.¹⁵⁶ Theoretical observations on diplomacy are rife within the diplomatic studies literature; an attempt to extract these observations, however, is not as common. This thesis sought to address and fill this gap.

In addition, to ultimately banish the notion of diplomatic theory as weak, non-existent and impoverished, and to ensure such claims would appear themselves frail in

¹⁵³ Wight, *Why is there no international theory?*, p. 20.

¹⁵⁴ *ibid.*, p. 17.

¹⁵⁵ Der Derian, *Mediating Estrangement*, p. 92.

¹⁵⁶ Wight, *Why is there no international theory?*, p. 33.

the future, this thesis sought to reconstruct diplomatic theory in a simple and concise fashion. In the future, there should be no doubt when answering the question ‘what *is* diplomatic theory?’ The central tenets of the most dominant type of diplomatic theory, TDT, can now be presented alongside two alternate and individual types of diplomatic theory, NDT and IDT, in a simple and concise fashion. Table 1 presents the central tenets of each of the three theories. When the three theories are presented in this lucid and simple fashion, we can clearly see how they complement one another. Indeed, they seem to cover most aspects of, and influences on, the complex modern diplomatic environment.

Table 1. - The Three Diplomatic Theories

	TDT	NDT	IDT
Primary actor(s)	State	Non-state: NGOs, IGOs, MNCs (for example)	State & non-state
Associated Theory/ Philosophy	Realism, neo-realism, Machiavellian	Idealism, Liberalism, Interdependence, Kantian, Moralistic, Ethical	Constructivism, Interdependence, neither optimistic nor pessimistic
Environment	Bi-Lateral, anarchical, international, balance of power, non-interventionist	Multi-lateral, domestic, international, transparent/open, interventionist	Polylateral, Internationalised networks of state and non-state actors
Origins/ Emergence	Post 1648	Post 1918	Post 1989
Agenda	High – military, individual security, defence, trade and national interest	Low – humanitarian, aid, environment, collective security	High and Low; and to clarify the limitations of rival theoretical interpretations on diplomacy.
Theorists	De Callieres, Berridge, Satow, Nicolson, Rana, Kissenger (for example)	Jackson, Hoffman, Reyckler, Langhorne (for example)	Sharp, Melissen, Lee, Cooper, Hocking, Kurbaliga (for example)
Associated Words	Mechanical, rigid, archaic, official, conventional, parochial, secret, bureaucratic, hierarchical, track one	Flexible, contemporary, unofficial, ethical, moralistic, utopian, transparent/open, self-righteous, track two	Symbiosis, balance, coexistence, duality, flexibility, modernity, innovation, originality
Foundations/ Driving factors	National Interest, sovereignty, balance of power, zero-sum competition (among state actors), security, international anarchy	World/International society, self-determination, public opinion, democracy, integration, interdependence, international organization	Advocacy of normative innovation through construction of new diplomatic 'images'; tracing assumptions within various theoretical traditions; discovering how and why they colour mental maps of diplomacy
Influences	Strong historical legacy, tendency to rely on history	No historical legacy, views contemporary IR system as a radical departure from the past	Contingent upon the theoretically constructed explanations about the basic drives of diplomatic actors

This thesis sought to present the ‘basic assumptions’ of various theorists’ opinions on diplomacy and to ‘re-evaluate’ the usefulness of ‘the mental maps they have relied on to make sense of its complexity’.¹⁵⁷ The dominant mental map within diplomacy studies remains Traditionalist diplomatic theory; however adhering to this one perspective, it was argued, was insufficient when attempting to understand the complexity of the modern diplomatic environment. The introduction and development of the two other diplomatic theories, NDT and IDT, was intended to offer the diplomatic scholar two alternate but equally useful theoretical lenses with which to interpret the modern diplomatic environment.

By mirroring the IR discipline and the divergent theories inherent to their theoretical field, this thesis argued the case for the inclusion, by way of reconciliation, of the three diverse, and often divergent, diplomatic theories. With reconciliation of these divergent theories, a consequent formality is that the diplomatic scholar now has a choice of three ‘lenses’ which ‘provide a map, or frame of reference, that makes the complex, puzzling world around us [more] intelligible’.¹⁵⁸ Similar to the way an optometrist uses a phoropter to incrementally overlay lenses of different strength to produce a clearer image, by combining the three diplomatic theories/lenses, and subsequently reinterpreting the six themes inherent to the modern diplomatic environment, our image of the modern diplomatic environment becomes sharper.

¹⁵⁷ Hastedt and Knickrehm, *International Politics in a Changing World*, p. 29.

¹⁵⁸ Kegley and Raymond, *The Global Future*, p. 24.

6.3 The necessity of Tripartite Diplomatic Theory

The introduction, construction and realisation of the three diplomatic theories is the first step to ensuring diplomacy studies has a strong and visible theoretical grounding. As hypothesised, the presence, identity and ongoing refinement of the three diplomatic theories is central to the overall rigour of the diplomatic studies field. Elman and Elman are two theorists who believes that the strength of ‘any discipline can be measured by a cursory glance at the inherent body of theory’.¹⁵⁹ While a discipline’s inherent body of theory is but one measure of its strength, it is an important measure. For diplomacy studies, a strong body of theory is important in terms of ensuring a promising and less marginalised future.

Furthermore, disparate theoretical views are useful for diplomacy studies. One reason behind introducing and constructing the three divergent diplomatic theories was the need to generate theoretical debate within the discipline. Waltz believes that divergent ‘theory is at the heart of any mature [academic] discipline’.¹⁶⁰ A necessity for the majority of academic disciplines is the presence of a coherent and vibrant theoretical debate at its core, as IR has shown for example. Through debate theories are contested, which in turn ensures strength in conflicting theories. After all, diplomatic scholars would be unlikely to introduce a theory that is weak and completely untested. With the three theories now constructed and evidenced, vibrant debate – as to the applicability, shape and robustness of each theory - can begin in earnest. By introducing the three diplomatic theories, it is hoped that this thesis has taken the first step to encouraging debate within

¹⁵⁹ Elman and Elman, *Progress in International Relations Theory*, p. 2.

¹⁶⁰ Waltz, Foreword in Elman Colin and Miriam Fendius Elman, *Progress in International Relations Theory*. Massachusetts, MIT Press, p. ix.

the theoretical field. Theoretical debate can only add to the strength and depth of the diplomatic studies field.

That this thesis was able to evidence three different, and often divergent, theories on diplomacy suggests that the diplomatic studies field is broadening. The emergence and rise of NDT and IDT can be correlated to the inability of TDT to fully account for the complexities of the modern diplomatic environment. Quite simply, Nascent theorists and Innovators are seeking to fill a gap in the field: diplomatic theory on non-state actors. Alternate theoretical perspectives (to TDT) can be clearly evidenced within the diplomatic studies field, as this thesis demonstrated in chapters three and four. Growth in unconventional diplomatic theory is only recent, yet highly significant considering the field was dominated by TDT for almost three centuries (1716 – 1989). The presence and growth of alternate diplomatic theory, alongside the incumbent body of TDT, confirms that the diplomatic studies field is growing.

The source of the growth of diplomatic studies can be traced to an increase in complexity of the modern diplomatic environment. One feature of the practical diplomatic environment is its diversity, with both state and non-state actors, such as MNCs and NGOs, fully engaged in processes of diplomatic exchange. Langhorne refers to this increasing complexity and diversity as ‘an ever-thickening texture of international relations and diplomacy’.¹⁶¹ The complexity of the modern diplomatic environment has meant an increase in the number of theorists postulating on the shape and nature of modern diplomacy.

If diplomatic theory is to relate to the practical realm of diplomacy it has to broaden, just as the environment has broadened. For too long now we have assumed that

¹⁶¹ Langhorne, *Current Developments in Diplomacy*, p. 13.

‘traditional or statist diplomacy’ means ‘diplomacy per se.’¹⁶² Since the end of the Cold War, non-state actors and unconventional environments for diplomacy, such as IGOs and summitry, are looking less ad-hoc and more permanent. Therefore, it is important that theory mirror this growth and development in ‘unofficial diplomacy’.¹⁶³ Diplomatic theory, if it is to remain relevant to the modern diplomatic environment, must be geared towards both state and non-state diplomacy. Permeating the diplomatic studies field with a more modern attitude to theorising on diplomacy are approaches which have objectivity and innovation at their core. This emergence is a positive for the scope of the diplomatic studies field.

Increasing our familiarity and knowledge of unconventional actors and fora for diplomacy was a central intention throughout this thesis. The six themes inherent to the current diplomatic environment, the diplomatic studies field and this thesis in particular were employed for this reason: to highlight the lack of, and need for, knowledge on non-state diplomatic actors and environments. In addition, the six themes were employed to test the applicability and modernity of various diplomatic theories; to illustrate the difference, strengths and weaknesses in these theories; to argue the need for more than one ‘lens’ with which to interpret modern diplomacy; and to ensure that diplomatic theory remains relevant to modern diplomatic practice. With the three categories of Traditional, Nascent and Innovative Diplomatic Theory now substantiated we can begin to thicken the texture of diplomatic theory, and enhance its appropriateness for interpreting the modern diplomatic environment.

¹⁶² Hoffmann, *Reconstructing Diplomacy*, p. 540.

¹⁶³ Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy*, p. 21.

In light of the broadening of the field, and this thesis' contribution to diplomatic theory, the future looks promising for diplomatic studies. So much so that one theorist claims we are living in a 'time when diplomacy is in renaissance'.¹⁶⁴ However, this claim is perhaps too positive. Sharp counsels that it is first important to ask: 'does diplomacy matter, and can the study of it yield anything of importance for our understanding of what happens and what ought to happen in international relations?'.¹⁶⁵ The response to this question is unequivocal. Diplomacy 'is a major and ubiquitous activity of our time, and therefore of importance to us all'.¹⁶⁶ The study of diplomacy, of how actors (state and non-state) interact, is central to any notion of international political stability and therefore merits ongoing, innovative and vigorous academic attention. Ensuring this occurs is the sole responsibility of the diplomatic studies field. There is much to learn of diplomacy. What this thesis has demonstrated is that we've only just scratched the surface.

¹⁶⁴ Rana, *Foreign Ministries: Change and Reform*, p. 9.

¹⁶⁵ Sharp, Herbert Butterfield, p. 855.

¹⁶⁶ Watson, *Diplomacy*, p. 13.

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Appendix A

UN accreditation, USAID and NGOs, The Ottawa Process, The Kimberley Diamonds, NOREPS, Nazi Gold and Venezuelan Elections

The Ottawa Process

In 1997 Jody Williams, the coordinator of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, won the 1997 Nobel Prize for Peace. In a subsequent interview she noted that not only had 'we won the Nobel Prize but we changed the way diplomacy is done'.¹ The most tangible achievement for the global ban on anti-personnel land-mines was to have 122 countries sign up to a conference that was held in Ottawa in 1997. The work of a group of like-minded countries received much credit and remains a firm example of the beneficial relationship the state has with NGOs.

In terms of the kick-starting role of NGOs the anti the Ottawa Process provides a sound example of the triggering effect NGOs can have on states and policy. Although the process itself was unique,² its effect on diplomacy and multilateral negotiation is remarkable. The lead actors pressing governments for effective action were not states but NGOs. The newly formed International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), along with the International Committee of the Red Cross stepped beyond the traditional NGO role of direct humanitarian aid and advocacy. The ICBL acted as a sort of 'master NGO, ultimately attracting over 1,000 NGOs from more than 60 countries', they were, in turn, supported by the collaboration of sympathetic small and middle power states such as Canada, South Africa and Norway.³

The Ottawa Process was unique in that it encouraged the unprecedented participation of NGOs in the negotiations themselves. Rarely have non-state actors been invited to disarmament conferences before. If they have, their participation was usually limited to providing expert advice. However, in this case, government ministers and

¹ Williams in Cooper, Governments, NGOs and the recalibration of diplomacy, p. 365.

² In May 1996, state diplomats attended the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva to discuss practical steps to address the problem of landmines. The states involved were particularly distrustful of a multi-lateral approach that would have allowed the will of the majority to prevail over matter which directly affected their own national security. Nations intent on using landmines, particularly the United States, were able to use their veto to weaken resolve, water down the treaty text and reach the lowest common denominator. The conference, involving solely state representative, was largely a dismal failure. Jody Williams, the Coordinator of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines stated that 'it was a useless treaty, with loopholes so big that you could drive a tank through them' (Williams in Davis, 2004: 2). In October 1996 the Ottawa Conference opened with renewed hopes. The summit involved fifty states, hundreds of NGOs and dozens of United Nations agencies. The conference and the need for quick and effective action was endorsed further when Lloyd Axworthy, the Canadian Foreign Minister, set an ambitious timetable for all interested states to sign a comprehensive treaty ban by December 1997. This was an ambitious schedule. Over the next thirteen months, the Ottawa summit was followed by a series of meetings and conferences held throughout Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe to build a global consensus and draft a workable treaty. By December 1997 this fast-track process lead to the signing of the Ottawa Convention by 123 nations. The Ottawa Conference was a resounding success.

³ David Davenport. (2003). The New Diplomacy. *Policy Review*, 116, p. 20.

officials shared plenary session with mine victims and NGO representatives.⁴ This was unconventional diplomacy in action, with state and non-state actors pooling resources in search of effective action. Traditionally this would have been the realm of the state diplomat, supported by international arms and disarmament experts. The process would have been exhaustive with accredited specialists engaged in lengthy and highly technical negotiations, with the time consumed by setting the agenda, negotiating the rules of procedure, identifying relevant issues, reviewing technical reports and debating various proposals about arms limitations. All of this would have occurred outside of public view and well in advance of heavily publicised meetings among senior government officials and heads of state.

The Ottawa Process was to introduce an alternative path: the power of mobilising public opinion to change government policy. Several of the NGO unconventional techniques were targeted directly at the public, for example they engaged in a 'massive letter-to-the-editor campaign to the majority of the world's most prominent newspapers'.⁵ However the coup de grace was their employment of television imagery, the ICBL sponsored documentaries and invited prominent individuals to offer their opinion. The most notable, Princess Dianna, sparked tremendous media interest while visiting landmine victims in Bosnia and Mozambique. As public momentum galvanised it became increasingly difficult for decision makers to ignore the swell of public support. In 1995, for example, the ICBL campaign sparked a public debate in the United Kingdom which culminated in a series of hearings in the British House of Commons. By 1997, landmines had become an election issue in Britain and France and eventually, under increasing public scrutiny, the newly elected governments in both countries pledged to support the Ottawa Process.

In the Ottawa Process both states and NGOs shared the same goal, the central difference being the urgency NGOs injected into the process. The words of Kofi Anan, the UN secretary General, illustrate the power of the cooperative NGO/state confluence when he announced that 'one does not have to be a global superpower to affect the future of international peace and security'⁶ and that the Ottawa Process was a 'model of international co-operation and action; this proves that a coalition of governments, NGOs, international institutions and civil society can set a global agenda and effect change'.⁷

⁴ Julian Davis. (2004). The Campaign to Ban Landmines: Public Diplomacy, Middle Power Leadership and an Unconventional Negotiating Process. *Canadian Institute of International Affairs Occasional Papers*, 1 (1), p. 2.

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 3.

⁶ *ibid.*, p. 4.

⁷ Anan in Davenport, *The New Diplomacy*, p. 22.

The Venezuelan Elections: The Carter Centre

With regard to the NGO as an *agent* (taking on a sub-contracting/facilitative role that supports the work of government) there is compelling evidence to suggest a symbiotic relationship with the state. Although not a recent development two aspects of this growing enterprise in the 1990s and early twenty-first century can be identified as significant departures from traditional adversarial state/NGO relationships. The first developmental aspect is the ‘diversity of relationships along the engagement-autonomy spectrum between government and NGO of many of these activities’.⁸

A solid example of this diversity is the work of the Carter Centre, a NGO that determines the course of its diplomatic action dependant on the situation. The subcontracting/facilitative role of NGOs was clearly illustrated when the Venezuelan government’s National Electoral Council (CNE) invited The Carter Centre and the Organisation of American States (OAS) to observe the presidential recall process in November 2003⁹. The work of the OAS and the Carter Centre Democracy Program¹⁰ was in turn supported by the US government who were keen to sub-contract the election monitoring process to reliable and professionally organised party. What can be deduced from the interaction of state and non-state actors in this instance is a public expression of the desired outcome and an ad-hoc response to achieve that outcome. The confluence of the state and non-state actors in the Venezuelan recall process is a firm example of all parties working towards the same goal – stability and a lessening of the anarchical nature of the IRS – but employing different methods, techniques and individuals to realise that goal. In this case it transpired that the alternate diplomatic methods NGOs favour would achieve the desired outcome more efficiently than the traditional methods of diplomacy.

⁸ Cooper, Government, NGOs and the recalibration of diplomacy, p. 372.

⁹ On August 15, 2004, Venezuelans came out in record numbers to participate in the first popularly mandated recall referendum ever to be held. In doing so, the Venezuelan people voted not to recall President Chavez from office, with 59 percent of the population voting for Chavez and 41 percent voting against him. It was the opinion of the Carter Centre that the August 15 vote clearly expressed the will of the people. For more on the process, outcomes, conclusions and recommendations see (2004). The Carter Centre Referendum Report: The “Will of the Electorate” Was Expressed, *International Debates*, 8 (2), pp. 233 – 236. For a broader view on the recent work of the Carter Center see Clymer, K. Jimmy Carter, Human Rights and Cambodia. *Diplomatic History*, 27 (2), pp245 – 279.

¹⁰ The Democracy Program works in three principal ways: conducting international election monitoring; strengthening the capacity of civic organisation to participate in government policymaking; and promoting the law. These three tenants are central to the diplomatic idealism paradigm as they advocate the betterment or improvement of civil society. The Centre requires an invitation from the country’s electoral authorities and a welcome from the major political parties to ensure the Centre can play a meaningful non-partisan role. The Centre seeks to work in tandem and even subordination to the dominant state, realising their idealistic agenda through diplomatic channels. Observers analyse election laws, asses voter registration, voter education efforts, and the openness and fairness of campaign, focusing on competitiveness, unhindered participation in the election process, and access to the media. These assessment begin months in advance. The presence of impartial observers reassures voters they can safely and secretly cast their ballots and that vote tabulation will be conducted without tampering. Thus, election monitoring deters interference or fraud in the voting process. The Carter centre has successfully observed 52 elections in twenty four countries on four countries.

The NGO/UN relationship

The UN Secretary General has frequently affirmed the importance of NGOs to the United Nations. Again and again, he has referred to NGOs as ‘indispensable partners’ of the UN, whose role is more important than ever in helping the organisation to reach its goals.¹¹ He has affirmed that NGOs are partners in ‘the process of deliberation and policy formation’ as well as in ‘the execution of policies.’¹² Since the UN adopted Resolution 1996/31 establishing new accreditation rules for NGOs on July 25, 1996, NGOs have enjoyed important advances.

NGOs have set new standards of positive contribution to the UN and reached further levels of access in new settings. For example, during negotiations towards an International Criminal Court, NGOs participated informally but effectively, alongside governments, in a high-level negotiating process. They spoke, circulated documents, met frequently with delegations, and overall had a major impact on the outcome. While NGOs do not enjoy formal decision making rights, they exercise a substantial influence over outcomes through their expertise and creative policy proposals.

The annual sessions of the Commission on Human Rights, held in Geneva, also attracts a large number of NGO participants, who provide vital information and substantial input to its deliberations. The Commission has incorporated NGO participation extensively, giving NGO representatives the opportunity to speak at plenary sessions, as well as broad rights to circulate documents. Public support from the worldwide human rights movement has strengthened this process and kept it moving forward.

To provide additional avenues for NGO participation, delegations and the Secretariat have recently experimented with new meeting arrangements in other forums. The panels and consultations of the Working Group of the General Assembly on Financing for Development, organized in 1999, provide a significant case in point. They give NGOs a framework to make presentations and to have discussions with delegations in an informal setting, outside the meetings of the Working Group, but still part of its overall process.

NGOs have also experimented with informal dialogues in new policy arenas, such as the Security Council. The NGO Working Group on the Security Council, comprised of some thirty NGOs with active program work on Security Council matters, has been meeting increasingly frequently with members of the Council since mid-1997 and expects to hold over 30 sessions in 2006.

At the same time, various institutions in the UN system have affirmed the importance of NGOs by establishing new focal point offices and by further opening their decision-making process to NGO voices and input. For several years, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has held important monthly meetings with humanitarian NGOs. In early 2004, the High Commissioner for Refugees consulted with leaders of about thirty major human rights and relief NGOs - a meeting that resulted in a follow-up dialogue process. The pace of such meetings across the UN system has

¹¹ Anan in James A. Paul. (1999). *NGOs and the United Nations: Comments for the Report of the Secretary General*. Global Policy Forum.

¹² *ibid.*

markedly increased.

The Secretariat and other agencies have also constructed excellent sites on the world wide web, making an increasing amount of UN information and documents available instantly around the globe. Additionally, the Secretariat has strengthened its relations with NGOs by improving some services such as the processing of accreditation applications, the NGO Resource Center and NGO training programs. Delegations have also set up useful web sites and they increasingly hold meetings and briefings with NGOs on matters of common interest.

USAID and NGOs

The subcontracting role of NGOs can be further evidenced by the ‘general trend towards off-loading of international development assistance by Western/OECD countries’.¹³ Again, an example serves the purpose of validating the non-adversarial relationship states have with NGOs. At the forefront of this shift in emphasis has been the US Agency for International Development (USAID)¹⁴. In stating its operational approach USAID demonstrates the close collaboration that has marked the growing relationship between state and non-state actors, ‘USAID will collaborate with other donors, host country governments, development agencies, universities and academic organisations, the private sector and NGOs. Where appropriate, USAID will pursue and practice joint planning and allocation of resources, sharing of methods and pooling of technical resources. This will extend from the institutional level to the field’.¹⁵ What this statement of intent indicates is a melding of state and non-state methods, techniques and expertise in pursuit of the same idealistic goal, which is of course bettering international society.

This state to non-state system has become in effect one of franchise holding, ‘in which NGOs tender alongside private sector agencies for contracts for the procurement and delivery of food aid, the implementation of development projects and advisory services’.¹⁶ In all these sub-contracting/facilitative examples of government/NGO interface the nation state has realised and actioned that there are alternate and more effective methods to deal with areas of increasing importance but not of traditional concern, such as power politics, militarisation and trade. The realist state is comfortable in outsourcing certain non-traditional agendas to proficient NGOs founded upon and practicing diplomatic idealism.

¹³ Cooper, *Governments, NGOs and the recalibration of diplomacy*, p. 373.

¹⁴ USAID was established in 1979 to be a focal point for economic matters affecting US relations with developing countries. The agencies functions are policy planning, policymaking, and policy coordination on international economic issues affecting developing countries. The director of the agency serves as the principal international development advisor to the President and the Secretary of State, receiving policy guidance from the Secretary of State. USAID administers US foreign economic and humanitarian assistance programs world wide in the developing world, Central and Eastern Europe, and the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. The agency supports programs in four areas: population and health, broad based economic growth, environment and democracy. USAID also provides humanitarian assistance and aid to countries in crisis and transition. For more on the challenges, strategic goals, areas of concentration, operational approaches, programs and methods see (1997) USAID Strategy: World Population Growth and Human Health, Congressional Digest, April, 76 (4), pp. 103 – 107.

¹⁵ USAID Strategy, 1997, p. 104.

¹⁶ Cooper, *Governments, NGOs and the recalibration of diplomacy*, p. 373.

NOREPS

The final suggestion concerning the symbiotic relationship between government and NGO is that of a 'joint manage, a pattern by which the activity of NGOs lend themselves to some type of institution-building with governments'.¹⁷ Essential to this relationship is some type of 'strategic alliance, partnership or multi-party cooperative venture' through which expertise is shared and some element of labour management, formal or informal, is evident.¹⁸ This form of joint management is best evidenced in Western government's responses to complex humanitarian emergencies.

An example of a more formal government NGO relationship is the integrative model of the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness Systems (NOREPS). The NOREPS-system is a strong and active Norwegian partnership supporting the UN and the NGOs in their efforts to reduce the suffering of victims of war and natural disasters. The goal of NOREPS is to facilitate, strengthen and support the UN-system and other international organisations, without delay.¹⁹ NOREPS works in collaboration with five leading Norwegian NGOs and, in terms of government organisations, Directorate for Civil Defence and Emergency Planning. Its record is impressive; during the first five years of its existence approximately fifteen-hundred Norwegian experts were deployed in twenty-two emergency operations in thirty countries.²⁰

Nazi Gold²¹

NGOs exerted a significant influence in almost every mediation undertaken on behalf of class action suits concerning the whereabouts of dormant accounts once held by Holocaust victims. Initial negotiations focused on stolen assets that had been deposited in Swiss bank during World War II. Later negotiations were focused on reparations for slave and forced labour, insurance, looted art, and other confiscated Nazi property. Although the official parties in these negotiation were traditional state actors – Germany, Austria, France, the United States and the lawyers on both sides of the issues – all parties knew that no final agreement was possible without first obtaining the consent of key NGOs, such as the World Jewish Council, The Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, and several German-Eastern European reconciliation commissions that had been established in Belarus, the Czech Republic, Poland, Russia and Ukraine. According to Eizenstat, 'these NGOs, in effect, were the ultimate arbiters as to whether an agreement between governments and the lawyers would be acceptable' to those

¹⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁹ NOREPS guarantees relief products and services to be airborne in 24 hours, a standby force of 300 experienced professionals trained and prepared for deployment in the field airborne in 72 hours, and a service packages – integrated systems combining the most suitable relief products with highly trained personnel – airborne in 72 hours. For more on NOREPS activities, structures, objectives and aims visit www.NOREPS.com

²⁰ Norwegian Emergency Preparedness Systems (NOREPS) (2004). Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved December 23, 2004, from <http://www.noreps.com>.

²¹ See generally, Authers, John & Wolffe, Richard. (2002). *The Victim's Fortune: Inside the Epic Battle over the Debts of the Holocaust*.

initially affected.²² He continues, ‘their blessing was essential for what were essential political and diplomatic negotiations. Even though they were not parties to the lawsuits, they had a formal role at the negotiating table.’²³

²² Eizenstat, *Nongovernmental Organizations as the Fifth Estate*, pp. 17 – 18.

²³ *ibid.*